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Abstract
The 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill was relatively small, yet generated significant 
societal reverberations; the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill was unambiguously large, but 
resulted in only a few societal rumblings. Both were often labelled crises, disasters, and/or 
catastrophes (CDCs). Utilizing frame theory, this thesis analyzed whether a relationship 
existed between the use of strong rhetoric (i.e., CDCs) and action taken to respond to the 
spills, by establishing what various actors meant when they framed them as CDCs, and by 
ascertaining how their action-oriented CDC frames correlated with the actual outcomes. This 
thesis found that the actors meant a great number and variety of things by framing the spills 
as CDCs, and that only the term disaster had a significant number of correlations with the 
spills’ outcomes. The results help explain why global environmental problems (e.g., climate 
change), despite being labelled crises, disasters, and catastrophes, are not receiving greater 
action.
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Introduction
Introducing Environmental Crises. Disasters, and Catastrophes
Crisis, disaster, and catastrophe represent strong, potent rhetoric. They call up images 
of threat, destruction, death, and devastation. They describe times and events when the very 
foundations of society, culture, and even survival appear to be teetering on the brink of 
collapse; and declare that urgent, overwhelming response is needed to regain normality and 
re-establish the status-quo. Consequently, they are—or should be—invoked only during Very 
Serious Occasions, and when only swift, comprehensive, and 
adaptive/mitigative/preventative action can deal with or solve the problem.
Not a day seems to go by when the mass media1 does not assert that some aspect of 
the global environment is in crisis, undergoing disaster, or facing catastrophe. Whether these 
terms/concepts are aimed at anthropogenic climate change (ACC), biodiversity loss, or 
population growth (to name a few of the many environmental problems threatening 
civilization’s continued survival), those utilizing them are trying to convey to certain and/or 
various audiences the seriousness of the situations. More importantly, they are working from 
the assumption, even expectation, that declaring these environmental problems 
(transformations) crises, disasters, and catastrophes (CDCs) will result in appropriate action 
that will ‘save the world.’ Unfortunately, social reality does not operate according to such 
simple declaration-response principles; action to address the causes and consequences of 
anthropogenic global environmental transformations (AGETs) seems so far scant and 
inadequate despite the whirlwind of CDCs enveloping them. I wish to understand why this is 
the case.
During the closing days of April 2010, whilst searching for an anchor that would 
ground my research into why the application of CDC terminology and conceptualizations has
apparently failed to induce concerted action against AGETs, a blowout preventer failed to 
work, causing 757 million litres of oil to spew into an ocean laying atop one of the most 
heavily drilled offshore expanses in the world, entangling thousands of kilometres of 
coastline in ropes of orange crude, and inspiring many to declare it a CDC. The Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill (DHOS) became my sought-after anchor. Although oil spills are not global 
in the same sense that ACC, biodiversity loss, or population growth are, many and various 
actors nevertheless use CDC terms/concepts to describe them and to justify action to mitigate 
their outcomes and/or to prevent future occurrences. I reasoned that whatever results came 
from examining oil spill CDCs might then be used to help explain the ‘broken’ AGETs CDC- 
action dyad (Wilkening 2013).
What is more, examining oil spill CDCs confers two advantages over delving straight
into the more all-encompassing environmental problems. The first is that while AGETs
began decades ago, and will likely continue for decades more (at least), oil spills are often
perceived as temporally circumscribed; in other words, the lifespan of an oil spill-as-CDC is
relatively short, often no more than a year or so. It is much easier, therefore, to analyze the
entire ‘CDC life-time’ of a spill than it is to analyze, for example, that of ACC, which is
burdened with a ‘fuzzy’ beginning, is still in progress, and has no determinable end. The
second advantage oil spills have over AGETs is that multiple instances exist; in other words,
there have been many oil spill incidents over the years, and those that managed to pierce
public consciousness were invariably labelled/declared CDCs. Conversely, ACC,
biodiversity loss, and population growth are, by their very nature, wholly unique phenomena;
there are no other examples of their happening in recorded history, and thus cannot be
compared against anything. The comparability of oil spill CDC-usage can not only generate
more robust results, but also provide greater insights into the CDC-action link. My search for
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a suitable candidate to complement DHOS (i.e., an offshore oil rig spill in US waters) did not 
last long: I soon discovered Santa Barbara and what happened there during the opening 
weeks of 1969 when a blowout preventer failed to protect 240 kilometres of hitherto 
unfouled beach from being inundated byl 1 million litres of black tides.
Having narrowed the scope of my research to a more manageable pair of oil spill case 
studies, I was ready to embark on my journey towards answering the overarching question 
that informs this thesis: Does labelling/interpreting a global environmental problem as a 
CDC help bring about decisive, concerted action to deal with it? Why or why not? This 
question can be easily reconfigured for application to oil spills: Does labelling/interpreting 
an oil spill a CDC help bring about decisive, concerted action to deal with it? Why or why 
not? Either way, there are many ways to go about answering this query. I chose one that 
would do so by analyzing a) the meanings that various actors attached to the terms crisis, 
disaster, and catastrophe, and b) the correlation(s) between these meaning-laden CDCs and 
each spills’ actual outcomes. (For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘correlation,’ and its 
various grammatical derivations, is used in the vernacular sense—to mean that a mutual 
relationship exists between two or more things, but not necessarily a casual one—rather than 
the statistical.) By exploring this meaning-action dyad (Wilkening 2013), I am essentially 
investigating whether a relationship exists between CDC terminology and action. To this end, 
I decided that the best methodology available to find this relationship was frame analysis', by 
doing so, I added the final component to this thesis’s two research questions.
Research Questions
This thesis attempts to answer the following two questions:
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1. What did the actors (frame sponsors) mean when they framed SBOS and DHOS as 
CDCs?
2. How did the frame sponsors ’ action-oriented CDCs correlate with the spills' actual 
outcomes?
Developing a Methodology
The primary methodology used by this thesis was frame analysis (FA). However, FA 
does not really have a formalized, universally accepted technique or approach, especially one 
that can be taken off the shelf and used step-by-step to yield robust results. Therefore, I had 
to formulate my own.
I began with Blumer’s notion of the sensitizing concept, which is an inductive means 
of defining ideas or contested terminology predicated on a “general sense of what is relevant” 
(1954, 7; see Chapter 2 for elaboration). By utilizing this idea, I was able to organize my 
approach not only for the frame concept, but also for the crisis, disaster, and catastrophe 
ones, as well.
Relative to frames, the process of constructing a sensitizing concept entailed
collecting as many definitions of frame(s) and framing as I could find, and then siphoning
from them those elements best suited to answering my research questions. In the end, four
elements were chosen, made up of a combination of those that enjoy wide acceptance
throughout frame scholarship and those I deemed most conducive for the purposes of this
thesis (see Chapter 3.2 for elaboration).
Relative to the CDC terms, various definitions for crisis, disaster, and catastrophe—
supplied by their respective literatures—were synthesized to derive a sensitizing concept for
each term/concept (see Chapter 2 for elaboration). These were then applied to the over 1000
extracts collected from SBOS and DHOS, each featuring at least one of the above-mentioned
CDC words, in order to draw out in as ‘pure’ a form as possible the basis any given actor had
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for calling/labelling each spill a crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe. The resulting data was 
then compiled and condensed to form the CDC extracts that the frame analysis could then be 
applied against.
This FA entailed using my frame/framing sensitizing concept to filter the several 
hundred CDC extracts in order to distill each one’s CDC frame. Subsequently, I analyzed 
each of these frames for their meaning, and then for any correlations with SBOS’s and 
DHOS’s actual outcomes.
A Brief Guide to the Research Questions’ Answers
From the above analysis, the answer to my first research question appears to be that 
the various actors meant a great number and a wide variety o f things when they framed 
SBOS and DHOS as CDCs. On the other hand, a fundamental, yet rudimentary, CDC frame 
meaning does seem to underlie both spills: that the spills required response because o f the 
economic damages they are causing. However, if only the action-oriented CDC frames are 
considered, then the economic meaning all but disappears, replaced by one calling for 
systemic management reform. For DHOS the FSs appeared to mean that response should 
focus on systemic management problems; for SBOS the FSs seemed to mean that a) response 
should focus on systemic management problems to repair and maintain economic well-being 
and b) politics, for the sake o f the environment, should work to help affected communities by 
passing (more and better) legislation and regulations, allowing public consultations on 
environmental resource decisions, and removing oil development from the Santa Barbara 
Channel.
The answer to my second research question, meanwhile, contends that whereas 
during SBOS there appeared to be few correlations between framing action in terms o f  crisis
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or catastrophe and the actual outcomes—but a moderate amount when using disaster—during 
DHOS there seemed to be a moderate number o f correlations between action frames utilizing 
all three CDCs and that spill’s actual outcomes. In other words, while both SBOS and 
DHOS FSs achieved some success using disaster as a means of advocating for action, they 
accrued little or none utilizing crisis or catastrophe. The primary reason for this appears to be 
that FSs from both spills largely perceived their spills as disasters, not crises or catastrophes, 
and therefore used the former term more often, increasing the chances that any action 
attached to it would correlate with the actual outcomes.
Importance of the Research
The research featured in this thesis appears to represent the only extant body of work 
that attempts to explore and analyze the relationship between specific examples of strong, 
potent language usage (i.e., CDCs) and things happening on the ground (i.e., action). Such 
research is important because language is the bridge linking perception and action, and the 
assumption is that potent language would build an even stronger one for action because it 
denotes something of overriding significance that must be dealt with immediately and by 
mobilizing all available resources. I could find no prior research examining if and/or how 
CDCs help, neutralize, or hinder the execution of subsequent action. In addition, my research 
appears to complicate frame theory’s (FT) assumption that framing simplifies the world out 
there; my findings show that each time an actor put forth another CDC frame, it invariably 
added new elements to the message they were trying to convey.
Summary of the Remaining Chapters
This thesis consists of six additional chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief before, 
during, and after overview of the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills, and
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includes a snapshot of the kinds of academic research conducted to date on each. It is 
subdivided according to spill, and then temporal focus. Chapter 2 consists of a literature 
review for each of the terms/concepts crisis, disaster, and catastrophe. It concludes that 
although crisis and disaster are the subjects and objects of intense scholarship generating 
innumerable studies, nobody has been able to formulate a universally accepted definition for 
either term/concept. Catastrophe, meanwhile, has yet to be recognized as a separate category 
worthy of study. The primary aim for conducting this review was to derive a sensitizing 
concept for each term/concept for the purposes analyzing the data. Chapter 3 presents a 
literature review of frame theory and analysis; despite the copious amount of scholarship 
available, both theory and methodology remain a patchwork quilt of conflicting sub-fields 
unable to coalesce into a consensus. Nevertheless, I was able to formulate a sensitizing 
concept for frame, and apply it to my data. Chapter 4 explains in step-by-step detail the 
methodology I undertook to convert thousands of pages of raw, primary data into a few 
hundred CDC frames from which to then ascertain what the FSs meant when they framed the 
two oil spills as CDCs, and what (if any) correlations exist between their action-oriented 
CDC frames and SBOS’s and DHOS’s actual outcomes. Chapter 5 unveils the results of my 
analysis, attempts to explain them, and answers my two research questions. And finally, 
Chapter 6 summarizes my results and conclusion, admits to my thesis’s limitations, suggests 
routes for further research, and attempts to extrapolate what my findings may mean for 
AGETs, such as ACC, biodiversity loss, and population growth, all of which have been (at 
one time or another, by one actor or another) framed as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes.
1
Chapter 1: Fraternal Oil Spills -  Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon
1.1 -  The Little Spill That Could: The Santa Barbara Oil Spill (SBOS)
1.1.1 — Before the Spill
Santa Barbara is a seaside community located along the California coastline that has 
been associated with oil since its founding. In 1898,2 the world’s first offshore platform was 
erected near the city, less than a hundred metres from the shoreline, and began pumping oil 
from beneath the ocean floor;3 today, the “breakthrough is commemorated by little more than 
a small bronze plaque” (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011,91; Cavnar 2010; Steinhart and 
Steinhart 1972). The following year, another derrick was constructed, sparking the world’s 
first offshore oil controversy and protest (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, 124; Steinhart 
and Steinhart 1972).4
Beginning in 1902, Union Oil (UO)5 either bought or leased from the California and 
federal governments much of the surface and offshore lands throughout the Santa Barbara 
County region; large-scale production commenced in 1920 (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). 
However, a series of legislative actions by the California government in 1929 effectively 
prohibited the oil industry (OI) from engaging in (new) offshore operations along the entirety 
of the state’s coastline. The impasse between state and OI continued until 1966, when the 
Carpinteria offshore field was discovered along the federally controlled Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS), and “led to the first sale of a federal lease beyond the three-mile [4.8 kilometre] 
limit in the Santa Barbara Channel” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 29). Despite a “storm of 
protest” from Santa Barbarians (Easton 1972, 5), the Bureau of Land Management granted 
UO6 5400 acres of tract 402 under federal OCS P-0241 in exchange for $61,418,000, a 
“royalty of one-sixth market price per barrel of oil produced, and an annual rental fee of 
$16,200 for the tract” (Easton 1972, 5; Steinhart and Steinhart 1972).7,8 UO began to erect
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Platform A in September of 1968, at a cost of $5 million (Easton 1972).9 Santa Barbarians 
grew especially incensed about the presence of this platform10 (and its sister, Platform B), 
rising 20 stories above the Channel surface nine kilometres away, because they saw it as a 
threat to holiday-making and recreation, as well as a potential hazard to the SBC’s abundant 
ecology, which was proving increasingly attractive to tourists (Easton 1972). Matters were 
not helped when UO’s future vision for the Channel leaked to the community: 70 additional 
platforms pumping from 4000 wells (Easton 1972). In early January 1969, construction of 
Platform A—designed to have access to 56 potential wells—was completed; drilling began 
immediately, and at a breakneck pace (Easton 1972). On the morning of the 28th, the fifth 
well, A-21, was nearing completion when the crew began to withdraw the drill in order to 
replace the bit (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972; Easton 1972).
1.1.2 — During the Spill
The day appeared to be like any other: one hole was nearly complete, another soon to 
commence. By 0900, the drilling crew on Platform A had drilled to a depth of 1060 metres,11 
and were “beginning] to circulate drilling ‘mud’tl2] in the well, in preparation for the 
removal of the drill pipe;” if all went well, A-21 would be ready for production by the 
following day (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). The Daily Drilling Report for that morning 
“indicate [d] that conditions were stable and [that] there was no sign of impending trouble” 
(Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 2). But at 1045, as the eighth 27.4 metre stand of drill pipe was 
being removed from the bore-hole, “mud began to flow out of the top of the pipe and splash 
down onto the rig floor;” in other words, a ‘kick’ had occurred, portending a more 
catastrophic blowout (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972,2). Over the next hour, the crew tried 
everything within their power to bring the situation under control, but were finally forced to
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abandon rig when “large boils of explosive, poisonous natural gas began to roll towards the 
platform (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 3). Shortly afterwards, following a “moment of 
strange calm, enormous volumes of sepia-coloured oil [began] floating] up to engulf the 
area[; t]he Santa Barbara oil spill ha[d] begun” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 3).
Over the next few days, UO continued to expect standard procedure to solve the 
problem. It never did. By the 30th, winds had finally risen, and although it carried away the 
gas, it also pushed the oil within a couple of kilometres of Carpinteria’s “glistening beaches” 
and “threaten[ed] to leave heavy deposits between Santa Barbara and Ventura” (Steinhart and 
Steinhart 1972, 5). On the 31st, Rincon and Pitas Points became the first recorded victims of 
oilfall, with nearly a kilometre of shoreline fouled between them (Steinhart and Steinhart 
1972). Over the next two to three weeks, oil continued to inundate the Channel’s shoreline.
At its peak, as much as 673,520 litres of oil per day had been pouring into the SBC 
(Easton 1972).13 By the 100th day (the 7th of May), it was estimated14 that over 12 million 
litres of oil had emptied into the Channel (Easton 1972). At its greatest extent, the oil 
stretched to between 2000 and 3100 square kilometres (Easton 1972). When the one year 
anniversary rolled around, the spill had still not been staunched; although it no longer 
drowned beaches and shorelines in thick, ebony-emerald blankets requiring thousands of 
tonnes of straw15 and hundreds of people to clean up, an average of 10 to 15 barrels per day 
continued to leak from the seabed adjacent to Platform A (OSIC 1969-73).
Throughout the winter and early spring of 1969, SBOS captured the attention of the 
United States, and even the world. A local anti-oil-in-SBC grassroots organization, Get Oil 
Out! (GOO!), formed three days after the spill started, and before the six-month mark, would 
collected 100,000 signatures in support of its goal of shutting down and removing all oil 
development from the Channel; at least 13 separate organizations/institutions got involved
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with cleanup and recovery;16 Secretary of the Interior (Sol) Hickel arrived on the scene,17 
ordered a complete review of all laws and regulations pertaining to offshore oil development, 
requested that all oil companies operating in the SBC cease their activities until that review 
was completed, vacillated between stopping all drilling in the Channel and permitting its 
resumption, and finally proposed nine recommendations for new regulations to make
1 ftoffshore oil production safer and less prone to oil spills; and President Nixon appointed a 
scientific panel to investigate SBOS, in particular, and offshore oil development, in general, 
which would produce two (slim) reports that Santa Barbarians would denounce because a) 
they recommended and endorsed the idea that the only way to stop the leak was to deplete the 
reservoir by increasing oil production and b) the panel was closed to the public and its expert 
testimony was drawn solely from the ranks of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
and the OI19 (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972; Easton 1972; OSIC 1969-73).
1.1.3 —After the Spill
The loudest chord struck during SBOS was the environmental one, largely because 
the media fixated on the goo-blackened bird corpses that began washing up two days after the 
spill began (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). The effects on all other marine life, and even the 
ecology itself, however, were at best ambiguous and at worst contested. For example, reports 
of distressed whales and dead sea lion pups were contradictory and finally debunked 
(Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). Overall, it appeared that the ecological damage had been 
“negligible—nothing like what previous experience with oil spills [had] led people to fear” 
(Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 87).20
While scientific expert testimony appeared to conclude that nothing much happened 
ecologically at Santa Barbara, legislatively, the “crisis” unleashed a “train of environmental
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reform steaming down the Congressional tracks” (Manheim 2009). The first environmental 
law enacted following the spill was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); 
although only “six pages long, [its] scope and boldness [was] breathtaking,” proclaiming that 
‘“the Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, 
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered 
according with the policies set forth in this Act’” (Manheim 2009, 44). In the next few years, 
an entire corpus of new environmental laws would be churned out, including the 1970 Clean 
Air Act Amendments, the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments, the 1972 Federal 
Environmental Pesticides Control Act, the 1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act, the 1972 
Coastal Zone Management Act, the 1973 Endangered Species Act, and the 1973 Safe 
Drinking Water Act (Manheim 2009). In addition, SBOS “reinforced the aversion to offshore 
drilling in most regions, leading to a moratorium on offshore development on the US Outer 
Continental Shelf outside of the Gulf of Mexico”; in fact, for the next five years, no leases 
were allowed anywhere (except in the Gulf), but this came to an end with the OPEC oil 
shocks of 1973 and 1974 (Freudenburg and Gramling 2002, 28; italics added).
Outside of Washington, especially in California, and along the SBC, “opposition to 
offshore oil development became stronger and more permanently organized,” with groups 
such as GOO! and Sierra Club “focus[ing] more.. .on attempts to block oil industry activities 
along the coast” (Michaud 2008, 22). At a local/regional level, these efforts appear to have 
been successful: as of 2005—contrary to UO’s vision of 70 platforms and 4000 wells—only 
21 rigs operate off the entirety of the California coast (compared to the 3500 in the Gulf of 
Mexico) (Gramling and Freudenburg 2006). More broadly, SBOS continues to be a ‘legacy 
moment,’ one that is credited with not only serving as midwife to NEPA and inspiring the 
inaugural Earth Day, but also increasing general environmental awareness throughout the
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United States and the world (Freudenburg and Gramling 1993; Grabosky and Shover 2010; 
Miller 1991).
From a research point-of-view, scholarship on SBOS has been relatively fallow. 
Researchers have theorized that UO’s poor handling of the spill kick-started the ethos of 
corporate social responsibility by providing an example of what not to do and say during an 
incident (Brown 2008). They have also examined the media interest in, and influence over, 
the spill (Molotch and Lester 1974, 1975; Miller 1991); analyzed the opinions and feelings of 
the local population to oil development (Molotch and Freudenburg 1996); presented the legal 
ramifications of the spill (Baldwin 1970-1); reviewed the regulatory fallout (Manheim 2009); 
measured the NIMBYism present in Santa Barbara (Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2008); and 
produced numerous scientific articles detailing the ecological impact of the spill and oil 
pollution in general (Foster, Neushul, and Zingwork 1971; Blumer et al. 1971; Carter 2003; 
Carter et al. 2000; Squire 1992).
1.2 -  The Giant Spill That Couldn’t: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (DHOS)
1.2.1 -  Before the Spill
Some forty years after the inaugural offshore well was punched through the
submerged strata of the Santa Barbara Channel, the first of the Gulf of Mexico’s (GoM)
many, many holes was sunk into its silt bottom (Cavnar 2010). Nowadays, the GoM contains
the most extensive and densest concentration of offshore oil platforms, both in the US and in
the world. As of 2008, 152 companies were operating 4000 producing rigs off the coasts of
the five Gulf States, of which 1962 are major platforms (Brooke and Schroeder 2008); recent
21 22estimates suggest that there are over 27,000 abandoned wells in the Gulf (Down 2010). ’ 
Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the depletion of shallow water
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reservoirs began to affect OI profit-margins, behooving it to invest colossal amounts of
23 • •money into the development of deepwater production to maintain profitability and thus 
industry survival. Between 1992 and 2002, this subset of the offshore oil machine had grown 
840%,24 and as of 2013 accounted for over 54% of the 7800 active leases, and two-thirds of 
the oil produced, in the Gulf from the 2000 wells located at depths of 305 metres or greater 
(Boehm et al. 2001; Brooke and Schroeder 2008; Fannin et al. 2008). Production now 
exceeds that of shallow water, “despite the fact that only 4% of all producing wells in the 
Gulf of Mexico are in deep water” (Boehm et al. 2001, xxv).
One of these wells, located in Mississippi Canyon block 252, was code-named 
‘Macondo,’ after the city in Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s One Hundred Years o f Solitude 
(Freudenburg and Gramling 2011; Cavnar 2010). A kilometre and a half of water separated 
the surface from the seabed, and the oil reservoir itself was located four kilometres beneath 
that. Drilling began on the 7th of October, 2009, by the mobile platform, Marianas', the 
following month, it sustained enough damage during Hurricane Ike that BP had to call in a 
replacement (Cavnar 2010; Freudenburg and Gramling 2011). They chose the Transocean- 
owned Deepwater Horizon. In September 2009, it had “set an all-time record for deepwater 
drilling, completing a well nearly six miles deep [over nine kilometres]” (Freudenburg and 
Gramling 2011, ix); reaching the Macondo reservoir, therefore, would not pose a problem. 
But by February 2010, the “well was behind schedule and over budget” (Freudenburg and 
Gramling 2011, 33). And unfortunately, all the parties directly involved with Macondo—BP, 
Transocean, Halliburton, and the Minerals Management Service (MMS)—were obsessed 
with keeping costs low and profits high, and therefore had no qualms about skipping and
25violating safety and maintenance procedures in the name of saving time and money.
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This confluence of factors came to a head during the week leading up to the 20th of 
April, 2010. A few days before, the MMS had given the platform a clean bill of health after 
only a couple of hours of ‘inspection,’ even though the rig was not operating with the safety 
documentation the agency itself ‘demanded’ it should (Freudenberg and Gramling 2011; 
National Commission 2011). The day before, Halliburton “had finished cementing 
the.. .well’s final casing, a key step in the process of getting the platform ready to move to a 
new location,” but skipped conducting the acoustical cement bond log test (which ascertains 
the integrity of the cementing) in order to save 12 hours and $128,000 of work (Freudenburg 
and Gramling 2011, ix; Cavnar 2010). That morning, the 16.5 metre tall blowout preventer 
rising up from the seafloor 1500 metres below was declared ‘fail-safe’ (Freudenburg and 
Gramling 2011; National Commission 2011). And just hours before, “important corporate 
bigwigs had come on board [to] celebrat[e] the fact that the Deepwater Horizon had just 
completed seven full years without a single lost-time accident—the first such rig to ever do 
so” (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, ix).
1.2.2 — During the Spill
The kick hit between 2140 and 2143 on the 20th of April 2010. A roaring gusher of 
sea water and drilling mud fired into the air from the rotary (the pipe leading to the bore 
hole), dousing the rig floor and the dozens of men working there (National Commission 
2011; Cavnar 2010). As per standard procedure, the crew attempted to re-route the mud from 
the rotary nozzle, then to close the top-side blowout preventer, but it was too late. Event after 
event cascaded into the next, culminating in a maelstrom of burning oil and gas (Cavnar 
2010). The fire was far beyond the fighting capabilities available on the rig (Cavnar 2010, 7; 
National Commission 2011).26 The captain gave the order to abandon ship.
15
On the 40th anniversary of Earth Day—the 22nd of April—the nine-year old, record- 
holding Deepwater Horizon collapsed in upon itself from fire damage and heat-stress and 
plunged to the bottom of the Gulf, where it will be slowly interred over the coming centuries 
by the outwash of the Mississippi River (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011; Cavnar 2010). 
During its descent, it destroyed the pipe connecting reservoir and surface, initiating the oil 
spill that would consume the nation for the next 86 days, stoked in no small part by the 
continuous failure of BP to staunch the flow, and by the installation of a real-time underwater 
camera that provided the internet with a 24/7 vigil of the greyish orange plumes rocketing 
from the broken riser. But instead of inspiring all relevant parties involved to engage in 
concerted, efficient action, it set them to squabbling—over the flow rate, over how to 
respond, over how to kill the well (Cavnar 2010; Times Topic 2010).
It took over two weeks for substantial amounts of orange sludge to begin washing up 
“on the beaches and wetlands of Louisiana’s fragile coastline”; beneath the surface, however, 
even greater quantities had been coalescing into gargantuan plumes—some as long as 35 
kilometres—and snaking out in several directions, such as toward the Gulf loop current that 
could sweep them beyond the GoM (Cavnar 2010,13, Camilli et al. 2010).27 Along with the 
oilfall, “several hundred sea turtles, all of them officially threatened and endangered, washed 
up dead.. .joined by hundreds of porpoises and other sea mammals, thousands of sea birds, 
and an unknowable number of fish,”28 all killed by either the oil, the dispersants used to 
break up the oil, or both (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, xi). Over the course of 54 days 
and 74 separate occasions, BP dumped 5.7 to 7.6 million litres of dispersant into the GoM, 
“by far the largest use of such chemicals in history” (Cavnar 2010; Levitt and Edmison 
2010).29
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As for the responsible parties, the Obama Administration convinced BP to set up a 
$20 billion escrow account to compensate Gulf Coast businesses and residents harmed by the 
spill (Times Topic 2010); but it is questionable if this money helped in the long-run. The 
MMS was disbanded and replaced with three separate bureaucracies30 to appease criticisms 
that the MMS had had a contradictory mandate (regulating an industry from which it 
collected billions of dollars per year); but all three agencies are still under the purview of the 
Department of the Interior (Cavnar 2010). And a six-month moratorium on new OCS oil 
activities was issued, but it ultimately only affected 33 deepwater operations, and was lifted a 
month early (Times Topic 2010).
1.2.3 -A fter the Spill
Three years after DHOS, the aftermath continues, largely in the forms of 
environmental problems, litigation, and an already vast body of academic research. Over the 
course of three months, 779 million litres of oil poured into the GoM;31 the ecological and 
social harm inflicted by this sudden en masse introduction of toxic material to the 
environment will affect the Gulf region for years, perhaps decades, to come. For example, oil 
mats continue to be discovered washed-up on many shores; in late June 2013, an 18,000 
kilogram tar mat was discovered washed-up near Isle Grand Terre, Louisiana, prompting the 
closure of nearby waters until it was dismembered and removed (Smith 2013). Meanwhile, 
the oil (and dispersant) particulates lacing the waters of the inter-tidal zones continue to 
cause problems for the seafood industry: oysterers, shrimp harvesters, fin fishers, and crab 
catchers are reporting that significant portions of their post-DHOS catches lack eyes (and
32even eye sockets), are riddled with lesions, and have missing claws (Strasser 2012).
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Meanwhile, unlike in the aftermath of SBOS, Congress appears to be taking little 
action in response to DHOS. With the exception of the RESTORE Act of 2012—which 
dictates that 80% of Deepwater Horizon-related Clean Water Act fines will go directly to the 
five Gulf states for the purpose of funding coastal restoration—neither the House nor the 
Senate have provided leadership to make “offshore drilling safer,” to “improve the nation’s 
ability to respond to oil spills,” or to ensure that oil development is performed in an 
environmentally sound way (Oil Spill Commission 2012). Many, however, consider even 
RESTORE to be flawed because the “monies coming to the Gulf coast will be controlled by 
[the] Gulf state’s governors (all five are Republican)... and other elected leaders, [with] Gulf 
residents.. .hav[ing] little say in how or where the billions of dollars will be spent” 
(Mastrototaro 2012). On the other hand, the judiciary branch of the FG has been diligent in 
extracting as much financial compensation and restitution from the three responsible parties 
as the law will allow. Halliburton was fined $200,000 (the statuary maximum) for 
“destroying the results of a computer simulation of the cement seal that it provided to [BP]” 
that proved the inadequacy of the cementing (Leroux 2013).33 Transocean reached a 
settlement with the FG: in exchange for pleading guilty to violating the Clean Water Act, it 
paid $1.4 billion in penalties and fines (MalakofF2013).34 Finally, BP has (so far) paid out 
$14 billion to the Gulf residents and businesses impacted by the spill (above and beyond 
what it has paid through the now depleted $20 billion escrow fund), and also reached a 
settlement with the FG: in exchange for pleading guilty to criminal charges, it paid $4.5 
billion in fines and penalties, which is the “largest total criminal resolution in the history of 
the United States” (Holder, as quoted in Kunzelman 2012). Its civil Clean Water Act fines— 
which could be as low as $4-5 billion and as high as $18-20—are still being fought and 
contested in the courts; a ruling is not expected until sometime in 2014.
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Finally, while Santa Barbara helped midwife into existence an unprecedented degree 
of environmental concern, Deepwater Horizon has not been able to capitalize on, nor even 
maintain, the widespread anger and protest it inspired from virtually all comers during its 
initial 86 days. Although the National Oil Spill Commission recommended that a GoM 
Regional Citizen’s Advisory Council (RCAC) be established to improve and expand citizen 
oversight of offshore development by granting them an active voice in decisions concerning 
“exploration, production, pipelines, tankers, terminals, spill prevention, response planning, 
and environmental monitoring,” the FG did not act upon it, and the 01 showed zero interest 
in it (Steiner 2013).35
On the academic front, a massive corpus of research has accumulated since the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill came to an ‘end.’ This scholarly deluge encompasses such topics 
and subjects as the effects of the oil on microbial life (e.g., Mason et al. 2012); the 
composition and fate of the oil plumes (e.g., Reddy et al. 2012); the consequences of the spill 
on the wetlands (e.g., Silliman et al. 2012; Mendelssohn et al. 2012); assessments on the 
dissemination of seafood safety claims (e.g., Geiner et al. 2013); the psychological responses 
of Gulf residents ( e.g., Morris et al. 2013); and the impacts of DHOS on the institution of 
management (e.g., Hoffman and Jennings 2011). A single study examines how the spill was 
framed as a social event (Hope 2011).
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Chanter 2; A Literature Review of Crisis. Disaster, and Catastrophe
The purpose of this thesis is to determine what the frame sponsors (FSs) of the Santa 
Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills meant when they utilized crisis, disaster, and 
catastrophe (CDC) terms, and whether these meanings had any correlation with the spills’ 
actual outcomes. In order to accomplish this, I need to know what these words, themselves, 
mean. This requires that each term be furnished with a denotation. Working from the belief 
that “definitions are tools that serve a purpose, nothing more, nothing less,” but keeping in 
mind that they also reveal “information about the motives and purposes” of the researcher 
(Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green 2004, 176), I decided that instead of picking one denotation for 
each term from the innumerable ones available, or composing my own based upon them, I 
would construct a sensitizing concept for each of the words and use those to 
ascertain/identify how and why the FSs perceived the spills as CDCs in their various texts. 
According to Herbert Blumer” (1954, 7), who first proposed/identified them, sensitizing 
concepts “lack precise reference and clean-cut identification of a specific instance and of its 
content”; instead, their ability to ‘define’ “restfs] on a general sense of what is relevant,” and 
by simply “suggest[ing] directions along which to look.” In other words, they are inductive 
‘definitions’ that act as umbrellas sheltering ideas and concepts, and allow for a far greater 
range of “openness or ambiguity” (Perry 2007, 2).
In practice, formulating these sensitizing concepts entailed a) collecting as many 
definitions of crisis, disaster, and catastrophe as I could find; b) picking out any and all 
repeating ideas; c) collating them into descending order from most referenced to least; and d) 
choosing the half-dozen (where applicable) most cited to become my sensitizing concept for 
each CDC. In addition, by assembling these references into coherent accounts, I was able to 
ascertain a consensual ‘sense’ of what the extant research, as a whole, means by each term,
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regardless of how well it matches with any of the separate nominal definitions or definitive 
concepts. Taken all together, not only do the sensitizing concepts minimize the influences 
and biases of research agendas not my own, but they are also appropriate since there exists no 
universally accepted definitions for crisis, disaster, or catastrophe. Consequently, I believe I 
have been able to excise as much arbitrariness from the meanings of the three CDCs as 
possible, freeing me from the cage of any particular denotation/connotation that may cause 
me to leave out important and invaluable elements present in my data. And by extension, I 
may also have—paradoxically—compiled a consensus definition of crisis, disaster, and 
catastrophe.
2.1 -  Framing Crisis
2.1.1 — Introducing Crisis
Crisis is a “popular—some say ‘sexy’—term,” one that has “instant appeal[,] and as a 
result is used frequently and in a wide variety of contexts” (Boin 2004, 166). According to 
Academic Search Premier, for example, 539 articles utilizing crisis have been published in 
English-language scholarly periodicals in the past six months; a LexisNexis search found 
that since May 2013, over 3000 English-language newswires, press releases, newspapers, and 
magazines (among other sources) have mentioned crisis;37 and Google Scholar retrieved 
approximately 63,500 articles and books containing the word crisis for 2013, alone.38 If these 
otherwise cursory results are anything to go by, crisis appears to have “immense lay, media, 
and academic currency” (Hay 1999,318),
For all its ubiquity and potential power, however, not only is there “no one, 
universally accepted definition of crisis” (Coombs 2010,18), but there is also
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“little that connects the multiplicity of uses to which the term has been put. Unless 
prefixed with the adjective ‘permanent,’ crises are generally temporary moments or 
phases; unless prefixed with the adjective ‘cyclical,’ generally deviations from the 
normal (or ‘natural’) course of events; [and] unless prefixed with the adjective 
‘terminal,’ generally capable of resolution.” (Hay 1999,318; italics in original)
The “enormous quantitative expansion in the variety of meanings attached to the concept” 
beginning in the 19th Century has resulted in “few corresponding gains in either clarity or 
precision” (Koselleck 2006, 397).39 In a very real sense, the crisis concept, “which once had 
the power to pose unavoidable, harsh, and non-negotiable alternatives, has been transformed 
to fit the uncertainties of whatever might be favoured at a given moment” (Koselleck 2006, 
399).
2.1.2 — Deriving A Sensitizing Concept o f Crisis
From a batch of approximately 50 crisis definitions collected from the crisis literature, 
I distilled a sensitizing concept containing seven primary elements: 1) threat, 2) 
urgency/decisions in a short time,40 3) negativity, 4) bigness, 5) uncertainty, 6) 
unexpectedness, and 7) turning point.41 According to a preponderance of contemporary 
minds—whether academic or lay—the central defining characteristic of a crisis is that it 
poses a clear and present threat, be it to an institution, organization, or individual; 27 
definitions advocate it as such, ranging from physical events incurring “death or damage” 
upon “life-sustaining systems” to “invisible and intangible perils” disrupting and/or 
destroying a community’s “core values”—safety, security, welfare, health, integrity, fairness, 
and/or organizational support (Erikson 1994,168; Boin and ‘t Hart 2007,43).42 The second 
most cited crisis characteristic is urgency/decision in a short time, with 17 references.43
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While “time compression is a defining element of crisis [because] the threat is here, it is real, 
and it must be dealt with as soon as possible,” scholars are quick to point out that this is 
oftentimes the “perception of decision-makers rather than some.. .predefined condition[]” 
(Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 44; italics added; Boin 2005b, 168; see also: Boin and ‘t Hart 2007; 
Boin, Kofman-Bos, and Overdijk 2004; Koselleck 2006; Pearson and Clair 1998). 
Meanwhile, 13 definitions describe crises as negative occasions, the notion predicated on the 
(potential) damage they can inflict physically, organizationally, financially, and/or 
reputationally.44 Ten definitions each consider crises to be big and rife with uncertainty45 
because a) if it is not large or significant, then it cannot rightly be called a crisis and b) not 
only are the causes and effects of the occasion unknown, but so too are the consequences of 
any decisions and actions required to deal with it. And finally, eight definitions depict crises 
both as unexpected and as turning points, based on the idea that they are largely 
unanticipated and unpredictable (Barton 2001; Coombs 2009), and that they can sometimes 
result in good (Sturm and Mulberger 2011; Friedman 2002).46
2.1.3 — Communicating Crisis
Of all the disciplines that have tackled crisis (sociology, economics, business, 
psychology, et cetera), communication studies is the most relevant to my thesis because it 
revolves around the power o f ‘mere’ language and semantics to create and manipulate 
meaning, often for the purpose of achieving some goal. The communication field recognizes 
that “crisis is a label, a semantic construction people use to characterize situations or epochs 
that they somehow regard as extraordinary, volatile, and potentially far-reaching in their 
negative implications” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 53). More specifically, it understands that 
crises are “subjectively defined by those who experience them, hear about them, deal with
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them, or report on them” as “construed threats,” and as such, the “language in which each 
crisis is discussed is selective in what it highlights and in what it masks” (Boin 2005a, 282; 
Boin et al. 2005, 2; italics added). In other words, “to call a set of events a ‘crisis’ implies 
certain beliefs that are also stressed” ( Edelman 1977,44). These beliefs can have profound 
effects on how the crisis is managed,47 who manages it, and who is blamed for having 
permitted the crisis to happen in the first place or for letting it escalate; they can even 
determine if something is considered a crisis or not. These effects, in turn, usually revolve 
around the distribution of prestige, power, and resources (i.e., money). It therefore “makes 
a... difference whether one labels events in terms of an ‘incident,’ an ‘accident,’ a ‘tragedy,’ a 
‘disaster,’ or a ‘crisis’” because each of “these terms convey different assessments of the 
situation in terms of seriousness and the allocation of responsibility [and resources] for it” 
(Boin et al. 2005, 83).48
The communications field’s theorizing on crisis appears substantive. It has, for 
example, differentiated crisis-talk into a) contents, b) dimensions, and c) the “function the 
idea of crisis ha[s] for those engaged in crisis discussions” (Sturm and Miilberger 2011, 6). 
The contents of crisis-talk generally emphasize the cause of the crisis, which can be either 
concrete49 or theoretical,50 while the dimensions concern whether a crisis is “permanent or 
temporary, constructive...or fatal” (Sturm and Miilberger 2011, 6). The “function [of] the 
idea of crisis,” finally, echoes the tendency of political science (and crisis prevention and 
management) to view such occasions through a functionalist lens, where crisis (potentially) 
signifies that some system or sub-system is not functioning properly and that action is 
required to restore normality; specifically, it seeks to identify what the actors utilizing crisis- 
talk hope to accomplish and/or get by doing so (Sturm and Miilberger 2011). An actor’s 
crisis-talk—or, more accurately, their crisis narrative—can overtake and even subsume
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whatever actual basis the crisis may have had and influence what should be done. In effect, 
the perception of crisis creates the perception of action and/or response without either 
necessarily having any grounding in ‘objective’ reality.
However, for all of the communications field’s crisis theorizing, there appears to be 
little research into the actual specifics', in short, the field is heavily inductive with little 
deductive evidence to confirm or deny its scholarship, especially in regard to the actual use 
of the term crisis and its effects (if any). This is not to say that there is a lack of on-the- 
ground research examining crisis in the communications field; there is, but a) it seems to 
have a largely cursory relationship with the purely theoretical work just overviewed, b) the 
research focuses almost exclusively on crisis narratives,51 as opposed to the word crisis and 
its meanings, and c) the sub-field of crisis communication, where much of this scholarly 
endeavour is based, has strong ties to crisis management, and often works to supply 
corporations, managers, and public relations people with pre- and proscriptive strategies to 
help manage crises (Fuller 2010; White 2009; Benoit 1997, 2004, Coombs 1999, 2006).
According to Benoit (1997, 2004), “crisis communication is discourse [designed] to 
protect and restore the image and reputation of organizations” through the deployment of 
strategies like “denial, evasion of responsibility, corrective actions, and apology” (White 
2009, 177). Research into it “centres on examinations of [the] strategic responses during [all 
the] different phases of crisis situations, primarily from the organization-as-sender 
perspective” (White 2009,177; Benoit 1997, 2004, Coombs 1999,2006). Due to the 
instrumental nature and demand of crisis management, much of this work is funnelled into 
crisis communication’s stakeholder reaction management stream,52 which seeks to develop 
strategies to improve the “communicative efforts (words and actions) [that] influence how
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stakeholders perceive the crisis, the organization in crisis, and the organization’s crisis 
response” (Coombs 2010, 25).
However, as already pointed out, this research and development is predicated on 
crisis narratives, not the actual use and meanings (intended or accidental) of the word crisis 
and its attendant concept.53 In other words, crisis communication focuses on how people talk 
about a crisis, not about what people mean when they literally use the word crisis in their 
texts or what meanings they (try to) affix onto it. This void in the literature is all the more 
puzzling since—as was indicated above—the “very act of labelling a particular set of social 
conditions a ‘crisis’ is in itself a major communicative act with potentially far-reaching 
political consequences” (Boin et al. 2005, 83; italics added). Labels have the power to 
“invoke ‘archetypical narratives’ that shape people’s expectations about what is to follow” 
(Boin et al. 2005, 83); labels such as ‘incident,’ ‘accident,’ ‘tragedy,’ ‘disaster,’ or ‘crisis’ 
“convey very different assessments of the situation in terms of its seriousness and the 
allocation of responsibility [and resources] for it” (Boin et al. 2005, 83). My thesis attempts 
to fill this gap by analyzing how the word crisis was used by various actors during the Santa 
Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills, and by ascertaining if using it to advocate for 
action had any correlations with the spills’ actual outcomes. However, this research will not 
simply examine crisis. It will also analyze its cousin: disaster.
2.2 -  Framing Disaster
2.2.1 -  Introducing Disaster
Crisis is often used interchangeably (i.e., as a mere synonym) with other high-impact, 
potent terminology; one of the most frequent is disaster.54 This exchangeability is enabled 
and perpetuated by the fact that in both the academic and layman domains, crises and
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disasters are perceived as “interlinked,” stemming from the notion that a “disaster, by virtue 
of the scale of its destruction, will generate crises for those organizations that are directly 
‘affected’ by the consequences of the ‘event[,]’...[and] may also serve as a trigger for ‘crisis’ 
elsewhere” (Smith 2005b, 299; Boin 2005b). In fact, while some scholars have argued that 
one “cannot formulate a useful definition of disaster without a proper definition of crisis” 
(Boin 2005b, 155), others have concluded that the “word ‘cris[i]s is...better” than disaster 
and would serve as disaster researchers’ “own choice of [label] if the field were to be 
miraculously restarted” (Quarantelli 1986, 13).55 As a consequence, many disaster 
researchers contend that disaster should be examined as a sub-set of crisis (Smith 2005b; 
Stallings 1997,1998b, 1998c, 2001, 2005) because while “not every crisis turns into a 
disaster., .every disaster does fit the crisis definition” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007,42; italics 
added).56
In spite of such reasoning, disaster continues to exert a powerful hold on the minds of 
both academic and layman alike. According to Academic Search Premier, 431 articles 
utilizing disaster have been published in English-language scholarly periodicals in the past 
six months;57 a LexisNexis search found that since May 2013, over 3000 English-language 
newswires, press releases, newspapers, and magazines (among other sources) have 
mentioned disaster:;58 and Google Scholar retrieved approximately 54,900 articles and books 
containing the word disaster for 2013 alone.59 As a term and a concept, then, disaster—like 
crisis—“appears to be applied to [almost] every conceivable individual and collective 
happening [that] someone might see in an unfavorable light” (Perry 2007,12). It is little 
wonder that—also like crisis—there is a “substantial lack of consensus about the meaning of 
the term disaster” (Perry 2007, 12; Quarantelli 1986; Turner and Pedgeon 1997; Quarantelli 
2005; Buckle 2005; Oliver-Smith 1999; Koselleck 2006).60
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Disaster, then, is an “extremely complex and emotive term,” and as such “[can]not 
[be] easily reduced to a simple definition” (Smith 2005a, 205). This is puzzling. On the one 
hand, there appears to be a “semantic heart to ‘disaster’ that [both] disaster professionals and 
lay people understand”—it is an occasion that inflicts “unwanted loss, often but not 
necessarily death, injury, bereavement, and trauma”; it “is rapid onset so opportunities for 
self-protection, evacuation, and warning are constrained”;61 and it “may affect a single 
family, a community, [a] region, or a nation” (Buckle 2005,177-8). On the other hand, not 
even this so-called “semantic heart” is necessarily universal: decisions and actions about how 
to respond to disaster, and/or expectations about what the response should entail, may be 
“predicated on an understanding that is not accepted by other agents,” leading to further 
“grief and suffering” (Buckle 2005,178).
2.2.2 — Deriving a Sensitizing Concept o f  Disaster
Enrico Quarantelli—a pioneer in disaster research, and one of its most prominent and 
cited scholars—once declared that “there is no basis in logic and little hope in practice that a 
single definition [of disaster] can be devised that meets and is universally accepted and useful 
[sic]” (Perry 2007, 2; Quarantelli 1987; Quarantelli 1986). He argued that “what is important 
is not consensus on one definition.. .but clarity of the term and its referent on the part of 
various users” (Quarantelli 1986,13-4).62 As a consequence, Quarantelli has advocated that 
the “word disaster should be thought of as a sensitizing concept.. .giv[ing] us general 
guidance” by “call[ing] attention to...[the] characteristics related to [the] phenomenon” 
(Quarantelli 1986,14; Kreps 1984, 311; italics in original).63
From a batch of approximately 30 disaster definitions pulled from the eponymous 
literature, I distilled a sensitizing concept that contains these seven primary elements: 1)
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social disruption/phenomenon, 2) event in space/time, 3) physical destruction/damage, 4) 
badness/negativity, 5) death, 6) unexpectedness/uncontrollableness, and 7) natural.64 
Reflecting the social turn that has reoriented disaster research in recent decades, the central 
defining characteristic of a disaster is that it causes social disruption, and even if by chance it 
does not, it is nevertheless a social phenomenon',65 20 definitions cite the social 
disturbance/phenomenon aspect to one degree or another, ranging from the assertion that 
disasters result in the “failure of the social system to deliver reasonable conditions of life,” to 
the observation that during such occasions “people adopt new behaviour patterns,” and to the 
generalization that disasters are any “basic disruption of the social context” (Perry 2007, 5; 
Moore 1958, 310; Fritz 1961, 655). The second most cited disaster characteristic, at 18, 
depicts them as events that happen within a circumscribed space/time.66 Whether their 
“concentration] in time and space” (Fritz 1961, 655; see also: Kreps 1984; Smith 2005a) is 
explicitly mentioned or not, the wide-spread acceptance of disasters as events has created a 
bias in which only “rapid on-set” occasions are considered disasters, “leaving unclear the 
categorical status of very diffuse events, such as famines and epidemics”—and AGETs like 
ACC, biodiversity loss, or population growth (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977, 24).
Meanwhile, 10 definitions identify disasters by the presence of physical destruction/damage, 
largely because of traditional or etymological precedent, or because o f ‘common sense’— 
people hear ‘disaster’ and the first images that come to mind are of things demolished.68 
Seven describe them as bad/negative occasions, based on the pain, suffering, death, and 
devastation they seem to invariably cause.69 Five definitions each associate disasters with 
death, and consider them unexpected/uncontrollable—the latter hearkening to the idea that
70disasters are caused by ill-favoured celestial alignments or the whim of the gods. And
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finally, three definitions depict disasters as originating (solely) from natural forces, with little 
or no prior anthropogenic connection.71
2.2.3 -  Communicating Disaster
Most of the extant disaster research implicitly assumes that “disasters are subjectively 
defined by those who experience them, hear about them, deal with them, or report on them” 
(Boin 2005a, 282; Aguirre 2002), with “each group or individual creating] a definition [to 
suit] different ends” (Perry 1998,214). The relevancy of this notion has only grown in recent 
years as “modem disaster.. .becom[es] more a product of collective sense-making processes 
than of some exogenous agent” (Boin 2005b, 157), where actors “impose [their] narrative 
and ideological order on” such occasions, making it so they are no longer “what they seem,” 
and are often “not what people want and need them to be” (Stein 2002,155).
However, very little work appears to have been done to actually examine and analyze 
these recognition and designation components of disaster, and even less into the actual 
employment of the term by actors other than academics; what little there is is largely 
theoretical and revolves around disaster narratives (where the word ‘disaster’ may or may 
not be present) rather than the real world utilization of the term and concept, what is meant 
by it, and how these meanings correlate with the actual outcomes. According to the sub-field 
of disaster communication, “reaction to a disaster is not entirely determined by the disaster 
type or magnitude,” but is “heavily influenced by the public’s interpretation of the disaster, 
which in turn is influenced by public relations and media framing” (Yearly 2002,269; de 
Vries 2004).72 During such occasions, public relations actors (in concert and/or conflict with 
the media) attempt to construct a disaster narrative, which “names an incident and reassures 
the public in [the disaster’s] initial stages” (Daley and O’Neill 1991,45). These things are
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done, for example, by a) naturalizing the occasion, b) “placfing] it outside human control,” 
thus “deflecting] attention from” the responsible parties (Daley and O’Neill 1991, 47), 
and/or c) “defining] the proper role for ordinary members of the public to be that of [the] 
victim” (Farrel and Goodnight 1981,284). But although public relations actors and the media 
exert a powerful influence, the creation of a disaster narrative is a “complex process that is 
affected by multiple factors including diverse counter frames offered by emergency 
managers, special interest groups, and the public” (Yearly 2002, 270; Edy and Merick 2007; 
Glascock 2000; Luther and Zhou 2005).
Unfortunately, while “often covert or taken-for-granted” in their literature, the social 
(and political) construction of disaster represents one of the main problematics affecting the 
dominant social approach to disaster research (Hewitt 1998, 76). Not only is it unable to 
figure out “how to study the mysterious processes through which people label a certain time 
frame or collective experience as a disaster” (Boin 2005b, 157), but it also seems 
uninterested in doing so. The sociology-weighted research agenda “drives... [researchers] 
towards objectifying the subjective...[and] want[ing] to know when and under what 
conditions a certain percentage of people agree on labelling some condition, event, or time 
period a disaster” (Boin 2005b, 157).73 Such scholars are “simply not interested in 
reconstructing the collective sense-making processes” that fabricate the perception of disaster 
and/or analyzing why certain actors frame occasions (or not) as disasters (Boin 2005b, 157). 
Rightly or wrongly, they consider such work a “political science activity”—explaining why 
what little work done in this area has been conducted by such researchers, or those practicing 
its agenda (see: Edelman 1971; ‘t Hart 1993; Bovens and ‘t Hart 1996; Olson 2000; Landis 
1999)—who they assume are comfortable with the fact that “disaster interpretations shift 
across time and space” (Boin 2005b, 158).
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By shying away from the slipperiness of the real-world use and assignation of 
meaning to disaster, however, the social approach potentially overlooks the fact that 
language—no matter what kind, or in what context it is used—cannot help but generate 
meanings. In other words, the very language used to tell of it can alter people’s perception of 
the disaster, transforming it from one kind of occasion to another (Stein 2002,157).74’75 
Disaster, then, is not merely an event or social occasion that suddenly comes into existence; 
rather, “disaster is [also] a language” (Stein 2002, 157) that creates itself through the 
generation or silencing of particular meanings, and exerts very real consequences on response 
and recovery. With my thesis, I hope to reverse—if only a little bit—this near-total lack of 
focus on the language and meaning of disaster in the same way I hope to do with crisis. But 
there is one more term and concept that will be analyzed, and that is catastrophe, perhaps the 
most neglected of the CDC triptych.
2.3 -  Framing Catastrophe: Deriving a Sensitizing Concept
For all intents and purposes, there is no literature examining, investigating, and/or 
analyzing catastrophe as a separate, quantitatively and/or qualitatively distinct concept in the 
way that crisis and disaster are, be it sociologically, psychologically, managerially, or 
linguistically. At best, catastrophe—in the form of catastrophic/apocalyptic discourse, or the 
catastrophic vision—is used as a handy catch-all term describing an entire syndrome of 
conceptual/ideational language (which includes also apocalypse, crisis, disaster, and tragedy) 
that is employed by their wielders to boost the “drama and novelty” of an occasion by 
evoking dread, fear, and overwhelming threat (Nerlich and James 2009; Hulme 2006; 
Edelman 1977,489; Nerlich 2009; Marriner and Morhange 2013); more often, it is treated as 
a synonym for disaster and occasionally crisis (see FEMA 2003; Prince 1920; Nerlich and
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James 2009). Catastrophe is neither recognized as a sub-field in any academic or theoretical 
endeavour (unlike disaster), nor is it studied across a broad spectrum of disciplines (like 
crisis). According to Academic Search Premier, only 25 articles utilizing catastrophe in any 
way were published during a six-month window; the majority o f these concern the 
mathematical theory, called catastrophe, while most of the rest concerned geology, where it 
appears to mean nothing more than a (relatively) sudden change in the physical environment. 
In contrast to academia’s apparent reluctance to investigate it, or to even invoke the word, the 
world-at-large appears to perceive itself as inundated by catastrophe: according to 
LexisNexis, over 3000 English-language newswires, press releases, newspapers, and
77magazines (among other sources) have mentioned catastrophe since May 2013; and a 
Google Scholar search retrieved approximately 18,400 articles and books containing the 
word for 2013 alone.78 There appears to be no research attempting to explain this dichotomy 
between academia’s disinclination to use and/or perceive catastrophe and the world-at-large’s 
enthusiasm for doing so.79
Periodically since the mid-1960s, however, attempts have been made to distinguish 
catastrophe as a unique term, concept, and typology; many of these have been initiated by 
Enrico Quarantelli, one of the elder statesmen of disaster research, with the remainder simply 
reiterating his work (Quarantelli 2006; Quarantelli 1986; Quarantelli 2008; Olson 2000; 
Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 2006). The rationale for these efforts has been the 
observation “that there [are] ‘disasters’” and then “there [are] ‘disasters that [are] beyond 
typical disasters,”’ which have “c[o]me to be called ‘catastrophes’” (Quarantelli 2006, 2). 
Recent mega-occasions—beginning with Hurricane Katrina and followed by the Indonesian 
Tsunami, the Tohoku Earthquake, Tsunami, and Nuclear Meltdown, and the recent Hurricane 
Taiyan—have further “reinforced the view.. .that the scale of any collective crisis has to be
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taken into account in any analysis,” and that “just as ‘disasters’ are qualitatively different 
from everyday community emergencies, so are ‘catastrophes’ a qualitative jump over 
‘disasters’” (Quarantelli 2006, l).80
From this extremely meagre data from the ‘literature,’ I managed to distill a 
sensitizing concept for catastrophe that consists of three elements: 1) require outside/whole 
new organizations/institutions for response; 2) distinguished by what institutions are
O 1
required for response; and 3) perceived as huge/incurring total devastation. Each element 
is connected to each other by the idea that something—more often than not, perceived 
order—has been overturned or subverted by an event. This notion will likely become more 
important in the future because it appears—or more accurately, people perceive—that 
catastrophes are increasing in number and occurring with shorter intervening intervals, 
particularly since the dawn of the 21st Century, fueling the dread that this will be an age 
“when the term catastrophe, not simply disaster, will be increasingly employed” (Olson and 
Gawronski 2010, 206).
2.4 -  The Takeaway: Summarizing CDCs
For the purposes of this thesis, there are two important outcomes that the preceding 
overviews of crisis, disaster, and catastrophe have provided. The first is that despite the 
recognition by various researchers that “the very act of labelling a particular set of social 
conditions a ‘crisis’ [or a ‘disaster’ or a ‘catastrophe’] is itself a major.. .act with potentially 
far-reaching... consequences,” including “whether or not that event [even] becomes a 
[CDC]” (Boin et al. 2005, 83; Coombs 2010,19), there appears to be a dearth of work 
examining crisis, disaster, and catastrophe as terms (much less establishing if there are any 
correlations between the use of these words—and the meanings and desired actions that
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actors attach to them—and the actual outcomes of CDC occasions, such as SBOS and 
DHOS). As a consequence of this lack, I am filling a gap in the literature. The second 
important outcome is that by delving into the literature each term has accumulated over the 
years, I was able to collect an entire host of definitions—denotative and connotative—that I 
was then able to distil into three sets of sensitizing concepts:
• For crisis: threat, urgency/decisions in a short time, negativity, bigness, uncertainty, 
unexpectedness, and turning point',
• For disaster: social disruption/phenomenon, event in space/time, physical 
destruction/damage, badness/negativity, death, unexpectedness/uncontrollableness, 
and natural',
• And for catastrophe: require outside/whole new organizations/institutions for  
response', distinguished by what institutions are required for response', and perceived 
as huge/incurring total devastation.
These concepts will be used to help me analyze how the various actors from both SBOS and 
DHOS framed the spills as CDCs, and whether the action-oriented CDC frames correlate 
with the outcomes following each spill. But before that operation can be detailed (see 
Chapter 4), a brief discussion offrames and framing must be offered.
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Chapter 3: Fram ing: A  Literature Review
3.1 -  The Foundations of Frame Theory and Analysis
Humans are defined just as much by the social world they have constructed around 
themselves as by the natural, objective world they exist within—perhaps even more so. As 
social creatures, it is impossible for people to be wholly a part of empirical, impartial reality 
because they have an innate need to understand and shape the universe around them, doing so 
by sharing, editing, and creating ideas, stories, and histories. Since the dawn of the genus 
Homo, the various permutations of the human species have been re-forging the world around 
them to better suit their needs; humans are “reality constructionists” (Berger and Luchmann 
1966, 367; Bumingham 1999).
3.1.1 -  Social Constructionism
Since its inception in the mid-1960s (Elder-Voss 2012), and its conceptual
development and transformation throughout the 1980s (in part by the infusion of Foucaldian
82thought) (Lock and Strong 2010), the paradigm of social contructionism has managed to 
touch almost every endeavour of knowledge-gathering and understanding to one degree or 
another. Social constructionism is “concerned with the creation and institutionalisation of 
reality in social interaction” (van Gorp 2007, 62); in other words, it assumes that “reality is 
created and constructed by beliefs and behaviours,” whether consciously or not, and is guided 
by choice(s) (Vasquez 1995,221). In short, it is predicated on the notion that social reality, 
and the human behaviour from which it springs, “result[s] from how people interact and 
[from] their use of symbols to create meaning” (Hallahan 1999, 206). More importantly, 
social constructionism “contends that representations of objects or problems in people’s 
minds vary from the corresponding actual objects or conditions on which they are based,”
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and that in the end, “people act based on these perceptions,” not on what the objective 
environment is telling them (Hallahan 1999, 206; italics added).83
Furthermore, social construction “reject[s] the belief that actors work solely towards 
given material interests,” or that their actions simply reflect such interests; instead, it argues 
that actions are “guided by [actors’] perceptions of their material interests,” the resultant 
“‘ideas’...producing] and constituting] the norms, narratives, discourses, and frames of 
reference that (re)create [their] perception of their context and material interests, and produce 
preferences and strategies [for] their actions” (Fuller 2010, 1123; italics added). In short, the 
way people “define a situation is[/becomes] the reality for them,” influencing how they shape 
their “attitudes, behaviours, and actions” to reflect and suit that reality (Britton 2005, 68). As 
Weick summed it up, “‘believing is seeing’ is a much more accurate description about human 
thought processes than ‘seeing is believing’ (1979,155).84
The most common and ubiquitous medium through which this process takes place is 
discourse/language. Constructionists regard discourse/language in “post-structuralist and 
Foucauldian terms as generally constitutive of social reality” (Moore 2011, 10). In other 
words, they assert that “language is not neutral,” but instead “create[s] representations of the 
world that reflect as well as actively construct reality by ascribing meanings... [,] identities, 
and social relations” to it (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 592). Consciously or unconsciously, 
actors—seeking to make sense of an occasion—implant perceptions into their discourses that 
“represent a ‘structured set of ideas’ which provide a cognitive filter or frame” to help guide 
their (target) audience(s) towards the actor’s preferred understanding of the situation or 
occasion” (Fuller 2010, 1123; italics added). Crises, disasters, and catastrophes (CDCs) often 
represent the pinnacle of occasions requiring that sense be made of them, and as a 
consequence, they become almost instantly ensnared within intertangled webs of discourse
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trying to establish what the CDC is, why it is, and what should (or should not) be done in 
response.
3.1.2- The Social Construction o f CDCs
Although CDC scholars have acknowledged that “both crises and disasters are 
subjectively defined by those who experience them, hear about them, deal with them, or 
report[] on them” (Boin 2005a, 282), and that during such occasions “many interlocutors may 
intervene and (re)construct[] further the disaster[, crisis, or catastrophe]” (Moore 2011, 9), 
they appear to have spent little time examining/analyzing how actors make sense of or define 
CDC occasions,85 in general, and even less about the actual language they use to speak of or 
about them, in particular.86 As the previous chapter attempted to make clear, crisis theory, 
disaster research, and what little catastrophe scholarship exists have all devoted the majority 
of their time and energy to the “question of the nature o f the crisis [/disaster/catastrophe],” 
and/or to figuring out a system of classification to demarcate CDCs from other high-stress 
occasions, rather than to “why the word crisis[/disaster/catastrophe] is used... [or] the effects 
o f [their] usage” (Thorpe 2003, 133; italics in original).87
Examining why/how CDC terms are used and what effects they may have, however, 
deserves greater scrutiny because language can and does exert a powerful and material 
influence on action, with CDC language potentially exerting even more (Snow and Benford 
1988; Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). While researchers seem to acknowledge 
this only conceptually and theoretically (see: Boin and ‘t Hart 2007; Hallahan 1999; Schon 
and Rein 1994; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Schneider 1985; Hay 1999), real world 
actors appear to be actively and proactively aware of language’s power and ability to 
establish and fix definitions and narratives: whenever a CDC occasion occurs, “different
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political, bureaucratic, [and] societal...stakeholders will not only form their own picture of 
the situation and classify it in terms of threats and opportunities, but many of them will 
actively seek to influence the public perception of the situation” because they know that 
“those who successfully ‘frame’ what a crisis[/disaster/ catastrophe] is all about hold the key 
to defining the appropriate strategies for resolution” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 53; italics 
added; Reese 2007; Snow et al. 1986, 82; italics added).88
Therefore, in order to explain and understand what various actors mean when they 
call, describe, or refer to an occasion as a CDC, and the (possible) political, policy, and 
action impacts/correlations of doing so, it is vital to “recognize the.. .diverging frames of 
interpretation” that are often constructed during and after a CDC, and the subsequent contests 
they can unleash—“contests between frames and counter-frames regarding 
crisis[/disaster/catastrophe] severity, causes, responsibility, and implications, which in return 
affects [szc].. .public policy” (Entman 2007, 6; Nohrstedt and Weible 2010, 6; Boin, ‘t Hart 
and McConnell 2009; Widmair, Blyth, and Seabrooke 2007). These “frames of 
interpretation” signifying CDCs are “‘constructed’ as representational discourses,” in which 
the “individual and collective actors attempt to exert social power by telling one particular 
story of the crisis[/disaster/catastrophe]” (Rocheleau, Steinberg, and Benjamin 1995, 1038). 
One of the most promising ways to examine and understand these “representational
on
discourses” is by utilizing frame theory (FT) and frame analysis (FA).
3.2 -  The Many Wavs to Frame the Theory and Analysis of Framing
I chose FT/FA as the basis for this thesis’s methodology because it a) “recognizes the 
ability of the text.. .to define a situation, to define the issues, and to set the terms of the 
debate,” and b) allows for an examination of the “subtle differences that are possible when a
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specific topic is presented in different ways” (Tankard 2001,96-7).90 CDC occasions, such as 
SBOS and DHOS, are “inherently multidimensional,” and FT/FA, with its focus on how 
social phenomena are made sense of, offered the clearest route toward ascertaining “how 
people think about” social phenomena, thereby providing insight into the “symbolic contests 
over the social meaning of... [CDCs], where meaning implies not only what is at issue, but 
what is to be done” (Callaghan and Schnell 2001, 18; Edy and Meirick 2007, 122; Schon and 
Rein 1994, 29; italics added).
3.2.1 — Framing Frame Theory and Analysis
FT and FA achieved renown beginning in 1974 with the publication of what many 
scholars consider the ur-text for the theory and its methodology, Erving Goffman’s Frame 
Analysis. According to Goffman, frames are “principles of organization which govern 
events—at least social ones—and [people’s] subjective involvement in them” (Goffman 
1974,10-1). More specifically, “when individuals attend to any current situation, they face 
the question: What is it that is going on here?'” (Goffman 1974, 8; italics added). Whether 
this query is “asked explicitly, as in times of confusion and doubt, or tacitly, during occasions 
of usual certitude, the question is put and the answer to it presumed by the way the 
individuals then proceed to get on with the affairs at hand” (Goffman 1974, 8; italics 
added).91
While Goffman’s take on frames appears relatively straight-forward, looks are 
deceiving: in contrast to the intent of most social science research, his formulation 
“complicates, rather than simplifies” (Scheff 2005, 368). For all its esteem and influence, 
Frame Analysis is a vast, difficult, and frequently misunderstood tome (Scheff 2005). From a 
procedural point of view, the entire book consists of a series of (exhaustive and hyper­
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detailed) explanations and demonstrations of FA-in-action, but at no point does it summarize 
or spell out a methodology for others to follow, elaborate upon, or improve (Scheff 2005; see 
also Giles and Shaw 2009; Hertog and McLeod 2001). And from a conceptual perspective, 
Goffman never (explicitly) elaborates on his otherwise exceedingly vague and general 
definition (Scheff 2005). The end result is that although scholars are convinced that framing 
is a “theoretically rich and useful concept” (Hallahan 1999,209), they are in the dark about 
what frames are, exactly, and how they should be examined.
Therefore, most researchers end up “ignoring or misconstruing Goffman’s approach” 
by taking only the basic premise—or even less: just the terminology—jettisoning everything 
else, and forging ahead with whatever it is they wish to frame analyze (Scheff 2005, 369); as 
a consequence, the “meaning of framing varies based on the research question, the level of 
analysis, or the underlying.. .processes of interest” (Hallahan 1999,209). On the one hand, 
this practice has generated an “enormous prevalence of framing research” (Giles and Shaw 
2009, 377);92 but on the other, many frame scholars have had to conclude that not only has 
FT/FA not been able to “settle[] on a core theory,” a “basic set of propositions,” or even a 
“widely accepted methodological approach,”93’94 but that also the “term ‘framing’ has itself 
managed to escape precise and consistent definition” (Hertog and McLeod 2001, 139; Giles 
and Shaw 2009, 377; see also: Cappella and Jamieson 1997; SchefF2005; Weaver 2007; 
Benford 1997; Moore 2011).95
Regardless of their assessment about the state of FT, all researches who conduct a 
literature review of framing invariably come away with the same result: thousands of 
citations throughout the academic literature showing that it is “used in different ways in 
several different disciplines to mean different things...[resulting in different] outcomes”
41
(Hallahan 1999; Cappella and Jamieson 1997, 39). My own review, for example, found that
frames have been defined as follows:
• “interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’” 
(Robinson 2002; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Benford 1997; Mooney and Hunt 
1996);
• “package[s] of several components[] telling the actor what the situation is about and 
what to do” in response to it (Esser 2001,262; Kotzian 2007);
• versions of reality and visions of solutions (Krogman 1996);
• a means of “ordering information into a coherent story” (Ryan 1991, 53; Straus 
2011);
• “intersubjective constructs” that “must be maintained through actors[] constantly] 
monitoring and adjusting their behaviour” (Diehl and McFarland 2010,1717);
• issue constructs (Nelson and Kinder 1996);
• definitions of policy problems and solutions corresponding to beliefs, perceptions, 
and arguments (Fuller 2010);
• alternative means of definition (de Vreese 2005); and
• “structures of meaning,” which can itself be subdivided into
a) the “concepts and the relationships among [them]” (Reese 2007, 140),
b) their underlying beliefs, perceptions, and appreciations (Schon and Rein 
1994),
c) those boundaries and categories that “define some ideas as out and others 
in, and generally operate to snag related ideas in their net” (Reese 2007, 
150), and/or
d) “cultural structures with central ideas and more peripheral concepts” 
(Hertog and McLeod 2001).
In addition to these more conceptual, metaphorical formulations, frames/framing have also 
been defined in more methodologically friendly ways:
• as patterns in text (Matthes and Kohring 2008; de Vreese 2005);
• as effects contained within texts, or those caused by an individual’s mind (Druckman 
2001); and
• as devices “embedded in political discourse” and/or as “individual structures of the 
mind” (Kinder and Sanders 1990; Scheufele 1999).
And finally, several researchers have made it clear what frames are not: narrative formats 
(such as the inverted pyramid style of the basic news story) (Hertog and Kohring 2001); 
topics or themes (Carragee and Roefs 2004); issues (Hertog and Kohring 2001); and 
positions (Steensland 2008).
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If there is one definition of frame/framing that comes the closest to being 
unanimously accepted, however, it would be Robert Entman’s, which has been described as 
“seminal” and a “classic[]” (Giles and Shaw 2009, 379; Kastenhofer 2009, 78).96 According 
to Entman (1993, 52; italics in original), to “frame is to select some aspects o f a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described.” In other words, framing is a “process of culling a 
few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections 
among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman 2007,164). Entman’s take 
possesses three primary virtues that have made it attractive to many frame researchers, 
especially those new to the paradigm. First, his definition assumes that framing is a verb, an 
action, rather than a noun, a thing; framing as an action invests the concept with purpose—it 
is done for a reason, which is to construct a particular version of reality for whatever 
reason—and with agency, in the form offrame sponsors (FSs),97 making people the centre of 
the framing process. And where there is one sponsor, there will likely be others, imbuing 
framing with an interactive component that puts the social in social construction. Second, 
Entman’s formulation does not dictate who can and cannot frame, implying that anybody, 
any actor or group, has the ability to frame an occasion, which can potentially disempower 
elites—who are usually perceived as holding hegemonic control over the ability to frame 
(Entman 2007; Hallahan 1999; Nelson and Kinder 1996)—and empower ordinary people, 
especially during CDC occasions when societal contradictions may be laid bare (Misra, 
Muller, and Karides 2003; Straus 2011; Entman 1993). Finally—and perhaps most 
importantly—Entman’s definition doubles as a precise, functional, and ready-to-use 
methodology, providing a check-list of items that can be easily applied to any discourse or
43
text. This complements/reinforces the idea that frames are utilized for a very specific 
purpose, which is to “introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, 
activating schemas that encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular 
way” (Entman 2007, 164).98’99
Recently, another definition of frames/framing has been attracting support in the 
literature (Schon and Rein 1994; Moore 2011; Hall 1982), one that offers an antidote to 
Entman and works to restore FT/FA to more Goffinanian parameters. According to Stephen 
Reese (2001, 11; italics added), frames are “organizing principles that are socially shared 
and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the world.” By 
organizing, he highlights that “framing varies in how successfully, comprehensively, and 
completely it organizes information”; and it is by this criteria that they should be analyzed (as 
opposed to judged), not by their ability to fulfill ‘their purpose’ (Reese 2001, 11). By 
principles, Reese emphasizes that the “frame is based on an abstract principle and is not the 
same as the texts through which it manifests itself ” (Reese 2001, 13; italics added); in other 
words, frames are not—as there is a habit of treating them in many frame studies— 
vocabulary choices, metaphors, visual images, keywords, stock phrases, or any other so 
called ‘framing devices’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3; van Gorp 2007; Weaver 2007; de 
Vrees 2005; Scheff 2005). In order to ascertain these principle(s), researchers must either 
infer it from the discourse or “ask what principles are held by... [the] frame sponsors that give 
rise to certain ways of expressing them” (Reese 2001,13).
By shared, meanwhile, Reese simply means that a “frame must be shared on some
level for it to be significant and communicable” in order for it to be a “useful and noteworthy
organizing device[]” (2001,14); an un(socially)shared frame is not a frame. By persistent, he
argues that the “significance of frames lies in their durability, their persistent and routine use
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over time” (Reese 2001,14); the less time a frame exists for, the less point there is in 
analyzing it for importance. By symbolically, Reese points out that frames are revealed 
through non-concrete forms of expression (this ties back to principles) (2001). And by 
structure, he argues that frames “impose a pattern on the social world...[, which] the ‘frame’ 
metaphor draws [scholars’] attention to,” so they can figure out “how the principles or 
organization create a coherent ‘package’ by combining symbols, gives them relative 
emphasis, and attaches them to larger cultural ideas” (Reese 2001,16). Taken all together, 
Reese’s definition of frames/framing “do[es] not so much limit experience and perception” 
(as Entman-esque denotations often seem to do through their reliance on such things as 
emphasis and exclusion) as “provide a powerful means for coordinated interaction by 
supplying the structure that allows actors to become aware of, and attend to, the same 
situational variables” (Diehl and McFarland 2010, 1717; italics added).
3.2.2 -  Framing A Sensitizing Concept for Frames
For the purposes of this thesis, Entman and Reese served as the conceptual 
foundations upon which I built my sensitizing concept of frames/framing. As I have tried to 
illustrate, FT/FA is a jumble of multiple definitions and assumptions, and settling on 
anything approaching a consensual (specific) theoretical framework (pun both intended and 
not)—to say nothing of excavating a methodology—is both impossible at this point in time 
and possibly detrimental to the present research. It is little wonder why most scholars who 
utilize FT/FA take only the basic premise, jettison everything else, and forge ahead with 
whatever it is they wish to frame analyze; via my sensitizing concept, I will, for all intents 
and purposes, be doing the same thing. On the other hand, three main virtues underlie my 
construction and use of a sensitizing concept of frame/framing for my thesis: a) the selection
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process for the sensitizing concept elements (similar to that used to derive each of the CDC 
ones; see Chapter 2) brings some order to the definitional/characteristic chaos of FT; b) it 
minimizes the influences and biases of research agendas not my own; and c) because the raw 
data I am working with is already partisan in nature, I did not want to compound things by 
applying to them a definition of framing that can, itself, be construed as biased and/or 
ideologically laced.
Based on Entman’s definition, the sensitizing concept will consist of discrete 
elements that can be immediately applied to any given text, and when the results are 
combined together will result in a frame; based on Reese’s conceptualization, the elements 
will be loose and open to any meaning, allowing whatever dynamism is contained within the 
text to flourish, with the resulting CDC frame based less on what is explicitly stated in the 
text (i.e., the “symbolic manifestation[s]” (Reese 2001,7)) and more on what is “behind [the] 
surface features,” on what can be “infer[red]” from the discourse (Reese 2001, 7; see Chapter 
4 for elaboration). Unlike the sensitizing concepts for crisis, disaster, and catastrophe, 
however, the elements making up the one for framing will not be as rigidly derived, i.e., 
collecting as many definitions as possible, tallying the number of components making up 
each one, and taking the half-dozen most oft-referenced. Instead, the elements (mined from 
this chapter’s literature review) will be comprised of a mixture of those that are broadly 
accepted and those that I reasoned best-suited to answering my two research questions. To 
that end, those elements are: 1) context, 2) meaning, 3) values, and 4) responsibility.100
The first two—context and meaning—enjoy broad acceptance throughout the framing
literature.101 Many scholars agree that “framing puts information into context” or “provide[s]
the widely understood context for understanding new phenomena,”102 and that they
“construct particular meanings concerning issues” or are “struggle[s] over the production of
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mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings” (Hallahan 1999, 224; Hertog and 
McLeod 2001,147; Carragee and Roefs 2004, 217; Benford and Snow 2000, 613). As a 
consequence, providing context and producing meaning are “active, processual phenomen[a] 
that impl[y] agency and contention at the level of reality construction,”103 allowing frames to 
be examined “from a variety of perspectives and [to] be construed as having implications for 
multiple values or considerations” (Benford and Snow 2000,614; Chong and Druckman
2007, 104).104
While the values element does not have nearly the support that either of the previous 
two elements enjoy,105 those who argue on its behalf are adamant that frames “bring to the 
forefront a whole set of strongly held values” (Tankard 2001, 96) that “inform the multiple 
realities held by [FSs] and the frames they construct to interpret the world” (Norris-Raynbird
2008, 27). Its inclusion in the sensitizing concept is based on the fact that CDCs, regardless 
of the presence of physical impacts, almost always inflict some degree of social disruption, 
often as a (perceived) disturbance to the affected society’s “core values” (Boin and ‘t Hart 
2007,43; italics added); crisis research, in particular, has not only suggested that the mere 
threat to a community’s core values—such as safety, security, health, and fairness (Boin and 
‘t Hart 2007)—posed by a crisis is enough to inflict disorder, but has also proposed that the 
“more lives are governed by th[os]e value(s) under threat, the deeper the crisis goes” (Snow 
etal. 1986, 3).106
Likewise, responsibility also lacks a copious amount of support in the framing 
literature,107 but those who offer it are certain that frames are “fundamental to the issues 
of.. .blame/causality... [and] resource acquisition” on account of how they “seem to influence 
the attribution of causal and treatment responsibility” (Benford 1997,410; van Gorp 2007, 
62). As this suggests, responsibility has a dual meaning: not only does it encompass who
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should be blamed for the occasion, or for its poor handling, but also who should act, who 
should accept the burden of restoring society to its pre-CDC conditions, regardless of 
culpability; my sensitizing concept incorporates both connotations. It has been included as 
one of the four elements because how CDCs are framed “starts the process of policy 
development that leads to the. ..[allocation of] tasks, resources, and activities” meant to 
facilitate response and recovery, and this often initiates a political struggle over the 
“possibility of control and the assignment of responsibility, which is only a short step to a 
much more loaded term: blame” (Britton 2005, 69; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994,162,
277). Post-CDC “debates are...contests between frames and counter-frames regarding 
[CDC].. .responsibility,” with each frame sponsor trying to “persuade citizens that their 
resolution is the most appropriate one available” (Entman 2007, 6; Boin et al. 2009; 
Widmaier et al. 2007; Reese 2007, 345).108
This four-element sensitizing concept should not be construed as an attempt to 
resolve either the definitional confusion burdening the frame/framing concept or the debate 
about how frames ‘should’ be examined and analyzed; it has been formulated for the sole 
purpose of helping me to answer my research questions, and therefore has no pretensions 
toward contributing to frame scholarship. More broadly, however, my use of FT/FA does 
seek to accomplish three things that appear lacking in the scholarship: a) analyzing how three 
words—crisis, disaster, and catastrophe—are framed into contextual, value-laden, and 
responsibility-seeking meanings; b) eschewing the use of media frames in favour of those put 
forth by the original frame sponsors; and c) attempting to understand how two ostensible 
environmental CDCs—SBOS and DHOS—were framed and what correlations (if any) might 
exist between these framings (and, in particular, the action-oriented ones) and the actual 
outcomes.109 The following chapter explains how it will do this.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
4.1 -  From Raw Data to Analvzable CDC Extracts
The crux of this comparative analysis lies with acquiring action-oriented and non­
action-oriented CDC frames that various actors put forth while the spills were in progress, 
predicated on the assumption that not only would people be more likely to frame SBOS and 
DHOS as CDCs while they were still occurring (providing a potentially richer pool of 
relevant data110), but also that actions stated or advocated during the heat of the moment may 
generate greater impact—and thus, a more robust chance of operationalization—than those 
put forth after the fact (to say nothing of before). With this in mind, I defined ‘present’ and/or 
‘in progress’ as each spill’s first 365 days: for SBOS, I collected raw data from the 28th of 
January, 1969 to the 28th of January, 1970, and for DHOS from the 20th of April, 2010 to the 
20th of April, 2011. By analyzing only ‘present’ and/or ‘in-progress’ CDC frames, I hoped to 
be able to draw clearer inferences between CDC usage during (seemingly) perceptually 
unambiguous environmental problems (i.e., the two oil spills) and perceptually ambiguous 
ones, such as anthropocentric climate change (ACC), biodiversity loss, or population growth.
While collecting such data was easy for DHOS, because it happened in an age of 
ubiquitous information technology,111 it presented a potential challenge for SBOS, which 
occurred when the mass dissemination of information was limited to radio, television, and 
newspapers. Fortunately, a treasure-trove of raw data existed in the Special Collections 
Department at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), in the form of an aborted 
attempt to create an Oil Spill Information Centre (OSIC) from 1969 to 1973.112 This cache 
was especially rich in print-resources (i.e., newspaper and magazine articles, transcribed
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speeches and subcommittee testimony, reports, et cetera); this justified my initial decision to 
limit any and all raw data collected to written text.113
None of the OSIC information was digitized, however,114 necessitating a two week 
research trip to UCSB to collect the raw data I needed.115 This data was collected in two 
ways: partly by photocopying any pages featuring the use of crisis, disaster, and/or 
catastrophe between the 28th of January, 1969 and the 28th of January 1970, but mostly by 
photographing the said pages with a digital camera within the prescribed time frame.116 In 
contrast, all of DHOS’s raw data was digitized; in many cases, the Web was the only place 
where any of it existed, in part or whole. The bulk of it was downloaded between August of 
2011 and September of 2011, with additional materials gathered in the months preceding and 
following it.117
Newspaper articles served as the primary source for SBOS raw data, mostly because 
this is what makes up much of the OSIC’s repository. A large number of these articles were 
published by the Santa Barbara News-Press (SBNP)—the media outlet closest to the front 
line.118,119 In addition to newspaper stories, material was mined from correspondence, actor 
literature (i.e., brochures, newsletters), subcommittee transcripts, personal written statements 
intended for subcommittee meeting oration, speeches, and reports (both governmental and 
academic). Meanwhile, the primary source for DHOS raw data were actor websites, which 
contained their official, non-truncated, words on and about the spill. Additional material was 
gathered from government reports, subcommittee transcripts, and correspondence.
Raw data were selected on the basis of whether or not any given written text featured 
the word(s) crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe', if even one of these terms was present in an 
article or a segment of testimony, the entire surrounding document was photographed or cut- 
and-pasted for later refinement.120 Once all the available and pertinent raw data had been
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collected (see Appendix A for a sample of the raw data), it was organized into three tiers,
each working from the results of the previous: by spill (SBOS or DHOS); by actor (for
example, local environmental group(s), state governors, national political actors, et cetera);
and by crisis, disaster, or catastrophe. Documents that featured two or all three of the CDCs
were broken up and the segments of text collated under the appropriate term. While tiers one
and three were self-evident as organizing principles prior to raw data collection, tier two
came about during the course of it.
Both common sense and preliminary DHOS data-mining suggested that the 2010 spill
would attract far greater numbers and, more importantly, varieties of actors calling it a CDC 
1^1than SBOS; many of these actors would not have (appropriate) 1969 counterparts because 
of factors such as not existing at the time. While sifting through the SBOS raw data, it 
became apparent that the same types of actors were repeatedly coming forward to declare the 
spill a CDC; and since these actors were either themselves prominent and established, or 
represented institutions that were, I predicted that their 2010 counterparts would a) still exist 
and b) describe DHOS as a CDC. Initial DHOS work corroborated this hypothesis.
Therefore, to maintain comparability, I decided that the actors who framed the Santa Barbara 
spill as a CDC would dictate who among those doing the same to Deepwater Horizon should 
be included in the study, and therefore join its band offrame sponsors (FS). In other words, if 
an actor in 1969 called SBOS a CDC and has a(n appropriate) counterpart in 2010 doing the 
same towards DHOS, both became FSs; if an actor in 1969 called the spill a CDC, but did
t o o  i o i  to>t
not have a(n appropriate) counterpart in 2010—or vice versa—they were discarded. ’ ’
In the end, I selected 26 actors from the SBOS and DHOS raw data, resulting in 13 
FS pairs. These FS represent eight levels of society:
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• the Administration (the Presidents and the Secretaries of the Interior);
• the federal government (Government Reports and Other Political Actors);
• the state governments (various officials whose powers do not extend beyond the 
borders of California or Louisiana);
• the oil industry (as represented by Union Oil and the triumvirate of BP, Halliburton, 
and Transocean);
• scientists (more often than not, physical scientists unaffiliated with either the 01 or 
the FG);
• national environmental groups (Audubon and Sierra Club);
• non-national environmental groups (GOO! and the RE As); and
• the US Senators for California and Louisiana, who straddle the federal-state divide 
(Mr. Cranston and Mr. Murphy, and Ms. Landrieu and Mr. Vitter, respectively).
Appendix B provides a brief description of each one.
After organizing the raw data according to spill and FS, the CDC-laden documents 
underwent further selection and refinement in order to convert them into analysis-ready CDC 
extracts. This process entailed three steps. The first dictated that only CDCs from direct 
quotations, or those whose connection with direct speech is without reasonable doubt (for 
example, transcribed subcommittee testimony), were chosen for analysis. The overwhelming 
majority of SBOS’s raw data came from newspaper articles, which were a mixture of direct 
and indirect speech (i.e., reporters construct their story through a combination of quotes from 
the actors and the journalist’s own words). As a consequence, not all CDC statements in a 
news article came from a FS, even if the wording and flow implied otherwise; I therefore had 
to assume that any CDCs not contained within quotations were the journalist’s, not the 
relevant FS’s, and had to be discarded.125 Most of DHOS’s raw data, meanwhile, came from 
press releases, which suffer from the same problem as news pieces; the only caveat is that the 
press release writer is ostensibly on the side o f the FS, simultaneously conveying what they 
said and speaking on their behalf. I decided, however, that only CDCs from FSs with a 
presumed interest in the spill—as opposed to those with a vested interest in their employer—
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should be included; in other words, I restricted CDC-use to those put forth by an actual FS, 
disqualifying any from (their) media representatives.126,127
The second step demanded that all quoted CDCs had to be attributable to an 
identifiable individual.128 This was done to maintain consistency and compatibility. While 
much of SBOS’s raw data came from newspaper accounts, which clearly state who said 
what, much of DHOS’s came from press releases, which feature a mixture of statements from 
the FS and their media representatives—the latter of whom are almost always anonymous.129 
For the purpose of this comparative analysis, I only wanted CDCs put forth by people with 
names.
The third step, finally, decreed that only the noun-forms of crisis, disaster, and 
catastrophe be included. This was done partly for consistency (crisis does not have an 
adjective-form, unlike disaster and catastrophe)', partly in recognition that the adjective- 
forms were haphazardly used in the first place, unlike the noun-forms (only ‘catastrophic’ 
approached regularity); but mostly because nouns describe by identifying things, which either 
are or are not—the spill is a crisis or is not a crisis—whereas adjectives describe by 
conferring some quality (e.g., terrible, unprecedented), meaning that a single thing can have 
any number of attributes. What is more, because nouns identify things right off the bat—the 
spill is a catastrophe!—the question of what can and/or should be done about it can be asked 
immediately; with adjectives, the question of action is delayed by having to ask why 
something is so—why is the spill catastrophic?
This three-step selection and refinement procedure condensed over 2000 pages of
various documents into approximately 200 SBOS and 800 DHOS CDC extracts. The number
of DHOS ones was further reduced by lumping many of them together into super-extracts—
collections of extracts made up of two or more extracts that either a) were identical, or nearly
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so, to another130 or b) shared such strong topical or thematic similarities that they could be 
judged as talking about the same subject.131 The process was only done within any given FS, 
not across them; for example, like frames were super-extracted within Sierra Club 2010 
only—they were not linked with those from, say, Audubon. Super-extracting was done 
because not only would analyzing 800 extracts have taken a prohibitive amount of time, but 
it also would have resulted in innumerable redundancies: the perceived need to supply 
constant updates, coupled with the fear that another FS’s frame could dominate the collective 
consciousness through more frequent messaging, meant that many of those 800 either 
repeated one another verbatim or subject-wise. Therefore, it was not only desirable, but also 
appropriate to lump extracts together. However, this process was only done with DHOS’s 
extracts. SBOS’s were not condensed into super-extracts because a) none of the extracts 
could be on account of each one being unique enough to resist the process, and b) there were 
not a sufficiently high enough number of them to warrant the procedure. Appendix C 
provides a sample of the super-extract process.
4.2 -  From Sensitizing Concept Analysis to Generalized CDC Frames
With the raw data collected; organized according to spill, FS, and CDC; and 
condensed into (super-)extracts, the analyses finally began. The first of these entailed 
conducting a sensitizing concept analysis, where each (super-)extract was brought into 
contact with its appropriate CDC sensitizing concept—derived from their respective 
literature reviews (see Chapter 2.1.2, 2.2.2, and 2.3)—so that those aspects illustrating why 
the FSs used crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe could be isolated and separated from
whatever other meanings may have been present. In essence, the sensitizing concept analysis
1answered the (non-research) question, why is the FS calling the spill a CDC? Appendix D
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provides samples from both SBOS and DHOS showing the sensitizing concept analysis and 
the results that came of it.
Having isolated the CDC aspects of each (super-)extract, I then subjected the results 
to a frame analysis methodology of my own devising using my sensitizing concept for 
frames/framing (see Chapter 3). This entailed filtering the CDC aspects through the 
following elements: context provided, values tapped or revealed, who or what is responsible, 
and meaning produced. The results from each element were then ‘tallied-up’ to produce the 
(super-)extract’s crisis, disaster, or catastrophe frame—in other words, its CDC frame.
During the course of this work, however, I discovered that there was no appreciable 
difference between meaning produced and the CDC frame, so the summation heading 
labelled ‘Frame’ was eventually dropped, the frame becoming whatever meaning produced 
stated. Appendix E provides a sample of the FA process.
Finally, the CDC frames were condensed and combined to form generalized CDC
frames—a process not dissimilar to how the super-extracts were produced. However, while
super-extract formation entailed lumping together identical or similar extracts within any
given FS’s repertoire of CDC-talk, forging the generalized CDC frames involved taking
chunks of material from one CDC frame and combining it with like-chunks from others
(albeit, still within a single FS; for example, chunks from within Scientists 2010’s clutch of
frames could be re-combined with each other, but not with State Actors 2010).133,134 As with
the super-extracts, the purpose of the generalized CDC frames was to eliminate repetition:
instead of Senator Vitter (R-La), for example, having three crisis frames about how the
federal government is making a mess of DHOS response, there is only one because the
original trio all shared the same topics and/or themes.135 But the primary reason for engaging
in this process was to forge as ‘pure’ a CDC frame as possible about any given subject. The
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CDC frames derived from the FA often contained more than one idea or theme; this was 
especially the case for those deriving from super-extracts, and even lengthy individual ones. 
To both simplify my thesis (analyzing unitary frames is easier and less time-consuming than 
multifaceted ones) and to delineate better the number and, more importantly, the variety of 
CDC meanings SBOS and DHOS attracted, I deemed it necessary and appropriate to separate 
and streamline the original CDC frames into their (albeit, context-laden) ‘distillates.’ 
Appendix F provides a full list of all the generalized CDC frames from SBOS and DHOS.
4.3 -  And Onward Towards Analyzing the Results
The list of generalized CDC frames is the foundation upon which all attempts to 
answer this thesis’s research questions were made. From it, I proceeded to code each 
generalized CDC frame by assigning it a number corresponding to a brief, one-to-four-word 
explanation, which was composed in such a way as to answer the Goffinan-inspired question, 
what kind o f crisis/disaster/catastrophe is going on here?136 The ‘answers’ to this question 
are hereafter known collectively as basic CDC topics. The basic topic formation and the 
coding were done simultaneously and inductively. The resultant basic CDC topic headings 
(such as Environment or Remove OD from SBC) were my summarizing reactions to any 
given generalized frame after (re-)reading it, not a priori constructs. Each generalized frame 
was coded according to the CDC it was associated with; these codes did not crossover with 
either spill’s other CDCs, nor their temporal counterpart’s.137 Successive re-checkings 
refined the coding by further collecting together similar generalized frames under the same 
basic CDC topics, and by eliminating redundancies (thus explaining the absence of code 
numbers in certain of Chapter 5.1’s charts). The answer to research question one was based 
on the subsequent results.
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Answering research question two, on the other hand, required that all the action- 
oriented generalized frames be separated from the non-action-oriented ones. The difference 
between the two was determined by defining ‘action-oriented’ as action that is either taking 
place in the present, or will/should/must take place in the future, and that is positive in 
nature.138 This definition is based on the idea that action in, or utilizing, a CDC context is 
about constructive advocacy, not about complaining that something is not happening or about 
recalling what has been done before. Each action-oriented generalized frame was then 
assigned a number corresponding to a brief summary composed in such a way that it 
answered the question, what kind o f action does the FS say is happening or it wants? These 
‘answer-’summaries are collectively known as action CDC summaries. The codes denoting 
them did not distinguish amongst crisis, disaster, or catastrophe, nor between SBOS and 
DHOS; the list was refined by eliminating action-oriented generalized frames that were later 
determined not to be such, and by collapsing similar ones under one action CDC summary 
(thus explaining why some of the numbers are missing in 5.2’s charts). The results were then 
compared with a list of the known, significant outcomes that have emerged from either spill, 
compiled from retrospectives (in the case of SBOS) and current news updates (in the case of 
DHOS). The results from this process are detailed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5: Results
Chapter 4 described how I transformed a deluge of raw data into a streamlined and
organized collection of generalized CDC frames that were then coded and subdivided into
packets/units of information suitable for answering the two research questions posed by this
thesis: 1) what did the FSs mean when they framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs and 2) how
1did the FSs ’ action-oriented CDCs correlate with the spills ’ actual outcomes? Throughout 
the remainder of this chapter, I answer these questions, provide details, and—within the 
bounds of this thesis’s research and data—propose possible explanations for the answers.
5 .1 -  What Did the FSs Mean When They Framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs?
5.1.1 — The Meaning Underlying the Cumulative Collection o f Generalized CDC Frames
Instead of producing a small number of CDC frames containing a limited repertoire of 
meanings in their attempt to frame the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills as 
CDCs, the various FSs ended up generating a great many covering a wide diversity. Chart 1 
shows the results of assigning each generalized frame a basic generalized CDC topic 
(hereafter referred to as basic CDC topic) and then listing only one instance of each, 
regardless of spill, FS, or CDC. From a total of 347 generalized CDC frames, there are 72 
unique basic CDC topics; or, in other words, when all three CDCs put forth by every FS from 
both spills are combined, 72 unique CDC meanings appear to emerge.140
Chart 1: Total Unique Basic Generalized CDC TopicsA
Oil dependency 
Values
Response
Community
Economic
Natural and human environmentOngoing
BureaucraticSystemic management 
Technological______ Unprecedented
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Categorical
Knowledge/expertise
Not a disaster
Responsibility
Forethought ignored
Environmental
Inevitable future spills
Remove OD from SBC
World importance
Emotional
Exploitation
Conflict of interest
OD resuming
Natural
Comparative
Financial restitution
Consequences
Coastal restoration
Continued disaster suffering
Remedial action
Human, economic, environmental 
Economic/human-ecosystem link
Mental health
Faith in OI, FG
01 operational culture
Human personal input
Louisianans
Accountability/responsibility
Moratorium
BP behaviour
National/global survival________
Legislative/regulatory_________
Moratorium justification_______
Sowing environmental awareness
Cover-up/non-disclosure_______
Public consultancy____________
Human_____________________
Forgotten(/no action)__________
Reputational(/leadership)_______
Political_____________________
Misplaced blame_____________
Bad idea____________________
Other actor involvement________
Unrealized
Capturing world attention
Liability/accountability
Hope
Expressing sorrow, regret
Unanswered questions
Guarantee
Human suffering
Failed wake-up call
National damage
History’s worst envi’tal disaster
Human-caused
Prior action
BAU resumption
Dirty, dangerous, deadly
Second catastrophe
Food safety
AThis chart is cumulative; it represents a combination o f spill, FS, and CDC. Only one instance of each basic 
CDC topic was included, regardless o f how many times it was used per CDC, FS, or spill. ‘No.’ means number, 
the numbers do not represent codes, but simply numerals attached to any given basic CDC topic for the sole 
purpose of tallying, i.e., arriving at a grand total (in this case, 72). The basic CDC topics are not arranged in any 
order other than first-encountered-first-recorded during the collection process, which began with SBOS- 
Audubon-Crisis and ended with DHOS-Senator Vitter-Catastrophe.
If framing the oil spills as CDCs was ‘supposed’ to simplify their complexity into 
packets of context, meaning, and action for easy audience and/or public understanding, then 
it appears that the FSs from both SBOS and DHOS failed (relatively speaking). This apparent 
failure is further demonstrated in Chart 1 by the absence of any overarching pattern linking
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together all 72 basic CDC topics beyond their association with the terms/concepts crisis, 
disaster, and/or catastrophe.141
Perhaps equally as interesting as the sheer extent of the spills’ CDC meaning-horde is 
the fact that for CDC occasions that were ostensibly environmental, very few basic topics 
refer to them as such. Based on the visual frames each spill produced,142 which dwelled on 
coastlines drowning in black tarmac or choking on orange tendrils, and on wildlife (usually 
birds) enveloped in globs of oil, SBOS and DHOS were CDCs because of the ecological 
impact. In fact, retrospectives on Santa Barbara credit a photo story by Life magazine, which 
depicted in full colour the black tide that had inundated beach and rock, and had killed birds 
and (baby) seals,143 as a seminal moment that helped increase American and global attention 
to (the effects of) environmental pollution (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). Yet the list of basic 
CDC topics (based solely upon written-text frames) shows a dearth of environmental
144summaries.
While the results from Chart 1 provide the broadest possible overview of the quantity 
and range of CDC meanings attached to both spills, they necessarily lack detail, especially in 
the form of a comparison between SBOS and DHOS CDC framings. Chart 2 begins to reveal 
this deeper level by showing the number and variety of unique basic CDC topics per spill: 
whereas SBOS’s FSs managed to generate 35 particular meanings, DHOS’s produced 51.
The most likely explanation for this differential is rooted in the fact that the amount of DHOS 
raw data dwarfed that of SBOS, resulting in almost double the number of generalized CDC 
frames.145
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Chart 2: Total Unique Basic Generalized CDC Topics According to Spill6
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History’s worst envi’tal disaster
Human-caused
Prior action
BAU resumption
Dirty, dangerous, deadly
Second catastrophe
Human
Food safety
Liability/accountability
^ h is  chart is cumulative on a per-spill basis. Only one instance of each basic CDC topic was included per spill, 
regardless of how many times it was used per CDC or FS. ‘No.’ means number, the numbers do not represent 
codes, but simply numerals attached to any given basic CDC topic for the sole puipose of tallying, i.e., arriving 
at a grand total for each spill (35 and 51). The basic CDC topics are not arranged in any order other than first 
encountered, first recorded during the collection process, which for SBOS began with Audubon-crisis and 
ended with Senator Murphy-catastrophe, and for DHOS started with Audubon-Crisis and finished with Senator 
Vitter-Catastrophe. The fact that both spills begin with Response is not a result, but a coincidence o f the first 
framings for each spill revolving around that topic.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about what Chart 2 reveals is just how many CDC 
frames SBOS FSs produced despite the double handicap of fewer avenues for frame 
dissemination and of the lack of experience framing offshore oil spills; only a sixteen topic 
differential exists between the two spills. This result suggests two things. One, that the 
outpouring of many and various CDC meanings has been an inherent element of the social 
construction experience of oil spills since the beginning, and that the acquisition of more 
awareness, knowledge, and experience (either about spills or about the contexts] within 
which they occur) has only accentuated this ‘fundamental’ element. The second suggestion is 
that the increase in the number and range of meanings has not been as swift or dramatic as 
the advance in knowledge and/or awareness about oil spills and their many impacts—or the 
decrease in the tolerance for disruption (Beck 1992)—might otherwise suggest. Taken 
together, these two points imply that FSs nowadays are no closer to narrowing-down what an 
oil spill means as a CDC than they were 40 years ago despite the increase in facts and data; 
and that this same increase has only somewhat enlarged the amount of CDC frames despite a)
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the ability of FSs nowadays to be more vocal and more omnipresent, and b) the fact that 
people perceive that more is now at stake when a spill occurs.146
Chart 3 shows that of the 72 unique basic topics, only 14 are shared by both spills; 
and that, unsurprisingly, the DHOS-only topics outnumber the SBOS-only ones—though 
again, not by as great a margin as might have been guessed.147 These 14 reveal that a handful 
of basic CDC meanings have remained constant despite differences and changes in temporal, 
cultural, and economic contexts (among others), culminating in what is probably the closest 
thing possible to a definitive, succinct answer to my first research question. What did the FSs 
mean when they framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs? They meant these 14 things, the only 
real connections tying them together being that a) they are associated with crisis, disaster, 
and/or catastrophe and b) they are used in reference to both SBOS and DHOS.148
Chart 3: Total Unique Basic Generalized CDC Topics Divided According to SBOS-only,
DHOS-onlv. or Shared By Both0
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cThis chart makes use of the exact same data as inputted into Chart 2; the only alteration is that the basic CDC 
topics have been rearranged according to whether they were used for SBOS only, DHOS only, or were used for 
both. ‘No.’ means number, the numbers do not represent codes, but simply numerals attached to any given basic 
CDC topic for the sole purpose of tallying, i.e., arriving at a grand total for each spill (21, 37, and 14). The basic 
CDC topics are not arranged in any order other than how they were diwied-up according to the number- 
schemes from Chart 2.
There is little to no question as to why these 14 basic CDC topics were used by the 
FSs of both 1969 and 2010. Each spill was perceived and framed as a Response CDC because 
both demanded that something be done (even if there seemed to be little agreement on what); 
as an Economic one because of the negative impacts to Santa Barbara and the Gulf Coast;149 
as a Systemic management one because the OCS system was portrayed by several FSs as a
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den of corruption, collusion, and/or inadequacy; as a Technological one because the spills 
provoked questions and criticisms about the ideology of technological prowess; as a 
Knowledge/expertise one because each spill tested (and often broke) the limits of human 
intellect and ingenuity; as a Responsibility one because the spills became battlegrounds full 
of recrimination and claims regarding responsibility; as an Environmental one because of the 
blatant incompatibility of oil and wildlife; as a Legislative/regulatory one because many 
concluded that the laws and regulations meant to prevent spills either failed, or needed to be 
enacted and/or enforced; as a Moratorium justification one because proponents in both 1969 
and 2010 considered the spills proof that oil development could not be conducted safely; as a 
Public consultancy one because environmental NGOs claimed that future spills could be 
averted by allowing local communities to have a say in natural resource mining decisions; as 
a Human one because of the mental, livelihood, and/or physical toll SBOS and DHOS 
exacted; as a Forgotten/no action one because once the spills were considered officially over, 
actors such as the FG and the OI became amnesiacs and failed to implement the lessons of 
the spills; as a Reputational/leadership one because various institutions and individuals 
suffered a dip in their legitimacy based on their spill response; and as a Political CDC 
because resources (including money) and culpability were on the line.150 Each one of the 14 
basic topics is—at face-value, anyway—sufficiently general and context-free enough to 
escape pigeon-holing within SBOS or DHOS.151
The cumulative list of basic CDC topics used during both spills, their division based 
on spill, and their exclusivity or inclusivity to either SBOS or DHOS, have so far generated 
the following results: a) the various FSs attached a great many and variety of meanings to 
crisis, disaster, and catastrophe, creating a cacophony of different framings; b) the relatively 
small margin of difference between the number of SBOS topics and DHOS ones suggests
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that the former set up a lot of the general ground that the latter would tread 40 years later; and 
c) most of the topics are pertinent only to one spill or the other, with just a small number 
straddling both (which, upon deeper examination prove to have few if any commonalities). 
Each result leads ever closer to a more compact answer to the first research question. Charts 
4 and 5 demonstrate what happens when the topics are partitioned according to CDC and by 
doing so, how they result in an even closer, more concise, definitive answer to this thesis’s 
first research question.
Chart 4: Basic Generalized SBOS CDC Topics According to Crisis. Disaster, and
Catastrophe0
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Cover-up/non-
disclosure_______
Public consultancy
Human_________
Forgotten_______
Reputational_____
Political________
Misplaced blame 
Bad idea________
“This chart organizes basic CDC topics for SBOS according to crisis, disaster, and catastrophe; topics are 
unique to each individual CDC, i.e., Response is listed only once for crisis, even though it may have more than 
one instance, and then is added once to disaster and catastrophe (if applicable). Cde stands for code; BCT, BDT, 
and BCaTfor basic crisis topic, basic disaster topic, and basic catastrophe topic, respectively. The numbers 
represent the numeric equivalent—or code—for the basic topic to the immediate right o f it, and are exclusive to 
each CDC (and spill—that DHOS BCT’s Response is 1 is a coincidence); that is why 1 is Response for crisis, 
Technological for disaster, and Remove OD from SBC for catastrophe. Topics were coded according to what 
came first in the list of generalized CDC frames; for example, Response was the first basic topic encountered, 
then Community, then Economic, earning the codes 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Missing codes are the result of the 
coding process being refined, in which some topics were either eliminated as false or folded into others due to 
similarity.
Chart 5: Basic Generalized DHOS CDC Topics According to Crisis. Disaster, and
CatastropheE
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EThe explanation for this chart is almost identical to that of Chart 4; the only difference is that the data belongs 
to DHOS.
Charts 4 and 5 show that the SBOS and DHOS FSs framed their respective spills, first 
and foremost, as disasters; after that, those from 1969 perceived Santa Barbara as a 
catastrophe second and a crisis third, while the 2010 ones regarded Deepwater Horizon the 
other way around—as a crisis, then a catastrophe. That both groups would frame their spills 
predominantly as disasters is not surprising. All the results so far, official (Charts 4 and 5, the
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generalized disaster frames) and unofficial (the raw data, the disaster extracts), have 
consistently demonstrated that it was the FSs’ CDC of choice—based on the number of basic 
topics, the gross quantity of generalized disaster frames, and the variety of FSs referring to it 
(all 13 of each spill’s clutch of FSs invoked disaster at least once; only half that number did 
so with crisis or catastrophe). It is the FSs’ choice of runners-up, however, where the results 
of Charts 4 and 5 become interesting.
One of the most surprising findings is how little DHOS, despite its scope and scale,
1 Owas framed as a catastrophe in comparison to SBOS. It is not surprising, however, that 
DHOS would be perceived as a crisis so much more than SBOS. As implied by its sensitizing 
concept, crisis is an in-progress occasion where opportunities for decisions and actions to 
mitigate, reverse, or even sidestep negative fallout can still be made; the meanings underlying 
the BCTs from DHOS tend to conform to this sense that something can still be done to 
dampen the impact, rather than to an acceptance that the impacts cannot be ameliorated or 
even mitigated, only recovered from and repaired.153 My results, unfortunately, cannot 
provide any clues or hypotheses explaining why a spill that blatantly continued longer than it 
‘should’ have was not framed as an ongoing crisis, while the one that continued in ‘secret’ 
was.
Perhaps the most surprising finding, overall, from Charts 4 and 5 is the revelation that
the basic CDC topics are so (potentially) interchangeable. While the underlying generalized
CDC frames provide the contextual details that explain or suggest why the FSs attached any
given meaning to crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe, the broader, more rudimentary basic
topics lack these cues justifying why most of them are or should be exclusive to one CDC or
another. As can been seen in Charts 4 and 5, many of the topics from either spill are often
attached to two CDCs, but not all three. For example, during SBOS, FSs framed Response in
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terms of crisis and disaster, but not catastrophe, and Environmental in terms of disaster and 
catastrophe, but not crisis. During DHOS, FSs framed Oil dependency as a crisis and a 
disaster, but not a catastrophe', Moratorium justification as a disaster and a catastrophe, but 
not a crisis; and Jobs as a crisis and a catastrophe, but not a disaster. In each case, based 
solely on an examination of the basic topics, there is no face-value reason why the FSs 
associated them with the CDCs that they do and not the others. The situation is scarcely 
improved after determining which topics from each spill are unique to only one CDC.154,155
One thing that the interchangeability of basic topics does contribute with regard to 
answering this thesis’s first research question, however, is the revelation that not only are a 
select few common to all three CDCs (per spill), but also that an even smaller number are 
shared by both SBOS and DHOS. By examining these commonalities, it is possible to 
ascertain a quasi-/rudimentary156 consensus about what was ultimately meant when the FSs 
framed the spills as CDCs, and to discover what overriding concem(s) link the CDC-framing 
of Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon. SBOS has four basic topics shared by all three 
CDCs: Response, Economic, Technological, and Ongoing;157 and DHOS has six: Response,
158Financial restitution, Economic, Environmental, Systemic management, and Values. Each 
spill’s set of topics is disparate, lacking any patterns interlinking them. But if their face-value 
meanings are strung together to form coherent accounts, then what SBOS FSs seem to have 
meant by framing the spill as a CDC is that it was an ongoing spill, caused by the ill- 
considered use o f exploitive technology, that inflicted economic harm to SB, and demanded 
(federal) response; and what DHOS FSs appear to have meant by doing the same to their 
spill is that it was an environmental calamity, borne from a combination o f mismatched 
values and systemic management failures, that imposed (further) distress on the region’s
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economy (fishing, tourism, and oil production),and demanded not only response, but 
financial restitution for the victims.
As can be seen, aside from the identified causal agent, and DHOS’s additional need to 
compensate victims, the meanings are identical. This result complements that derived/ 
inferred from Chart 2—namely, that much of the groundwork for Deepwater Horizon's 
CDC-framings had been laid during Santa Barbara—by reinforcing and accentuating the 
conclusion that despite the contextual differences of time, geography, politics, and 
environmental consciousness, there is little fundamental difference in framing the spills as 
CDCs. The result is further bolstered when the only two basic topics shared by every CDC 
from both spills—Response and Economic—are compiled into a single account: the spills 
require response because o f the economic damages they are causing. Ultimately, then, it 
appears that the most fundamental CDC meaning underlying two spills separated by 40 years 
has remained unchanged.159
5.1.2 -  The Meaning Underlying the Action-Oriented Generalized CDC Frames
While all the meanings from the previous section provide a workable answer to my 
first research question, they are broad and general, in large part because they were distilled 
from all available CDC frames, regardless of whether they were descriptive in nature, 
querulous, pessimistic, tangential, or action-oriented. If a narrower, more specific meaning 
representing each spill exists, then the best way to discover it is to examine only the action- 
oriented generalized CDC frames (by way of their basic topics) because, as pointed out in the 
literature review, how an occasion is defined—as a CDC, an accident, an incident—can exert 
a profound influence (perhaps even effect?) on what is done to mitigate it, recover from it, 
and prevent future occurrences of it.
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Charts 6 and 7 show the 72 basic generalized CDC topics separated into two groups: 
non-action-oriented topics and action-oriented ones. Based on what CDC-usage can 
potentially do, the purpose underlying their use can be interpreted as giving impetus to (a 
certain) action, or lending justification or emphasis for why action should or must be 
initiated; common sense, therefore, suggests that the majority of the Santa Barbara and 
Deepwater Horizon CDC frames should be action-oriented.
Chart 6: Total Unique Basic Generalized Non-Action-Oriented CDC TopicsF
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FThis chart lists all the unique basic generalized CDC topics that are non-action-oriented—i.e., they do not 
propose present or future action that is positive in purpose. NAO means non-action-oriented. The non-action- 
oriented basic frames are taken directly from Chart 1, and aside from the non-action-oriented limitation, Chart 6 
adheres to all of Chart 1 ’s selection, abbreviation, and organization criteria.
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Chart 7: Total Unique Basic Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Topics0
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GThis chart lists all the unique basic generalized CDC topics that are action-oriented—i.e., they propose present 
or future action that is positive in purpose. AO means action-oriented. The action-oriented basic topics are taken 
direcdy from Chart 1, and other than for the action-oriented stipulation, Chart 7 adheres to all of Chart 1 ’s 
selection, abbreviation, and organization criteria.
As the breakdown of basic topics in Charts 6 and 7 make clear, however, the SBOS 
and DHOS FSs did not put forth the majority of their CDC frames to advocate for 
present/future positive action, but rather to articulate a multiplicity of other objectives 
(description, explanation, comparison, criticism, and accusation, to name the most common). 
Although the discrepancy between action- and non-action-oriented topics is significant, it is 
not startling; the 12-topic difference confers an otherwise rough equality. On the one hand, 
this disparity suggests that both spill’s FSs were more interested in, or only capable of, 
talking about Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon as CDCs, rather than declaring them as 
such for the purpose of pushing for mitigative or preventative action; the results, however, 
cannot offer reasons as to why. On the other hand, the rough parity between action- and non­
action-oriented topics reinforces the finding that the spills were not, and could not be,
73
perceived by the FSs—as a whole160—as anything less than multi-dimensional occasions (see 
Chart 2 and its explanation). The complexity and unprecedented natures161 of SBOS and 
DHOS defied rigid and exclusive compartmentalization, resulting in CDC frames that might 
have been more expansive and multi-purposive than if they had been generated in reaction to 
some other occasion (e.g., a tornado, a terrorist attack).162
Chart 8, showing only the action-oriented basic topics separated according to spill 
(with SBOS’s clutch totalling 16 and DHOS’s 24), offers three primary results. The first is 
that compared with the total number of topics for each spill (see Chart 2), the totals from 
SBOS and DHOS indicate that half of the CDC frames put forth by the 1969 FSs, and 
slightly less than half by the 2010 ones, were action-oriented; this finding contradicts to some 
extent what Charts 6 and 7 showed (i.e., that the difference between the number of action- 
and non-action-oriented topics, while pronounced, was relatively small). Chart 8 suggests, 
instead, that the ratio between the two kinds of CDC frames, within each spill, was even (or 
very near to it). The conclusion here is that the FSs framing the Santa Barbara and Deepwater 
Horizon oil spills as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes spent as much time using the CDCs 
to advocate for action as they did to fulfill other purposes.
Chart 8: Unique Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Frames According to SpillH
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Coastal restoration_____________
Remedial action_______________
Economic____________________
Mental health_________________
Reputational/leadership_________
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Moratorium___________________
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Guarantee____________________
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HThis chart is cumulative on a per-spill basis; the data was taken from Chart 7. Only one instance of each basic 
action-oriented CDC topic was included per spill, regardless o f how many times it was used per CDC or FS. 
Aside from the action-oriented bias, Chart 8 adheres to all o f Chart 2’s selection, abbreviation, and organization 
criteria.
The second result is that the difference between the number of SBOS and DHOS 
action-oriented topics is simultaneously smaller and more or less even with the total number 
of basic topics for each spill (see Chart 2)—smaller in terms of gross numbers, but largely 
even proportionately.163 The final result is that despite the novelty of oil spills in 1969 (or 
because of it), SBOS FSs proposed a wider variety of actions to stop, mitigate, and/or prevent 
(future) spills than their DHOS counterparts, who confined themselves to a more limited 
staple. Although a cursory examination of Chart 8 indicates that 2010’s pool of action- 
oriented topics appears more varied (reflecting the fact that it has more of them) than 1969’s, 
this is a misrepresentation caused by basic topic nomenclature; a brief examination of the 
actual frames uncovers something different (see Appendix G).164
A significant number of the action-oriented topics advocated for during SBOS ended 
up being picked up again during DHOS.165 As Chart 9 shows, 10 of the topics are shared by 
both spills, meaning that approximately 63% of the action frames from Santa Barbara were 
referenced during Deepwater Horizon, making up nearly half of the latter spill’s clutch of
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basic action topics. While this result shrinks the number of topics exclusive to SBOS 
considerably, reinstating DHOS’s otherwise unrivalled supremacy in the number and variety 
of action-oriented topics (and frames), it also reinforces the idea that the available or 
imaginable options for action against oil spills has not advanced as much as the passage of 
almost half a century would seem to imply.
Chart 9: Total Unique Basic Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Topics Divided According to
SBOS-onlv. DHOS-onlv. or Shared By Both1
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‘This chart makes use of the exact same data as inputted into Chart 8; the only alteration is that the basic action- 
oriented CDC topics have been rearranged according to whether they were used for SBOS only, for DHOS 
only, or for both. ‘No.’ means number; the numbers do not represent codes, but simply numerals attached to any 
given basic CDC topic for the sole purpose of tallying, i.e., arriving at a grand total for each spill (six, 14, and 
10, respectively). The basic CDC topics are not arranged in any order other than how they were divvied-up 
according to the number-schemes from Chart 8.
On the other hand, SBOS’s overall greater variety of action-oriented basic topics does 
not distribute itself across a variety of CDCs. As Chart 10 shows, most of the action topics
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put forth by the 1969 FSs were used to frame the spill in terms of disaster; the overwhelming 
majority of those offered by the 2010 ones did likewise, as demonstrated by Chart 11. This is 
unsurprising because the general population of CDC topics from both spills ‘concluded’ that 
each spill was, first and foremost, a disaster (see Charts 4 and 5); it is only logical that the 
action-oriented ones would follow the same trajectory. Also like the results from Charts 4 
and 5, SBOS FSs action-framed their spill as a catastrophe second and a crisis third, while 
DHOS ones did the opposite; the surprises and possible reasons why are unlikely to be 
significantly different from those for the generalized topic distribution. Taken all together, 
the results appear to lend support to the idea that how an oil spill occasion is perceived in 
general dictates from what perspective the action to deed with it will be framed.
Chart 10: SBOS Basic Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Tonics According To Crisis.
Disaster, and Catastrophe1
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This chart organizes the basic action-oriented CDC topics for SBOS according to crisis, disaster, and 
catastrophe; topics are unique to each individual CDC, i.e., Response is listed only once for crisis, even though 
it may have more than one instance, but can be included in disaster and catastrophe, if applicable. Cde stand for
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code; and BAOCT, BAODT, and BAOCaTfor basic action-oriented crisis topic, basic action-oriented disaster 
topic, and basic action-oriented catastrophe topic, respectively. The numbers represent the numeric equivalent- 
or code— for the basic topic to the immediate left o f it, and are exclusive to CDC (and spill); that is why 1 is 
Response for crisis, Technological for disaster, and Remove OD from SBC for catastrophe. Topics were coded 
according to what came first in the list of generalized CDC frames; for example, Response was the first basic 
topic encountered, then Community, then Economic, earning then the codes 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Chart 11: DHOS Basic Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Topics According to Crisis.
Disaster, and CatastropheK
EnvironmentalResponse Response
Financial restitution Coastal restoration Systemic management 
EconomicLegislative/
regulatory
Systemic management
Oil dependency Response
Jobs Remedial action Moratorium
justification
Natural and human 
environment
Economic
Systemic 
management
Mental health
Reputational/leadership 
Accountability/ 
Responsibility
Responsibility
Knowledge/
exnertise
Moratorium
Financial restitution
Oil dependency
Public consultancy
Political
Technological
Guarantee
Moratorium
justification
Bureaucratic
Dirty, dangerous, 
deadly
KThis chart is essentially the same as Chart 10; the only difference is that the date pertains to DHOS.
Unlike the results from Charts 4 and 5, however, not one basic topic was shared by 
every CDC from both spills; nonetheless, they do share a single, fundamental CDC meaning, 
which is systemic management reform.166 All three of DHOS’s CDCs appear to agree167 that 
what its FSs meant when they action-framed it was that response should focus on systemic
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management problems. No such unitary summation could be distilled from SBOS’s FSs.
16RInstead, as a crisis-disaster, its FSs seemed to mean that response should focus on systemic 
management problems for the repair and maintenance o f economic well-being', and as a 
disaster-catastrophe,169 they appeared to mean that politics, for the sake o f the environment, 
should work to help affected communities by passing (more and better) legislation and 
regulations, allowing public consultation in environmental resource decisions, and removing 
oil development from the SBC.170' 171 The 1969 spill’s greater variety of action—especially in 
comparison to the number of action frames offered—could not translate into a consensus 
amongst crisis, disaster, and catastrophe about what can or should be done about or against it, 
or how to prevent its like from happening again; nevertheless, it produced two fundamental 
meanings, both of which (partially and/or by roundabout ways) became actual outcomes. 
Although DHOS did achieve a consensus, it involved only two topics from a total of 24 
action-oriented ones culled from 74 CDC frames, indicating that despite antecedent spills and 
advances in knowledge and expertise, framing action against oil spill CDCs has all but failed 
to achieve a robust meaning that can result in true mitigative and/or preventative action.
Summary
This examination of the generalized action-oriented CDC topics/frames, by and large,
confirms and reinforces the results gained from analyzing the generalized CDC ones. The
only significant differences are that the number of action topics/frames is a little less than
half that of the general population, and that SBOS FSs managed to generate a more diverse
range of actions to stop, mitigate, and/or prevent the (or another) spill—especially in
comparison to the total number of generalized action-oriented frames—than their DHOS
counterparts; this, in turn, carries through into SBOS’s inability to achieve a possible
fundamental consensus meaning of the spill as an actionable CDC. Other than that, the action
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analysis reinforced the finding that there is a small margin of difference between the number 
of SBOS basic action topics and DHOS ones, indicating that the number and range of 
available and/or imaginable action has not increased substantially in 40 years. What the 
SBOS and DHOS FSs seemed to have meant by action-framing their spills as CDCs, 
however, is different from what they meant when all the frames were examined. Instead of 
economics reigning supreme, systemic management repair/reform held sway. The following 
section will attempt to discover if any of the(se) positive present/future generalized action- 
oriented CDC frames put forth by each spill’s cadre of FSs correlate with any of the 
significant and/or unique actual outcomes deriving from them, thus answering my second 
research question.
5.2 -  How Do the FSs ’ Action-Oriented CDC Frames Correlate With the Spills ’ Actual 
Outcomes?
No cause is without effect, and neither the Santa Barbara nor the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spills are exceptions to this law. Each spill not only inspired various FSs to frame many of 
their perceived meanings as CDCs, but also several actors to undertake action intended to 
either stop the spills, mitigate their impacts, and/or prevent futures ones from erupting.
Several of these actions—particularly those speaking of present and/or future action that 
were positive in orientation—were advocated for by invoking crisis, disaster, and/or 
catastrophe. Charts 12 and 13 provide a list of each spill’s significant and/or unique
outcomes, denoting their societal strata of origin and their primary target(s) 172
Chart 12: Actual Outcomes of SBOS
SI NEPA (1969) Top-down General Environment
S2 EPA (1970) Top-down General Environment
80
S3 State Oil Moratorium (1969-1973) Top-down Oil Specific
S4 CEQA (1970) Top-down General Environment
S5 Improved/Updated Offshore 
Regulations (1969)
Top-down Oil Specific
S6 Unofficial Quasi-moratorium in CA 
OCS (1969-2008)
Top-down/Middle-
outwards/Bottom-up
Oil Specific
S7 UCSB Environmental Studies 
Programme (1970)
Middle-outwards General Environment
S9 Enhanced American Environmental 
Movement
Bottom-up General Environment
S10 Contributing Factor to Inaugural Earth 
Day (1970)
Bottom-up General Environment
S ll GOO! Collects 100,000 Signatures In 
Favour of Removing Oil Development 
from SBC (1969)
Bottom-up Oil Specific
S12 Other outcomes 'Various-''/ Various
LThis chart lists the significant and/or unique outcomes of SBOS. Cde is the alphanumeric cipher representing 
the outcome, located immediately right, used to determine which generalized action-oriented CDC frame 
correlated with what actual outcome (where applicable). The years located in SBOS Outcomes denote when the 
outcome was operationalized. Origin refers to what or who an action came from, i.e., was the outcome initiated 
by the government, an educational institution, a grassroots organization. Terminus pertains to the target o f the 
action, i.e., did the outcome effect the general environment, something specific to oil development, et cetera. 
Other outcomes include any kind of actual outcome whatsoever, regardless of significance, uniqueness, origin, 
or terminus. The outcomes are arranged according to societal strata o f origin. The absence of S8 is because I 
discovered too late that that actual outcome was false.
Chart 13: Actual Outcomes of DHOSM
D1 $20 Billion Escrow Account (2010- 
2013)
Top-down Economic/Financial
Compensation
D2 Rescinding Go-ahead for Exploratory 
Drilling Off Other Coasts (2010)
Top-down Oil Specific
D3 MMS Broken Up Into Three BOEMs 
(2010)
Top-down Oil Specific
m Six-Month Moratorium On New 
Deepwater Drilling (2010)
Top-down Oil Specific
D5 FG Passes RESTORE Act (2012) Top-down General Environment
D6 BSEE Implements New Safety Rules 
Based on DHOS Lessons (2012)
Top-down Oil Specific
D7 BP Pleads Guilty to 11 Counts of 
Manslaughter, Two Misdemeanors, A 
Felony Count of Lying to Congress -  
Fined $4.5 Billion (2012)
Top-down Corporate 
Accountability; 
Financial Restitution; 
General Environment
D8 GoM RC AC Holds Meeting to Work 
Out How to Implement GoM RCAC
Bottom-up General Environment
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(2013)
D9 BSEE Recommends Periodic 3rd Party 
Experts to Audit Rigs (2013)
Top-down Oil Specific
DIO Halliburton Pleads Guilty to 
Destroying Evidence, Fined $200,000, 
Donates $55 Million to NFWF (2013)
Top-down Corporate 
Accountability; 
Financial Restitution; 
General Environment
D ll Transocean Settles in Exchange for 
Paying $1.4 Billion in Criminal and 
Civil Fines (2013)
Top-down Corporate 
Accountability; 
Financial Restitution; 
General Environment
D12 Other outcomes Various Various
MThis chart is essentially the same as Chart 12; the only difference is that it lists DHOS's actual outcomes, and 
they are arranged in chronological order.
Perhaps the most noticeable pattern revealed by the charts is that whereas SBOS’s 
outcomes originated from various strata of society—top-down, middle-outwards, and 
bottom-up—but only targeted one of two things (the general environment173 or oil 
production174), DHOS’s came almost exclusively from the top—specifically, the federal 
government—but aimed at a wider variety of objectives (seeking economic/financial 
compensation/restitution and corporate accountability, in addition to dealing with the general 
environment and oil production). In other words, while SBOS’s outcomes were inclusive in 
terms of where they came from, but exclusive in what they impacted, DHOS’s were the 
opposite.175
Four additional striking differences between the two spills revolve around the
outcomes, themselves, which are often mirror opposites of each other. First, whereas SBOS
resulted in many environmentally focused initiatives, DHOS produced only one. What is
more, SBOS’s environmental initiatives reached into multiple realms: education, in the form
of UCSB establishing one of the first Environmental Studies programmes in the US;
legislation, in the form of helping CA formulate and pass new drilling moratoria; and
activism, in the forms of solidifying the American environmental movement, in general, and
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of helping GOO! collect 100,000 signatures in favour of removing oil development entirely 
from the SBC, specifically. The only environment-focused outcome to emerge from DHOS 
was the (tentative) establishment of a GoM RCAC (modeled after the ones in Alaska, formed 
in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill), meant to bring multiple stakeholders together to better 
manage resource mining.176’177 Second, whereas SBOS resulted in several pieces of 
legislation that were either outcomes, in and of themselves (for example, CA’s four-year ban 
on new offshore oil production), or led to institutions that generated outcomes (i.e., NEPA, 
which led to the EPA), DHOS only produced one piece of legislation, the RESTORE Act, 
which dictates only that a minimum of 80% of the Clean Water Act fines collected from BP, 
Halliburton, and Transocean must be given directly to the Gulf States to fund coastal 
restoration. Third, whereas SBOS forced the FG to do little more than improve and update its 
offshore drilling regulations, DHOS behooved it to a) rescind a plan to allow exploratory 
drilling along America’s three other coasts; b) break up the dysfunctional MMS into the 
three, separate BOEMs; c) enact a six-month moratorium on new deepwater drilling projects; 
d) implement new safety rules based on the lessons of DHOS; and e) recommend periodic 
third-party audits of oil platforms. And finally, whereas none of SBOS’s outcomes 
mentioned economic or financial compensation/restitution, DHOS’s are full of them, 
beginning with the President compelling BP to set up a $20 billion escrow account to 
compensate DHOS victims, continuing with the courts judging BP, Halliburton, and 
Transocean guilty of various criminal offenses and ordering them to pay millions and billions 
in fines, and to be concluded (sometime soon) with a verdict on BP’s civil liability, which 
could result in an additional $5 to 20 billion in fines (Malakoff 2013).178
If the actual outcomes and the various CDC frames (action-oriented or otherwise)
have one thing in common, it is the lack of commonalities shared between the two spills; any
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similarities gained through examining the basic topics are lost upon scrutinizing the 
generalized frames, and whatever outcomes resulted from SBOS did not happen in the wake 
of DHOS (and vice versa). But what of the relationship(s) between the FSs’ crisis, disaster, 
and catastrophe frames and what the spills actually produced? Are there any, and if so how 
strong are they? Although it is nearly impossible to establish direct causal connections 
between CDC frames and outcomes, it was possible to discover if any correlating ones exist. 
The following analysis seeks to discover these by comparing the generalized action-oriented 
CDC frames against the spills’ outcomes, both from a macro point-of-view (i.e., does the use 
of crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe, in general, correlate to any of the actions that 
happened/are happening? If so, which CDC has the most correlations?) and a micro one (i.e., 
does the action frame advocated by a FS correlate to one of the spill’s outcomes? If so, to 
which one and to what degree?).
5.2.1 — Correlations between SBOS and DHOS Action-Oriented Crisis Frames and Their 
Respective Outcomes
During the first year of the Santa Barbara oil spill, six FSs put forth 13 generalized 
crisis frames; five of them offered one action-oriented frame a piece. Chart 14 shows that 
none of the action crisis frames correlated with any of the spill’s outcomes, while only one 
half-correlated; the remainder are evenly divided between indeterminate and no correlation 
(see Appendix H). The absence of correlative crisis frames is consistent with Chapter 5.1’s 
conclusion that SBOS FSs did not really consider the spill a crisis, but rather a disaster and a 
catastrophe. With the lack of crisis-perception came a disinclination to invoke it to 
support/justify any action sought. Table 1 provides details about the lone half-correlate.
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Chart 14: Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Crisis Frames and the
Spill’s OutcomesN
ll i 'liS
Mr, *
■ »
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2 1 X 11
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NThis chart shows whether SBOS’s generalized action-oriented crisis frames correlate with the spill’s outcomes, 
and if so, which one(s). ACS means action crisis summary, and refers to the distilled summary of the action 
frame (see: Chapter 4.3); the numbers are codes representing each ACS (see Appendix I). BCT means basic 
crisis topic (see: Chapters 4.3 and 5.1); they have been included to contextualize the ACSs. C means 
correlation; //m eans half-correlation; / means indeterminate (i.e., the action frame contained insufficient 
information to determine if it correlated or not with any outcome); and A  means no correlation. The 
alphanumeric cipher (example: S3) corresponds to one or another o f the outcomes (see Charts 12 and 13). N/A 
means non-applicable, and refers to the fact that the FS did not put forth even one action-oriented crisis frame 
despite offering (a) generalized crisis frame(s).
Table 1: SBOS Crisis Action-Oriented Frames-to-Outcomes Correlation3
SC 5 Drilling in SBC should H S3 The CA government enacted a four-year
remain subject to a drilling ban on new oil development in
moratorium until the state waters following SBOS; although
results of public, the ban was lifted in 1973, the State
participatory decision­ Lands Commission has not granted any
making come in -> new leases for the past 40 years.
SBOS-1 Although the FG continued to grant
leases in OCS off CA after 1969, it did
so at minimal levels, until the US
Congress enacted a blanket moratorium
on new OCS leasing (and thus oil
production) along the entirety of the
Western and Eastern Seaboards, and
most of Alaska’s, in 1981 (which would
be continuously renewed until 2008);
what little new production took place in
CA—including in SBC—occurred on
pre-1969 leases.
“This table identifies who put forth the action-oriented crisis frame (FS), displays the generalized crisis frame 
that the FS put forth (Action-Oriented Frame), and explains how it (half-)correlates with one or more of the 
spill’s outcomes (Details). ACS means action crisis summary; see Chapter 4 for explanation, and Appendix I for
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what each number stands for. CtO means correlation to outcome; see Chart 14 explanation to decode the letter 
cipher. Ocm means outcome; see Charts 12 and 13 to decode the alphanumeric cipher.
Siena Club’s action frame achieves only half-comelation status because although 
various federal and state government institutions either ended drilling in the SBC altogether, 
or slowed it to a near-standstill, this was not the NGO’s primary objective, per se. Instead, 
they sought to end the business-as-usual (BAU) paradigm of leaving natural resource 
decision-making to the sole discretion of government and industry officials179—neither of 
whom had roots more than profit-deep in places like Santa Barbara, and therefore little vested 
interest in taking into account the ecological and aesthetic risks of offshore oil 
development—by demanding that the public participate in such determinations (presumably 
as equal partners).180,181
Like Sierra Club’s crisis action frame, those put forth by the other four FSs are also 
top-down oriented, each one targeting Oil Specific matters, none the General Environment. 
President Nixon and Sol Hickel attempted to assure the American public that the FG was 
doing all it could to deal with SBOS, by either saying just that or by appointing an 
investigatory panel; OPA urged the President to declare Santa Barbara a disaster area to 
prevent any further harm to the community’s future economic well-being; and Science 
demanded an end to the unhealthy relationship between DoI/USGS and the OI. Based on 
what little evidence exists, then, it would appear that when SBOS FSs framed their action 
proposals in terms of crisis, they meant to convey a need for top-down initiatives aimed at 
almost everything except the general environment. This is in contrast to not only what 
happened—with over half the actual outcomes targeting the general environment, and 
coming from a mixture of top-down, middle-outwards, and bottom-up initiatives—but also to 
what SBOS is best remembered for today: namely, giving further impetus to the then-nascent
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American environmental movement. On the other hand, however, the preponderance of top- 
down action crisis frames, with their largely technocratic solutions and programmes, aligns 
with the crisis concept, which assumes that such occasions are the domain of leaders, 
administrators, and officials who have been tasked by society or the circumstances of the 
situation to solve the problem before it gets worse. Each of the indeterminates and non­
correlates state or propose action(s) that conform to this paradigm.
Meanwhile, during DHOS’s first year, six FSs put forth 38 generalized crisis frames, 
15 of which were action-oriented. Chart 15 shows that unlike its 1969 counterpart, all six 
participating Deepwater Horizon FSs offered at least one action crisis frame: REAs had four; 
OPA two; President Obama five; Scientists two; and Sierra Club and Sol Salazar one each. 
Of these 15, five correlated with the actual outcomes, and two half-correlated; the remainder 
are a mixture of indeterminates (five) and non-correlations (three) (see Appendix H). REAs 
had the highest number of correlatives, with two and a half, followed by the President, with 
two; REAs also had the most diverse mix of frame-outcomes, with two correlates, a half­
correlate, an indeterminate, and a non-correlate. The high number of action crisis frames— 
both in total and those paralleling, to one degree or another, the spills’ outcomes (relative to 
SBOS, anyway)—is consistent with Chapter 5.1 ’s conclusion that DHOS was perceived as a 
major crisis, second only to it being seen a disaster. Table 2 takes the five correlates and two 
half-correlates and blows them up into their generalized crisis frames, and provides 
contextual details about how they relate to the spill’s actual outcomes.
Chart 15: Correlations Between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Crisis Frames and the
Spill’s Outcomes0
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°This chart is essentially the same as Chart 14; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized 
action-oriented crisis frames.
Table 2: DHOS Crisis-to-Outcomes Correlations
REAs Calling DHOS a ‘spill’ 
fails to capture it—it is 
Exxon Valdez several 
times over, and will 
require years of 
response DHOS-1
D12 Over three years after the spill, 
response continues, especially in 
Louisiana (in July of 2013, clean up 
operations along Florida, Mississippi, 
and Alabama ended).
REAs Sound response holds 
the promise of creating 
RCACs, just as Exxon 
Valdez did in Alaska 
DHOS-2
D8 While the National Commission 
recommended the creation of a GoM 
RCAC, neither the RESTORE Act, 
nor any other Congressional 
legislation, has followed through on 
this. Taking matters into their own 
hands, Gulf residents from a wide 
range of differing groups took part in 
the first official meeting to try and 
formally establish, from the ground 
up, a GoM RCAC in May 2013 in 
New Orleans—albeit with the 
conspicuous and pointed absence of 
any oil industry representatives, in 
spite of their having been invited. 
ConocoPhillips, the only OI that 
deigned to even respond, justified its 
non-appearance on the grounds that
88
they believe there are already enough 
avenues to discuss things with all 
possible stakeholders.
REAs 10 BP liability money 
should be invested into 
existing, but under- 
resourced coastal 
restoration initiatives -> 
DHOS-3
H D5 Although the RESTORE Act 
stipulates that 80% of BP’s eventual 
CWA fines will be deposited into 
Gulf state coffers, not the federal 
Treasury’s (as per custom), it is 
entirely up to state governors how to 
spend/distribute the money. SC, 
based on the strong Republican 
majorities in all five Gulf states, 
thinks this bodes ill.
OPA 12 President’s only priority 
should be stopping the 
oil flow—thinking 
about anything else will 
lead to hasty decisions 
that will cost jobs -> 
DHOS-3
H D12 Under federal auspices, the well was 
capped on 15, July, and the well 
officially killed almost exactly two 
months later. Whether Mr. Obama’s 
‘thinking about anything else’ cost 
jobs is entirely in the eyes of the 
beholder—Republicans, especially 
Gulfers, tended to think so based on 
the fishing closures and the six- 
month moratorium.
OPA 13 Federal government 
using every resource in 
its arsenal to respond to 
DHOS; it will hold BP 
responsible -> DHOS-4
C Dl,
D7
In addition to apparently using every 
resource in its arsenal, FG also 
forced BP to set up a $20 billion 
escrow account to compensate Gulf 
residents for DHOS-related losses, 
and is currently seeking a verdict of 
gross negligence in relation to the 
Clean Water Act.
Prez 16 Prez will make BP pay; 
Prez will relentlessly 
pursue responsible 
parties for full 
compensation, and hold 
federal fully 
accountable for its part 
DHOS-2, 9
C Dl,
D7,
DIO,
D ll,
D12
President Obama appeared 
instrumental in forcing BP to set up a 
$20 billion escrow account to 
compensate Gulf residents of DHOS 
losses; and through the Justice 
Department, is currently pursuing a 
verdict of gross negligence in 
violation of CWA to be awarded a 
further $20 billion ($5 billion if the 
verdict is mere negligence).
Prez 17 DHOS revealing how 
inadequate, broken, and 
unenforced OCS system 
is, hurting an already 
injured region, and
C D3,
D6,
D9
MMS was broken up into three, 
independent regulatory bodies to 
eradicate the collusion and conflict- 
of-interest that has plagued OCS 
management since 1954 (when OCS
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therefore calls for 
systemic overhaul of 
OCS; how oil industry 
and federal conducted 
offshore will be 
overhauled to root out 
flaws; DHOS-5, 10
Act was enacted), and especially 
since MMS was formed in 1981. 
According to the regulatory 
enforcement body, regulations have 
been strengthened, enforcement 
increased, and proper, more frequent 
inspections conducted.
Environmental groups and industry 
watch-dogs, however, claim that 
nothing has fundamentally changed; 
judging from the frequency of lease- 
granting since 2011, the criticism 
may not be unfounded.___________
’This table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized 
action-oriented crisis frames.
Of the five correlates, only President Obama’s call to overhaul the OCS system (ACS 
17) exhibits a correlation between both the frame and outcome origin and the frame and 
outcome terminus; the other four feature only one or the other—either the frame and outcome 
origins correlate, but not the terminuses, or vice versa. The reason for the President’s 
complete correlation is not clear from the data, but the most likely possibility is that his 
action frame represented a ‘perfect storm’ of various factors that permitted it to pass from 
frame to outcome intact—no additions, no subtractions, no alterations.182
As for the other four correlates, an even split exists between those with frame and 
outcome origin correlations and those with frame and outcome terminus ones: REAs’ ASCs 8 
and 9 (see Appendix I) each have correlating frame and outcome terminuses, but not origins, 
and OPA’s ACS 13 and President’s ACS 16 each have correlating origins, but not 
terminuses. The primary reason for REAs’ lack of correlation between frame and outcome 
origins is due not to a disagreement about what strata of society should be responsible for 
implementing their actions, but instead to neither crisis frame mentioning an origin; they only 
state or recommend an action. The data provides no clues indicating why they neglected to
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nominate an actor to carry out what they wanted done. In the end, however, the NGOs’ call
for long-term response became the responsibility of BP and the FG (i.e., top-down
actors/institutions), reflecting the perception that only these upper-echelon actors possessed
the expertise and resources to implement long-term response. The formation of the GoM
RCAC, meanwhile, has largely fallen upon the shoulders of the various environmental
organizations operating along the Gulf Coast because both the 01 (claiming that satisfactory
forums for industry-public interface already exist) and the FG (forgetting that its non-partisan
181National Commission recommending their formation) have declined to take part.
The two half-correlates, in contrast, exhibit a correlation between each of their frame 
and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses. At first, this may seem surprising, 
on account of them being half-correlates, but their inability to attain complete correlation has 
nothing to do with what the frames stated, and what the outcomes delivered, and everything 
to do with a lack of information about the implications that accompanied the action frames.
In other words, although REAs’ demand that BP liability money be invested into (existing) 
coastal restoration projects (ACS 10) appears to have been granted by the RESTORE Act 
stipulating that at least 80% of BP’s fines bypass the federal treasury and be deposited 
directly into the coffers of the Gulf states, earmarked for coastal restoration, the Governors of 
those states ultimately have full discretion over how the money is spent; some actors, such as 
Sierra Club, are worried the money will not be used for its intended purpose, citing the 
Republican majorities in all five Gulf states and the lack of public input (Mastrototaro 2012). 
And while OPA wanted the President to concentrate on stopping the spill (ACS 12), which 
he did, they also contended that if he thought about anything else, job-losses would surely 
follow; however, while President Obama did think of other things, such as pushing for a six-
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month moratorium on new deepwater drilling and giving his blessing to Sol Salazar’s 
overhaul of the MMS, it is unknown if any jobs were lost as a result.184
Summary
Based on what little data is available, it seems that during SBOS, FSs framing action 
in terms of crisis resulted in virtually no correlations with the actual outcomes, while those 
doing so during DHOS appeared to achieve a moderate amount (i.e., a little less than half the 
action frames manifested to some degree as actual outcomes). In SBOS’s case, the crux of 
the matter is that its FSs did not really perceive—and thus frame—the spill as a crisis; as a 
consequence, they only put forth five action frames, which produced no correlations and just 
a single half-correlate (plus two indeterminates and non-correlates each). Although DHOS 
FSs did not suffer (to the same extent) from their counterpart’s perceptual problem, their 15 
action frames resulted in a mere seven correlates and half-correlates (plus five indeterminates 
and three non-correlates). Whether their action frames correlated or not, DHOS FSs almost 
always advocated for top-down action, and the actual outcomes predominately reflected this; 
and although SBOS is best remembered for its bottom-up initiatives, and while its half­
correlative sought to bring top and bottom together, the actual outcome its FS wanted was 
accomplished almost entirely by top-down processes. What is more, while the Deepwater 
Horizon's frames (again, correlative or not) focused on financial compensation, visceral 
response, and oil dependency, Santa Barbara’s failed to demonstrate any pattem(s)—each 
frame existed in its own world, never concurring with any other. Finally, although the legacy 
of SBOS’s half-correlate action is well into its fifth decade, it appears that none of DHOS’s 
correlatives or half-correlates will enjoy such longevity and impact: the clean up in Florida, 
Mississippi, and Alabama has already ended (Platt 2013), and Louisiana’s will probably
wrap-up soon; the money exacted (or donated) by the responsible parties will be used up, one
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way or the other; and the BOEMs have not significantly slowed the expansion of offshore 
exploration and production (Wethe 2013).
5.2.2 — Correlations between SBOS and DHOS Action-Oriented Disaster Frames and Their 
Respective Outcomes
If there is one thing that the SBOS and DHOS FSs ‘agreed’ upon it was that first and 
foremost they perceived their respective spills as disasters (see Chapter 5.1). Even though 
only ten of SBOS’s 13 FSs framed the spill as a disaster, they nevertheless managed to 
generate 92 disaster frames; of those, however, only 25 were action-oriented (representing 
27.5% of the total number), encompassing 17 unique ADSs. Chart 16 shows that six of the 
action frames correlated with the spill’s outcomes and six half-correlated; and while there 
was only one indeterminate, there were 12 no correlations (see Appendix H). Sierra Club 
proffered the most action disaster frames (five), but despite their troubles failed to achieve 
any degree of correlation, instead earning the highest number of non-correlates (four); State 
Actors, on the other hand, generated the second greatest number of action frames (alongside 
OP A), and by doing so won the greatest number of correlations, with a single full one and 
two halves (OPA secured two half-correlates); and finally, GOO! attained two full correlates, 
more than any other FS.185 Of all the outcomes, State Oil Moratorium (S3) accrued the most 
correlations and half-correlations, two and three, respectively, for a total of five; Enhanced 
American Environmental Movement (S9) came in second, with three, all of which were full 
correlates.186 Table 3 attempts to account for these results, and explain how they correlate 
with the SBOS’s actual outcomes.
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Chart 16: Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Disaster Frames and the
Spill’s Outcomes**
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pThis chart is essentially the same as Chart 14; the only difference is that the data pertains to SBOS generalized 
action-oriented disaster flames.
Table 3: SBOS Disaster-to-Outcomes Correlations0
Gov 23 Even though SBOS C S3 Commerce Secretary did suspend
took place on OCS new state offshore oil operations;
operating under federal this suspension has continued for
regulations, the state new offshore production for the past
Commerce Secretary 44 years and counting. Whether the
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will suspend state oil 
operations until a 
review has been 
completed -> SBOS-2
review found something 
fundamentally disquieting, or public 
opinion informed by the growing 
environmental movement, caused 
this to happen cannot be 
determined.
GOO! 25 Even though GOO! 
only sought to remove 
oil development from 
SBC, their efforts have 
piqued the nation—they 
do not want to see 
another SBOS; GOO! is 
supported by people 
across the country and 
world SBOS-2, 14
C S9,
S ll
Not only did GOO! collect 10,000 
signatures in support of removing 
OD from SBC, SBOS in general 
helped to increase environmental 
awareness throughout the US and 
the world.
GOO! 27 Even though Sol admits 
oil development in SBC 
a mistake, he is 
nevertheless trying to 
continue it by talking 
tougher regulations and 
clarifying cleanup 
responsibilities; Sol has 
resumed oil 
development in SBC; 
Hickel guilty of 
resuming oil 
development in SBC; 
resumption of oil 
development in SBC 
unsurprising because of 
"weight of tradition" 
SBOS-8, 9,13,18
C S5 Almost from the beginning, Mr. 
Hickel cited the weakness, or lack, 
of regulations as the prime culprit 
for SBOS, and stronger, newer 
regulations were made and 
implemented. Oil production did 
continue in SBC, albeit in federal 
waters, but the rate of its increase 
was undoubtedly blunted by the 
force of negative public opinion, 
and from 1981 to 2008, a federal 
moratorium on new offshore 
development anywhere that was not 
GoM or certain areas of Alaska.
OPA 28 For pro-legislation for 
oil and water pollution, 
SBOS is proof-positive 
why more federal 
powers are required to 
ensure clean water, no 
oil pollution, and 
“careful site selection 
and effective [clean up] 
authorization”; 
provisions, such as 
depletion allowances,
H SI,
S12
Although SBOS did provide the 
final push for Senate to provide 
President with some of the above 
mentioned powers, and although it 
did help pass NEP A, which 
presumably aided in “careful site 
selection,” that is about where the 
spill’s influence ended. Although a 
Clean Water Act would be passed in 
1972, there is no evidence that 
SBOS was a major contributing 
factor to it; judging by later spills
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should be discontinued 
so as to make oil 
companies pay their fair 
share of income tax; 
took SBOS to alert 
Congress to need for 
conservation 
legislation; thanks to 
SBOS, Senate has 
finally passed 
legislation (after three 
years of effort) that give 
President power to 
impose financial 
liability on oil 
companies for their oil 
pollution, and authority 
to clean up spills -> 
SBOS-2, 3, 7, 8
and their lackluster cleanups, 
nothing came of improving 
response; and depletion allowances 
continue to be allowed.
OPA 5 SBOS has reaped a few 
certainties, but many 
uncertainties, and 
because of the latter, a 
moratorium should be 
enacted until_“all 
reasonable precautions” 
are in place -> SBOS-1
H S3 A moratorium/ban, in one form or 
another, on new offshore production 
has been in effect in state waters 
since 1969 as a direct consequence 
of SBOS; a federal one was in effect 
for new leases from 1981 to 2008; 
and in between, very few leases 
were granted and very little new 
production was initiated.
Sci 30 Sol is allowing the 
resumption of drilling 
in SBC even though he 
does not understand 
tectonic data -> SBOS- 
3
H S12 Mr. Hickel did permit drilling to 
resume in SBC. On the other hand, 
in the end it resulted in almost 
nought due to the lack of new oil 
production that would result in the 
wake of the spill.
Sci 25 Tide of conservationism 
driving the oil industry 
into a comer; many 
Americans inspired to 
pay attention/notice 
environmental 
destruction and come to 
aid -» SBOS-4, 9
C S9 SBOS is often cited as a significant 
milestone in raising awareness 
about the environment, and 
consequently as helping to build the 
American environmental 
movement. Judging from the lack of 
oil development that has occurred in 
SBC and CA coast, both state and 
federally, it would appear that that 
awareness (if not the movement) 
succeeded in making OI’s offshore 
footprint small.
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Sol 36 Future oil disasters will 
be prevented by the 
federal government and 
the oil industry working 
together to draft the 
best regulations 
possible; SBOS is so 
bad because current 
offshore regulations are 
inferior or non-existent, 
and by rectifying this, 
disasters like SBOS 
will not happen again 
-» SBOS-1, 3, 4
H S5 Mr. Hickel, almost from the 
beginning, blamed SBOS on poor or 
non-existent regulations; during the 
DuBridge panel, and presumably 
other meetings, FG and OI did 
collaborate to draft regulations, 
which Mr. Hickel was satisfied with 
and which caused controversy 
because a) those who caused the 
spill were the only actors allowed to 
provide input and b) the information 
upon which the regulations were 
based were not made publically 
available. Although there have been 
oil spills in US waters since SBOS, 
they have either been a) small, b) 
involved oil tankers, or c) not 
publicized; DHOS was only the 
second significant offshore platform 
spill in US waters in American 
history to gain public attention.
SA 37 Despite lack of spills in 
state waters, State 
Lands Commission 
reviewing its own 
house, in addition to 
federal’s, anyway to 
make sure -> DHOS-4
C S3 CA’s State Lands Commission did 
review its own house; whatever was 
found soon enough led to 
Sacramento instating a four-year 
ban on new leases/oil development 
in state waters. Whether the results 
of SLC’s review influenced/caused 
this to happen, or representatives 
listening to their constituents, is 
unknown.
SA 40 State government doing 
all it can to learn 
everything about SBOS 
to prevent another; 
legislation required to 
ensure that spills are 
better contained and 
mitigated; SBOS 
requires state to "take 
decisive action to 
prevent future oil 
disasters;" only 
bipartisan support can 
prevent future SBOSs 
SBOS-11, 12,13,14
H S3 CA did act to prevent another 
SBOS, albeit by enacting a four- 
year ban on new leases in state 
waters; this ban has continued, in 
one form or another, ever since. 
Whether the ban(s) were instituted 
with bipartisan support is unknown. 
Due to the outright ban on oil 
development in state waters, 
however, it does not appear that C A 
had any incentive to craft legislation 
that would ensure better 
containment. Since SBOS, CA has 
suffered at least one other oil spill, 
in SF Bay from a tanker.
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SA 40 State must “take 
decisive action to 
prevent future oil 
disasters;” in response 
to worst oil pollution 
disaster in continental 
US history, and to 
protect Californians, 
Attorney General 
speaking out in favour 
of Cranston’s bill -> 
SBOS-13, 15
H S3,
S6
CA did “take decisive action to 
prevent future oil disasters” by 
instituting a four-year ban on new 
state leases. On the other hand, Mr. 
Cranston’s bill aimed to ban oil 
development in FG-controlled 
areas, which would fail. Eventually, 
though, there would be a federal 
moratorium, lasting from 1981 to 
2008; in the mean time, the rate of 
new oil production along CA 
slowed to a crawl.
Dem 25 Because of the 
despoliation, people 
across US and world 
are asking why SBOS 
happened, and what 
Congress can do to 
prevent another; spill is 
raising questions about 
FG’s ability to prevent 
future spills and 
whether oil production 
in SBC is “truly.. .in the 
national interest” -> 
SBOS-9, 10
C S9,
S ll
In the wake of SBOS, 
environmental awareness increased; 
GOO! was able to procure 100,000 
signatures in favour of removing 
OD from SBC.
‘This table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to SBOS generalized 
action-oriented disaster frames.
Of the six correlating action disaster frames, four exhibit correlations between both 
frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; the other two feature only a 
correlation between the origins of the frames and outcomes, but not the terminuses. The four 
correlates—ADS 23, by Governor Reagan; ADS 27, by GOO!; ADS 30, by Scientists; and 
ADS 37, by State Actors (see Appendix I)—reveal two major patterns. The first is that three 
of them (ADSs 23,27, and 37) are top-down in orientation, while only one is bottom-up 
(ADS 30), a ratio that contrasts with the overall balanced distribution of the origins among 
the actual outcomes. From a frame point-of-view, this suggests that initially, at least (i.e., 
during the first 365 days), FSs stated or argued that the burden of action does or should fall
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upon the shoulders of upper-echelon actors—namely, federal and state governments— 
because preventing the next SBOS disaster is the only thing that can be done,187 and only 
those at the top have the possible wherewithal to accomplish such deterrence, i.e., by 
exercising their authority and purview to shut down offshore operations along the CA coast, 
conducting a full review of how it works, and ordering flaws fixed and changes made.188 The 
second pattern is that all four correlated actions have Oil Specific objectives (and eventual 
accomplishments) to them.189 On the one hand, this contrasts significantly with the dominant 
General Environment theme of the actual outcomes, but on the other, it indicates simpatico 
amongst the FSs and the top-down action initiators: each perceived that the primary target of 
any action should be the prevention of any and all future oil spill disasters, predicated on the 
idea that doing so is the only thing that can be done.
The two frame and outcome origin-only correlates (by GOO! and Senator Cranston), 
meanwhile, are bottom-up in orientation, with the actual outcomes—specifically, ADS 25 -  
Rising environmental/oil awareness—manifesting because of the work of ordinary people 
taking action. Both FSs’ frame terminuses, however, were Oil Specific in target, seeking to 
remove oil development from the SBC. The explanation for the disparity between the FSs’ 
oil-centric goals and the actual outcomes likely lies with the fact that the NIMBYism 
overlaying both GOOl’s and Mr. Cranston’s frames was soon subsumed by the explosion of 
general environmental awareness (and eventually action) that SBOS would spawn; why this 
happened, my research cannot answer.190
Like the full correlates, four of the six half-correlating action disaster frames exhibit 
correlations between frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; of the 
remaining two, one features a frame and outcome origin half-correlation, but not a terminus 
one, and the other highlights the opposite. The four complete half-correlates—ADS 28, by
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OP A; ADS 30, by Scientists; ADS 36, by Sol Hickel; and ADS 40, by State Actors (see 
Appendix I)—are all top-down in orientation and Oil Specific in target, reflecting the FSs’ 
contention that only upper-echelon actors could enact sweeping environmental legislation, 
prevent future spills, and operationalize academic knowledge and skills. Although the actual 
outcomes concurred with these advocations, they ended up meeting the frames half-way 
because only some of the a) environmental legislation (namely, NEPA), b) “effective [clean 
up] authorization” (OSIC 1969-73), and c) Presidential powers to impose financial liability 
on offending oil companies came to pass as a probable direct result of SBOS. Although Mr. 
Hickel did resume drilling in SBC despite the tectonic risk, the predicted earthquakes did not 
happened, much less induce even more terrible SBOSs; the new rules and regulations the 
Interior Secretary was so proud of did not prevent future spills; and although the CA 
government did succeed in preventing oil spills along its coast, it did so by way of a 
moratorium, therefore dampening the need for legislation to develop better oil spill 
containment measures (OSIC 1969-73).
As Chart 16 showed, SBOS featured a high number of non-correlations19' and only a 
single indeterminate. The near total absence of the latter is attributable to the fact that after 40 
years, much of the uncertainty obscuring the existence of correlations between action disaster 
frames and actual outcomes has been erased.192 The large number of non-correlates, 
meanwhile, can be explained by the fact that two-thirds of them either advocate for the 
prevention of future oil spills or for the termination of all oil development in the SBC.193,194 
In short, these FSs sabotaged the chances of their actions manifesting any degree of 
correlation by demanding action that a) would not happen (ending oil development in the 
SBC), b) could not happen (the only way to prevent oil spills is to shut down the oil
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economy), or c) were accomplished through alternative means (i.e., new regulations, courtesy 
of Mr. Hickel).
Just as the predominant pattern among the correlates and half-correlations was for 
top-down Oil Specific action, so too was it for the non-correlates.195 Eight frames cite or 
imply that an upper-echelon actor—almost always the government, usually the federal one— 
should be responsible for initiating the proffered action, and seven target some aspect of the 
oil situation, either in the form of prevention or complete excision (see above).196 This near­
total obsession with calling on the government to remedy the spill, and the fixation on spill- 
related targets, may have contributed to the number of non-correlations by way of expecting 
far too much of government, and being blind to the other issues SBOS brought, or could have 
brought, to the fore and deserved greater attention.
As pointed out above, the outcomes State Oil Moratorium (S3) and Enhanced 
American Environmental Movement (S9) garnered the most correlations from the various 
FSs’ action disaster frames (five and three, respectively), because CA was in a position to 
‘reject’ offshore oil since its economy did not depend upon it, and because environmentalism 
had been steadily building throughout the decade, fuelled by the work of Rachael Carson and 
the spontaneous combustion of the Cuyahoga River. They are also mirror images of each 
other—while S3 is top-down oriented and Oil Specific in target, S9 is bottom-up and impacts 
the General Environment. Not only does this partially reflect the divide characterizing 
SBOS’s actual outcomes, but it also reveals a complete lack of vision about the role middle- 
outwards actors could play in the spill’s aftermath (while one and a third of the actual 
outcomes involved the middle, only one FS—Senator Murphy—put forth an action frame 
origin suggesting they instigate action, albeit in conjunction with a top-down actor).197
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Meanwhile, 13 DHOS FSs produced 166 generalized disaster frames during the 
spill’s first year, but only 54 of those were action-oriented (representing 32.5% of the total 
number), encompassing 43 unique ADSs. Chart 17 shows that 12 of those 54 are correlates, 
while eight are half-correlates; the remainder are divided amongst 10 non-correlates, two 
indeterminate-non-correlations,198 and an astounding 22 indeterminates (see Appendix H). As 
they did in 1969, Sierra Club 2010 put forth the most action disaster frames (10), but unlike 
then, they managed to score four correlations, which not only represents the highest number 
of full-correlates of any FS, but also the highest number of correlations of any degree; on the 
other hand, the NGO also incurred four non-correlates—the most of any DHOS FS.199 OPA 
generated the second-greatest number of disaster frames (eight), getting five indeterminates 
for their efforts,200 more than any other single FS. Senator Landrieu, meanwhile, proffered 
the third-highest number, at six (a correlate, two indeterminates, and an indeterminate-non- 
correlation). And while REAs are only one of three fourth-place finishers, they achieved the 
greatest variety of results—a correlate, an indeterminate, an indeterminate-non-correlation, 
and two non-correlates.201 From the clutch of twelve actual outcomes, Other Outcomes (D12) 
accrued the most correlates and half-correlations with 14, of which 10 are correlates and four 
half-correlations;202 $20 Billion Escrow Account (Dl) comes in second, with seven (four 
correlates and three half-ones); and BP Pleads Guilty to 11 Counts o f Manslaughter, Two 
Misdemeanors, and A Felony Count o f Lying to Congress — Fined $4.5 Billion (D7) is third, 
with four (three correlates and single half-one).204 Table 4 attempts to account for these 
results, as well as to explain how they correlate with the SBOS’s actual outcomes.
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Chart 17: Correlations Between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented Disaster Frames and
Their Outcomes*3
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Table 4: DHOS Disaster-to-Outcomes Correlations
Aud 44 DHOS inspiring
ordinary people to take 
responsibility by 
coming out to help with 
response effort -> 
DHOS-3
D12 Thousands of people did, indeed, 
come out to help in whatever way 
they could during DHOS.
GR 47 DHOS is a complex 
disaster causing 
widespread mental 
health issues, leading to 
medical, social, and 
economic problems, 
and this requires 
complex solutions, 
from BP paying claims 
to public service ads 
stressing the importance 
of staying connected to 
ensuring seafood safety 
to monitoring care­
giver states of mind; 
many Gulfers are 
stricken with health 
ailments, but oil spills
H D1 BP, primarily through its $20 billion 
escrow account, paid out claims for 
three years (the account was empty 
by around July 2013); whether BP is 
paying for claims by other means is 
difficult to determine. Whether BP is 
actually helping with the medical, 
social, and economic problems 
induced by DHOS is unknown.
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have long been 
considered 
environmental 
problems, not health, 
so... -> DHOS-4, 25
GR 50 Due to the scale of 
DHOS, non-profits 
have been vital to 
response/recovery, and 
will continue to as 
short-term segues into 
long-term -> DHOS-7
C D8,
D12
Environmental groups have been 
busy putting forth suggestions about 
how to go about restoring the Gulf, 
and criticizing what has already been 
suggested or has not been suggested. 
In May, the preliminary meeting of 
GoM RCAC met to work out how to 
bring the organization into being (in 
lieu of federal mandate, as had 
happened in the case of Alaska’s 
RCACs).
REAs 59 DHOS so bad that only 
federal and responsible 
parties have the 
resources to respond, 
and they should provide 
them -» DHOS-19
C D12 For the most part, only FG and 
OI/BP responded to DHOS: FG 
declined international aid, and 
although thousands of ordinary 
people came out to help with the 
response, plus the monitoring efforts 
of NGOs, the primary work was done 
by the government and the industry.
BPHT 60 BP committing to pay 
all legitimate claims in 
“simple randl fair” way 
DHOS-2
c D12 Primarily through the $20 billion 
escrow account, BP paid out claims; 
recently, it has gone to court to stop 
future claims payouts on account of 
incidents of fraud.
OPA 16 America must not 
tolerate BP's profits 
over safety behaviour, 
but make sure BP pays 
for any/all damages and 
decide whether they 
should be allowed back 
in GoM; nation must 
take the opportunity to 
rethink its energy 
policy ("this mad rush 
to drill") in a 
depoliticized way, bring 
those responsible 
forward, prevent 
another, and make the 
oil industry upgrade its
H Dl,
D7,
DIO,
D ll
Although FG has pursued BP to pay 
for any and all damages related to 
DHOS, continues to do so via CWA, 
and has brought the responsible 
parties forward, it has allowed BP 
back into GoM. What is more, nation 
has not taken the opportunity to 
rethink its energy policy, in a 
depoliticized or politicized way, and 
it seems unlikely that it has forced 01 
to upgrade its cleanup technology.
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cleanup technology -> 
DHOS-3,10
OPA 62 OI and FG working 
together and using 
massive amounts of 
resources to end DHOS 
quickly and
satisfactorily -> DHOS- 
7
C D12 OI (in form of BP) and FG did use 
vast reservoirs of resources to 
respond to DHOS.
Prez 70 Of DHOS’s many 
lessons, one is that oil 
production should only 
be allowed if there are 
assurances that another 
DHOS cannot/will not 
happened, oil industry 
not allowed back into 
GoM until this 
provided; deepwater 
drilling in GoM should 
only continue if oil 
industry can supply 
assurances of no more 
DHOSs -» DHOS-4, 15
C D12 Due to the uptick in leasing in GoM, 
it would appear that OI has provided 
assurances that another DHOS 
cannot and will not happen. As a 
caveat, there is no solid, 
independently verifiable proof that 
such has actually occurred.
Prez 47 President considers BP 
financially and legally 
responsible for DHOS 
and therefore is 
obligated to repair 
damages to families, 
communities, and 
environment in addition 
to following federal’s 
directives -> DHOS-6
C Dl,
D7,
D12
All throughout the stop-the-gusher 
phase, FG (in the form of the Unified 
Command) made sure BP was 
operating per the rules. In addition, 
Mr. Obama convinced BP to set up a 
$20 billion escrow account to 
compensate Gulf Coast victims of the 
spill. BP has been cleaning/paying 
for the cleaning of oiled coastline for 
the past three years; cleanup 
operations in Florida, Alabama, and 
Mississippi have recently come to a 
close, citing success (July 2013). FG 
is currently prosecuting BP for CWA 
fines.
SC 5 To spare other 
America’s other coasts 
from spills, oceans 
afire, and oil-threatened 
habitat, President 
should issue 
moratorium; leaders
C D2,
D4
Mr. Obama did issue a moratorium 
on new offshore drilling, but it only 
pertained to new deepwater projects, 
and it only lasted six months. On the 
other hand, Mr. Obama’s decision to 
open up the Atlantic Coastline and 
the Eastern GoM in March 2010 was
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must prove they get the 
oil-is-unwise message 
by reinstating national 
moratorium; DHOS 
proves that offshore is 
inherently unsafe, thus 
justifying a blanket 
moratorium on new 
offshore; only way to 
prevent another DHOS 
is to keep Eastern GoM 
and Atlantic Coast out 
of 5-year drilling plan 
-> DHOS-1, 10, 13,27
rescinded soon after DHOS began, 
and was confirmed in December 
2011; therefore, both these regions 
are not a part of the five-year drilling 
plan, and are safe from until at least 
2017.
SC 16 BP cheated; BP’s spill 
has killed people and 
jeopardized the 
livelihoods of 1000s, 
and they should be 
prosecuted; DHOS is 
BP’s fault because they 
did not purchase 
equipment that could 
have prevented the 
spill, and because they 
mishandled the 
response; BP is failing 
to staunch the oil flow 
-» DHOS-3,4, 8,21
C Dl,
D7,
D12
BP has been and is in the process of 
being prosecuted, the punishment 
always being financial compensation: 
for the cleanup and to victims. Their 
recently depleted $20 billion escrow 
account, among other compensatory 
sources has been used to pay for 
damages and harm. They are 
apparently footing the bill for the 
cleanup (which has recently ended in 
Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi). 
On the other hand, BP did manage to 
staunch the oil flow, on 15 July,
2010.
sc 47 BP should be made to 
pay compensation for 
their willful negligence; 
DHOS is BP's fault and 
they should pay for the 
entire cleanup, 
compensate every 
victim, and pay for 
every destroyed 
national treasure; 
leaders must keep 
holding BP responsible 
for DHOS -> DHOS-4, 
8, 10
C Dl,
D7,
D12
In 2012, BP was found guilty of 
errors and omissions leading up to 
DHOS, and fined $4.5 billion (a 
record); in 2010, they were forced to 
set up a $20 billion escrow account; 
and they are now in the process of a 
civil trial to determine how negligent 
they were under CWA rules, the 
verdict leading to additional fines of 
$5 billion to $20 billion.
sc 73 Oil industry’s influence 
continues to be 
powerful, blocking Gulf
C D12 OI is as plugged into the political 
Zeitgeist as before.
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Coast recovery, 
prevention of future 
spills, and initiating CE 
economy; bills to hold 
BP accountable, action 
to reform OCS and 
prevent future spills 
blocked because of oil 
industry influence over 
a handful of senators; 
oil industry working 
hard to prevent 
America’s entry into 
CE economy 
DHOS-6, 12, 18
Sol 80 Because of DHOS, Dol 
is increasing 
inspections, 
investigating the root 
causes of the spill, more 
thoroughly examining 
exploration plans, and 
reforming MMS to 
make offshore safe; Dol 
doing everything within 
its power to respond 
and protect/restore 
what's been damaged, 
even changing its plans; 
Dol has been 
aggressive in its 
response, even at Day 
11 mark; Dol is helping 
people harmed by 
DHOS and learning 
lessons to prevent 
another DHOS-2, 4, 
6,7
H D3,
D6,
D9
It appears that Dol has done 
everything it says it was doing or 
planned on doing, especially in 
regard to reforming MMS; whether 
this has made offshore safe is 
unknown, though spokespeople have 
(predictably) confirmed that it has. 
On the other hand, it is not known if 
Dol really is helping restore/protect 
what has been damaged by the spill.
Sol 82 DHOS requires a) a 
massive response and 
b) a "cautious 
approach" to boost 
safety and oversight -> 
DHOS-10
H D12 While DHOS did receive a massive 
response, it is not known if a 
“cautious approach” was and 
continues to be used in regard to 
safety and oversight.
Dem 83 DHOS reaction must be 
calm and measured to
C D12 Judging from the fact that no truly 
radical outcomes came out of DHOS
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get the “right lesson” to 
make the “wisest 
decisions;” although 
spill is terrible, and 
improvements to the 
system are required, 
must maintain 
perspective—most oil is 
harvested without 
spills, natural seeps 
introduce far more oil 
than even DHOS, 
America needs oil, 
should not export 
potential spills to ill- 
equipped countries 
DHOS-1,9
(i.e., a complete moratorium on all or 
new offshore everywhere for greater 
than six months; unambiguous, 
uncompromising, and public 
commitment to achieving CE backed 
up with substantial investment), but 
rather an almost complete 
reinstatement of BAU—save for 
reforming MMS, increasing 
inspections, tightening regulations, 
etc.—it would appear that the calm 
and measured approach was indeed 
taken, resulting in the “right 
lesson[s]” that went on to inform the 
“wisest decisions.” Rigs that 
apparently took off during DHOS are 
returning to GoM.
Dem 47 BP is responsible for all 
economic and psych 
damages caused by 
DHOS, and should be 
using local know-how 
and motivation; BP's 
compensation 
DHOS-7,6
H Dl,
D2
BP is/has paid billions in 
compensation, though whether this 
also included psychological damages 
is unknown. It is also unknown if BP 
is using local know-how in the post­
spill phase; they did hire local boats 
during the actual spill, but 
besides/after that?
Dem 85 Need a balance between 
improving safety and 
oil industry’s 
importance to 
Louisiana's economy 
and America's energy 
security -> DHOS-13
H D12 The definition of ‘balance’ is not 
given; however, judging from Ms. 
Landrieu’s pro-drilling credentials, it 
would appear that she has gotten her 
balance: drilling continues, 
BOEMRE says safety has been 
improved.
Rep 52 Small Business 
Administration should 
be allowing deferred 
payments and not 
denying so many loan 
applications; Dept of 
Commerce Secretary 
should declare a 
fisheries disaster 
because of the 
importance of Gulf 
fishing to national 
economy; BP 
should/must provide
H D5,
D12
It is unknown if Small Business 
Administration and the Gulf banks 
relaxed their rules. However, I 
believe BP did give written assurance 
that they would pay for all costs 
associated with DHOS (whether they 
are honouring this is not known); and 
according to the RESTORE Act, the 
majority of BP’s CWA fines will go 
to the Gulf states for the purpose of 
coastal restoration (whether the states 
will use every penny for this is 
unknown).
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written assurance that 
they will pay for all 
costs caused by DHOS, 
and federal should give 
majority of this money 
to Gulf states so they 
can invest in coastal 
restoration; the 
interface between 
decision makers and 
spill-effected people 
should continue; Gulf 
banks should be helping 
Gulf/Louisiana people 
by relaxing their rules 
(restructure loans, 
waive late-fees, hasten 
loan decisions) so 
repayment not required 
now, but when BP 
money starts arriving 
DHOS-1,2, 4, 6,8
Rep 87 Need to "educate 
environmental groups” 
and other stakeholders 
to make sure that facts 
dominate, not theories 
or political and 
fundraising agendas -> 
DHOS-6
H D12 However, based on the fact that Mr. 
Vitter is a staunch Republican, it 
appears that the “facts” did 
“dominate” in that offshore 
production has continued in GoM.
dThis table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized 
action-oriented disaster frames.
Of the 12 correlating disaster frames, 10 exhibit correlations between both frame and 
outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; the remaining two each feature 
correlations between the frame and outcome origins, but not the terminuses. All but one of 
the 10 full-correlates205 are top-down in orientation, accurately reflecting the distribution of 
origins among the actual outcomes. Unlike during SBOS, where the preponderance of top- 
down origins suggested that virtually all the FSs shared the perception that only upper- 
echelon actors had the ability to prevent future spills, DHOS’s near-unanimity indicates that
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its FSs believed that only the FG and the OI had the capabilities to take (any) action against 
the spill on account of its scope and scale; as one of the REAs pointed out, Deepwater 
Horizon was so vast and terrible that only government and industry had the resources to 
respond (Cresson 2010).206
If the near-universal consensus among the full-correlates was that action against 
DHOS should come from the top-down, and that the actors belonging to this category 
seemingly agreed by accepting the burden of responsibility, then no such commonality can 
be found amongst the correlating outcomes, which are a hodgepodge of different 
suggestions/demands and manifestations. This result accords well, in general, with the 
distribution of terminuses among the outcomes, which offer a similar medley. While three of 
the correlates (by Sierra Club and Ms. Landrieu) are Oil Specific, three others fall under 
Various Outcomes—two (by REAs and OP A) pertain to response and one (by President 
Obama) to guarantee;207 of the remaining four, two (by BP/Halliburton/Transocean and 
Sierra Club) are allocated to Economic/Financial Compensation, one (by Mr. Obama) to 
Corporate Accountability-Economic/Financial Compensation-General Environment (CA- 
E/FC-GE), and one (by Audubon) to General Environment™ This melange of terminuses 
(and eventual outcomes) suggests that unlike SBOS FSs, with their binary view of the spill, 
DHOS FSs recognized that oil spill response was and must be holistic, tackling the health, 
economic, and livelihood consequences, as well. This, in turn, offers further justification for 
the predominance of the top-down orientation of the frame and outcome origins and 
terminuses: only vast institutions/organizations that can touch multiple facets of society, like 
government and industry, can render aid and response to an occurrence that is equally multi­
faceted.
I l l
As mentioned above, Other Outcomes received the most correlations, with 14 (of 
which 10 are full-correlates): nine of those cite only D12, while five refer to it in combination 
with at least one other outcome (seven of the 10 only cite Other Outcomes, while three 
appear in association with others).209 Two major themes link many of the full-correlation 
D12s. The first revolves around people and/or institutions coming together for common 
purpose to affect mutually-beneficial results. It is less surprising that these actions—such as 
a) ordinary people coming out to help with the response (Audubon), b) the FG and the OI 
being the only actors capable of responding to something of DHOS’s scale (REAs), and c) 
government and industry working hard together to end the spill—happened at all than it is 
that some FSs felt the need to point out that these actions (should have) happened in the first 
place.210 The second major theme concerns BP’s civil liability under the Clean Water Act, 
the pending verdict of which will determine whether the multinational will pay an additional 
$4-5 billion in fines or $18-20 billion; both President Obama and Sierra Club refer to this. 
Almost three years after litigation began, a ruling has yet to be reached,211 though one is 
expected in 2014.212
Meanwhile, four of the eight half-correlating action disaster frames exhibit half­
correlations between both frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; the 
remaining four consist of three that have a half-correlation between the frame and outcome 
origins, but not the terminuses, and one featuring the opposite. Unlike the full-correlations, 
all four complete half-correlates are top-down in orientation; also, unlike their counterparts, 
there is a clear predominance among the terminuses, i.e., three of them are Oil Specific (the 
forth is Economic/Financial Compensation). The former result is entirely in keeping with the 
preponderance of top-down origins among DHOS’s crisis and disaster action frames, and 
likely has the same explanation.214 The Oil Specific majority of the outcome origins and
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terminuses are, on the one hand, reflective of the tendency of the actual outcomes to have 
affected one aspect of oil development or another,215 but on the other, contradictory of the 
plurality of actual outcomes that distinguishes DHOS’s aftermath from SBOS’s. The primary 
reason for this lack of variety among the half-correlated outcomes is because only two FSs— 
Sol Salazar and Senator Landrieu—put forth all four of those action disaster frames; with so 
few contributors, it is little wonder that the pool of terminuses is so shallow, especially when
7  1 a  7 1 7these FSs have an interest in continuing oil production in the GoM. ’
As for the three frame and outcome origins-only half-correlates, all are top-down in 
orientation and supplied by only two FSs (Government Reports and Senator Vitter); the 
actual outcomes they anticipated were initiated by upper-echelon actors; and Other Outcomes 
claimed two of the three. These findings are consistent with DHOS’s other action-oriented 
disaster frames, and what explains them probably applies to these, as well. The most likely 
reason for Government Report’s and Mr. Vitter’s lack of half-correlations between frame and 
outcome terminuses is that it is all but impossible to determine if they have or have not been 
accomplished, to say nothing of to what degree—this is just like with the full half- 
correlates.218, 219 As for the remaining partial half-correlate frame and outcome terminus, 
meanwhile, its incompleteness is due to the fact that while OPA’s call for Economic/ 
Financial Compensation and Corporate Responsibility manifested as an actual outcome, it 
was achieved through strictly top-down measures (the President, the courts), contradicting 
OPA’s desire that “America”/“the Nation” ensure they were done—in other words, they tried 
to rally the combined might of top-down, middle-outwards, and bottom-up actors to censure 
BP, rethink the country’s energy policy, and make the OI upgrade its clean-up technology. 
What is more, this half-correlate is the only one where it is not unknown or indeterminable 
whether some of the advocated actions actually happened. Rather, the US has clearly not
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rethought its energy policy (in a non-politicized way, or even a politicized one), and it is 
unlikely that the OI has upgraded its clean-up technology (judging from the fact that it has 
not advanced much since 1969).
In addition to DHOS-disaster acquiring the most action-oriented frame-to-outcome 
(half-)correlates of any CDC (including those of SBOS), it also has the second-highest 
number of non-correlates (after SBOS-disaster) and—by far—the greatest number of 
indeterminates. Over half the non-correlations were incurred because the FSs (mostly REAs 
and Sierra Club) demanded that the nation’s addiction to oil end and its commitment to 
achieving a CE economy begin, which, considering how dependent the American economy is 
on fossil fuels, was just never going to happen.220 As for the indeterminates, the reason for 
their existence is the same as the one explaining why most of the half-correlates are 
indeterminate: it is next to impossible to find out whether the proffered actions happened or 
not, and to what degree.221
Taken together, the indeterminates and non-correlates offer an accurate reflection of 
the distribution of the 20 (half-)correlate frame origins and outcomes. Twenty-four of the 
indeterminates are top-down in orientation,222 replicating the consensus that upper-echelon 
actors should and/or must take action against DHOS, and reinforcing the conclusion that the 
FSs perceived that only government and industry could and should respond to the spill. 
Furthermore, not only did the outcomes those FSs seek cover a wide range of different 
targets, echoing the diversity of the actual outcomes, but Oil Specific is also the leading 
action, just as it is amongst the correlates and actual outcomes, lending credence to the 
idea that for the FSs, the problems Deepwater Horizon exposed were limited to the means 
and ways of oil development, and did not involve such factors as oil dependence, poor 
response capabilities, or environmental destruction. In addition, many of these potential
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terminuses would have fallen under the Other Outcomes heading had they found (half- 
)correlation, echoing the fact that these types of actual outcomes dominated the correlations 
and had a strong presence among the half-correlates, and buttressing the suggestion that 
DHOS’s outcomes are/would have been dominated by the smaller, less spectacular and long­
standing ones, unlike SB OS.
Summary
Overall, these results suggest that nearly half the action-oriented frames put forth 
during Santa Barbara, and almost 40% during Deepwater Horizon, resulted in correlations or 
half-correlates. FSs from both spills tended to favour top-down action (regardless of whether 
or not their disaster frames correlated with the actual outcomes); but whereas DHOS frame 
outcomes accurately reflected this orientation, SBOS’s contradicted it by having middle- 
outwards and bottom-up actors step up to become prominent action-originators. As for the 
terminuses, SBOS FSs usually sought Oil Specific outcomes and DHOS ones 
overwhelmingly aimed for either Financial/Economic ones or miscellaneous results (i.e.,
D12 -  Other Outcomes)', but whereas DHOS frame outcomes successfully previewed what 
would be done (e.g., virtually every action the FG initiated concerned exacting monies from 
the responsible parties to punish them for their culpability, or to compensate victims),
SBOS’s failed to anticipate that the action initiated would have significant General 
Environment co-benefits. What is more, the (largely unanimous) opinion that government 
and/or industry should/must take active responsibility put forth by both spills’ FSs resulted in 
half the SBOS action frames, and a fifth of the DHOS ones, not correlating with any outcome 
whatsoever because they advocated for things that such upper-echelon actors either could 
not, or would not, execute.224 Meanwhile, the passage of time has eroded SBOS of all but one 
of its indeterminates (whose lingering existence can be attributed to the fact that its
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determination is dependent on interpretation, which in this case cannot be proved one way or 
the other), but has yet to do so for DHOS, explaining why nearly half of its disaster frames 
remain stuck in limbo.
Finally, SBOS’s top two outcomes—State Oil Moratorium and Enhanced American 
Environmental Movement—are mirror images of each other (i.e., top-down and Oil Specific 
versus bottom-up and General Environment), encapsulating what the spill has since come to 
represent: a (general environmental) legislative triumph that curtailed SBC oil production, 
and a national, even global, poster-child for humanity’s impact on the environment that 
inspired tens of thousands to take up environmentalism. DHOS’s top three, on the other 
hand—Other Outcomes, $20 Billion Escrow Account, and BP Pleads Guilty...Fined $4.5 
Billion—while all top-down in origin, all stop at completely different terminuses (various, 
Economic/Financial Compensation, and Oil Specific, respectively), which echoes the scope 
and scale of the spill, and signifies both the plurality of impacts oil spills are now more fully 
recognized as inflicting and the relatively limited inventory of tools available to mitigate 
them (e.g., throw money at the problem; promise better regulatory due-diligence). What is 
more, SBOS’s outcomes have stood the test of time—a moratorium on new offshore drilling 
in CA waters (and in the adjacent federal ones) continues to this day, and environmentalism 
in America remains a force—but it is unlikely DHOS’s will enjoy similar longevity, because 
they focused on extracting money (which either has been or will be accomplished) and 
carrying out transitory tasks, such as cleaning up oilfall (which will, and mostly has, come to 
an end).
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5.2.3 -  Correlations between SBOS and DHOS Action-Oriented Catastrophe Frames and
Their Respective Outcomes
According to the FSs of 1969, SBOS was second of all a catastrophe (see Chapter 
5.1), despite only five of them framing it as one. Of the 20 generalized catastrophe frames 
they put forth, just seven revolved around action (representing 35% of the total number), 
encompassing a mere five unique ACaSs. Chart 18 shows that only one of those seven 
correlated with any of the actual outcomes, and only one half-correlated; the remainder 
consist of one indeterminate and four non-correlates (see Appendix H). It also indicates that 
both Sierra Club and State Actors put forth the most action frames (two each), but while the 
latter achieved a mixture of results—the single half-correlation, and a non-correlate—both of 
the former’s frames ended in naught. And finally, it reveals that only four of the twelve 
actual outcomes received any kind of correlation, each one referenced but once. Table 5 
attempts to account for these results, as well as to expand upon them by explaining how they 
correlate with the SBOS’s actual outcomes.
Chart 18: Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Catastrophe Frames and
Their Outcomes11
GOO!? 24 1 X IN
OPA 6- N/A N/A N/A N\A NYA N\A N\A
Sri 1 89 6 X 11
SC 32 7 X 2N
24 1 X
SA « 24 1 X 1H, IN
S’ 90 2/11 X
Rep | 36 10 X 1C
H H I 5 6 1 1 1 4
S3, S4, S6
S5
RThis chart is essentially the same as Chart 14; the only difference is that the data pertains to SBOS generalized 
action-oriented catastrophe frames.
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Table 5: SBOS Catastrophe-to-Outcomes Correlations6
Rep 36 New laws and 
provisions needed to 
prevent oil spills 
because they are 
becoming common -> 
SBOS-1
S5 New laws and provisions were, indeed, 
enacted in the wake of SBOS (though 
whether they have prevented oil spills 
is up for debate).
SA 90 Both the state and 
federal government, for 
the sake of 
Californians, must act 
quickly and decisively 
to protect the marine 
environment from 
SBOSs -> SBOS-4
H 53,
54, 
S6
Although the state and FG did not 
really work together to protect the 
marine environment (of SBC), their 
individual efforts have helped keep oil 
development in the Channel to a 
minimum: the state enacted a four year 
ban on new leases, which was 
subsequently continued in one form or 
another; and beginning in 1982, FG 
instituted a moratorium on new leases 
all along the CA coast._____________
'This table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to SBOS generalized 
action-oriented catastrophe frames.
The single full-correlate action catastrophe frame exhibits a correlation between both 
frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses, and it is top-down in 
orientation and Oil Specific in target. Since Senator Murphy framed SBOS as a catastrophe, 
and since such are distinguished by their enormity and heights of devastation,226 it is only 
natural that he would suggest that the FG be the primary actor in charge of ensuring that 
another oil spill did not happen again; what is more, his call for new laws and provisions was 
a common one, most often advocated by Sol Hickel and the Government Report (OSIC 
1969-73). Likewise, oil development as the target of action was fully in keeping with the 
perception that the ecological environment would ultimately be fine, that the crux of the
matter was preventing such spills from happening again, especially in the SBC.227
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Meanwhile, the single half-correlate also features a correlation between both the 
frame and outcome origins and the frame and outcome terminuses; both are top-down in 
orientation and Oil Specific in target. That State Actors would frame SBOS as a catastrophe 
was a given considering how close to home the spill hit, and based on their (outsized? 
exaggerated?) perception of it. Furthermore, it was natural that they would call on the 
combined might of the federal and CA governments to protect their coastline against future 
spills; they were not alone in doing this (see GOO!, Senator Cranston, and Sierra Club). But 
while their choice of who should act did not distinguish them from their contemporaries, 
what they identified as the object of that action did, especially in combination with who: they 
were only the actors during SBOS to declare (within a CDC frame) that one of the duties of 
government was to protect the (ecological) environment from oil spills.228 No other FS did 
this, not GOO!, not even Sierra Club, who either only implied governmental responsibility 
for the environment, or tasked it with ending general pollution and/or economic exploitation. 
Although the FG would not really begin taking up its half of the duty until the early 1980s 
(explaining why the correlate is only a half), CA immediately enacted a four-year State Oil 
Moratorium (S3), in the process initiating the Unofficial Quasi-moratorium in CA’s Waters 
and OCS (S6) and the passage of CEQA (S4) in 1970.
As for SBOS’s collection of non-correlates, three of the four are top-down in
orientation and Oil Specific in target, albeit with General Environment co-benefits; these
same three all pertain to the same demand: Remove offshore OD from SBC (see Appendix I).
Despite the amount and degree of local outrage and petitioning in Santa Barbara, and despite
the (international coverage the spill received, along with the accompanying bad press both
the FG and the OI (albeit, primarily UO) suffered, instituting a ban on all offshore activity in
the Channel—in state and federal waters—and removing every extant rig was not going to
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happen. Although some FSs argued that paying the one billion dollars to buy back all SBC 
leases would be cheaper than risking coastal CA becoming a “dead sea” (OSIC 1969-73), it 
was obvious that neither the federal nor state governments would do such a thing, thus 
dooming all action frames advocating the contrary to non-correlative status. The remaining 
non-correlate—Sierra Club backing Need public participation—was bottom-up in orientation 
and primarily sought to benefit the General Environment. Its failure to achieve any degree of 
correlation can be attributed to the fact that government and industry were (and for the most 
part, continue to be) unwilling to share or extend decision-making authority over offshore 
natural resources to communities who could very well scuttle their attempts to make 
billions.229 The lone indeterminate, meanwhile, sought a middle-outwards/bottom-up origin 
and a response target, but suffered from Scientists not explaining who the non-FG, non-OI 
actors are lending their expertise.
The FSs framing DHOS, on the other hand, did not really consider their spill a 
catastrophe, as demonstrated by the fact that only four of them produced a mere 18 
generalized catastrophe frames, of which just five were action-oriented (representing less 
than 28% of the total number), encompassing five ACaSs. As Chart 19 shows, only one of 
those five correlated with any of the actual outcomes, although two managed to half­
correlate; the remaining two are divided evenly between indeterminates and non-correlates 
(see Appendix H). OP A put forth the most action frames, and in so doing scored two of the 
three (half-)correlations (a full and a half). From the clutch of 12 outcomes, only three 
managed to capture any degree of correlation: all of them were top-down in orientation, and 
two were Oil Specific in target (the remainder concerns Economic/Financial Compensation). 
Table 5 attempts to account for these results, as well as to expand upon them by explaining 
how they correlate with the SBOS’s actual outcomes.
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Chart 19: Correlations Between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented Catastrophe Frames and
Their Outcomess
OP/
91 1 X IN
45 2 X 1C, 1H
63 4/5 X
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 10 X 1H
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
95 4 X 11
5 6 I 2 I 1
^ h is chart is essentially the same as Chart 14; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized 
action-oriented catastrophe frames.
Table 6: DHOS Catastrophe-to-Outcomes Correlationsf
OPA 45 MMS’s flaws makes it 
necessary to completely 
review how OCS 
managed -> DHOS-1
C D3 MMS was not only reviewed, but 
reformed right out of existence, 
becoming three new, independent-of- 
each-other bureaucracies.
OPA 63 DHOS
damaging/j eopardizing 
the $700 billion per 
year GoM fishing 
industry and its 185,000 
jobs; people need 
compensation and 
restoration of faith 
DHOS-3
H D1 Although fishers were provided 
compensation, there appear to be 
questions about whether it was 
sufficient and issues with it being 
one-time only; it is unknown if faith 
has ever been restored.
SC 5 DHOS has killed 
people and destroyed 
the environment, and 
the economy 
therefore, President 
should place a 
moratorium on new 
offshore drilling 
DHOS-3
H D4 Mr. Obama did, indeed, place a 
moratorium on new offshore drilling, 
but only the deepwater variety, and 
only for six months.
fThis table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized 
action-oriented catastrophe frames.
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The single full-correlate action-oriented catastrophe frame exhibits a correlation 
between both the frame and outcome origins and the frame and outcome terminuses; it is top- 
down in orientation and Oil Specific in target, which accords well with both the crisis and 
disaster frames before it, and with the origins and terminuses of the majority of the actual 
outcomes.230 Meanwhile, only one of the half-correlates features a correlation between both 
frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; the other has a correlation 
between the origins, but not the outcomes. The complete half-correlate is top-down in 
orientation and Economic/Financial Compensation in target, which is unsurprising because 
in 2010 America was still suffering from the effects of the Global Recession that began in 
2007.231 The partial half-correlate is also top-down in orientation, but while Sierra Club’s 
frame (apparently) sought a moratorium on all new offshore production to help the General 
Environment (and to prevent more deaths, and economic damage), the FG enacted only a six- 
month one on new deepwater drilling. If Sierra Club’s desire to stop offshore development in 
1969 was guaranteed to fail, then it was even more so in 2010 when the issues of jobs, 
economic growth, and national security were framed as hinging on America’s ability to 
produce as much of its own oil as possible; it makes one wonder why they bothered to 
suggest it in the first place.
As for the indeterminate and the non-correlate, the former appears to argue that all
levels of society should contribute resources to repair the fishing industry, while its terminus
revolves around economic repair (Senator Vitter, ACaS 95); the latter does not actually
specify who should be conducting the independent monitoring (the implication might be
middle-outwards or bottom-up), focusing instead on what, which is response. REAs’
broaching a role for lower-echelon actors is almost unprecedented among the DHOS CDC
frames, whether action-oriented or not. Nonetheless, the scope and scale of the spill seemed
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to work against FSs perceiving that action against it might be undertaken by anyone other 
than the government and the industry that caused it.233
Summary
Based on the small amount of data available, it appears that during SBOS, FSs 
framing action in terms of catastrophe resulted in few correlations (just one and a half), 
while during DHOS the situation was scarcely better (one correlation and two half-ones) 
(meanwhile, SBOS earned one indeterminate, but four non-correlates, while DHOS also got 
one indeterminate, but only one non-correlation). Although the removal of oil development 
from the SBC is commiserate with catastrophe's sensitizing concept, such an outcome was 
all but guaranteed not to materialize; according to one State Actor, this was because SBOS 
had not been catastrophic enough—if it had been, then Channel oil production would have 
been finished (OSIC 1969-73). Indeed, based on subsequent oil spills—whether from tanker 
(most common) or platform (rare)—the Santa Barbara spill was small; its inability to initiate 
(specific, SBC-related) action much beyond the state-level, then, was unsurprising. Although 
DHOS FSs, on the other hand, achieved marginally better success in their use of 
catastrophe—in fact, one of the actual outcomes exceeded what FSs had advocated—that 
might only be attributable to the fact that most of the actions sought were at least 
hypothetically possible (only one FS called for an end to all oil development; during SBOS, 
three did). While DHOS seemed to be fully deserving of the catastrophe frame, FSs appeared 
to have thought differently, rarely invoking the term/concept, and utilizing it to call for action 
even less. As a consequence, they failed to take advantage of catastrophe's hypothetical 
power to imbue their desired actions with greater weight.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
6.1 -  Summary of Results and Conclusions
6.1.1 -  On Research Question 1: What Did the FSs Mean When They Framed SBOS and 
DHOS as CDCs?
The answer to this question depends on the strata of data and analysis examined. The 
one simply lying on the surface (so to speak; and in other words, the broadest), is that the 
various FSs meant a great number and a wide variety o f things when they framed SBOS and 
DHOS as CDCs. This may sound facile, and perhaps even obvious, but this result was 
unexpected, from both a common sense perspective and an academic one. Based on the 
academic literature, not only is the underlying purpose of framing to make sense of the 
clutter of reality by providing context, bestowing values, and asserting responsibility to 
produce meaning—in other words, by focusing on whatever is (or, more accurately, what a 
FS considers) ‘important’ during any given situation to mollify the Gofftnanian query, ‘what 
is it that is going on here?’—but the primary reason actors utilize CDC terms and concepts is 
to assert that the occasion so labelled is extraordinary, thereby circumscribing the scope and 
diversity of possible meanings and, by extension, the options and procedures available to 
contend with it. Common sense, meanwhile, assumes that the meaning of CDC occasions is 
‘self-evident’ and ‘obvious,’ as is/should the response.
I expected, therefore, to find only a relatively small number and limited range of 
meanings attached to the words/concepts crisis, disaster, and catastrophe by the FSs. Instead,
I uncovered a cumulative total of 347 generalized CDC frames (125 for SBOS and 222 for 
DHOS); even when distilled into unique basic topics, there were still a grand total of 72 
separate meanings. For occasions that were ostensibly ‘straight-forward,’234 this seems to be 
an excessive number. It is only accentuated by the fact that few patterns—definitive or
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otherwise—can be discerned from them (other than their association with crisis, disaster, 
and/or catastrophe).235 From this quantity and diversity, I can offer the following conclusion: 
rather than being ‘focusing events’—in the sense of occasions that concentrate perception, 
and thus meaning-making, on only a handful of possibilities236—SBOS and DHOS, despite 
being framed as CDCs, were just as multi-faceted and interpretation-rich as any other aspect 
of social reality. Perhaps even more so, for my result lends further evidence to the idea that 
occasions framed as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes often quickly become sites of frame 
competition between actors trying to influence the definition and designation of such social 
phenomena. As Boin et al. (2005, 83) pointed out, “it makes a...difference whether one 
labels events in terms of an ‘incident,’ an ‘accident,’ a ‘tragedy,’ a ‘disaster,’ or a ‘crisis’” 
because these words “convey different assessments of the situation in terms of [its] 
seriousness and the allocation of responsibility [and resources]” to deal with it. Both spills 
inspired various FSs to unleash a cacophony of frames, which tried—whether through 
description (i.e., the non-action-oriented frames) or advocation (i.e., the action-oriented 
frames)—to persuade/convince the public, influential actors, or both that the spills were or 
were not (a certain kind of) CDC(s) for the purpose of pushing for a certain outcome.
Digging one stratum beneath this surface answer, to the level examining the action-
and non-action-oriented topics/frames shared by all three CDCs from both spills, the
resolution to the first research question’s query appears to be that the spills required response
because o f the economic damages they were causing. In other words, because Response and
Economic were the only two topics framed in terms of crisis and disaster and catastrophe
during both spills, responding to economic turmoil seems to be the ultimate CDC frame for
both Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon.237 This answer appears to be substantiated by
those unearthed from the strata analyzing the action- and non-action-oriented topics/frames
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shared by all three CDCs, albeit with SBOS and DHOS as separate entities. As a CDC, Santa 
Barbara238 was an ongoing spill, caused by the ill-considered use o f exploitive technology, 
that inflicted economic harm to SB, and demanded (federal) response', and according to its 
own,239 while DHOS was an environmental calamity, borne from a combination o f  
mismatched values and systemic management failures, that imposed (further) distress on the 
region’s economy (fishing, tourism, and oil production), and demanded not only response, 
but financial restitution for the victims. Both of these topic-derived ‘overall’ CDC frames are 
essentially the same, particularly in what they highlight: both spills caused economic harm to 
a local area and response (implied as federal) should/must be provided.240 From this point of 
view (and in contrast with the implications from the ‘surface’ answer), the topic-derived 
CDC frames did succeed in making sense of the clutter of reality: they fixated on only one of 
the probable myriad of dilemmas sparked by SBOS and DHOS and ‘restricted’ its effects to a 
single comer of the human endeavour.241 This focus on local economic harm—to the city and 
adjacent environs of Santa Barbara, and to the Gulf Coast, respectively—simultaneously 
brings the ‘real’ problem into sharper relief (it is easier for people to sympathize/empathize 
with a local area suffering economic turmoil than it is with, say, a nation) and confines it to 
that place (i.e., although bad for the local area, the negative economic consequences do not 
extend beyond it).242,243
Where they differ, however, is in regard to each spill’s identified causal agent:
exploitive technology for SBOS and mismatched values and systemic management failures
for DHOS. Neither appears to have significantly altered the ‘intent’ of the topics/frames, but
they may have made some small influence on what was done in the wake of each spill.
Whereas DHOS’s actual outcomes (dealing largely with seeking and/or distributing financial
compensation/restitution) more or less followed the spirit of the spill’s ‘overall’ topic/frame,
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SBOS’s did not: rather than redressing Santa Barbara’s economic wounds, they instead 
revolved around passing environmental legislation, imposing moratoria on (new) offshore 
drilling, and boosting overall environmental awareness. The part the stated causal agent may 
have played in these outcomes centres on the fact that while exploitive technology is external, 
visible, and can be specifically targeted for action by actors other than industry or the FG 
(e.g., people can go out and protest the installation of an offshore platform), mismatched 
values and systemic management failures are internal, invisible, and are the sole province of 
government and industry regulators and regulatees. In other words, the former provides a 
physical target—a symbol—for people outside the conclave of offshore production to rally 
against and exert some degree of agency over; the latter is ephemeral and complex, and 
closed to the public.244
However, the strata beneath these answers—concentrating on only the action-oriented
topics/frames shared by all three CDCs from SBOS and DHOS—largely fail to support the
primacy of restoring economic well-being; they instead advocate the need to correct systemic
management problems. Both spills do not share a common action topic CDC frame; in other
words, not one topic was used by each CDC term/concept for both spills. The consensus
action topic/frame for Deepwater Horizon—whose ‘overall’ action- and non-action-oriented
CDC topic/frame enshrined financial redistribution—makes no mention of economics.
Rather, the FSs focus on what they had previously identified as the spill’s causal agent by
seeming to assert that response should focus on systemic management problems. Santa
Barbara, meanwhile, has two possible ‘overall’ action CDC topics/frames (because no one
topic was referenced by crisis and disaster and catastrophe). As a crisis-disaster, the SBOS’s
FSs appeared to argue that response should focus on systemic management problems for the
repair and maintenance o f economic well-being; and as a disaster-catastrophe, they seemed
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to contend that politics, for the sake o f the environment, should help affected communities by 
passing (more and better) legislation and regulations, allowing public consultation in 
environmental resource decisions, and removing oil development from the SBC.
The data can neither explain nor offer any clues as to why the removal of the non­
action-oriented topics/frames should end the dominance of the economic frame/theme. 
However, based purely on what these three ‘overall’ action-oriented topics/frames proffer— 
and judging them against the actual outcomes—it appears that systemic management action 
was not carried out. Although the FG not only reformed, but replaced MMS in the aftermath 
of DHOS, there is a dearth of independent evidence proving that offshore oil production is 
safer and better managed under the BOEMs than it was under MMS before the spill. 
Similarly, following SBOS, it cannot be determined if addressing the systemic management 
problems made a positive contribution to economic well-being; on the other hand, it can be 
shown that oil development was not removed from the SBC and that the public (along the 
Channel or almost anywhere else) has rarely been consulted in any meaningful manner about 
environmental resource decisions. While more and better general environmental legislation 
and regulations were passed, their impact on affected communities is unknown.
6.1.2- On Research Question 2: How Did the FSs’ Action-Oriented CDCs Correlate with 
the Spills ’ Actual Outcomes?
Unlike with research question one, the answer to this query is far more straight­
forward. According to my results, whereas during SBOS there appeared to be few  
correlations between framing action in terms o f  crisis and catastrophe—but a moderate 
amount when using disaster—during DHOS there seemed to be a moderate number o f  
correlations between action frames utilizing all three CDCs and the spill’s actual outcomes.
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Although SBOS suffered from a deficit of relevant data, what exists suggests that 
there were virtually no correlations between the FSs framing action in terms of crisis and the 
spill’s actual outcomes. The reason appears to be simply because its FSs did not really 
perceive—and thus frame—the spill as a crisis; as a consequence, they only put forth five 
action frames, producing just a single half-correlate (plus two indeterminates and non­
correlates each). Although DHOS FSs did not suffer (to the same extent) their counterpart’s 
perceptual problem, their 15 action crisis frames resulted in a mere seven correlates and half­
correlates (plus five indeterminates and three non-correlates). Whether their action frames 
correlated or not, DHOS FSs almost always advocated for top-down action, and the actual 
outcomes predominantly reflected this; and although SBOS is best remembered for its 
bottom-up initiatives, and while its half-correlative sought to bring top and bottom together, 
the actual outcome it wanted was accomplished almost entirely by top-down processes. What 
is more, while the Deepwater Horizon's frames (again, correlative or not) focused on 
financial compensation, visceral response, and oil dependency, Santa Barbara’s failed to 
demonstrate any pattem(s)—each frame existed in its own world, never concurring with any 
other. Finally, although the legacy of SBOS’s half-correlative action is well into its fifth 
decade, it appears that none of DHOS’s correlatives and half-correlates will enjoy such 
longevity and impact: clean up is/was transitory, money is finite, and offshore development 
continues to expand (Wethe 2013).
As for framing action in terms of catastrophe, it appears that for both spills there 
were few correlations between the FSs’ frames and the actual outcomes. Each spill managed 
to capture only one correlation, with SBOS acquiring an additional half-correlate and DHOS 
two (meanwhile, the former earned one indeterminate, but four non-correlates, while DHOS 
also got one indeterminate, but only one non-correlation). Although the removal of oil
129
development from the SBC is commiserate with catastrophe’s sensitizing concept, such an 
outcome was all but guaranteed not to materialize; according to one State Actor, this was 
because SBOS had not been catastrophic enough—if it had been, then Channel oil production 
would have been finished (OSIC 1969-73). Indeed, based on subsequent oil spills—whether 
from tanker (most common) or platform (rare)—the Santa Barbara spill was small; its 
inability to initiate (specific, SBC-related) action much beyond the state-level, then, is 
unsurprising, and made even more so by the fact that California had already demonstrated 
environmental sympathies before the spill. Although DHOS FSs, on the other hand, achieved 
marginally better success in their use of catastrophe—in fact, one of the actual outcomes 
exceeded what FSs had advocated—that might only be attributable to the fact that most of the 
actions sought were at least hypothetically possible (only one FS called for an end to all oil 
development; during SBOS, three did). While DHOS seemed to be fully deserving of 
catastrophe frames, FSs appeared to have thought differently, rarely invoking the 
term/concept, and utilizing it to call for action even less. As a consequence, they failed to 
take advantage of catastrophe's hypothetical power to imbue their desired actions with 
greater weight.
And finally, there was sufficient data from both spills to ascertain that there appeared 
to be a moderate number of correlations between the FSs framing action in terms of disaster 
and SBOS’s and DHOS’s actual outcomes. Nearly half the action disaster frames put forth 
during Santa Barbara, and almost 40% during Deepwater Horizon, resulted in correlations or 
half-correlates. FSs from both spills tended to favour top-down action (regardless of whether 
or not their disaster frames correlated with the actual outcomes); however, whereas SBOS’s 
usually sought Oil Specific outcomes, DHOS’s overwhelmingly aimed for either 
financial/economic results or miscellaneous ones (i.e., D12 -  Other Outcomes). Although
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SBOS FSs’ frame origins and terminuses technically reflected those of the actual outcomes, 
they did not anticipate a) the significant role middle-outwards and bottom-up actors would 
have securing those outcomes, or b) that most of the outcomes achieved had considerable 
General Environment co-benefits that ended up eclipsing the Oil Specific ones. DHOS FSs, 
however, successfully previewed what would be done to deal with their spill (e.g., virtually 
every action the FG initiated concerned exacting monies from the responsible parties to 
punish them for their culpability, or to compensate victims). What is more, the (largely 
unanimous) opinion put forth by both spill’s FSs that government and/or industry 
should/must take active responsibility resulted in half the SBOS action frames, and a fifth of 
the DHOS ones, not correlating with any outcome whatsoever because they advocated for 
deeds that such upper-echelon actors either could not, or would not, execute. For example, 
Santa Barbara FSs wanted preventative measures more robust than mere regulations (e.g., 
public participation in natural resource harvesting decisions) and/or called for the complete 
removal of all oil development from the SBC; Deepwater Horizon's called for the end to the 
nation’s addiction to oil and the construction of a CE economy, pushed for better response 
capabilities, and/or demanded compensation for fishers and tourism operators.
SBOS’s top two outcomes—State Oil Moratorium and Enhanced American 
Environmental Movement—are mirror images of each other (i.e., top-down and Oil Specific 
versus bottom-up and General Environment), encapsulating what the spill has since come to 
represent: a (general environmental) legislative triumph that curtailed SBC oil production and 
a national, even global, poster-child for humanity’s impact on the environment that inspired 
tens of thousands to take up environmentalism. DHOS’s top three, on the other hand—Other 
Outcomes, $20 Billion Escrow Account, and BP Pleads Guilty... Fined $4.5 Billion—while 
all top-down in origin, all stop at completely different terminuses (various,
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Economic/Financial Compensation, and Oil Specific, respectively); this state of affairs 
echoes the scope and scale of the spill, and signifies both the plurality of impacts oil spills are 
now more fully recognized as inflicting and the relatively limited inventory of tools available 
to mitigate them (e.g., throw money at the problem; promise better regulatory due-diligence). 
What is more, SBOS’s outcomes have stood the test of time—a moratorium on new offshore 
drilling in CA waters (and in the adjacent federal ones) continues to this day, and 
environmentalism in America remains a force—but it is unlikely DHOS’s will enjoy similar 
longevity because of their focus on extracting money (which either has been or will be 
accomplished) and carrying out transitory tasks, such as responding to oilfall (which will, and 
mostly has, come to an end).
From a practical perspective, these results suggest four things a prospective FS should
keep in mind when deciding whether or not to use CDCs to describe a negative
environmental occasion, be it something relatively circumscribed, like an oil spill, or
something global, like anthropogenic climate change, biodiversity loss, or population growth.
Firstly, they should always be aware that a) crisis, disaster, and catastrophe have meanings,
and that they are very distinct from one another (i.e., they are not synonymous), and b)
people possess a broad pre-conceived idea of what each CDC means and, more importantly,
a general sense of what constitutes appropriate action to respond to each one (see Chapter 6.4
for elaboration). Therefore, care must be taken ensure that the CDC used is the meaning
desired, and that that meaning accords well with others’ pre-conceptions. Secondly, FSs
should make sure that their CDC term/concept is a suitable match with the negative
environmental occasion; a crisis is not a disaster, and neither are a catastrophe. Any
mismatch may result in the FS diluting their frame and sought-after action. Thirdly, FSs must
be consistent with their CDC-usage: they should choose one CDC and stick with it, refraining
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from the use o f ‘synonymous’ terms/concepts (see Chapter 6.4 for elaboration). And lastly, 
FSs should explain why a negative environmental occasion is a CDC in order to better 
illustrate why (their preferred) action should be taken to mitigate it; CDC terms/concepts 
should not be used as one-word short-hand to justify action because of the possible 
misunderstandings this might cause.
6.2 -  Limitations and Further Research
Although this research was humbled by several limitations, they should be taken to 
represent avenues for further research. Perhaps the most serious limitation concerns 
replicability. Although I feel confident that if another researcher tried to reproduce my work, 
the general results would be similar to what I generated, the specifics would undoubtedly be 
different. The primary reason for this is because of the inductive manner in which the 
analyses were carried out; inductive methodology does not lend itself well to replicability.245 
While there is merit in this notion, and while there are many aspects of the social sciences 
that can/do lend themselves to a scientific method-like approach, the examination of the 
social construction of meaning is not one of them, especially when the focus of the research 
revolves around language and ends up discovering that an occasion as seemingly 
denotatively and connotatively straight-forward as a crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe is 
anything but.
Another limitation—albeit, one imposed on purpose—involves my not including 
CDC frames generated by the media. The rationale behind this was two-fold: to focus on 
frames produced by the original FSs (which goes against the grain of most frame research), 
and to reduce the amount of data I would have to work with. If this thesis were to have a 
sequel, it would utilize my methodology to ascertain what the media meant when they framed
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SBOS and DHOS as CDCs, and to find out how their action-oriented CDC frames correlated 
with the spills’ actual outcomes; this would be followed by a concluding installment, which 
would compare the results from part one and two. Alternatively, researchers might also want 
to examine how much, and to what degree, the media used SBOS and DHOS FSs’ frames 
and analyze how the media may have changed them; and/or they may seek to determine 
which FSs the media appeared to ‘side’ with (i.e., via repetition in subsequent articles) and 
why.
A third limitation is one that formed as a by-product (albeit, unintended) of this 
thesis’s methodology: the super-extracting process erased any sense of the temporal 
evolution of the CDC frames. Future scholars could do well to analyze how any given FS’s— 
and/or the general tenor of all the FSs’—CDC frames changed (or failed to change) between 
Day 1 and Day 365, thereby drawing a map of the perceptual development of SBOS and 
DHOS as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes. Such a map could show such things as a) 
when did acute response frames morph into recovery ones (e.g., before or after the spill was 
declared over?), b) when did any given FS begin to use their dominant CDC frame(s) (e.g., 
from the outset, or later on?), and c) what actual events (may have) provoked a CDC frame- 
shift, and how was this change reflected in the subsequent frames?
While not a limitation, per se, but rather a methodological improvement, my CDC 
analysis approach would be better utilized if applied against paragraphs and/or whole articles, 
instead of extracts. The primary reason is that the latter data-sets tend to be short and their 
meaning easily apprehended; this became readily apparent while analyzing the Santa Barbara 
data. My procedure only came into its own when used to ascertain the CDC qualities of the 
DHOS data because much it had been sewn together into super-extracts, where the copious 
amount of information made it invaluable for separating the relevant from the irrelevant.
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Finally, the results from this thesis lack solid explanatory power: they can neither 
provide reasons for the volume and variety of CDC frames, nor can they shed light on why 
FSs framing action in terms of all three CDCs during DHOS resulted in correlations with the 
spill’s actual outcomes, but only FSs framing action in terms of disaster during SBOS did. In 
terms of framing, furthermore, my results cannot explain why the most ‘effective’ CDC— 
disaster—was also the most complex (i.e., having the most meanings attached to it, thus 
contradicting the assumption that framing simplifies the world). The closest my thesis can 
manage is that disaster was ‘effective’ and complex for the same reason: it was utilized so 
many times. If crisis or catastrophe had been used as frequently, and had been as varied, they 
would probably have been equally ‘effective’ and complex. However, this paucity of 
explanations is not so much a limitation—because my thesis did not set out to explain such 
phenomena—as it is a starting-point for further research.
6.3 -  Benefits and Contributions
The research that went into this thesis produced five primary benefits and 
contributions. One of these is that this study appears to be the first to not only comparatively 
analyze the use of CDC terms/concepts between SBOS and DHOS, but also the first to 
conduct such an analysis between any two oil spills, offshore or otherwise. What is more, this 
thesis appears to be first of its kind to comparatively analyse anything between a) the Santa 
Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills and b) any two offshore platform oil spills. The 
second benefit this research has made is producing two relatively neutral sensitizing 
concepts—one for crisis and the other for disaster—that can be utilized by future researchers 
to better define these terms/concepts should they wish to avoid the baggage of disciplinary 
assumptions. According to my literature review (and those of others), there is no universally
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accepted definition of crisis or disaster, but instead an entire ‘rogue’s gallery’ of denotations, 
most of which are weighted in favour of the discipline utilizing them. The inductive one that 
I constructed, based on a “general sense of what is relevant” (Blumer 1954, 7), and 
representing a consensus bome from the many definitions out there in the scholarship, 
perhaps comes the closest to achieving the sought-after generalized definition. As for 
catastrophe, the underdevelopment of the literature relegates its sensitizing concept to a 
strictly provisional status; however, by attempting to generate one at all, I hope I have 
contributed something to this still nascent sub-field of research—one that may only grow in 
relevance as the consequences of AGETs become more pronounced.
In addition, this thesis has made two benefits and contributions to FT/FA. The first 
involves suggesting that the sensitizing concept idea might/can be used by FT to clear up 
some of the confusion plaguing it. The one I generated can be used as a model to derive a 
more generalized one that might finally bestow upon FT a solid enough core to facilitate the 
development of a coherent and more widely accepted theory and methodology. The second 
contribution concerns my finding that framing an occasion as a CDC apparently does not 
conform to FT’s assumption that frames simplify the world out there. According to my 
results, the more FSs framed the spills as CDCs, the more complex the spill’s CDC meaning 
became because each new frame almost invariably added new ideas and viewpoints to what 
had already been established.
Finally, by demonstrating that what FSs mean when they label/frame an occasion a
CDC is not as straight-forward and ‘obvious’ as common sense assumes, this thesis hopes to
encourage further study of this particular aspect of the social construction of reality. Despite
the fact that language, in general, has been recognized as constitutive of social reality, and
despite the fact that crisis and disaster narratives have been studied for their effects on policy
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and/or public perception, the specific CDC terms (and the meanings they provoke) have 
received virtually no attention. This is unfortunate and puzzling in light of the fact that their 
potency—their ability to call-up (as it turns out) so many meanings—can have potentially 
concrete impacts on action. As this thesis found, the fact that the FSs from both SBOS and 
DHOS predominately framed the spills as disasters may have influenced certain actions to be 
taken because it was perceived as a disaster, therefore suggesting some kinds of actions (e.g., 
clean up and recovery), but not others (e.g., the wholesale rearrangement of BAU); had the 
spills been seen and framed as crises or catastrophes, different actions might have been taken, 
resulting in different actual outcomes.
6.4 -  The Bigger Picture: CDCs and Anthropogenic Global Environmental Transformations 
A small body of literature suggests that using the terms/concepts crisis, disaster, 
and/or catastrophe (or, more generally, apocalyptic discourse, or the language of fear and 
terror) is counterproductive to the goal of convincing upper-echelon actors and the public to 
act against AGETs, such as ACC, biodiversity loss, and population growth. According to 
these scholars, the “language of fear and terror operates as an ever-weakening vehicle for 
effective communication or inducement for behavioural change” because “such appeals often 
lead to denial, paralysis, apathy, or even perverse reactive behaviour” (Hulme 2006, 2007; 
Moser and Dilling 2007). In other words, “framing issues in catastrophic terms ends up 
paralyzing [people] instead of motivating” them (Goodman 2007) to do whatever the FSs 
contend is the right thing to do because “when people are confronted with an overwhelming 
threat and don’t see a [doable] solution, it makes them feel impotent,” causing them to “shrug 
it off or go into deliberate denial” (Gelbspan, as quoted in Goodman 2007). In the case of 
ACC, for example, the “dominant narrative.. .has been that we’re responsible and have to
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make changes or we’re all going to die,” a story “tailor-made to ensure inaction” 
(Shellenberger, as quoted in Goodman 2007; italics in original). What is more, to state that 
something like “climate change will be ‘catastrophic’ hides a cascade of value-laden 
assumptions which do not emerge from empirical or theoretical science” (Hulme 2006), 
adding fuel to the deniers’ charges of conspiracy. All of this has led to the recommendation 
that proponents for the existence of, and the need to act against, AGETs “try[] to leave 
behind [such]...‘discursive overbidding’” (Nerlich and James 2009, 584).246
On the one hand, my results lend some support to this position—in that during both 
spills, crisis and catastrophe were rarely used, and when they were, few correlations between 
frame and actual outcomes were achieved—but on the other, they seem to conclude that 
although CDC-usage does not appear to help FSs achieve their desired action(s), neither does 
it hinder or neutralize. For example, although the SBOS FS’s CDC frames, as a whole, only 
sometimes correlated with the actual outcomes, they also sometimes did correlate with 
them—even if only partially: GOO! may have failed to remove oil development from the 
SBC entirely, but the surge in general environmental awareness sparked by the spill did result 
in a series of moratoria that have slowed its expansion to a crawl. During DHOS, meanwhile, 
any CDC frames calling for the pay-out of financial compensation/restitution more or less 
came about; as for all the frames that did not materialize in reality, their failure likely had 
less to do with the CDCs, themselves, and more to do with the social, political, and economic 
climate of Louisiana, the Gulf Coast, and the United States at the beginning of the second 
decade of the 21st Century.247 As a consequence, I am not convinced that the problem of 
inaction against AGETs is because of the use of CDCs (although I do acknowledge that the 
notion has some merit); instead, my results suggest to me that the crux of the matter concerns 
the meanings attached to the CDCs.
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As this thesis demonstrated, the various FSs meant a great many things when they 
framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs; this number and diversity, naturally enough, extended to, 
and was reflected by, the action-oriented CDC frames. If something as seemingly ‘concrete’ 
and ‘unambiguous’ as an oil spill can spawn such a multiplicity of meanings and actions, 
then the situation is likely as (and probably even more) complicated and chaotic for the 
diffuse, ambiguous, and contentious AGETs. Part of the reason for the spill’s cacophony of 
CDC-meanings was that the FSs—most of whom were laymen—did not subscribe to 
academia’s definitional rigour, resulting in the CDCs (and, therefore, their meanings) often 
being used synonymously. As a consequence, there were several instances where, for 
example, crisis (which connotates threat and the hope of stopping it) took on a catastrophe 
meaning (which suggests total devastation and that the wholesale construction of a new 
status-quo); in terms of action, this meant that there were crisis frames calling for catastrophe 
actions (one does not normally respond to a threat by completely revamping society). 
Similarly, when ACC, biodiversity loss, or population growth are referred to as, say, crises, 
but are followed by calls for action requiring even ordinary people to radically change their 
ways of life, a cognitive dissonance is generated that (at best) confuses people and (at worst) 
disillusions and angers them. Either way, the FS’s action is unlikely to be initiated.
However, my results also suggest that it is not just the specific meanings FSs attach to 
CDCs that help explain the lack of decisive, concerted action being taken to deal with 
AGETs; it could also be the general meaning—complete with ‘standard’ action—that each 
CDC, itself, embodies. Based on both their literatures and my sensitizing concepts,
• A crisis is perceived as a potentially dire occasion, but one in which something can 
(still) be done to either stop it or to mitigate the consequences;
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• A disaster is perceived as an occasion where the disruption and/or destruction has 
already happened, and the best that can be done is to clean up, recover, and perhaps 
prevent the next occurrence; and
• A catastrophe is perceived as an occasion of complete and total devastation that 
requires nothing less than the wholesale creation of a new status-quo.
According to my research, both SBOS and DHOS FSs overwhelmingly considered and 
framed their spills as disasters, because a) they represented environmental problems in which 
it was ‘too late’ for arresting, or even mitigative, action—the oil was already in the water and 
on the shore—leaving no other recourse but to clean up and seek ways to prevent future such 
occasions; and b) they did not produce the kind of across-the-board annihilation that would 
convince both upper-echelon actors and the public that an entirely new system was required. 
As a result, calls for action using disaster frames were more likely to be heeded (the only 
question was what action should be taken). AGETs, on the other hand, are often framed as 
crises—as in something currently in progress that action can mitigate or off-set—or having 
(future) catastrophic effects (i.e., they will lay waste to human civilization and/or irreparably 
disrupt human social systems). Both types of framing fail to inspire action: crises are rife 
with uncertainty—not only about the AGET, itself, but also about the consequences of any 
action(s) to alleviate or mitigate the problem—leading to paralysis; and catastrophes are too 
terrible (or impossible) to contemplate, also leading to paralysis. This state-of-affairs 
encapsulates AGETs to perfection.
In fact, based on my results, I am tempted to offer a hypothesis: that of the three 
CDCs, human beings are primed—perceptually ‘programmed,’ so to speak—to perceive 
disasters and act in response to them more than they are to crises or catastrophes. Disasters 
seem to be the ‘Goldilocks’ of CDCs: they neither present ambiguous ‘threats,’ nor are they
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riddled with uncertainty, like crises; and their impacts are neither total, nor entail the need to 
completely dismantle BAU, like catastrophes. Instead, they demonstrate clear and present 
disruption and/or destruction; are seen as ‘over;’ and recovery requires ‘only’ clean up and 
reconstruction. From this point of view, AGETs—in addition to not being perceived and 
acted against as crises or catastrophes—are not disasters. The disruption, destruction, and/or 
death that population growth is inflicting are not perceived as being caused by burgeoning 
numbers of people, but are explained as symptoms of poverty, poor governance and rule of 
law, or the intrusion of fundamentalist ideologies on otherwise content societies. The havoc 
biodiversity loss is reaping is both invisible to human social systems and perceived as having 
no effect upon them. And the vast nebulousness of ACC is beyond most people’s perception 
because of the non-linear connections between increasing levels of greenhouse gases and 
tangible environmental effects. Even when the connection is more linear—such as a warming 
atmosphere generating stronger, more frequent hurricanes; melting polar ice caps; and 
thawing methane-engorged permafrost—their implications are either not understood by 
decision makers and/or the public or actively denied and framed as anti-capitalist/freedom/ 
common sense ravings. If this hypothesis contains any veracity, then it seems that there is 
little hope that decisive and concerted action to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of 
AGETs will be happening soon because the ability of decision-makers and the public to 
perceive environmental crises before they become disasters or catastrophes is limited, as 
demonstrated by the outbreaks of two of America’s most notorious offshore oil platform 
spills.
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Endnotes
Introduction Endnotes
1 This mass media includes the daily newspapers, weekly newsmagazines, and the 24/7 news 
network machine, and the specialist media of interests groups and peer-reviewed periodicals. 
Chapter 1 Endnotes
2 Or 1896, according to Bob Cavnar (2010). My research has been unable to resolve the 
confusion.
3 Actually, the world’s first ‘offshore oil platform’ was neither technically offshore nor a 
platform; instead, it was an otherwise normal (for the time) on-shore oil derrick that had been 
erected in water, and was attached to shore by a pier (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011; 
Cavnar 2010).
4 This protest, led by a “party of the best known society men of Santa Barbara[,] armed to 
meet any resistance, and with workmen employed for the purpose, utterly demolished [the] 
new oil derrick” as a message to the oil companies that no such things would be permitted to 
“disfigure the beautiful views of [the] land and sea” (as quoted in Molotch 2000, 804).
5 UO was originally a company native to Santa Barbara County; it eventually expanded into 
Louisiana, Alaska, and what was formally Indochina (among other places). By the late 1960s, 
it possessed over $2.4 billion in assets (Easton 1972).
6 UO was the majority partner representing a group that also included the Gulf Oil 
Corporation, Mobile Oil Corporation, and Texaco Incorporated (Easton 1972).
7 This would be the most expensive lease until the following year, 1969, when the Alaskan 
North Slope was leased for $900 million (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972).
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8 By the beginning of 1969, “twenty-six companies had paid the US Treasury a [then] record 
total of $602,719,261.60 for drilling rights in the Channel[; i]n addition they.. .pa[id] the one- 
sixth market price royalty on each of the Channel’s estimated 4 billion barrels of oil, each 
[one then] worth about $3.50,” giving the FG a likely royalty of $2.5 billion” (Easton 1972, 
25-6). What is more, the 01 had “spent more than $100 million in exploratory and other 
development” activities, which not only “established certain rights,” but also “represented a 
major contribution to the welfare of the nation and the region[: a]s everyone knew, oil was 
vital to national defense and the national economy” (Easton 1972, 25-6).
9 In addition, each well dug from Platform A cost in excess of a quarter million dollars to 
drill out (Easton 1972).
10 By this time, there were already 12 other platforms scattered throughout the SBC (Easton 
1972).
11 This does not count the 1066 metres of water separating the ocean surface and the seabed 
(Steinhart and Steinhart 1972).
12 Drilling mud is a complicated mixture of clay and industrial chemicals poured into oil 
wells during drilling. It has three primary functions: to cool the drill bit; to carry away the 
rock debris created by the drilling; and—most importantly—to maintain pressure so that the 
oil and gas hitherto locked into the crust by the sedimentary rock does not explosively escape 
(or, blowout) from its reservoir (Freudenberg and Gramling 2011). The viscosity and weight 
of the mud varies depending on depth and pressure measurements, and as these variables 
change, so too must the consistency of the mud to maintain the pressure seal. The application 
of drilling mud is by far the most critical component in the drilling process.
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13 UO declared that ‘only’ 79,493 litres had been leaking into the SBC at the spill’s peak; 
some have suggested that as much as 1.5 million litres per day had been vomiting forth 
(Easton 1972).
14 This was unofficially confirmed by measurements taken from U-2 flights and spy 
satellites, and relayed through an anonymous whistleblower (Easton 1972).
15 Straw was the only material that appeared to soak up the oil.
16 These 13 were: the Weather Bureau, the Coast Guard, Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
personnel, the Geological Survey, the US Army Corp of Engineers, the Public Health 
Service, the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the local Humane Society, the California 
Department of Fish and Game, the US Forest Service (for some reason), the Santa Barbara 
campus of the University of California, and UO.
17 Sol Hickel had been on the job only four days when SBOS began.
18 These nine are: 1) requiring new and improved specifications for drive casing; 2) 
increasing the “depth to which surface casing is required”; 3) specifying the “proper density 
[of mud]”; 4) requiring that a “plan of action for emergencies.. .be submitted to the USGS 
headquarters for approval”; 5) mandating “tests to ensure isolation of zones of oil, gas, and 
fresh water from each other...be witnessed by USGS representatives”; 6) making “blowout 
prevention requirements [more] stringent”; 7) calling for the installation of “warning 
devices.. .to indicate whether the drilling mud in the hole is adequate”; 8) requiring “safety 
and antipollution devices... on platforms... includ[ing] gas detector and alarm systems, 
firefighting systems, shutdown devices for the wells and equipment on the platform, pipeline 
alarm, and auxiliary power equipment for safety[, and p]ollution control equipment including 
booms, skimmers, and approved chemical dispersants, must be on hand during all mobile
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platform and drilling operations”; and 9) implementing “additional scheduled inspections of 
all operations...[to] be conducted by the USGS” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972. 50-1).
19 Both actors were seen as the villains of the whole affair, and as those who would benefit 
the most from increased oil production.
20 A thorough ecological study conducted and published within three years of the spill noted 
only that 90% of the barnacle population had died from oil suffocation, with the survivors 
exhibiting inhibited reproduction and development; and that although sand fleas, crabs, and 
mussels also appeared impacted, sea flora seemed unaffected (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972; 
Easton 1972). This study was “greeted with feelings ranging from skepticism to disapproval” 
because a) the study had been funded by the Western Oil and Gas Association, leading to 
accusations of conflict-of-interest; b) it flew in the face of accepted wisdom—“everyone 
knew intuitively that the oil spill had been an ecological disaster, yet scientists were saying 
otherwise[, and so t]he results must therefore be wrong;” and c) lay people were unable to 
distinguish between sound present results and the availability of comparative background 
data, which in the case of the SBC was lacking (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972,100; italics 
added). The only comprehensive pre-1969 study of SBC’s ecology had been conducted in 
1959; although comparisons showed that there had been an overall decline in species 
diversity and populations, it was attributed to a decade’s worth of general water pollution, 
not to the effects of the SBOS deluge.
21 They have been abandoned because they either a) failed to strike any oil or gas at all or b) 
became depleted through round-the-clock production.
22 Between 1937 and 1977, approximately 6300 exploratory, and 21,000 developmental, 
wells were drilled off the shores of Louisiana’s eight coastal parishes alone.
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23 Deepwater is generally considered to be any offshore oil and gas exploration and 
production that takes place through 305 metres or more of intervening water.
24 Gas production, meanwhile, has jumped an astounding 1600% during the same ten year 
period (Fannin et al 2008).
25 BP, for example, had a long history of refusing to follow safety rules and regulations: 
following the 2005 Texas City refinery explosion, which killed 17 and injured 170, 
investigators “determined that the company had ignored its own protocols on operating a 
refinery tower that was filled with gasoline, and.. .that a key warning system had been 
disabled;” and after the 2006 Alaska pipeline spill, which “spew[ed] nearly 200,000 gallons 
[757,000 litres] of crude oil across the snow,” investigators revealed that the “company had 
been warned to check the pipeline four years earlier, but had failed do so” (Freudenburg and 
Gramling 2011,42; emphasis mine). Transocean, meanwhile, was fully aware of the myriad 
of safety and equipment issues afflicting not only its fleet, in general, but the Deepwater 
Horizon, in particular: in May 2008, for instance, more than 70 employees had to be 
evacuated from the platform because of a ballast system malfunction the company had 
known about for years, but did nothing to rectify (Freudenburg and Gramling 201 l).a As for 
the MMS, a “2008 Inspector General report concluded that the agency’s relationships with 
oil companies were even worse than most critics had claimed” when it revealed that the 
agency “was.. .in bed with the industry, literally, in a pattern of sex, drugs, and the wrong 
kind of role,” becoming the OI’s enabler, instead of its enforcer, permitting it do whatever it 
wanted and giving passes to even the most egregious safety and environmental violations 
(Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, 51).
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a. What is more, Transocean—with the support of BP—engaged in the cost-cutting 
move of “officially registering [the Deepwater Horizon] as a ship under the flag of 
the Marshall Islands [to] limit[] the potential ability of the US government to regulate 
its operations” (Freudenburg and Gramling, 15; italics mine).
26 On the bridge, chaos reigned: the captain hesitated to order the well killed by activating the 
main blowout preventer, forcing the technical personnel to take the initiative—to no avail: 
the blind-shear rams that should have severed the pipe and sealed the oil and gas forever 
failed, as indicated by a) the Deepwater Horizon not floating free of its position and b) the 
inferno spewing from the rotary not choking to death on lack of fuel (Cavnar 2010; National 
Commission 2011).
27 On the seabed, NOAA expeditions found “dead and dying coral reefs.. .an ecosystem in 
collapse,” which surprised many scientists because they only “expected to see some subtle 
effects from the oil,” based on earlier preliminary surveys that indicated things were fine 
(Rudolf 2010).
28 The spill coincided with the height of the Atlantic blue fin tuna spawning season; with the 
help of satellite data from the European Space Agency, it is estimated that 20 percent of tuna 
larvae perished, likely as a result of ingesting oil-contaminated plankton (Anonymous 2010).
29 Dispersants, however, do nothing more than just that—disperse. They “neither eliminate[] 
nor decrease[ the oil’s] toxicity[, but].. .create[] a much more toxic cocktail” that can “begin 
a slow but sure degradation of the ecosystem from the bottom up” (Levitt and Edmison 
2010). For example, miniscule droplets of oil-dispersant adhere to plankton which are then 
consumed by plankton-eaters, which are then devoured by small fish, and so on, up the food
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chain, bioaccumulating in the fatty tissue of each successive organism, eventually ending up 
in commercial fish species (Cavnar 2010; Levitt and Edmison 2010).
30 These agencies are the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (in charge of planning, 
permitting, and leasing); the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (responsible 
for enforcing safety and environmental regulations for offshore oil production); and the 
Office of Natural Resources Revenues (tasked with collecting the royalties from leasees) 
(Cavnar 2010).
31 To get a better idea of how much oil this actually is, picture a two-litre milk jug. Imagine it 
filled with orange crude. If one jug is placed right after the next in a rumba-line, it would 
require 397,468,237 jugs to contain the Gulf Oil Spill, stretching 795 kilometres; that is the 
distance from Prince George to Nanaimo. Conversely, another way to think about it is like 
this: the US uses about 20 million barrels of oil per day (EIA 2006); that is 833,333 barrels 
per hour. Therefore, over the course of 86 days, the US lost a little over six hours of oil 
consumption.
32 The FDA has found DHOS-linked contaminants in various commercial fish stocks, “but at 
levels well below any threat to human health and safety” (as quoted in Biello 2011; BP
2012); however, not only is most of the agency’s testing being paid for by BP, but its 
mandates and standards are relatively low when compared with, for example, the EPA’s 
(Biello 2011).
33 In addition, Halliburton has voluntarily donated $55 million to the National Fish and 
Wildlife foundation.
34 One billion of this was punishment for the civil Clean Water Act violations—setting a 
liability record—and is thus subject to the RESTORE Act; $100 million goes toward
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appeasing the criminal Clean Water Act violations; and the remaining $300 million is for 
criminal recoveries, and will be evenly divvied out to the National Academy of Sciences and 
the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to support oil spill-related research) (Malakoff
2013).
35 This has not dissuaded various individuals and groups throughout the Gulf Coast from 
trying to form one, anyway. In May 2013, the members of the hoped-for GoM RCAC at last 
held their first meeting. Although they had invited representatives from all the principle oil 
companies and associations operating in the Gulf, such as BP, ExxonMobile, the American 
Petroleum Institute, and the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, each and 
every one declined to attend. According to the reply sent by ConocoPhillips’ Vice President, 
William Bullock, it was because “strong. ..avenues [already existed] to meet with 
stakeholders to understand their concerns and incorporate input into our business plans and 
actions.. .participation in a .. .RCAC is not [required]” (Anonymous 2013).
Chapter 2 Endnotes
36 I conducted the Academic Search Premier search on the 12th of November, 2013. By using 
the advanced search function, I limited the results to those written in peer-reviewed English- 
language texts published in the past six months. Crisis was queried as a subject term.
371 conducted the LexisNexis search on the 12th of November, 2013.1 limited the query to 
English-language publications from the past six months. The subject term was crisis.
381 conducted the Google Scholar search on the 12th of November, 2013. Results were 
limited to the year 2013, and did not include patents or citations. The queried term was crisis. 
39 Koselleck (2006, 397) claims that ‘crisis’ “remains a catchword, used rigorously in only a 
few scholarly or scientific contexts.”
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40 I decided to combine urgency and decisions in a short time together because a) many of the 
definitions often explained that a crisis is urgent because of the temporal pressure to make 
decisions (or to act; but in order to act, one must first make a decision about how to act) 
about how to counter or respond to it and b) the few definitions that made reference only to 
crises being urgent affairs nevertheless appeared to imply that swift decision or action was 
required by referring to the existence of a narrow window of time in which to decide or act.
41 Each element’s summarizing word was chosen because it was the one literally featured in 
the definition; occasionally, the summarizing word was inferred from an alternative one 
actually used, or from the obvious implications. The seven elements are listed in descending 
order of how many times each word was referenced (and in the case of big, implied or 
conveyed through alternative means—e.g., “an emergency people must face together” 
(Edelman 1977,45; italics added); an occasion “so severe as to propel an issue onto the 
national agenda” (Kurtz 2004, 204; italics added); an “event that affects or has the potential 
to affect the whole o f an organization’’ (Coombs 1998, 177; italics added)).
42 For threat, see: Coombs 2007; Feam-Banks 1996; Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer 1998; 
Coombs 1999; Fink 1987; Edelman 1977; Kurtz 2004; Heath 2004; Boin 2005b; ‘t Hart 
1993; Turner and Pidgeon 1997; Boin and ‘t Hart 2003; Alink et al. 2001; Boin et al. 2005; 
Cortell and Peterson 1999; Sturm and Miilberger 2011; Boin and ‘t Hart 2007; Rosenthal, 
Boin, and Comfort 2001; Rosenthal, Charles, and ‘t Hart 1989; Quarantelli 1993; Bostdorff 
and O’Rourke 1997; Pearson and Clair 1998; Boin et al. 2005; Sellnow 1993; Kouzmin and 
Jarman 2004; Quarantelli, Lagadec, and Boin 2007; Drabek et al. 1981; Perrow 1984;
Raphael 1986; Kouzmin and Jarman 1989; Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and Kouzmin 1991.
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43 For urgency/decisions in a short time, see: Rosenthal, Charles, ‘t Hart 1989; Shaluf, 
Ahmadun, and Said 2003; Boin et al. 2005; Quarantelli 1993; Bostdorff and O’Rourke 1997; 
Boin and ‘t Hart 2007; Boin 2005b; Herman 1963; Kouzmin and Jarman 2004; Koselleck 
2002; Boin, Kofman-Bos, and Overdijk 2004; Hale, Dulek, and Hale 2005; Koselleck 2006; 
Quarantelli, Lagadec, and Boin 2007; Drabek et al. 1981; Perrow 1984; Raphael 1986; 
Kouzmin and Jarman 1989; Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and Kouzmin 1991.
44 For negative, see: Shaluf, Ahmadun, and Said 2003; Coombs 2007; Feam-Banks 1996; 
Mitroff and Anagnos 2001; Barton 2001; Coombs 1999; Fink 1987; Kurtz 2004; Astroff and 
Nyberg 1992; Heath 2004; Boin 2005b; Mitroff, Pearson, and Harrington 1996; Boin 2004; 
Boin, Kofman-Bos, and Overdijk 2004.
45 For Big, see: Mitroff and Anagnos 2001; Barton 2001; Coombs 1999; Fink 1987; Edelman 
1977; Kurtz 2004; Boin 2005b; Boin and ‘t Hart 2003; Boin et al. 2005.
For uncertainty, see: Feam-Banks 1996; Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer 1998; Boin and 
‘t Hart 2003; Alink et al. 2001; Boin et al. 2005; Cortell and Peterson 1999; Boin and ‘t Hart 
2007; Boin 2005b; Drabek et al. 1981; Perrow 1984; Raphael 1986; Kouzmin and Jarman 
1989; Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and Kouzmin 1991; Koselleck 2002.
46 For unexpected, see: Coombs 2007; Barton 2001; Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer 1998; 
Coombs 1999; Heath 2004; Boin et al. 2005; Quarantelli 1993; Herman 1963.
For turning point, see: Friedman 2002; Regester 1989; Fink 1986; Reus-Smit 2007; Davies 
and Walters 1998; Darling 1994; Stallings 2005; Sturm and Miilberger 2011.
47 Perhaps three of the most common beliefs informing crisis (management) are 1) the “event 
is different from the political and social issues we routinely confront, different from other 
crises, and it occurs rarely;” 2), “it came about for reasons outside the control of political and
industrial leaders, who are coping with it as best they can;” and 3), “the crisis requires 
sacrifices to surmount it” (Edelman 1977,44; italics added).
48 What is more, the longevity and/or success of a crisis is dependent on how the “mass 
media, politics, and the general public... fram[e] and interpret^.. .these events as crises”— 
perhaps even more so than the physical circumstances (if any) causing them—as it 
“expand [s] and contracts] depending on which themes and issues command attention at 
different points in time” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2003, 545-6; italics added; Porfiriev 1996).
49 In terms of this thesis’s case studies, examples can include Union Oil (UO) not using 
enough casing to secure the well (SBOS) or BP not taking adequate safety precautions 
(DHOS).
50 In terms of this thesis’s case studies, examples can include arguments favouring the 
elimination of all oil production from the Santa Barbara Channel (SBOS) or statements 
framing the spill as a consequence of America’s over-dependence on oil (DHOS).
51 Crisis narratives, according to Fuller, are “created and mediated by political agents and the 
media,” and are “central to existing institutional configurations being challenged and 
changed” (2010,1125) The notion is “firmly embedded with recent social construed [on] ist 
accounts o f ‘narratives’[, which] typically encompass a clear sequence of selected, organised, 
and connected events and consequences, based on the experience, desires, and beliefs of 
actors” (Fuller 2010,1125). Through the careful use of “stories, metaphors, and frames,” 
crisis narratives are “deployed as political strategies to enact change by appealing to shared 
experience and understanding,” and are not an “objective reflection of reality”; instead, they 
are “embedded in the contingent and reflexive situation of those constructing, conveying, and
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receiving narratives” (Fuller 2010, 1125). The similarity of this to framing is uncanny, and 
might simply be a case of the same phenomenon being given a different name; see Chapter 3.
52 The other major stream of crisis communication research focuses on crisis knowledge 
management (CKM), which “involves identifying sources, collecting information, analyzing 
information (knowledge creation), sharing knowledge, and decision making”; as a 
consequence, it examines what is going on “behind the scene[s],” examining the “work the 
crisis team does to create public responses to crisis” (Coombs 2010,25). In other words, 
CKM concerns the actual generation of knowledge, materials, and even actions before their 
debut into the public sphere; as such, it is beyond the purview of this thesis, which instead 
examines and analyzes the CDC portion of this knowledge once it enters the public domain. 
This thesis does not involve itself with CKM, largely because it was deemed infeasible to 
attempt a reconstruction of the internal knowledge management processes of DHOS and, 
especially SBOS.
53 Crisis narratives need not feature the use of ‘crisis;’ all that is required is that they convey 
a sense of anxiety, threat, and urgency, if not a greater sense or implication of doom, even 
apocalypse.
54 Some examples of this interchangeability include a) “disaster situations tend to be peopled 
by emergent groups [and] entities that had no existence prior to the crisis” (Quarantelli and 
Dynes 1977, 10); and b) “sociologists looking at disaster situations could not avoid such 
situations; both kinds of behaviour abound in such crises” (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977, 33). 
As can be seen, these authors do not distinguish between disaster and crisis, instead using 
them synonymously.
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55 Such opinions are based on findings suggesting that whereas a “crisis involves an urgent 
threat to the core functions of a social system,” a disaster is what happens when that crisis is 
left unattended (Quarantelli, Lagadec, and Boin 2007,23; italics added; Boin 2005a); in other 
words, a disaster is a “crisis with a devastating ending” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007,42; Boin 
2005a; Boin 2005b).
56 For example, crisis can cover occasions that do “not meet conventional disaster 
definitions,” such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; AIDS and BSE; Waco, Texas, and 
Oklahoma City; Wall Street’s Black Monday; Challenger and Koerst, Y2K; or the “coming 
water crisis” (Boin 2005b, 154; italics added). In other words, the crisis concept can “appl[y] 
to all processes of disruption that seem to require remedial action,” thus “meriting the 
attention of disaster students” (Boin 2005bl61; italics added).
571 conducted the Academic Search Premier search on the 21th of November, 2013. By using 
the advanced search function, I limited the results to those written in peer-reviewed English- 
language texts published in the past six months. Disaster was queried as a subject term.
581 conducted the LexisNexis search on the 21th of November, 2013.1 limited the query to 
English-language publications from the past six months. The subject term was disaster.
591 conducted the Google Scholar search on the 21th of November, 2013. Results were 
limited to the year 2013, and did not include patents or citations. The queried term was 
disaster.
60 Additionally, there is no “good sense of what governments, organizations, communities, 
and so on mean when they use the term” (Buckle 2005,177).
61 The author adds that this applies even to “slow onset disasters such as droughts and 
famines [that] may approach imperceptibly and inexorably” (Buckle 2005, 177-8). However,
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he does not explain why even gradual disasters, (presumably) long foreseeable, would also 
face “constrained” warning, evacuation, and self-protection (Buckle 2005, 177-8).
62 This is based on the notion that the “concept of disaster is not a matter of empirical 
determination, but a logical and definitional matter...[where t]he label is something that 
preceeds [sic] rather than reflects the empirical world” (Quarantelli 1986,13-14; italics in 
original).
63 It was Quarantelli’s work that originally informed me about Blumer’s idea about 
sensitizing concepts.
64 The summarizing word for each element of the sensitizing concept was chosen because it 
was often the one literally featured in the definition; sometimes, the word was inferred from 
the alternative one actually used. In the case of bad/negative, however, I decided to limit its 
tally to either literal use or utmost obviousness because virtually every definition implied that 
a disaster in a bad and/or negative thing. The seven elements are listed in descending order of 
frequency of reference.
65 For social disruption/phenomenon, see: Perry 2007; Wallace 1956; Killian 1954; Moore 
1958; Fitz 1961, 1968; Sjoberg 1962; Cisin and Clark 1962; Stallings 1998b; Smith 2005b; 
Stallings 2005; Kreps 1984; Parker 1992; Kreps 1989; Buckle 2005; Smith 2005a; Oliver- 
Smith 1996; Oliver-Smith 1999; Boin 2005b.
66 For event space/time, see: Perry 2007; Fitz 1961,1968; Sjoberg 1962; Cisin and Clark 
1962; Porfiriev 1998; Smith 2005b; Stallings 2005; Kreps 1984; Parker 1992; Kreps 1989; 
Turner and Pedgeon 1997; Richardson 1994; Smith 2005a; Oliver-Smith 1996; Buckle 2005; 
Kreps 1984.
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67 Some scholars, however, have accused disaster research’s event-centrism as a “pro- 
Western, pro-technology, pro-capitalism bias unsuitable for distinguishing disasters in 
underdeveloped societies” (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977, 24; Westgate and O’Keefe 1976) 
where they are more frequent—and will become more so if (and when) the predicted 
outcomes of the aforementioned AGETs—especially ACC—come to pass.
68 Tot physical destruction/damage, see: Killian 1954; Buckle 2005; Stallings 2005; Fritz 
1961; Kreps 1984; Parker 1992; Kreps 1989; Oliver-Smith 1996; FEMA 2003.
69 For bad/negative, see: Perry 2007; Wallace 1956; Killian 1954; Fitz 1961,1968; Buckle 
2005; Sjoberg 1962; Smith 2005a.
70 For death, see: Moore 1958; Smith 2005b; Fritz 1961; Turner and Pedgeon 1997; 
Richardson 1994.
For unexpected/uncontrollable, see: Sjoberg 1962; Drabek 1986; Stallings 2005; 
Stallings 2005; Kreps 1984.
71 For natural, see: Stallings 2005; FEMA 2003.
72 In addition, “cultural resonance and moral values also influence whether the public adopts 
public relations and media frames about [a] disaster” (Yearly 2002,269; Edy and Merick 
2007). For example, during DHOS, it appeared that the United States was split in its reaction 
to the spill: from a cultural point-of-view, the image of oil spill recalled Exxon Valdez, 
inspiring anger, especially from those who lived far from the Gulf of Mexico; but from a 
moral point-of-view, the Gulf Coast was valorized as “America’s working coast” (Landrieu 
2010) and a part of America’s attempt to achieve energy security, engendering a moderate 
reaction, especially from those who lived near/along the Gulf, or are patriotic.
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73 As sociologists, they are more “interested [in] learning] about how people [i.e., plural] and 
organizations behave[] in times of collective stress” (Boin 2005b, 157; italics added).
74 For example, the story that DHOS was an environmental disaster was gradually superseded 
by the story that it was a management, regulatory, and safety disaster; as a consequence, 
government and industry devoted much more time to improving these aspects of the spill (or 
appearing to) and less to the environmental, ones which would have potentially required far 
higher financial compensation, even tougher regulations, and/or a reassessment of the entire 
offshore oil endeavour.
75 At the same time, however, disaster is also a story or narrative that “precedes an event,” 
one that actors “use to say how a story—and its event—should go,” where the language used 
can influence that story, and therefore its meaning (Stein 2002, 157; italics added). During 
SBOS, for example, the unprecedented nature of the spill resulted in several different 
outcomes, ranging from governments passing laws to people gaining increased 
environmental awareness; but despite DHOS’s shocking size, its ‘oil spill narrative’ had been 
pre-written (by, for instance, Exxon Valdez), helping to ensure that its outcomes would be 
confined to financial penalties.
761 conducted the Academic Search Premier search on the 29th of November, 2013. By using 
the advanced search function, I limited the results to those written in peer-reviewed English- 
language texts published in the past six months. Catastrophe was queried as a subject term.
771 conducted the LexisNexis search on the 29th of November, 2013.1 limited the query to 
English-language publications from the past six months. The subject term was catastrophe.
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781 conducted the Google Scholar search on the 29th of November, 2013. Results were 
limited to the year 2013, and did not include patents or citations. The queried term was 
catastrophe.
79 Except, perhaps, by Beck (1992) and his theory of risk society, which states that as a 
society becomes more advanced and insulated from the calamities that were once a routine 
part of life, the people within that society will become increasingly intolerant of any 
disruption or disturbance to their daily lives, describing anything annoying or inconvenient in 
conceptual language that ‘should’ be reserved for large-scale occasions that negatively 
impact a large number of people.
80 But while Katrina, Tohoku, and Taiyan have convinced a few scholars to take “more 
seriously” the need for a catastrophe concept and category, only a few “have spent time 
trying to describe the characteristics of catastrophes, maybe because most researchers are 
more interested in doing empirical studies rather than clarifying the conceptual distinctions” 
(Quarantelli 2006, 2).
81 Unlike for crisis and disaster, the sensitizing concept elements for catastrophe are not nice, 
neat terms taken directly from the various texts, but rather conceptual summaries based on 
the ideas that kept appearing.
Chapter 3 Endnotes
821 prefer the term ‘constuctiomsm’ to ‘constructivism’ because the latter sounds positivistic 
in nature, implying that a given social circumstance is being constructed in order to build 
something, to achieve some goal or ideal. The former, on the other hand, has no such 
connotations or implications; it merely suggests that a social circumstance is being assembled 
regardless of whether the result will be boon, bane, or indifference.
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83 To put it another way, the social constructionist perspective reveals that perceptions of 
such seemingly ‘impartial’ occasions as hurricanes and tsunami are “not totally—or even 
necessarily—determined by the[ir].. .objective characteristics,” but rather “by a number of 
factors, among the most important being the symbolic contexts within which [the occasions] 
are located” (Coin and Gallagher 1984, 83). People act upon these perceptions as if they are 
objective—because they have become so through the perceptual process.
84 The rationale behind Weick’s summation is that people’s “stories are largely self-fulfilling 
and self-validating interpretations”; humans often “come to ‘see’ that which they ‘believe’ 
will be seen” (1979,155).
85 Academics, on the other hand, as Chapter 2 indicated, have expended a lot of ink and 
pixels attempting to denotate each CDC term, albeit often for instrumental purposes, i.e., 
providing criteria to crisis managers so they can determine if the occasion truly is a crisis, or 
is something else.
86 The exception to this is public relations research specializing in crisis and disaster. 
However, virtually all of the work done within this sub-field is pre- and pro-scriptive in 
nature (Kotzian 2007; Snow et al. 1986; Reese 2007; Schultz, Utz, and Goritz 2011; Graber 
2003)—i.e., crisis managers should use language that emphasizes positive, ameliorative 
action, not language that describes or passes judgement on the incident or its participants.
87 The reason is not difficult to understand. CDCs represent moments when time is of the 
essence and immediate action is required; therefore, CDCs are (or should be) about managing 
the occasion, alleviating any pain and suffering, and initiating the processes of mitigation, 
recovery, reconstruction (if required), and perhaps even prevention—and that is where most
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of the research has gone. Analyzing vocabulary-choice and what—if any—effect(s) it may 
cause appears to hold little interest or importance.
88 As mentioned in the preceding chapter, “it makes quite a difference whether one labels 
events in terms of an ‘incident,’ an ‘accident,’ a ‘tragedy,’ a ‘disaster,’ or a ‘crisis’ [because 
t]hese terms convey different assessments of the situation in terms of it seriousness and the 
allocation o f responsibility [and resources] for it” (Snow et al. 1986, 83; italics added).
89 While social construction offers rich and insightful perspectives through which to 
understand the world and what happens in it, it can serve only as a theoretical platform upon 
which to formulate assumptions and research agendas; it neither constitutes, nor outlines, nor 
even suggests practical analytical procedures. FT is one of several sub-theories that attempt 
to ‘compartmentalize,’ to a degree, the vast potentialities offered by social construction, and 
FA is among the many methodologies devised to mine quantitative and qualitative data from 
the discursive texts constructing the social world.
90 By the same token, it is “this very subtlety [that] makes framing difficult to define” 
because the “specifics of measurement will differ for each topic of discourse” (Tankard 2001, 
96-7).
91 In other words, frames help people to figure out what is happening, with both the question 
and the answer(s) emanating from what people do (which includes what they say). Later 
commentators have tried to elaborate on this idea by noting that frames are “schemata of 
interpretation” enabling individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences 
within their life space and the world at large... [for the purpose of] organizing] experience 
and guid[ing] action, whether individual or collective” (Snow and Benford 1988,214).
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92 So much so, in fact, that framing is all but “omnipresent across the social sciences and 
humanities” (Entman 1993, 51; van Gorp 2007)
93 In fact, it is probably because of its “imprecise conceptual/theoretical development” that 
framing has gained its present ubiquity (Benford 1997,413; Giles and Shaw 2009).
94 Entman (1993, 51), especially, is disconcerted about the fact that “nowhere is there a 
general statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within 
and make themselves manifest in text.”
95 While some scholars are comfortable with FT serving as “more of a research programme 
than a unified paradigm”—because it has fostered “creative analysis,” and/or because the 
“theoretical diversity has been beneficial in developing a comprehensive understanding of the 
[framing] process (if not a consistent terminology)” (Hertog and McLeod 2001,140; Reese 
2007, 148)—many others lament that framing is a “broken paradigm,” one that is devoid of 
continuity, rendering the “cumulative learning that is supposed to accompany normal 
science... [impossible]” (Entman 1993, 51; Giles and Shaw 2009; Hertog and McLeod 2001, 
140).
96 See also Matthes and Koring 2008; Steensland 2008; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Straus
2011; Brunken 2006; Callaghan and Schnell 2001; van Gorp 2007; Carragee and Roefs 2004; 
de Vreese 2005).
97 Since FT “assumes that individuals are the definers of reality” (Krogman 1996, 374), 
frames are therefore presumed to be put forth by actors, a.k.a .frame sponsors. Although 
“frames [can be] sponsored by multiple societal actors, including politicians, organizations, 
and social movements” (Entman 1993; Beckett 1996; Gamson and Modigliani 1989), most 
frame research focuses on elites (Entman 2007; Nelson and Kinder 1996) or the media
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(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007) on account of their money, power, and access to 
communications, which researchers assume bestows them with greater societal influence.
98 Several researchers have focused more narrowly, even exclusively, on the 
ability/characteristic of frames to select, emphasize, interpret, and include/exclude (Snow, 
Vliegenthart, and Corrigall-Brown 2007; Anderson 2009; Chong and Druckman 2007; 
Entman 1993; Durham 2001).
99 Entman’s offering is not without criticism, however. Reese (2007,151-2), for example, 
complains that what is gained in “precisely locating the unit of analysis is traded off in 
restricted interpretive ability”; what is more, Entman’s definition “begs the question of how 
[frames] are organized in such a way to promote their effects” (Reese 2007, 152; italics 
added). Others, meanwhile, take issue with Entman’s underlying assumptions about how 
knowledge and understanding should best be acquired. According to D’Angelo, Entman’s 
(1993) lament about the fractured nature of FT, and his contention that all effort should be 
made to streamline it into a codified paradigm, “does not take into account that various, even 
competing, theories may be required to understand framing” (2002, 872); he fails, also, to 
comprehend that “theories are supposed to generate inconsistencies, which, in turn, provide 
new directions for future research” (2002, 873). D’Angelo implies that Entman is trying to 
circumscribe FT into the narrow confines of problem-solving theory, where attention is fixed 
on a given problem-focus, which is then dissected so its variables can be accounted for and 
labelled according to positivistic convention (Cox 1986). Entman’s formulation, therefore, 
has fallen victim to the same trap that has snared so many scholars: it focuses too much on 
the purposeful use of frames, i.e., every frame a FS puts forth seeks to accomplish something 
concrete. One of the main problems with such a fixation is that “what is potentially lost... [is
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an] understanding [about] how...actors create the shared experience that makes frame 
contests meaningful and understandable in the first place” (Diehl and McFarland 2010,1717; 
italics added).
100 The element headings are, for the most part, derived from their explicit reference in any 
given definition/characteristic of frames/framing.
101 Those concurring that frames/framing provide context include Hallahan 1999; Brunken 
2006; Hertog and McLeod 2001; van Gorp 2007; Benford 1997; and Scheff 2005.
Those who contend that frames/framing impart meaning include Benford and Snow 
2000; Carragee and Roefs 2004; Ryan 1991; Hertog and McLeod 2001; Boettcher 2004; 
Chong and Druckman 2007; Snow et al. 1986; Anderson 2009; Benford and Snow 2000; 
Benford 1997; Snow and Benford 1988; Reese 2001; and Entman 1993.
102 In fact, after conducting a careful reading of Goffman’s entire corpus, Scheff concluded 
that what Goffinan had meant all along by frame was context; he goes so far as to hazard that 
if Frame Analysis had been subtitled, Defining Context, then it “would have been better 
understood,” possibly erasing much of the confusion that now characterizes frame research 
(Scheff 2005, 374).
103 It is “active in the sense that something is being done,” and “processual in the sense of a 
dynamic, evolving process”; it “entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work 
of social [actors, a]nd.. .is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of 
interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them” 
(Benford and Snow 2000, 614).
104 Since frames are “invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues.. .efficiently 
and in a way that makes them accessible to lay audiences” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007,
12), thus “mak[ing] the world more knowable and understandable” (Druckman 2001, 100), it 
is important that the two keystones for achieving this—context and meaning—be included in 
my sensitizing concept.
105 Those who argue that values are an important aspect of frames/framing include Nelson 
1997; Scheufele 1999; Fuller 2010; Huckin 2002; Norris-Raynbird 2008; Stolte and Fender 
2007; and Tankard 2001.
106 What is more, the perceptual nature of most CDCs (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007; Hallahan 
1999) means that they often only “become [such occasions] as a result of being perceived as 
nonroutine, unstable, less-understood, and time-urgent” (Druckman 2001, 188); these are 
determinations that “impl[y] certain beliefs” (Ungar 1992, 44) about how things should be 
that are informed by holding certain values. The fact that CDCs are usually a “matter of 
perspective [to] each key public” (Heath 2004,176; italics added)—all of whom may hold 
subtly or radically different values—only accentuates the role of values in the framing of 
occasions as CDCs.
107 Those who believe frames/framing entails responsibility include Robinson 2002; van 
Gorp 2007; Hertog and McLeod 2001; and Benford 1997.
108 This may help explain why so many occasions that seem to be crises, disasters, and 
catastrophes are not framed as such, but rather as accidents or natural disasters, which are “to 
a large extent still seen as a-political,” and thus “serve as prox[ies] for blamelessness”
(Moore 2011, 3; Landis 1999,264).
109 As far as I can determine, there is only one paper that examines how an environmental 
CDC (DHOS, in this case) was framed, Matt Hope’s (2011) “Framing the ‘Greatest 
Environmental Disaster in Our History:’” The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill as a Social
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Event.” Although he shows that contrary to the rhetoric, DHOS was framed as a social event, 
and not an environmental one, his work does not really treat crisis, disaster, and/or 
catastrophe—as terms and concepts—as objects of analysis. What is more, he only examines 
the statements of three actor types over the course of six months during this one occasion. 
Finally, he does not seek to discover if there were any correlations between frames and actual 
outcomes; instead, he concludes that the framing of the spill as a social event may further 
contribute to the overall philosophical milieu of ecological modernisation and its attendant 
policy discourse.
Chapter 4 Endnotes
110 This assumption was based on another, which posited that the first year of each spill 
would be when the greatest number and variety of actors would most likely frame them as 
CDCs. Virtually nobody would frame a spill a CDC before the fact, and as time wore on and 
each spill faded from prominence and immediacy, there would be less and less reason for 
them to refer to them as CDCs afterwards. This assumption proved correct: not only did the 
use of CDCs begin immediately after word of SBOS and DHOS got out, but after a few 
months, the quantity and frequency of CDC-usage dropped-off significantly. What is more, 
both spills had wildly different durations: while SBOS was still leaking oil a year later— 
although the worst of it had come to an end three weeks after the initial blowout—DHOS 
was capped after 86 days with no detectable infusions of new oil spilled into the GoM. 
However, this elicits a question (one that is beyond the parameters of this thesis to explore): 
how does one define a spill as over? Is it when a well is no longer releasing oil in an 
uncontrolled manner? When all obvious signs of oil and its damage have been removed from
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the social environment? When all traces of oil have been removed from the environment and 
the sociopolieconomic consequences have been remedied?
111 Most of the DHOS raw data was procured from the websites of various, relevant actors, 
usually from sections entitled ‘Newsroom’ or ‘Press Releases’; the remainder was acquired 
from transcribed subcommittee meetings, publically available letters, and a smattering of 
newspaper articles, all located online. As of September 2013, these websites still exist, are 
free to visit by anybody with an internet connection, and continue to cache the raw data I 
drew upon.
112 Due primarily to the fact that SBOS occurred in 1969, the OSIC stored at UCSB is 
probably the only significant, organized source for on-the-ground and as-it-happened 
information about SBOS in the world (whether from a CDC point of view or any other). It 
chronicles four years of Santa Barbara’s—and to a certain extent, the nation’s, and the 
world’s—relationship with oil spills. The collection’s materials range from journalism to in- 
house reports (i.e., Union Oil’s [UO], the Presidential advisory panels) to various actors’ 
correspondences with other actors. Consequently, I did not consult any other source for raw 
data utilizing crisis, disaster, or catastrophe pertaining to SBOS.
113 Although the OSIC also contained audio-visual material—and could have provided 
something of a complement to the vast repositories of DHOS video and audio from DHOS 
available on the Internet—it appeared too piecemeal to provide a representative enough 
overview of the 365 day period serving as the time frame of my study. As a consequence, the 
written-text restriction was imposed upon DHOS raw data collection, as well, to retain 
comparability. This deliberate limitation did not pose a problem in the end because both 
spills (especially DHOS) had accumulated more than enough material to base a study on.
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114 Instead, it exists as thousands of pages of hardcopy (most of it original) contained in 
hundreds of binders stored in seventy-plus boxes (fifty-plus of which I requested, having 
determined from an inventory list what I wished to consult) residing in a storage facility, and 
had to be delivered to UCSB’s Special Collections office at the Davidson Library so that I 
could go through them.
1,5 This trip took place from the 12th of July, 2011 to the 24th of July, 2011.
116 This resulted in approximately 200 pages of single-sided photocopies and about 2300 
photographs stored on a data card (and were then uploaded to my computer). The tactic of 
photographing the pages was suggested by both Dr. Wilkening, my supervisor, and Mr. Ed 
Fields, head of Special Collections at the Davidson Library, UCSB.
117 The collection of DHOS data was further streamlined by my experiences at UCSB, where 
I ended up finalizing the number and types of actors that my thesis would focus on; this, in 
tandem with the virtues of the World Wide Web, allowed me to target the chosen actors, 
access their websites, sift through their press releases, and cut-and-paste any relevant 
documents into actor-assigned Word files, as opposed to visiting the electronic archives of 
various newspapers and wading through their myriads of stories. This would have proven 
untenable, anyway: whereas in 1969, the interested newspapers only published a dozen 
stories per day in total on SBOS, by 2010, virtually all newspapers were publishing a dozen 
stories per hour each on DHOS during its height.
118 As a left-of-centre, somewhat activist newspaper, SBNP sided not with government and 
industry, but with the people of Santa Barbara, most of whom were dismayed and horrified at 
the black tides staining their beaches and killing or driving away the Santa Barbara Channel’s 
(SBC) plentiful birdlife; it sided, especially, with those seeking to remove all oil development
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from the Channel. As a consequence, it published scores of articles on SBOS, in particular, 
and oil, in general. Almost all of them had a get oil out (pun both intended and not) 
implication and/or verdict; long after the national, and even state media, had left Santa 
Barbara for other stories, SBNP continued to report on the spill, going so far as to include a 
daily count: “Day [Such-and-Such] and Counting—When Will It End?” (OSIC 1969-73). As 
of the 28th of January, 1970, SBNP reported the spill as still ongoing.
119 Several news stories came from such organs as the New York Times, the Los Angeles 
Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Washington Post, and even the Wall Street Journal.
120 However, not all documents with these words were collected. If the terms appeared only 
in the title of an article, report, or press release, the document was disregarded because the 
lack of context would have made conducting a meaningful analysis impossible (frames are 
explanatory in nature, while titles are designed to pique reader interest, not to sate their 
curiosity). In addition, if the words appeared in a letter whose signatory does not have a 
1969/2010 counterpart, it was not collected; the same applies to letters with multiple 
signatories: if even one of them does not have a counterpart, the entire text was ignored. For 
example, if a letter of indignation was signed by both Sierra Club and Greenpeace, it was 
disqualified on the grounds that the latter environmental NGO did not exist in 1969. This 
limitation was imposed for the purpose of maintaining comparability between the two spills.
121 For better or worse, the Internet—and more specifically, its subsidiary components the 
World Wide Web, Twitter, et cetera—has provided anybody with access to a computer and a 
wifi hotspot the opportunity to disseminate their views on any topic conceivable, sans 
editorial authority/gate keeping, at little to no financial cost. In contrast, the only forms of 
mass communication available in 1969 were print media, radio, and television, where access
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was limited by physical space, scheduling, costs (to both producer and broadcaster), 
perceptions of public interest, and content gatekeepers/enforcers (i.e., editors; moral censors; 
the dictates of informative journalism).
122 An example of a pair of temporal counterparts would be Audubon 1969 and Audubon 
2010: the ornithological/environmental NGO existed in 1969 to call the Santa Barbara spill a 
CDC, and it existed in 2010 to do the same to the Deepwater Horizon. An example of an 
appropriate pair of temporal counterparts would be President Nixon and President Obama: 
although they are two different individuals from two different political parties, the office and 
position they represent are common to both 1969 and 2010, therefore making them 
corresponding FSs. Meanwhile, neither Greenpeace nor MMS could be included because 
they did not exist in 1969 (MMS has the added distinction of ceasing to exist part-way 
through the Deepwater Horizon spill; its successor, the BOEMs, was disregarded for obvious 
reasons).
123 Although municipal and county actors often condemned SBOS as a CDC, they could not 
be included as FSs, despite the frequency of their potential contributions (aided and abetted 
by the fact that SBNP—the source from which the majority of my raw data came from—gave 
these actors considerable print-space on account of it being a local/regional organ). There are 
two reasons for this. The first is that although Louisiana has the appropriate municipal and 
parish (the Louisiana version of counties) counterparts, a cursory examination of their 
websites indicated that not only did they rarely mention DHOS, but they also refrained from 
referring to it as a CDC. The second reason is that whereas SBOS more or less had a single 
epicentre—Santa Barbara—DHOS did not; even if I limited my inquiry to Louisiana, no 
single parish, city, or town stands out as the poster child for DHOS’s devastation, by my own
169
judgement or anybody else’s. I could not in good conscience, therefore, arbitrarily choose a 
single place to act as a synecdoche for the rest, nor conglomerate them into a single voice, 
because doing so would have robbed the others of their (potentially) unique CDC voices. 
That, and there appeared to be nothing to work with, anyway.
124 A slight caveat to the rule stated in endnote 124 pertains to non-national environmental 
groups. While SBOS literally resulted in the formation of a specialist anti-oil group—Get Oil 
Out! (GOO!), dedicated to the complete removal of all oil exploration and production in the 
SBC3—DHOS does not appear to have inspired the same. What is more, although there are 
several environmental NGOs based along the GoM, in general, and in Louisiana, in 
particular, they a) do not subscribe to a goal as radical and rigid as GOO’s and b) have 
networked themselves together into a community so that no one is necessarily predominant 
over any other. As a consequence, and because the non-national environmental group voice is 
critical to the integrity of my comparative analysis, I decided to gather together all Louisiana- 
based15 environmental NGOs under one umbrella, which I called Regional Environmental 
Actors (REAs),e to provide GOO! with an appropriate temporal counterpart. This caveat 
extends to those actors grouped under Scientists, as well, albeit for a somewhat different 
reason: what the scientists said about either SBOS or DHOS did not radically differ among 
them; they appeared to agree that the spills were, in general, potentially deleterious for the 
SBC and the GoM. In light of these two things, I felt comfortable collecting all extracts made 
by scientists under the heading of Scientists.
a. GOO! continues to exist and operate to this day, its primary mission unchanged. 
According to its website, though they had little to say about DHOS; in fact, they did 
not even refer to it as a CDC, at least not during the designated timeframe.
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b. Although DHOS impacted all five Gulf states (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Florida), not only was Louisiana considered the most impacted state, 
but it was also judged by common opinion to have been the epicentre of the spill and 
its response: the Macondo well is/was located 66 kilometers south-west of the state; 
the National Command tasked with ending the spill was based out of first Robert, 
Louisiana, then New Orleans; fishing closures effected Louisianans the most; the 
state has the most extensive coastal wetlands along the Gulf; and most of BP’s 
eventual Clean Water Act fines will be going to Louisiana.
c. In the end, three Louisiana-based non-national environmental NGOs made up the 
REAs: the Gulf Restoration Network (GRN); the Louisiana Bucket Brigade (LBB); 
and Coastal Conservation Association (CCA). How do I justify putting all three of 
these actors under one FS heading, something I refused to do with Louisiana’s 
municipalities and parishes? By the fact that the individual content of the each actor’s 
statements survived the refining and condensing process (to be described later in the 
chapter) intact; in other words, although all three are huddled under one umbrella, 
their unique CDC perspectives remained separate from each other.
125 As Chapter 3 pointed out, most framing research examines, in one way or another, how 
the media frames something and/or what effects media framing has. I decided very early on 
that I would not do this, so that my research might stand out from the pack. It was also for the 
sake of reigning in the potential scope of the study. At the very beginning of my research, I 
conducted a LexisNexis search of newspapers using the keywords “Deepwater Horizon,” 
“crisis,” “disaster,” and “catastrophe” and came up with thousands of hits. Even assuming
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that only half of them were not FS quotations, that still meant that the media is by far the 
largest user and purveyor of DHOS-as-CDC.
126 For example, statements from then White House Press Secretary, Robert Gibbs, were not 
included even though he served as the official voice of the Obama Administration whenever 
the President, Vice-president, or any of the cabinet members did not personally issue 
statements.
127 This was also done in an effort to reign in the number of CDCs.
128 Government reports are an exception to this rule. While on the one hand these reports 
have identifiable authors, on the other, those bylined authors did not actually write what is 
contained within them save the foreword. Rather, they were written by staffers working 
under the ‘author.’ I decided to include them, anyway, for two reasons: a) the reports, written 
after the spill but still within the one-year time frame, serve as summaries for the ways in 
which various actors perceived the spills as CDCs and therefore can be compared and 
contrasted with all the other FS’s CDC-framings to see if the summary matches with what 
was reality; and b) the DHOS reports used CDCs a lot—so many times, in fact, that not 
including them would have prevented a fuller picture from forming of the federal 
government’s perception of what made the spill a CDC.
129 Although press releases often feature the contact information of the media representative, 
it cannot be proven whether this individual actually wrote the release or acted as editor to 
whoever did, strengthening my assertion that media representatives are fundamentally 
anonymous.
130 DHOS FS media representatives often recycled chunks of text from their press releases 
into succeeding ones for the purpose of either rounding-out and/or reiterating a point the FS
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presumably wanted repeated. One of the diseases of the information age is the need for 
constant updates, even when there is nothing to update: silence is anathema because it 
perceived as being filled by some other FS whose ffame(s) might be critical or contrary to the 
first’s, and/or because it is assumed to be potentially winning hearts and minds.
131 For example, under DHOS -  Sol -  Disaster, four of the 27 individual extracts could be 
combined into a single super-extract because the general topic/theme of each one of those 
four revolved around how DHOS proved the importance of continuing to reform the offshore 
oil system.
132 While the sensitizing analysis was largely superfluous for the short and individual 
extracts, where the distinguishing CDC features were often a matter of what-you-see-is-what- 
you-get, it proved very advantageous for the lengthy ones and the super-extracts, where it 
distilled volumes of locution into more succinct and plainer packets of text illustrating at a 
glance what and/or why the spills were perceived as CDCs. By so doing, I acquired relevant 
raw materials for the frame analysis—i.e., potential CDC frames and/or meanings framed in 
the context of CDCs, not political or environmental frames.
As will become apparent in Chapter 5, the resulting CDC frames do have political and 
environmental meanings to them; I was not trying to strip such meanings from the frames. 
Rather, I wanted the politics and environmentalism to be in service to the CDC, not the other 
way around, as is often the case in other framing research (i.e., Hay 1999; Hope 2011; Millar 
and Beck 2004). In essence, that is what I interpret framing to entail: what meanings are 
being used to serve, strengthen, and propagate another meaning. This thesis could well have 
been about the political or environmental framing of the spills, where CDCs are one of 
several meanings recruited to build the political or environmental frame (see Hope 2011).
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133 Whereas making super-extracts always reduced the amount of material, the process of 
assembling generalized CDC frames sometimes resulted in reduction, but at other times led 
to an increase in information, or to no change at all; usually, though, there was either a 
decrease or no change, and rarely an increase.
134 Example lo f the process of converting CDC frames into generalized CDC frames (GDFs):
• SBOS was not a disaster—and therefore should not be made such a big deal 
of—because no people were killed.
• Although SBOS was a terrible thing, nobody was killed, the damage can be 
cleaned/repaired, and another spill can be prevented by following “good 
procedures. ”
Both of these disaster frames are from Union Oil, and they contain the same 
idea/theme: that SBOS was not a disaster because nobody was killed, the damage 
is mitigatable, and prevention is relatively easy. Therefore, they can be combined 
into a single GDF:
• SBOS was not a disaster because nobody was killed, the damage is 
repairable, and future spills can be prevented through procedural 
improvements.
Example 2:
• BP cheated and MMS let them, resulting in DHOS, but fixing this by adding 
stronger safeguards will not get to the root o f the problem, which is 
America’s addiction to oil; it is unacceptable, and the President should 
deliver a plan to get the nation o ff oil within 20 years.
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This disaster frame is from Sierra Club 2010, and it contains several 
ideas/themes: a) BP cheated, resulting in DHOS; b) MMS let BP cheat, resulting 
in DHOS; c) the root of the problem (i.e., DHOS; spills, in general) is America’s 
addiction to oil; and d) the President should deliver a plan to get the nation off oil 
within 20 years. The result is that this single disaster frame can become/help 
contribute to three GDFs:
• DHOS is BP’s fault; hence why they should take full responsibility;
• MMS failed to do its job because it colluded with oil industry; and
• America is too dependent on oil and should therefore kick the habit by 
rethinking its energy policy and realizing a CE economy.
Ideas/themes c) and d) could be combined to form the third CDC frame 
because for Sierra Club, oil addiction/dependence and getting o ff oil are 
always intimately related; during DHOS, the two frames/framings were 
almost never separate, as was the case for other FSs who mentioned one 
or the other or both.
Example 3:
• America is at a turning point because DHOS proves that the oil industry has a 
‘‘stranglehold on our economy, our health, and our environment, ” and the 
nation needs assurances that DHOS will not happen again.
• Big Oil is so obsessed with securing oil that it refuses to learn the lessons 
from its failures, putting the nation at greater risk for spills.
These two crisis frames are from Sierra Club 2010, and while they share several 
ideas/themes (i.e., the oil industry has too strong a hold over the economy, health,
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and environment of the US; the oil industry is too fixated on getting more oil to 
learn from its mistakes), they also have differences (the former states that 
America is at a turning point, requiring certainty of no more spills and a 
commitment to getting off oil, while the latter merely complains about Big Oil). 
As a consequence, these two disaster frames become two GDFs:
• DHOS proves that the oil industry has a “stranglehold” on the 
economy, health, and environment via oil; the oil industry is too 
obsessed with acquiring more oil to learn from its mistakes, thus 
putting nation at risk for more spills and
• America is at a turning point where it simultaneously needs assurances 
o f no more spills and kicking oil within 20 years.
135 This thesis was not interested in determining how many times a FS utilized a frame, but 
rather in how many different frames did a FS put forth. That being said, however, the number 
of instances of any given frame (i.e., how many times the FS referred to it) has been 
preserved. After each generalized CDC frame in the eponymous list (see Appendix F), there 
is a sequence of numbers (following either ‘SBOS’ or ‘DHOS’); these represent how many 
(super-)extracts made mention of the generalized frame.
136 Although most of the time I was successful at generating a more or less logical answer to 
the question (i.e., what kind o f crisis is going on here? A response/community/economic 
crisis), sometimes I was not (for example, what kind o f catastrophe is going on here? A  
remove oil development from SBC catastrophe). Nevertheless, all basic CDC topics 
accurately, if abbreviatedly, reflect the main idea of each generalized CDC frame.
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137 For example, the crisis code, ‘3,’ for Economic, applied only to SBOS’s generalized crisis 
frames, not to the same spill’s generalized disaster or catastrophe spills (for them, the code 
for Economic was ‘21 ’ and ‘5,’ respectively). In addition, these codes did not pertain to any 
of DHOS’s generalized CDC frames (for them, Economic was ‘5’ for crisis, ‘9’ for disaster, 
and ‘4’ for catastrophe). Instances where code numbers appear to be same—such as ‘ 1’ 
being the crisis code for Response for both SBOS and DHOS—were coincidences; in each 
spill’s clutch of crisis frames, Response was the first encountered.
138 In other words, generalized frames referring to past action, to action not taken, or to 
negative action were not included.
Chapter 5 Endnotes
139 While my methodology succeeded in reducing the amount of material (i.e., the volume of 
text into extracts, the number of extracts into generalized CDC frames), it did not appear to 
decrease the quantity and range/variety of meanings attached to crisis, disaster, and 
catastrophe; in other words, stripping out extraneous and irrelevant text, collapsing CDC 
extracts into one another, and coalescing the frame extracts into generalized ones only 
partially dampened the cacophony that characterizes, as a whole, the various FSs’ framing of 
the spills as CDCs. Over the course of 365 days, SBOS generated 13 GCFs, 92 GDFs, and 20 
GCaFs, for a total of 125 generalized CDC frames; and DHOS produced 38 GCFs, 166 
GDFs, and 18 GCaFs, for a total of 222 generalized CDC frames. Even when the cumulative 
347 generalized frames are boiled down to unique, basic CDC frames—see Chapter 5.1.1 
below—there are still over 70 CDC meanings for both spills.
140 While at face value this represents a remarkable reduction of material to meaning, it is 
offset by the fact that the majority of these basic CDC topics encompass at least two (often
177
several) different perspectives pertaining to a) what it is, represents, or means depending on 
which spill it comes from; b) what FS is putting forth the topic; or c) even what CDC is being 
utilized. For example, Response acquired over half a dozen perspectives from DHOS alone 
because most FSs who referenced the topic meant something different by it—from the 
Audubon and President Obama pointing out that the spill inspired ordinary citizens in the 
thousands to help with the response (Saville 2010; Obama 2010) to OP A demanding that 
spill response be based on facts, evidence, and truth, not emotion, recrimination, and political 
opportunism (Cassidy 2010; Lambom 2010; McClintock 2011) to Sol Salazar declaring that 
the response must be massive and adhere to the “cautionary approach” (Salazar 2010g).
OP A, by itself, has at least three: in addition to the aforementioned one, they 1) report that 
the FG and the OI are working together to respond to DHOS, each investing massive 
quantities of resources (McNutt 2010), and 2) contend that only large-scale, coordinated 
cooperation can hope to mitigate the spill’s ecological impact, a good model to follow being 
ACC work (Lyder 2010). By taking into account the basic CDC topics’ multiple 
perspectives, the number of meanings quickly re-approaches the original number of 
generalized CDC frames.3 But even if this problematization was disregarded, 72 meanings 
for crisis, disaster, and catastrophe seems excessive.
a. It would not fully equal—or exceed—the original number of generalized CDC 
frames, however, because not all of the basic CDC topics had multiple perspectives; 
some had only one. For example, DHOS — Oil dependency -  Disaster has four 
contributing GDFs, but they all add up to a single perspective: oil dependency— 
and/or more broadly, fossil fuel addiction—is bad (for America) and should come to 
an end, preferably through the development of a CE economy.
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141 There is also a scarcity of patterns tying together groups of basic CDC topics within the 
72; little more than perhaps three are readily apparent. One revolves around economics and 
money, consisting of five topics: Economic', Financial restitution; Jobs; Human, economic, 
environment; and Economic/human-ecosystem link. Another concerns the apportioning of 
blame, and encompasses three topics: Responsibility; Accountability/ responsibility; and 
Liability/accountability. However, topics from either of these sub-groups are not mutually 
exclusive; Financial restitution is just as much about blame as it is money and 
Liability/accountability is just as much about money as it is blame. Meanwhile, a third 
potential group centres on management, which includes six topics: Systemic management; 
Legislative/regulatory; Public consultancy; OIoperating culture; BP behaviour; and BAU 
resumption.
In the end, however, attempting to find patterns amongst the 72 basic CDC topics is 
extremely vexing for two reasons. The first is that, as the first two examples demonstrate, the 
topics do not lend themselves exclusively to any one potential sub-group heading; one could 
spend endless hours arranging and rearranging the topics into one series of groups or another, 
and struggling over whether topics should belong to only one sub-grouping or be permitted to 
straddle. But to what end, especially in the context of this thesis? In addition to contributing 
little to nothing towards answering either of my two research questions, it also does a 
disservice to the actual frames—the actual meanings—summarized by the topics; what is 
gained in (oversimplification and (possible) empiricism is lost in nuance and of the peculiar 
CDC-view(s) put forth by the individual FS. The second reason, meanwhile, is that the basic 
CDC topics were not designed so they could be slotted into patterns, but merely a means of 
condensing the otherwise unwieldy number of generalized CDC frames into a much more
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compact form demonstrating at a glance the surprising number and diversity of meanings the 
various FSs attached to CDCs during SBOS and DHOS.
142 Although, as Chapter 4 stated, only written-text frames were included, I nevertheless 
ended up absorbing a large number of each spills’ visual frames while collecting the raw 
data, usually in the form of photographs accompanying newspaper or magazine articles 
(SBOS) and by witnessing DHOS via newscasts. More often than not, these photographs 
depicted aspects of nature inundated by waves of black or ensnared in tendrils of orange. An 
example of iconography common to both spills was the portrait of the oiled bird.
143 Allegedly. No proof has ever been found that SBOS’s oil—or any oil—caused the death 
of any seal (baby or otherwise) in the SBC. Investigations carried out soon after the 
publication of the Life article determined that the supposed dead seals had in fact been 
sleeping, and what looked like oil was some other kind of gunk harmless to the mammals 
(OCIS 1969-73).
144 On the one hand, this can be chalked up to how the environment was framed, and 
subsequently summarized into topics: whenever a FS mentioned the environment, they 
tended to talk about the same subjects (i.e., ruined coastline, oiled wildlife, unknown long­
term ecological consequences), which ended up being categorized under only one CDC topic, 
as opposed to something like economics that encompassed many different subjects (i.e., jobs, 
compensation, moratoriums), thus requiring several specialized topics to properly represent 
them. On the other hand, the lack can also be attributed to the difference between explicitly 
and directly framing the environment and doing so implicitly and indirectly. For example, 
basic CDC topics like Exploitation or Oil dependency put subjects such as unchecked 
technology and fossil fuel addiction front and centre, but the underlying purpose for speaking
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out about such things is to decry the environmental damage they wreak; in that sense, these 
topics are about the environment, and therefore make up for the apparent deficiency.
145 Not only did Deepwater Horizon (officially) last longer than Santa Barbara—three 
months versus two weeks—extending the zenith during which the majority of the CDC 
framings could be made, but the existence in 2010 of a voracious 24/7 news machine and the 
ubiquity of information technology ensured that FSs had plenty of opportunities and 
mediums by which to disseminate as many CDC frames as they wished, whenever they 
wished, and as often as they wished. However, the disparity can also be attributed to how 
framing oil spills (as CDCs), and to how the socio-econo-political and environmental 
contexts within which the spills and the framings occur, have changed during the 40 years 
separating SBOS and DHOS. Santa Barbara was only the second oil spill in history to receive 
intense media attention, and the first to effect the shores of a populated and socially 
significant (American, tourist) city. When the black tides began inundating the beaches, the 
spill’s various FSs lacked a precedent to guide how they should frame SBOS as a CDC (or as 
anything else, for that matter); they were making up the oil spill CDC framework as they 
went along, referring to topics as they came up instead of working from an established list of 
impacts, consequences, and responses. What is more, the world of 1969 was less complex in 
several respects—or, to be more accurate, complex in different ways—than that of 2010, 
especially in regard to mass industrial pollution occasions. Since something like SBOS had 
never before exploded into mass awareness with such abruptness and haste, few if any actors 
had any pre-conceived notion of how to respond, at all or even appropriately (both the FG 
and the OI, for example, denied that the spill was a CDC [OSIC 1969-73]).
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146 As with the results in Chart 1, no overarching pattern can be found that connects all or 
most of the basic CDC topics, at least not without incurring enough significant ambiguity to 
render the exercise unhelpful; nor can smaller sub-groups be discerned from matching topics 
together. The reasons for this are the same as those given above for Chart 1. However, if the 
basic topics as presented in Chart 2 are divided according whether they were exclusive to one 
spill or the other, or were inclusive of both, a different (albeit, broad) kind of pattern does 
emerge: those basic CDC topics that SBOS and DHOS have in common (see Chart 3).
147 The 14 shared topics constitute about 40% of SBOS’s total number of unique basic CDC 
ones and approximately 27% of DHOS’s.
148 On the other hand, the 14 also represent only a broad pattern because in addition to being 
a disparate lot, offering even fewer potential linkages than the per-spill or cumulative lists, 
the actual perspectives explaining the meaning of the topic are, more often than not, very 
different from each other, reflecting and feeding off the contexts of 1969 California and the 
2010 Gulf Coast.
149 For Santa Barbara, the economic turmoil was restricted to the vital tourism industry, 
which was built upon the perception that the city’s beaches were especially beautiful and 
pristine (OSIC 1969-73). The Gulf Coast not only suffered from a tourism drop-off, but also 
from fishing grounds closures, loss of consumer confidence in the safety of GoM seafood, 
and (purportedly) lost of OI jobs because of the (six-month) moratorium on (new) deepwater 
production; all of these exacerbated the impacts caused by the Great Recession.
150 These ‘summaries’ are only broad distillations of the actual content of the generalized 
CDC frames and are not meant to definitively reflect and/or suggest correspondence between 
SBOS and DHOS CDC frames; most of the time, the spills and the FSs sharing a common
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basic CDC topic had significantly different perspectives on that topic, therefore lacking the 
equivalence and/or comparability that my ‘summaries’ otherwise imply. What is more, 
several of the 14 common topics were rarely used throughout each spills’ 365 days; in other 
words, while Response and Economic were often-referenced topics/frames, most of the others 
(such as Technological, Human, and Reputational/leadership) were referenced only once or 
twice by one or two FSs from each spill.
151 It is not immediately obvious, however, why most of the SBOS-only and DHOS-only 
basic CDC topics are relegated to one spill or the other. While the reasons for sequestering 
Remove OD from SBC and BP behaviour are obvious, why are Ongoing and Sowing 
environmental awareness the sole province of SBOS’s FSs even though DHOS lasted far 
longer than it ‘should’ have, and even though it caused a flood of environmental concern in 
the form of protests and thousands of ordinary people volunteering to help oiled wildlife 
(Obama 2010; Saville 2010)? Why are Financial restitution and Unprecedented the sole 
province of DHOS even though the Santa Barbara spill did cause property damage, thus 
making it (hypothetically, at least) eligible for compensation from either the FG or the OI, 
and even though it was the first of its kind while DHOS was ‘merely’ the biggest? The 
answers to such questions are not within the purview of this thesis, but they are likely to be 
had in the geographic, social, economic, political, and environmental contexts of not only the 
time periods, but also the very different regions each spill occurred in (see Freudenberg and 
Gramling 1993).
152 Deepwater Horizon FSs may have produced 14 GCaTs to Santa Barbara’s 13, but this is 
belied not only by the fact that it did so from 18 GCaFs (as opposed to SBOS’s 20), but also 
by such physical facts as the amount of oil spilled (DHOS: 795 million litres; SBOS: 14
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million) and the area of the impact-zone (DHOS: thousands of kilometres of wetlands and 
beaches across five states; SBOS: a couple hundred kilometres of beach bordering the SBC).3 
Common sense would seem to dictate that DHOS should have attracted far more catastrophe 
frames than it did; reality indicates, however, that these wildly unequal spills resulted in a 
roughly equal number of generalized CDC frames and BCaTs. How to account for this?
Judging by the BCaTs, it appears the reason is because of the tenor of the catastrophe 
frames. According to SBOS FSs, the spill was seen from both an insular and an expansive 
point-of-view; in other words, they catastrophe-framed in terms of the spill happening in the 
SBC and the fact that it was happening anywhere at all. Each of the BCaTs revolve around 
either local calamity and/or solutions {Remove OD from SBC; Response; Economic) or a 
larger—national, even global—perception of the danger posed by oil spills/industrial 
pollution, and/or the need for spill prevention and environmental protection {Other actor 
involvement; Environmental; World importance). DHOS’s BCaTs, on the other hand, tend to 
be far more insular, focusing almost exclusively on the harm inflicted on impacted 
communities along the GC, and on what can/should be done to alleviate it {Remedial action; 
Food safety; Human); four of the BCaTs, alone, concern regional economics in some fashion 
{Financial restitution; Economic; Jobs; and Second catastropheh). Based on this, it is 
possible to infer that the perception of catastrophe surrounding SBOS was perhaps more 
acute than DHOS—from a framing perspective—because the FSs at the time could see how a 
spill despoiling beaches routinely described as “beautiful” and “world renowned” (OSIC 
1969-73) synecdochically fits into the ‘bigger picture’ of the decade’s growing 
environmental awareness and concern. FSs in 2010, however, could not see much beyond the 
economic distress both spill and response (Federal, read: moratorium) was causing to
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“America’s working coast” (Landrieu 2010aa).c Why the FSs from each spill saw it these 
ways, though, is beyond the ability of this thesis to determine.
a. On the other hand, the catastrophe-perception of both spills can be debated from a 
sensitizing concept point-of-view. While SBOS required outside organizations (Red 
Adair’s blowout crew; prisoners) to help staunch the spill and/or clean it up, it was 
not huge (in comparison to subsequent spills); and while DHOS was certainly 
gargantuan, no outside institutions were required to help end or clean it up (in fact, 
both the FG and BP/the 01 declined outside assistance).
b. What the generalized CDC frame(s) contributing to the BCaT, Second catastrophe, 
mean is that the FG’s response to DHOS—namely, the (six-month) moratorium on 
(new) deepwater oil production—is causing a second, economic catastrophe to the 
Gulf region (in general) and to Louisiana (in particular) in the form of job losses.
c. My findings appear to lend further corroboration to Freudenberg and Gramling’s 
(1993) research examining the social, political, economic, and even geographic 
contexts distinguishing coastal California and Louisiana and how they contribute to 
the regions’ vastly different opinions and attitudes towards offshore oil production.
153 In other words, the Deepwater Horizon crisis frames state or imply that something can 
still be done—as long as it is done soon—to prevent the spill from becoming any worse. 
What is more, DHOS lasted for 86 continuous, high-profile days, and the number and variety 
of BCTs reflects this fact; the longer the height of the spill, the more time the FSs had to 
attach crisis meanings to it. Finally, and strangely, none of the FSs crisis-framed the spill as 
ongoing or continuous. SBOS, on the other hand, was crisis-framed as Ongoing. Although
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Santa Barbara was officially declared over within three weeks of its eruption, the fissure 
beneath Platform A serving as the point-source continued to seep, on average, approximately 
five to 10 barrels of oil per day for over a year (OSIC 1969-73); each new (albeit, small) 
patch of surface sheen or oil landfall duly noted in the SBNP. (In fact, not only did SBOS FSs 
associate Ongoing with crisis, but also disaster and catastrophe.)
154 SBOS has only one unique BCT: Categorical', three unique BCaTs: Other actor 
involvement, Unrealized, and Comparative', and 18 unique BDTs: Not a disaster, 
Responsibility, Forethought ignored, Inevitable future spills, Emotional, Exploitation, 
Conflict o f interest, OD resuming, Natural, National/global survival, Sowing environmental 
awareness, Cover-up/non-disclosure, Human, Forgotten, Reputational, Misplaced blame, 
and Bad idea.
DHOS has four unique BCTs: Natural and human environment, Unprecedented, 
Responsibility, and Consequences', four unique BCaTs: Second catastrophe,
Liability/accountability, Human, and Food safety, and 29 unique BDTS: Coastal restoration', 
Continued disaster suffering', Human, economic, environmental', Economic/human-ecosystem 
link, Mental health', Faith in OI, FG; OI operating culture; Reputational/leadership; Human 
personal input; Louisianans; Accountability/responsibility; Moratorium; Public consultancy; 
BP behaviour; Capturing world attention; Forgotten/no action; Hope; Expressing sorrow, 
regret; Technological; Unanswered questions; Guarantee; Human suffering; Failed wake-up 
call; National damage; Worst environmental disaster in history; Human-caused; Prior 
action; BAUresumption; and Dirty, dangerous, deadly.
155 From a sensitizing concept point-of-view, few of the topics offer any explanation as to 
why the FSs might have kept them exclusive to crisis, disaster, or catastrophe. For example,
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during DHOS, why was Natural and human environment only framed in terms of a crisis 
when it would be just as appropriate to frame it in terms of disaster or catastrophe? Why was 
the spill a Human catastrophe, but not a Human disaster? And why was OI operating culture 
framed as a disaster and not a crisis despite most accounts implying (if not out-right stating) 
that the OI has done little to nothing to change how it manages and conducts oil production? 
Meanwhile, several topics that should be exclusive to one CDC or another are not. During 
SBOS, for instance, the Ongoing nature of the spill was framed as a crisis, and a disaster, and 
a catastrophe, despite neither of the latter two’s sensitizing concepts defining themselves in 
terms of continuation. The suggestion/demand to Remove OD from SBC was not only framed 
in terms of catastrophe, where it fits with the eponymous concept, but also in terms of 
disaster, whose concept does not hint at such drastic actions/solutions. And finally, the spill 
was not only catastrophe-framed as being of World importance, but also disaster-framed as 
such, despite the former being a more ‘proper’ home for such ‘hyperbole.’ Results such as 
these appear to lead to the conclusion that what FSs meant by framing the spills as CDCs 
cannot be answered by examining only the basic CDC topics.
156 Quasi-/Rudimentary because even though a certain basic topic may have been framed as 
each CDC, it should not be taken to mean, or even to imply, that all the FSs CDC-framed 
their respective spills as that topic; some might have framed it as a disaster, but not a crisis or 
a catastrophe, or they might not even have framed the spills as that topic.
157 Disregarding the sensitizing concepts, the reasons why SBOS FSs would frame these 
topics as CDCs appear to make sense. Whether perceived as a crisis, a disaster, or a 
catastrophe, an oil spill happening near a socially significant place demands Response; steps 
must be taken to stop it, fix it, and put in place measures that will at least theoretically
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prevent another such occasion from happening again. Meanwhile, when CDCs erupt, the only 
barometer that seems to count is that measuring the Economic consequences; if an occasion 
negatively affects the economy in some way, it is bad, and if it does not, it is not. During the 
late 1960s, due in part to exposes like Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, the Technological 
utopianism of the 1950s was coming to an end; occasions such as SBOS demonstrated that 
the technologies purportedly benefiting Americans had a dark side, one with grave 
environmental consequences. And, finally, the fact that oil continued to pollute the waters 
and coastline of the SBC long after UO and the FG declared SBOS over behooved various 
FSs to complain about its Ongoing nature.
158 Disregarding the sensitizing concepts, the reasons why DHOS FSs framed these topics as 
CDCs appear to make sense. As with SBOS, DHOS demanded Response, not only to dampen 
the potential ire of the citizenry, but to prove that various actors could competently deal with 
a CDC (especially federal agencies, whose last major CDC was Hurricane Katrina, a 
response debacle). In the United States, at least, any CDC quickly becomes a battleground 
echoing with demands for Financial restitution: people have been harmed in some way by an 
outside force (be it nature, government, or industry) and they need/want money to help them 
alleviate some of the distress. Like in 1969, the world of the 21st Century appears to measure 
phenomena according to the Economic consequences. But at the same time, the world of 
today is much more aware and concerned about the Environmental effects of human activity, 
especially when said activity unleashes a CDC like DHOS; the situation along the GC, and 
especially Louisiana, accentuated this because several FSs linked the spill with wetland 
deterioration and (the need for) coastal restoration to call attention to the threatened multi­
billion dollar GoM seafood industry and to the need to rebuild the coast’s natural hurricane
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buffers. Meanwhile, if there was one thing that virtually all DHOS FSs could agree upon, it 
was that offshore oil management was riven with Systemic management problems, and that 
these (in part, at least) contributed to the spill. And, finally, a couple of FSs questioned the 
Values feeding into issues associated with offshore energy production, primarily the profit-at- 
any-cost mentality of the OI at the expense of safety and technological prudence (i.e., flying 
in the face of should because can is beckoning with possibilities).
159 There are two very glaring caveats to this, however. The first is that the basic CDC topics 
are riven with fundamental deficiencies as a result of not only trying to stuff the rich-text of 
the generalized CDC frames into one-to four-word summaries, but also from crowding them 
under ‘like’ umbrellas. And the second is that despite any similarities implied by the basic 
topics, the generalized CDC frames invariably end up shattering them by illustrating the 
differences through the details. On the other hand, if the overall purpose of the topics is kept 
in mind—i.e., to get a general idea of what the SBOS and DHOS FSs very broadly meant by 
framing them as CDCs—then these results should serve well enough.
160 There were certain individual FSs whose CDC frames were narrow and limited. Perhaps 
the most extreme examples of such frames were put forth by Government Reports 1969 and 
UO during SBOS: they both denied that the spill was a CDC.
161 SBOS was unprecedented because it was pretty much the first oil spill to impact a socially 
significant community and environment, and generate intense media and public interest. 
DHOS was unprecedented because it steadily became the largest accidental oil spill in 
history.
162 As with Chart 1, there seems no practical purpose in picking out patterns amongst the 
action- and non-action-oriented topics, and for the same reasons; and although there is also
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no overriding commonality linking them together in either list, there does appear to be three 
significant themes coursing through the non-action-oriented topics. They revolve around 
humans, their emotions and/or cognition, and the negative behaviours of certain members of 
them; taken together, they are referenced 19 times.3 While these themes are present in the list 
of 72, the division into action- and non-action-oriented topics not only makes them more 
prominent and noticeable, but also reveals something interesting about the way the FSs 
conveyed what they meant when they framed the spills as CDCs, especially when compared 
with the action-oriented topics—namely, that a division of labour appears to exist in how 
CDCs were used. Whereas non-action-oriented CDCs are illustrated with the spills’ human 
and emotional/cognitive toll, and the deleterious effects of certain behaviours, the action- 
oriented ones used them as single-word short-hand to emphasize, justify, and/or give impetus 
to a needed, desired, or sought-after action. In other words, if the FSs did not call for action, 
the motivation for perceiving the spills as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes was 
explained; if they did call for action, they used them as self-explanatory rationales 
underscoring the need to act.b Neither the results, nor the research as a whole, can offer a 
substantial reason as to why such a distribution exists within the topics, and by extension the 
generalized CDC frames. For whatever reason, both the SBOS and DHOS FSs used CDCs in 
two very distinct ways when they framed the spills as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes; 
and the objectives of this thesis demand that it turn its attention towards an exclusive focus 
on the action-oriented frames.
a. The basic topics making explicit mention of humans are Human', Human, economic, 
environmental', Economic/human-ecosystem link', Human personal input', Louisianans
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(although not explicitly referred to as human, Louisianans nevertheless are, thus 
justifying their inclusion); Human suffering; and Human-caused.
The basic topics referencing emotion/cognition are Bad idea; Values; Faith in 
OI, FG; Hope; Expressing sorrow, regret.
The basic topics mentioning (negative) behaviour are: Forethought ignored; 
Conflict o f interest; Cover-up/non-disclosure; Misplaced blame; BP behaviour; and 
Failed wake-up call.
b. An all-important caveat to remember, however, is that this finding is essentially 
limited to the basic topics; the details and contexts provided by the generalized CDC 
frames may, can, and do sabotage this result to one degree or another. For example, 
there are generalized action-oriented CDC frames that not only describe human 
suffering or bad behaviour, but also call for action to end it; and there are non-action- 
oriented ones that state that the situation is a CDC and stop there. On the other hand, 
this finding does appear robust: an examination of the generalized action-oriented 
CDC frames (see Appendix G) seems to substantiate that they devote little to no 
attention to explaining or describing why the spills are perceived as CDCs, instead 
using the words/concepts as one-word short-hand to strengthen/justify their cases for 
action. The crisis and catastrophe frames of both spills feature little to no human, 
emotional/cognitive, and/or behavioural details; a moderate number of them 
accompany SBOS’s action-oriented disaster frames. Only DHOS disaster frames 
include a notable enough quantity of such details.
163 Both perspectives, however, not only reinforce the conclusion reached by Chart 2—that 
oil spills have become only somewhat more complex and multifarious during the intervening
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years between Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon—but also augment it by showing 
through the marginal increase in the number and variety of action-oriented topics between 
SBOS and DHOS that oil spill CDC action advocacy has undergone barely any 
intensification and complexification. This, in turn, suggests that the cache of potential 
actions, or the imagination to think them up, has advanced little since 2010, too. This appears 
to be substantiated, for example, by the state of oil spill clean-up techniques. In 2010, as in 
1969, clean-up relied on (ineffectual) booms, skimmers, and dispersant (Cavnar 2010; OSIC 
1969-73).
164 As Chapter 5.2 will show, SBOS FSs generated 37 action-oriented CDC frames during the 
first year of the spill, whereas DHOS FSs produced 74; comparing these figures with the 
number of unique action topics (i.e., Chart 8) reveals that while nearly half of Santa 
Barbara’s action frames are unique, only about a third of Deepwater Horizon's are such. This 
suggests that the earlier oil spill, despite taking place during a time when the world had less 
knowledge and experience dealing with them, managed to inspire an entire host of proposals 
and demands that (as will be shown in Chapter 5.2) covered a wide palette, from pure 
NIMBYism to global environmental consciousness, and involved various levels of society. 
The later spill, meanwhile, occurring in the wake of several high-profile spill occasions, 
resulted in a relatively meagre number of actions, many revolving around financial 
compensation and/or restitution, and focusing almost exclusively on what the upper echelons 
of society could/should do.
165 However, as has been pointed out before, just because the spills share the same basic topic 
does not mean that any commonalities exist between the actual frames they represent; often, 
they do not.
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166 Although DHOS managed to retain two of the six topics held in common by all three of 
its CDCs during the conversion to an action-oriented focus, SBOS was unable to hold on to 
any.
167 Condensed from Response and Systemic management.
168 By way of Response, Economic, and Systemic management.
169 Via Remove OD from SBC, Legislative/regulatory, Environmental, Political, and Public 
Consultancy.
170 These two SBOS summations, and the preceding DHOS one, are based solely upon the 
face-value of the basic action-oriented topics (and the background knowledge acquired from 
selecting, organizing, and manipulating the data); see Chapter 5 Endnote 160.
171 On the other hand, though, each CDC’s clutch of leftover topics—i.e., those exclusive to 
only one CDC—provides insight into whether they are ‘appropriate’ to their CDC. While 
crisis’s Community and catastrophe’s Other actor involvement do fit their respective 
sensitizing concepts (because while a community cannot be destroyed or annihilated by an oil 
spill, it can be threatened by one; and because catastrophes are partly characterized by 
requiring non-indigenous responders), three of disaster’s six do not: World importance 
sounds too ‘grand,’ according to disaster’s sensitizing concept (it would match better with 
catastrophe); and Moratorium justification and Sowing environmental awareness sound 
drastic enough to qualify for catastrophe, not so much disaster, because while the latter is 
distinguished by what the occasion wreaks, the former is by how it is responded to. The 
remaining three {Responsibility, OD resuming, and Knowledge/expertise), however, cannot 
be determined (i.e., based solely on the topic, there appears to be no reason why they should 
be exclusive to disaster, as opposed to crisis or catastrophe). Meanwhile, their 2010
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counterparts show that whereas crisis has four exclusive topics (Legislative/regulatory,; 
Natural, human, environmental; Responsibility, and Knowledge/expertise), catastrophe has 
none, and disaster has thirteen (Environmental; Coastal restoration', Remedial action', Mental 
health', Reputational/leadership', Accountability/responsibility, Moratorium', Public 
consultancy, Political', Technological', Guarantee', Bureaucratic', and Dirty, dangerous, 
deadly).
172 Whereas the SBOS one was compiled primarily from retrospective analyses of the spill, 
the DHOS list is the result of paying attention to the spill’s aftermath as reported by the news 
media.
173 If an actual outcome benefitted the General environment, that means the law, regulation, 
provision, money, or increased/enhanced awareness had—or was intended to have—a 
concrete effect on the health of the broader environment. For example, NEPA was one of the 
first pieces of comprehensive federal legislation aimed at improving the overall health of the 
environment; it mandated environmental impact assessments and justified the enactment of 
regulations to mitigate or prevent environmental pollution regardless of their being a specific 
law targeted at doing so.
174 If an outcome was Oil specific (a.k.a., targeted at oil production), that means the law, 
regulation, provision, money, and/or increased/enhanced environmental awareness did—or 
was intended to—curb OI behaviours and operational cultural practices perceived to be 
detrimental to the environment and/or (coastal) community well-being. For example, the 
dissolution of the MMS into the three BOEMs was/is supposed to restore citizen confidence 
in the FG’s ability to oversee OCS oil operations by reining in oil industry zeal, act as a
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bulwark against its influence, and basically perform as if it is not a rubber-stamp institution 
for the OI.
175 A partial explanation for this result can be found in how the spills were framed as CDCs. 
Overall, DHOS FSs generated the most CDC frames, both of the general and action-oriented 
variety; and as pointed out in Chapter 5.1, this reflected that the gargantuan size of the spill, 
which effected five states and impacted, in one way or another, the millions of people whose 
well-being depends on the GoM. As a consequence, many FSs perceived that only the FG 
had the organizational structure, resources, and—frankly—responsibility to deal with 
something so vast in scope and scale, and these notions infused the CDC frames with which 
they called on the President, or Congress, or the courts, or any relevant FG organ to do 
something to stop and/or mitigate the damage (and prevent more) and to ameliorate the 
suffering. What is more, the combination of the sheer number of (potential) victims, the 
extent of the damages, and the broader sensitivity/awareness to the complexity of oil spills 
(as CDCs) had, by 2010, expanded the roster of targets for action. The relatively small and 
circumscribed extent of the SBOS, meanwhile, echoed by its more modest cache of CDC 
frames, was seen only to have harmed the ecology of the SBC, and to have been caused by a 
woefully inadequate regulatory and oversight system, thus accounting for why these two 
kinds of terminuses dominate the outcomes to the exclusion of all others. Conversely, the 
spill’s size—in conjunction with it taking place in a decade noted for the rise of non- 
establishment’ actors (i.e., women, African-Americans, youth) fighting for their political, 
economic, and social voice and place inspired actors from the middle and lower strata of 
society could, themselves, become (part of) the solution, thereby increasing the odds that 
their calls would be heeded.
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176 It has, however, received little support from the federal or state governments, and none 
from the oil industry, who have all declined to participate because there already exist 
appropriate forums for stakeholders to air their views (Schumaker and Steiner 2013).
177 On the other hand, the RESTORE Act stipulates that the majority of the fines collected 
from BP, Halliburton, and Transocean for CWA violations are supposed to be used for 
coastal restoration projects, endowing the economic/financial compensation/restitution-based 
outcomes with an environmental focus. In addition, these three responsible parties have been 
providing money (in the form of donations or plea agreements) to the National Institutes of 
Health (BP 2010) and to environmental science organizations (Shen 2013), such as NFWF, to 
study the effects and impacts of oil on the Gulf environment, and to develop more effective 
means of rebuilding the wetlands (which have been devastated by the activities of the OI, in 
particular their pipelines).
178 None of these differences is out of the ordinary. SBOS’s high degree of environmental 
action was a concoction brewed from the decade’s growing environmental awareness, the 
shock of the new (i.e., a large pollution event effecting a community), the location of the spill 
(an affluent, socially conscious vacation city), and the media attention surrounding it; 
although DHOS became the largest accidental offshore oil spill in US and world history, it 
had the misfortune—from an environmentalist perspective—to happen along “America’s 
working coast” (Landrieu 2010aa), where the political, economic, and social contexts do not 
lend themselves to the kind of environmentalist action that became one of SBOS’s enduring 
legacies (Freudenberg and Gramling 1993). Meanwhile, DHOS’s flurry of governmental 
action was entirely in keeping with a spill whose scope and scale had compelled many to 
perceive that only the FG could contend with it; but in 1969 Santa Barbara, government
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officials saw that because the spill was neither killing people nor destroying infrastructure, 
the FG need not step in (OSIC 1969-73). Likewise, the amount of physical and livelihood 
damage wreaked by Deepwater Horizon made it a natural lightning rod for parties seeking 
restitution and compensation, which SBOS’s scant destruction could not.3 And finally, while 
the amount of legislative action in the wake of SBOS is somewhat surprising, considering the 
relatively small number of top-down outcomes it produced compared to DHOS, most of it 
sought either to prevent another oil spill or to goad the FG into taking a more active role in 
environmental protection (as per the will of several FSs), unlike Deepwater Horizon’s 
cavalcade of cavalcade of top-down actions (sans legislation), which was of an immediate 
and/or retributional nature, intended to provide quick-fixes and to make the responsible 
parties pay.
a. In actual fact, a class-action lawsuit was launched at UO by various aggrieved parties 
in Santa Barbara; however, no references to this lawsuit were framed as a crisis, 
disaster, and/or catastrophe, explaining its absence from the results and this thesis.
179 Sierra Club considered the lack of public participation in matters such as leasing decisions 
to be one of the prime causal factors contributing to SBOS (OSIC 1969-73).
180 Since communities, like Santa Barbara, bear the brunt of any oil production-related CDC, 
Sierra Club believed the public ought to have a voice about where and how oil development 
should proceed in the Channel, or if it should at all. Although the NGO achieved its ultimate 
aim in the end, it appears it did not obtain its stated one: the all but total cessation of (new) 
oil development in the SBC was, for the most part, a top-down initiative with minimal public
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input (though citizen influence likely played an important part in nudging politicians towards 
supporting at least some of the moratoria).
181 Interestingly, in spite of Sierra Club being a national environmental group, their action 
crisis frame is decidedly NIMBY in scope, failing to take into account offshore development 
elsewhere in the country; this contrasts sharply with the largely national perspective they 
would take during DHOS 40 years later. What is more, despite being an environmental 
organization, the reason/justification underlying the NGO’s crisis frame is not explicitly 
environmental (i.e., to benefit the General Environment)—a trend that runs not only 
throughout many of the organization’s SBOS CDC framings, but also its future DHOS ones, 
as well. Unfortunately, the nature of my results cannot explain their crisis frame’s lack of 
explicit environmental reference; however, it seems that in this case, Sierra Club was betting 
that public participation would lead to the downfall of oil production in the SBC, thus 
achieving environmental protection as a co-benefit.
182 The first of these factors is that the crisis frame came from Mr. Obama, a president (at the 
time) not yet two years into his first term (and still riding high on the popularity and good 
will that swept him into Office), who took an immediate interest in the situation (in contrast 
with President Bush’s tardy handling of Hurricane Katrina); the other FSs lacked this cachet. 
Second, of all the action crisis frames the FSs put forth (correlative or not), his is the only 
one that specifies both a cause and a remedy: DHOS was caused by a broken OCS 
management system, and could be fixed by overhauling it. The other FSs speak in broad 
generalizations (for example, ending oil dependence; holding BP responsible) or are vague 
about cause or cure (for example, the President should focus only on stopping the spill; spill 
response will take years). Third, Mr. Obama’s action frame is the only one that can be
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accomplished quickly, which conforms to the limited time aspect of the crisis concept; 
solutions such as ending America’s addiction to oil, cleaning up the spill, or even suing BP, 
Halliburton, and Transocean for damages can take years (and have, and are). And finally, his 
frame is possibly the only feasible one: cleaning up after the spill or converting the nation’s 
economy to clean energy may be impossible, and defeating the OI in the courts cannot be 
assured.
183 Meanwhile, there is less an absence of correlation between both OPA’s and the 
President’s frame and outcome terminuses as there is an incompleteness; in other words, their 
frames only explain or predict some of the things that the actual outcomes would (eventually) 
fulfill. For example, while Mr. Obama vowed to exact financial compensation from BP and 
the other responsible parties, accomplishing that goal also resulted in enforcing corporate 
accountability; and in the case of both the President and OP A, the financial compensation 
did/will (or was/is intended to) benefit the general environment by facilitating coastal 
recovery, not only from the effects of DHOS, but the decades of wetland deterioration 
jeopardizing people’s livelihoods and lives.
184 Finally, there does not appear to be a pattern amongst DHOS’s clutch of indeterminate 
action crisis frames (beyond a lack of information linking frame and outcome), but a very 
clear one does course through the non-correlates (see Appendix H). While two of the 
indeterminates are top-down in orientation (President, ACS 14; Science, ACS 20), two others 
are unspecified (President, ASCs 15 and 18), and one implies a potpourri of top-down, 
middle-outwards, and bottom-up (Scientists, ACS 21); and while all five revolve around 
response, the specifics are all over the map, ranging from explaining what is happening in the 
moment to making promises about what should be done in or for the future, and from
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identifying what is derailing response to suggesting what can enhance it. On the other hand, 
two of the three non-correlates—Sierra Club, ACS 11 and Sol Salazar, ACS 22—have 
unspecified origins (the third—REAs, ACS 11—cites the FG, i.e., top-down). But where the 
pattern emerges most unambiguously is with the single outcome all three FS advocated for: 
ending America’s dependence on oil.
The indeterminates’ lack of pattern can ultimately be chalked up to the absence of 
hard, non-partisan information to conduct a proper comparison. But the data suggests there 
could be another possibility: for the most part, the action frames do not conform to the crisis 
concept. Crisis implies a sense of immediacy and that something can still be done to either 
stop the occasion or at least prevent it from doing further damage; virtually everything the 
FSs put forth, however, could not be accomplished immediately (if at all) and assumed that 
the battle was already lost, that it was time to repair the damage (which corresponds with 
disaster). In other words, the inability to determine any degree of correlation might be the 
result of the FSs not crisis-framing their desired action according to what is ‘required’ for a 
crisis to mean crisis, and therefore more effectively propel its message.
If this is the case, then, the non-correlations for REAs’, Sierra Club’s, and Sol 
Salazar’s end-oil, begin-CE make even more sense. From a logical point-of-view, the reason 
why their action frames did not correlate with any of the outcomes was because what they 
demanded was too radical, too costly, and too economically, politically, and socially 
disruptive to even attempt, especially as a response to DHOS, in particular, and for the sake 
of preventing future oil spills, in general. From a more narrow framing perspective, their 
solution did not fit within the crisis concept paradigm; if it belonged to anything, it was to 
catastrophe. All three FSs took it for granted that their audience understood why oil
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dependence is a crisis—that it can even be perceived as a crisis—and therefore did not 
explain why it is one; and none of them did an adequate job of linking an oil spill (an 
infrequent occasion) with oil dependence (a ubiquitous fact-of-life).
i o e
GOO! and Senator Cranston offered the third largest number of action disaster frames, at 
three apiece (with the grassroots NGO achieving two correlates and a non-correlation, and 
Mr. Cranston the exact opposite). Scientists produced the fourth most, attaining one correlate 
and a single half-correlation. Governor Reagan, President Nixon, Sol Hickel, and Mr.
Murphy put forth only one action frame each, earning a correlate, a non-correlation, a half­
correlate, and a non-correlation, respectively.
186 Improved/Updated Offshore Regulations (S5), GOO! Collects 100,000 Signatures In 
Favour o f Removing Oil Development from SBC (SI 1), and Other Outcomes (SI 2) all came 
third, each earning two hits each. NEPA (SI) and Unofficial Quasi-Moratorium in CA Waters 
(S6) achieved only one (half-)correlation each.
187 Because, as implied by the disaster sensitizing concept, the SBOS ‘genie’ has already 
escaped from the bottle and cannot be put back; the only thing that can be done is to clean up 
after it and try to make sure that another does not happen.
188 From an outcome point of view, the preponderance of top-down action may be connected 
to the fact that a) two of them involved shutting down state offshore operations and 
reviewing how they work (despite state waters having never suffered an oil spill), and b) they 
were averred by CA actors as already happening (i.e., the suspension and review occurred 
shortly after SBOS began). (The third top-down correlate is also a present-tense action— 
GOO! sounding the alarm that Sol Hickel is resuming oil drilling in SBC in spite of his own 
admission that oil development in the SBC was a mistake.) These points, in turn, suggest that
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the government of CA was far less encumbered by the OI’s “weight of tradition” than its 
federal counterpart (OSIC 1969-73)— which is interesting, since offshore oil production 
began in California (see Chapter 1.1).
189 In addition to its Oil Specific component, Scientists included a General Environment one 
to their action disaster frame, which manifested in the correlating outcome.
190 What is more, the environmental damage the spill caused was unknown and/or 
contentious, as was its extent (both spatially and temporally), and therefore would have made 
a problematic justification for action; and two, SBOS had already wreaked its environmental 
damage—nobody could stop what it had done—but people could prevent future spills from 
happening by invoking the spectre of the Santa Barbara disaster.
191 Depending on how one looks at (frames) it, the non-correlates either outnumber the 
correlates and half-correlates, separately, by half, or are equal to the combined total of the 
correlates and half-correlates.
192 The sole hold-out—whether or not Sol Hickel did “review [the] fundamental issues” 
about the continuing SBOS (OSIC 1969-73), as Sierra Club demanded—can never be settled 
because it ultimately rests on opinion: according to Mr. Hickel, he did, as evidenced by his 
enacting new rules and regulations governing offshore oil production; however, according to 
Sierra Club, he did not because the public was not called to participate in leasing and 
development decisions, and because he permitted drilling to resume in the SBC despite the 
uncertainties of geology and technology (OSIC 1969-73).
193 To be specific, five frames (by Sierra Club, Senator Cranston, and Senator Murphy) 
sought to prevent future spills, and three (by GOO!, OP A, and Senator Cranston) to end oil 
production in the SBC. The remaining four frames are divvied out as follows: two wanted the
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President to declare Santa Barbara a disaster area (OPA and President Nixon), one predicted 
that Sol Hickel’s decision to resume drilling the Channel would cause another SBOS (Sierra 
Club), and one demanded that the OI confront the possibilities of oil spills and make the 
appropriate contingency plans (State Actors).
194 Three of Sierra Club’s four non-correlations, alone, argued for the initiation of various 
strategies to thwart another SBOS, accounting for the NGO’s lack of ‘success.’
195 And for its single indeterminate.
196 Three of the remaining four frame origins also contend that top-down actors should be 
responsible for implementing the action, but in conjunction with either middle-outwards 
actors (Senator Murphy) or bottom-up ones (GOO! and one of Sierra Club’s); the final one 
did not specify who should conduct the action. Two of the remaining five frame terminuses 
argued that their action could be both Oil Specific and beneficial to the General Environment 
(OPA and Sierra Club); one would spare Santa Barbara’s economy further distress (OPA); 
one would boost response (President Nixon); and one would contribute to greater public 
participation in natural resource decision-making (Sierra Club).
197 In other words, FSs viewed who should take action in SBOS’s wake from a dichotomous 
perspective: either the government or the OI does something, or the people do. It occurred to 
(almost) nobody that something could or should be done by those in the middle. This binary 
view of things remained true from frame to outcome, as all the outcomes either targeted oil 
production/spills, or the environment.
198 ‘Indeterminate-non-correlate’ means that the comparison between frame and outcomes 
resulted in a mixture of the two statuses, making categorization as one or the other both 
difficult and potentially inaccurate; in addition, this category surmises that whatever doubt
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(indeterminate) may exist will likely tend towards the negative (non-correlation). For 
example, REAs argue that in order for offshore production to be made safe (again), a) the 
entire region must be included, b) RCACs should be created, and c) local communities must 
have input into the full ecosystem damages assessments. The outcomes, however, indicate 
that despite the (nascent) establishment of a GoM RCAC, the entire region will not be 
included due to the refusal of the OI to participate or to allow the region/communities access 
to its decision-making conclaves; meanwhile, it is unknown if a) full ecosystem damages 
assessments have been made and/or b) local communities have had any input into them 
(though it seems unlikely).
199 And lastly, Sierra Club acquired two indeterminates. It did not earn any half-correlates.
200 On the other hand, OPA scored a correlate and a half-correlation, and suffered only one 
non-correlate.
201 The two other fourth-place FSs, at five action disaster frames each, are Government 
Reports (with a correlation, a half-correlate, two indeterminates, and a non-correlation) and 
President Obama (two correlates, two indeterminates, and a non-correlation). Governor 
Jindal takes sixth-place with four action frames (three indeterminates and a non-correlate); 
Audubon, Sol Salazar, and Senator Vitter all share seventh with three each (a correlate and 
two indeterminates; a correlation, a half-correlate, and an indeterminate; and two half­
correlates and an indeterminate, respectively); and BP/Halliburton/Transocean and State 
Actors come last with only one frame a piece (a correlate and an indeterminate, respectively). 
Scientists did not put forth any action disaster frames.
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202 Six of these correlations—and three of the half-correlates—refer only to a D12; the other 
four—and the remaining half—refer to D12 in addition to at least one other outcome (for 
example: Government Reports ADS 50’s correlation encompasses D8 and D12).
203 One of these correlations—and two of the half-correlates—refers only to D1; the other 
three—and the remaining half-one—refer to D1 in addition to at least one other outcome.
204 All three of these correlations—and the one half-correlate—always refer to D7 in 
combination with at least one other outcome; one of these is always D1. D12 joins all three 
correlates, and DIO and D11 is associated with the half-correlation.
205 The 10 are: ADS 44 (Audubon); ADS 59 (REAs); ADS 60 (BPHT); ADS 62 (OPA); ADS 
70 (President); ADS 47 (President; Sierra Club); ADS 5 (Sierra Club); ADS 73 (Sierra Club); 
ADS 83 (Senator Landrieu) (see Appendix H).
The two with correlations between frame and outcome origins, but not terminuses, are 
ADS 50 (Government Reports) and ADS 16 (Sierra Club) (see Appendix H).
206 As a consequence, the majority of the full-correlate frame origins refer to things that only 
the FG, the OI, or both can provide in quantities commiserate with the spill’s enormity: 
money, resources, and the reassertion of general calm and reasonableness.8 What is more, 
even though Audubon put forth a bottom-up origin, their reasoning is likewise provoked by 
the magnitude of the spill: their mention of (the thousands of) ordinary people coming out to 
help with the spill (Saville 2010) signified the not uncommon perception that not even the 
combined might of the FG and OI could respond to something so titanic in extent. The fact 
that each of these origins manifested correlating outcomes seemed to indicate that the 
government and the oil industry agreed with the assessment that only they could do 
something. This agreement, however, may also reflect the fact that DHOS’s enormity made it
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impossible for either the FG or the OI (specifically, BP) to ‘wiggle’ their way out of 
accepting responsibility; while Union Oil and the 1969 FG could deny that SBOS was a 
disaster, and deflect much of the material responsibility for it, due to the spill’s brief, small, 
and circumscribed dimensions, neither BP nor the 2010 FG could do likewise in the face of 
86 days and five million barrels of oil poured into the GoM.b
a. President Obama, Sierra Club, and even BP, itself, argue that BP should and will pay 
for any and all aspects of the DHOS response; REAs point out that only the 
government and industry have the resources to tackle a spill of Deepwater Horizon's 
enormity; and Senator Landrieu (2010) calls for a calm and measured reaction so that 
the “right lesson” is reached and the “wisest decisions” made. Furthermore, OPA 
highlights that government and industry are working together to bring the spill to a 
satisfactory end; Mr. Obama demands assurances that another spill cannot happen 
before BP, or any oil company, is allowed to drill in the GoM again; and Sierra Club 
wants the President to enact a blanket moratorium across all of the US’s coasts 
because DHOS proves that oil production is dirty, dangerous, and deadly. Only Sierra 
Club’s contention that OI influence continues to be strong and felt in all comers of 
government does not match the FG/OI-taking responsibility bandwagon.
b. Though according to REAs, BP attempted to do so anyway by blocking independent 
monitoring of the response and forcing responders to sign non-disclosure agreements 
to prevent them from disseminating any information about the long-term impacts of 
the oil (Sarthou 2010; Viles 2010, b).
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207 These two outcomes, guarantee and response, are not capitalized because a) they are not a 
part of the list of DHOS’s actual outcomes, but instead are associated with Various 
Outcomes, and b) I wished to distinguish them from the basic disaster topics of the same 
names.
208 The closest things to discrepancies are a) the poor showing for CA-E/FC-GE, which has a 
more robust presence in the actual outcomes, and b) the number of Various Outcomes, 
explainable by it representing a potpourri of different and varied aims/conclusions, as 
opposed to the unitary ones of the others.
209 The only full-correlations to escape any association with D12 are a) BP’s commitment to 
pay all (legitimate) claims (Dl) and b) Sierra Club calling on the President to enact a 
moratorium on all offshore drilling along American shores (D2, D4).
210 Common sense would seem to dictate that such responses are a given, and that action 
disaster-framing would be better spent on either details (i.e., what are ordinary people 
actually doing that formal organizations cannot? How should the FG and the OI use their vast 
pools of resources to best deal with DHOS? How can the govemment-industry interface be 
improved?) and/or advocating for more exotic action, like converting the Nation to a CE 
economy (e.g., Brune 2010e, f, q, t, u, hh, 11; Kordick 2010; Manuel 2010c; Pope 2010). On 
the one hand, perhaps these FSs realized that the only action frames that had a chance of 
being carried out were such elementary ones; anything more ambitious was doomed to 
failure, as the CE economy and even the fully supported GoM RCAC ones proved. Another 
possibility is that such concord really is remarkable due to the sociopolitical climate of the 
previous decade, where unity had previously only been achieved through fear (of terrorists), 
and where the still recent election-cycle had exposed bitter divides.
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211 As of the 14th of January, 2014.
212 The three remaining D12 full-correlates are Mr. Obama demanding that BP and the OI 
provide guarantees that another spill will not happen as a condition of being allowed back 
into the GoM; Sierra Club warning that OI influence continues to infiltrate government; and 
Ms. Landrieu calling for a calm reaction to DHOS, to ensure that the right lessons are learned 
and the best decisions are made.
213 The four complete half-correlates are ADS 80 (Sol Salazar); ADS 82 (Mr. Salazar); ADS 
47 (Senator Landrieu); and ADS 85 (Ms. Landrieu).
The three frame and outcome origins are ADS 47 (Government Reports); ADS 52 
(Senator Vitter); and ADS 87 (Mr. Vitter).
The single frame and outcome terminus half-correlate is ADS 16 (OPA).
214 I.e., the scope and scale of the spill provoked FSs to perceive that only upper-echelon 
actors could do something, thus impacting their frames; this same enormity probably goaded 
the FG and the OI to act (with a degree of concertedness that might have been lacking had 
Deepwater Horizon been smaller and more circumscribed, like SBOS), resulting in the top- 
down initiation of many of the actual outcomes.
2,5 Five of the 12 actual outcomes are Oil Specific.
216 As noted in Appendix B, Sol Salazar had (continues to have?) strong ties to the mining 
industry, especially in his native Colorado; and although he is purportedly in favour of 
converting the nation to a CE economy (Salazar 201 Op), as the head of the Interior 
Department, he was in charge of making sure that a significant source of federal dollars ran 
smoothly. Also as noted in Appendix B, Senator Landrieu is among the most conservative
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Democrats in the Senate, and is a staunch supporter of oil production because of its 
importance to Louisiana’s economy and America’s energy security (Landrieu 2010m).
217 One other way that DHOS’s quartet of full half-correlates is unlike SBOS’s revolves 
around why the 2010 frames manifested only half-correlations with the actual outcomes: not 
because certain actions the FSs wanted did not come to pass, but because it is unknown 
whether or not they did, have, or will do so. Although the Dol has apparently done 
everything Sol Salazar said or vowed would be done (see Table 4 -  Sol, ADS 80)—and in 
some respects, more, i.e., reforming MMS—it is unknown if any of these actions have truly 
made offshore production safer, or if the Interior Department really is helping to restore and 
protect what the spill damaged. While DHOS did receive a massive response, it is unknown 
if Mr. Salazar’s “cautious approach” (2010g) strategy to guide safety and oversight was 
and/or continues to be utilized. And even though BP has paid billions in compensation and 
damages—and will pay billions more—it is unknown if any of this money is going towards 
psychological rehabilitation, or if local know-how was and continues to be used3 in the post­
spill phase, as Senator Landrieu wanted.b These unknowns owe their existence largely to the 
paucity of data that would otherwise verify what has or has not happened, and to what 
degree. At the present time, obtaining such information is a) beyond the parameters of this 
thesis, b) does not exist in published, or reasonably locatable, form, or c) does not exist at all 
on account that it has yet to be created. What are available are partisan claims. While Mr. 
Salazar and Ms. Landrieu may say that safety has improved, that the Dol is repairing and 
protecting the Gulf, that the “cautious approach” is being used, and that balance has been 
struck between precautions and economics, their lack of impartiality renders their ‘facts’ 
frames.
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a. During the actual spill, BP hired local fishing boats, idled by the federal fishing 
closures, for various tasks related to the response.
b. Senator Landrieu’s call for a balance between the need to improve safety and the OI’s 
importance to Louisiana’s economy, and the nation’s energy security, is a peculiar 
full half-correlate because although Ms. Landrieu has seemingly gotten what she 
wanted—the BOEMs instituted a new safety regimen, and drilling continues as 
always in the GoM—(and therefore should be a fu ll correlate), she never defined 
‘balance,’ nor suggested what such should/would look like; this absence caused me to 
classify it as a half-correlate.
218 Like Senator Landrieu’s full half-correlate (see Chapter 5 Endnote 79b), Senator Vitter’s 
(201 Of) demand that environmentalists need to be “educate [d]... to make sure that facts 
dominate, not theories or political and fundraising agendas” is strange in that although it 
appears to have happened—evidenced by the fact that oil production in the Gulf continues 
apace—he neglected to identify a reason for his mandate, leaving the reader to infer (albeit, 
probably correctly) that it is because he does not want environmentalists in any way 
interfering with the continuance and expansion of oil development in the Gulf. What is more, 
he leaves vague who should be doing the “educating],” though again, the implication is an 
upper-echelon actor of some sort, likely one who is in favour of economic growth. 
Consequently, I categorized this action disaster frame as a half-correlate on the basis that 
although environmentalists probably did not receive an “education],” a top-down actor (i.e., 
the BOEMs) did ensure that the “facts dominate[d]” in the sense that oil continues to be 
pumped out of the GoM.
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219 An additional explanation may lie with the fact that both FS’s enumerated a long list of 
recommendations and/or demands; the lack of succinctness and priority perhaps doomed 
some (most?) to failure. In both cases, the only aspects of their ‘laundry lists’ to manifest 
correlations with the actual outcomes are those pertaining to Economic/Financial 
Compensation.
220 Other action frames receiving no correlations include, but are not limited, to the 
following: demanding the OI to fundamentally change how they operate vis-a-vis safety, 
environmental practices, clean up preparation, and management behaviour, and to 
fundamentally reform the OCS system (Government Reports -  ADS 17); calling on the FG to 
stop assigning blame (BP’s continuing legal battles in regard to the CWA belie this) and 
creating bureaucracies (MMS was dismantled and reformed into the three BOEMs) (OPA -  
ADS 52); and advocating for response capabilities to be set up before drilling can resume 
(REAs-ADS 57).
221 The problem appears to be two-fold. First, actions—such as acquiring the maximum 
amount of money out of BP, commencing with coastal restoration, and ascertaining if 
replacing the MMS with the BOEMs will increase safety—are taking, and will take, more 
than three years to play out; and second, what information exists testifying to how a certain 
action has improved things or made them worse is far too partisan for this thesis to use as a 
means of determining a correlation between CDC frame and actual outcome. For example, 
while the RESTORE Act dictates that at least 80% of BP’s (eventual) civil Clean Water Act 
violation fines are to be used for coastal restoration, it is unknown how much of this money 
will be used for that purpose. The potential (anticipated?) problems include the following: a) 
each Gulf State has full discretionary power over how to use the money, and—as Sierra Club
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points out—all five are Republican-controlled (SC 2010), and b) despite pro-restoration 
rhetoric from Senators Landrieu and Vitter (Landrieu 2010; Vitter 2011), it is not known if 
any or all of the money will be used for its intended purpose. Also, although the environment 
of the Gulf has not been completely cleansed of oil, it is unknown if every effected industry 
(fishing and tourism, especially) are operating at 100%. And finally, it is unknown if the 
thorough investigation DHOS received (by the National Commission on the spill) will 
prevent future spills.
222 Of the ‘leftover’ indeterminates/non-correlates, five advocated for a coalition of top- 
down, middle-outwards, and bottom-up actions to remedy the effects of the spill; one cut out 
the middle-man by suggesting that top-down and bottom-up act; and four neglected, 
declined, or otherwise did not state who or what should take active responsibility.
223 From the pool of 34 indeterminates and non-correlates, eight are Oil Specific; five are 
Economic/Financial Compensation; four are clean energy-only; three are economic and 
General Environment, respectively; and two are response. The rest—response/General 
Environment, Oil Specific/General Environment, response/moratorium, public participation, 
Oil Specific/clean energy, Economic/Financial Compensation-Corporate Accountability, 
money, bureaucracy, and seafood—are referenced only once. (Note: the non-capitalized 
actual outcomes refer to ones under the Other outcomes heading)
224 The (unsuccessful) Santa Barbara FSs wanted preventative measures more robust than 
mere regulations (for example, public participation in natural resource harvesting decisions) 
and/or called for the complete removal of all oil development from the SBC; Deepwater 
Horizon's called for the end to the nation’s addiction to oil and for the construction of a CE
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economy, pushed for better response capabilities, and/or demanded compensation for fishers 
and tourism operators.
225 DHOS’s recognition of plurality is strengthened by the fact that every one of its actual 
outcomes had at least one (half-)correlation, in contrast to SBOS, where only six of its actual 
outcomes demonstrated any variety of correlates.
226 Although the amount of damage to human infrastructure was scant, and that to the 
ecological environment for the most part unknown—albeit perceived by several as 
transitory—photographs of bright beaches enveloped, and birds drowning, in thick layers of 
black, crude oil helped paint a picture of complete devastation (OSIC 1969-73).
227 Perhaps the only surprising thing about this correlated action frame is that it was put forth 
by Mr. Murphy, the Republican US senator for CA; but this is only so if seen with a 
contemporary political outlook. In the past 40 years, the Republican Party has changed 
considerably in its ideological stance, or to be more precise, in how zealously it holds to it: it 
has gone from being a party with a conservative outlook on oil (i.e., oil production makes a 
positive contribution to the Nation) to a fundamentalist one (i.e., oil production is a God- 
given right, and anybody who tries to interfere is un-American). On the other hand, it was 
probably not Mr. Murphy’s intention that all new oil development in SBC, and along the 
entire coast of CA, come to an end (as is what happened), but rather to provide the endeavour 
with a much-needed updating, as per Mr. Hickel’s intention. As a consequence, while Mr. 
Murphy got his wish for Improved/Updated Offshore Regulations (S5), they were soon 
superseded by the first in a chain of successive moratoriums that would help keep the SBC, 
and the entire CA coastline, virtually free from oil spills.
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228 State Actors said/implied the same thing during a couple of their action-oriented disaster 
frames.
229 In 1976, however, CA citizens would get a say in how their coast was managed via the 
California Coastal Act, which in turn led to the California Coastal Commission; but there 
appears to be no connection between its creation and SBOS. Following the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill, federal and state governments, the OI, and the Alaskan people (native and 
non-native) would participate in RCACs to help determine how best to utilize the state’s 
natural resources. And presently, Gulf Coast environmental organizations and others are 
attempting to get their own version of a RCAC off the ground, but unfortunately, government 
involvement (federal or state) appears negligible (despite the National Commission’s 
recommendation), and the OI has outright refused to participate, citing the sufficiency of 
other industry-public forums (Bullock 2013).
230 Just as certain 1969 FSs established at the outset that the ‘official’ cause of SBOS was a 
lack of rules and regulations, so, too, did 2010 FSs quickly ascertain that the ‘official’ 
instigating agent behind DHOS was the MMS’s failure to do its job. Therefore, the only 
actor(s) who could do something about offshore oil’s primary governing agency was the FG, 
to which the MMS was nominally answerable. However, whereas OPA only sought an 
agency-wide review, the Dol ended up reforming it to such an extent that the MMS ceased to 
exist, becoming the three BOEMs; regardless, whatever General Environment co-benefits 
may result from this reformulation, they are tertiary to the supreme goals of increasing safety 
and installing stronger governance over OCS activities to ensure its continuance into the 
foreseeable future.
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231 The FG had already bailed out financial firms and portions of the automotive industry, so 
several OPA considered it even more appropriate that it provide compensation to the 185,000 
fishers of the Gulf—“America’s working coast” (Landrieu 2010aa)—who contribute $700 
billion a year to the national economy; and until the fishing grounds were eventually 
reopened, and the commercial fish stocks were found to be uncontaminated, giving money 
was the only thing that could be done to alleviate their distress. However, while the fishers 
did receive compensation (from the $20 billion escrow account President Obama compelled 
BP to set up), there were questions about the sufficiency of the pay-outs; and it cannot be 
determined if the influx of cash restored their faith (in what? OPA does not specify).
232 More broadly, the actual outcome is consistent with the relative poverty of General 
Environment initiatives in the wake of DHOS, and the abundance of those that were Oil 
Specific, implying that like SBOS, it was perceived from a mostly oil-centric point-of-view, 
rather than as something threatening the environment and/or awakening people to the plight 
of the environment. The difference, however, is that before too long, SBOS became primarily 
remembered not for the actions attempted to curb oil spills, but for the environmental 
awareness it helped foster in people; it is unlikely, however, that the same legacy will radiate 
from DHOS. The uptick in environmental consciousness had been building for a decade 
before SBOS, and within three years of it, the signs of the environmental renaissance were 
already in full-force (Earth Day, environmental sciences departments at several universities, 
the Oil Shocks alerting people to the need to conserve resources); with the economic 
recession at the end of the first decade of the 21st Century came a retraction in environmental 
initiative, and three years after DHOS, there does not appear to be any great outpouring of 
environmental awareness.
215
233 Mr. Vitter’s invocation of everybody having a role/responsibility for repairing Louisiana’s 
fishing industry was also highly unusual; the only other times DHOS CDC frames called on 
(or implied that) all levels must/should do something as a consequence of the spill were to 
argue for a) breaking the nation’s addiction to oil and b) building a CE economy. Just as 
those actions failed, so did Mr. Vitter’s, suggesting that during Deepwater Horizon arguing 
for societal action guaranteed that it would not happen. On the other hand, if either the 
indeterminate or non-correlate had achieved some degree of correlation, then their terminuses 
would have been folded into Other Outcomes, which was the spill’s number one actual 
outcome.
Chapter 6 Endnotes
234 In part, this expectation/assumption was fed by a) the legacy of SBOS, which paints the 
spill and its aftermath as a watershed moment in the development of broad environmental 
awareness (implying that the spill was described/framed with environmental words and 
images) and b) the media coverage of the DHOS while it was happening, which focused on 
BP’s and the FG’s inability to stop the well, the economic fallout upon fishers, and the 
environmental toll.
235 There are two major caveats to this conclusion, however. The first is that the basic topics 
do not lend themselves exclusively to any one potential pattern: one could spend endless 
hours arranging and rearranging the topics into one series of groups or another, and 
struggling over whether topics should belong to only one pattern or be permitted to straddle 
two or more. What is more, trying to find patterns a) contributes little to nothing towards 
answering either of my two research questions and b) does a disservice to the actual 
frames—the actual meanings—summarized by the topics; what is gained in
(oversimplification and (possible) empiricism is lost in terms of nuance and the peculiar 
CDC-view(s) put forth by the individual FSs. The second caveat is that the basic CDC topics 
were not designed so they could be slotted into patterns, but merely to condense the 
otherwise unwieldy number of generalized CDC frames into a much more compact form to 
demonstrate at a glance the surprising number and diversity of meanings the various FSs 
attached to CDCs during SBOS and DHOS.
236 My definition of focusing events should not be confused with Birkland’s (1997), which 
has a more formal and (govemmentally) procedural slant to it; I merely appropriated and 
redefined his term for the sake of convenience.
237 This does not mean, however, that every participating FS CDC-framed the spills in terms 
of Response and Economic', in fact, several/most did not. The result seeks only to point out 
that those two topics are the only ones that each of the CDC terms/concepts from both spills 
had in common, regardless of how many FSs contributed to them.
238 Again, this is not to imply that all the SBOS FSs contributed to this meaning; as many as 
half did not. The result/answer only contends that the topics contributing to it were shared by 
all three CDCs.
239 See Chapter 6 Endnote 239.
240 Although the DHOS answer points out that the spill was an environmental calamity, the 
overwhelming weight of the consensus favours systemic management, economic distress, and 
financial restitution.
241 This despite the fact that the reverberations of SBOS ended up touching both the entirety 
of the US and the whole world in the form of enhanced environmental awareness, 
culminating in the 1970s becoming the ‘decade of the environment;’ and despite the fact that
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DHOS brought (some) attention to the dangers and possible consequences of the 
international push to seek oil in ever more inaccessible and risky places, such as in waters 
exceeding 305 metres, and in the Arctic.
242 The broader, multi-spill consensus topic CDC frame (that the spills require response 
because o f the economic damages they are causing) only accentuates this phenomenon, 
which essentially says that the spills are economically onerous, send (federal) help.
243 The mostly likely explanation for why the (participating) FSs framed the spills this way is 
probably to reign in any potential alterations or changes to BAU that might result. The focus 
on economics can help ensure that, for example, the environmental aspects of the oil spills do 
not become dominant—which could lead to onerous regulations on industries whose profits 
depend on ecological exploitation—while the stress on local consequences can distract 
people from considering the broader implications of the spills, such as America’s economic, 
political, and social dependence on oil, and possibly doing something about them. In the end, 
despite the passage of 40 years, it appears that the meaning underlying the CDC framing of 
offshore oil spills has remained unchanged: response for the sake of mitigating economic 
harm.
244 The remaining differences between the two topic CDC frames, meanwhile, are relatively 
minor: SBOS points out that the spill has yet to be stopped, while DHOS notes that the 
calamity is environmental (this nod to the ecological, however, is to its instrumental value— 
as signified by subsequent references to fishing, tourism, and oil production—as opposed to 
its intrinsic value); in addition, DHOS specifies the need for financial restitution.
245 This can be problematic in today’s climate where duplication and triplication are required 
to convince people of the veracity of something. Rightly or wrongly, there is a notion that
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social science should follow the lead of the physical sciences and produce data, results, and 
conclusions that can be independently verified down to last decimal place; the rationale is 
that doing so validates the knowledge, empiricizes it, and makes it more authoritative.
246 And some cursory evidence, by way of conducting a search using Academic Search 
Premier, appears to confirm that this is/has been happening. Confining my search to English- 
language periodicals published between July 2013 and January 2014, the search terms ‘crisis’ 
and ‘climate change’ brought back only one result (using ‘title’ as a field; ‘subject’ retrieved 
no results); those of ‘disaster’ and ‘climate change’ resulted in four (via ‘title;’ ‘subject’ 
brought back one); and ‘catastrophe’ and ‘climate change’ retrieved just one (via ‘title;’ 
‘subject’ came up zero). Meanwhile, a search matching each of the CDCs with ‘biodiversity 
loss’ all came back zero (regardless of ‘title’ or ‘subject’). And querying each CDC with 
‘population growth’ also resulted in nothing. Google Scholar, on the other hand, produced 
more positive results: confining the search to works published since the beginning of 2013 
(and excluding patents and citations), the terms ‘crisis,’ ‘disaster,’ and ‘catastrophe’ added to 
‘climate change’ came back with 18,500, 11,900, and 6770 hits, respectively; matching them 
with ‘biodiversity loss’ resulted in 1460, 892, and 691, respectively; and querying them with 
‘population growth’ retrieved 8190,4090, and 3120, respectively. However, in comparison to 
what each CDC word individually came back with (see Chapter 2 Endnotes 37, 38, and 39; 
58, 59, and 60; and 77, 78, and 79), these represent only a fraction; what is more, there is 
some doubt as to whether all of the results really are conjoining the CDC with the AGET.
The general media, meanwhile, appears to be also downplaying the association between 
AGETs and CDCs. Utilizing LexisNexis, a search of the past six months’ worth of 
newspapers came back with only 35 results for ‘crisis’ and ‘climate change,’ 69 for ‘disaster’
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and ‘climate change,’ and 10 for ‘catastrophe’ and ‘climate change;’ no hits were returned for 
each of the CDCs and ‘biodiversity loss;’ and ‘crisis’ and ‘population growth’ and ‘disaster’ 
and ‘population growth’ came back with four results and one, respectively, while 
‘catastrophe’ and ‘population growth’ retrieved nothing. (All three database searches were 
conducted on the 20th of January, 2014).
247 The economy of the Gulf Coast—and Louisiana, in particular—is dependent on oil 
development; all five Gulf states have Republican governors, and most have Republican 
congressmen and senators in Washington, DC; and (as Chapter 1.2.1 pointed out), oil 
production has been a social fact-of-life in the GoM since the 1930s/1940s.
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Appendix A -  Sample of Raw Data
The following are samples of raw data from SBOS and DHOS. The sample does not 
represent original sources, but transcriptions/cut-and-pastes from those sources into Word 
files; the reason I did not include samples of the original documents is simply because of the 
difficulty and cost of reproducing photographic data. The text, on the other hand, is original; 
the only alterations I have made to it is to a) remove irrelevant surrounding data and b) 
provide citation information.
SBOS Raw Data Transcribed -  Crisis, Audubon
“Santa Barbara’s oil disaster has pated up for the world the fact that our techno can get us into 
serious trouble—trouble we can hardly repair.”
o Dr. Elvis Stahr, president of the Nat’l Audubon Society, in response to touring the 
SB’s beaches and expecting only a little bit of staining and not oil rolling up the 
beaches -> “Audubon Society President ‘Appalled’ by Pollution” SBNP 19/03/69 
“Santa Barbara’s voice has been heard more loudly than any voice of protest in years. The 
fact that this disaster was manmade gives it a special impact.”
o Dr. Elvis Stahr, president of the Nat’l Audubon Society, talking about how FG people 
are gaining increased awareness of conservation issues b/c of the SBOS -> “Audubon 
Society President ‘Appalled’ by Pollution” SBNP 19/03/69
DHOS Raw Data Transcribed -  Disaster, BP/Halliburton/Transocean
“Although it is premature to reach definitive conclusions about what caused the April 20 
explosion, we do have some clues about the cause of the disaster. The most significant clue is 
that the events occurred after the well construction process was essentially finished.”
o From Steve Newman, CEO Transocean, testimony, 3 Transocean Testimony - May 
18 2010.
"We are absolutely committed to a simple, fair claims process that gets funds to people who 
have been hurt by this disaster as quickly as possible," said BP Chief Executive Tony 
Hayward. "We have opened claims offices across the region, and will make every effort to 
reach everyone who has a legitimate claim. And we will appoint an independent mediator so 
that we have as fair a process as possible for everyone in the Gulf region."
o From Hayward, Update On Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill Response, 26/05/10 
“our team is working side by side w/ others include BP and governmental agencies and these 
investigative efforts will con’t until we have satisfactory As. While it is still too early to know 
exactly what hap on Apr 20th, we do have some clues about the cause of the disaster.” 
o From Steven L Newman, Transocean Ltd President and CEO before Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Strategy and Implications of the Deepwater Horizon 
Rig Explosion: Parts 1 and 2, Oversight Hearing before the Committee on Natural 
Resources US House of Rep, 111 Congress 26-27/05/10, Serial No. 111-54 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html Or Committee address: 
http ://resourcescommittee.house.gov
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“While it is still too early to know exactly what happened on April 20, we do have some clues 
about the cause of the disaster. The most significant clue is that the events occurred after the 
well construction process was essentially finished.”
o From Steve Newman, CEO Transocean, testimony, 5 Transocean Testimony - May 
27 2010a.
The explosion and sinking of the BP-operated Deepwater Horizon rig "never should have 
happened — and I am deeply sorry that they did," he said in testimony to be delivered to a 
House panel Thursday. "My sadness has only grown as the disaster continues."
o From Tony Hayward, at House Panel, “Gulf of Mexico oil spill left BP CEO Tony 
Hayward ‘personally devastated,’ he says” Times-Picayune, 16/06/10 
<http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil- 
spill/index.ssf72010/06/gulf_of_mexico_oil_spill_left.html>
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Appendix B -  Frame Sponsor Information
The following provides a brief description of each FS, separated into their 1969 and 
2010 counterparts. The overviews provide a smattering of background, endeavouring to 
concentrate on their opinions and actions concerning oil development and/or environmental 
stewardship. Whenever possible, I attempted to acquire the information from ‘the horse’s 
mouth’ (for example, the websites of the actual actor).
Audubon (The National Audubon Society)
The National Audubon Society, named after naturalist and ornithologist, John James 
Audubon, was founded in the late 1880s (later incorporated in 1905), making it one of the oldest 
environmental organizations not only in the US, but the world (Audubon 2013). It is a non-profit 
organization that uses science and grassroots advocacy to educate people and conserve the 
environment, especially as it pertains to birdlife and habitat (Audubon 2013). Its stated mission is to 
“conserve and restore the natural ecosystems, focusing on birds, other wildlife, and their habitats for 
the benefit of humanity and earth’s biological diversity” (Audubon 2013). Based in New York City 
and Washington, DC, it has offices in 24 states; is affiliated with over 500 independent chapters; and 
owns and operates several nature centres and bird refuges (Audubon 2013).
Government Reports
When something extraordinary happens that impacts the national interest in some (usually 
negative) way, one of the standard reactive procedures undertaken by government is to order an 
official investigation, culminating with a report that assigns a cause, details the consequences, and 
suggests measures to prevent the occasion from ever happening again; both the Nixon and Obama 
Administrations followed this procedure, the Presidents commissioning investigations and receiving 
reports in the wakes of the SBOS and DHOS, respectively.
SBOS resulted in two reports. The first was The Oil Spill Problem, First Report of the 
President’s Panel on Oil Spills, published in 1969 and credited to the Executive Office of the
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President, Office of Science and Technology. This report did not utilize any CDCs (and therefore was 
not included in this study). The second was Offshore Mineral Resources: A Challenge and an 
Opportunity, Second Report of the President's Panel on Oil Spills, also published in 1969, and also 
credited to the Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology. The report 
focused on what could be done to prevent oil spills and improve offshore oil extraction in general, 
very little of its content pertained to SBOS or the SBC, specifically. These two reports were the only 
two contemporary SBOS reports I could find; both were less than 30 pages long.
DHOS also produced two (primary) reports. The first was entitled, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil 
Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the President, published in January of 2011 
and credited to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling. It is an exhaustive tome, basing its findings on everything from expert technical 
investigation to layman eyewitness testimony, and emphasizing causes, consequences, prevention, 
and safety improvements. The second is America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, published in September of 2010 and credited to the United States Coast 
Guard (USCG). While thorough, it focuses more on what can be done to recover from DHOS on a 
societal-, cultural-, and environmental-level by examining what went wrong (and right) during the 
response. These two reports were the two highest-profile contemporary DHOS reports produced; both 
are multi-hundred page documents.
Governors
Ronald Reagan (R-Ca) was the 33"1 Governor of the State of California, from 1967-1975, and 
was eventually elected the 40th President of the United States for two full terms (1980-1988). His first 
term as Governor (during which SBOS occurred) was notable for two things: his hard-line approach 
to war-protesters—in May 1969, he sent first the California Highway Patrol, then 2200 National 
Guardsmen to occupy Berkley for two weeks to quell protests (Cannon 2001)—and his environmental 
stewardship, in which he contributed 145,000 acres of land to the state park system, established the 
Air Resources Board to combat smog, and blocked the (federal) construction of dams along the Eel
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and Feather Rivers (Hayward 2009). By the time he became President, however, his modest 
environmentalism had been all but subsumed by the economic policies for which he is most 
remembered today, whether in praise or condemnation, and these in turn impacted his 
Administration’s environmental policies. Although he continued with the phasing-out of leaded 
gasoline, and signed the Montreal Protocol, he or his cabinet appointees also denied that acid rain was 
a problem (paradoxically), slashed EPA budgets, and vetoed the reauthorization of the Clean Water 
Act (a decision later overturned by Congress) (Cannon 2009; Gristadmin 2004); perhaps his most 
pertinent act in regard to DHOS was appointing James Watt, a fierce advocate for corporate rights to 
exploit the environment, as Interior Secretary, and authorizing the creation of Minerals Management 
Service (MMS)—ostensibly to oversee and streamline how America harvested its mining assets, but 
became for all intents and purposes a rubber-stamp bureaucracy favouring the interests of the oil 
industry over those of environmentalists and local communities.
Bobby Jindal (R-La) has been the 55th Governor of the State of Louisiana since 2008, and is 
currently serving his second consecutive term as of the first quarter of 2014. He is a staunch political, 
economic, and social conservative; despite his support for offshore oil development, however, he 
opposes oil cartels (namely, OPEC, going so far as to vote in favour of its criminalization); signed an 
executive order to increase office recycling programmes, reduce waste, and promote paperlessness; 
offered tax credits to encourage hybrid vehicle-use; and increased Louisiana’s energy efficiency goals 
and standards (Jindal 2008; OnThelssues 2008).
Non-national Environmental Groups
For SBOS, these is represented by GOO!, a grassroots organisation that spontaneously 
formed mere days after SBOS began with the primary objective of ending and removing all oil 
exploration and production from the SBC. They are still in operation to this day. Their mission has 
been, and is, to “protect the Santa Barbara Channel and coastline from all environmental, economic, 
and aesthetic encroachments by petroleum development” (Get Oil Out 2013).
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DHOS is not represented by any single, premier environmental group—spontaneously 
formed in the wake of the spill or not—because the environmental situation along the Gulf has not 
produced one. Instead, Louisiana is the base of operations for a series of regional (i.e., Gulf Coast- 
concerned) groups. The ones used in this analysis are: the Gulf Restoration Network (GRN; the 
primary one), the Louisiana Bucket Brigade (LBB), and the Coastal Conservation Association (CCA).
GRN was formed in 1995 by representatives from the various conservation organizations 
operating throughout the GoM; it became an independent corporation in 1998 after receiving funding 
for this purpose from Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund (formerly the Siena Club Legal Defense Fund) 
(Gulf Restoration Network 2013). GRN is based in New Orleans, Louisiana. Its mission is to “unit[e] 
and empower[] people to protect and restore the natural resources of the Gulf Region” (Gulf 
Restoration Network 2013).
The LBB was formed in 2000 through a $50,000 gift from the Beldon Fund (Louisiana 
Bucket Brigade 2013). LBB specializes in helping so-called fenceline communities (people living 
near or next to dumps or places of industrial pollution), and was inspired by the people of the Niger 
Delta, Nigeria, and their efforts to stand up against industrial pollution (Louisiana Bucket Brigade
2013). It is an environmental health and justice organization, which “support[s] communities’ use of 
grassroots action to become informed, sustainable neighbourhoods free from industrial pollution 
(Louisiana Bucket Brigade 2013).
The CCA was formed in 1977 in the wake of the “drastic commercial overfishing along the 
Texas coast decimated redfish and speckled trout populations” by “14 concerned recreational anglers” 
(Coastal Conservation Association 2014). It has 206 chapters in 17 states, some as far away as New 
England and Washington State, and has an estimated membership of 100,000. Its stated purpose is “to 
advise and educate the public on conservation of marine resources” in order to fulfill its objective of 
“conserving], promoting], and enhancing] the present and future availability of those coastal 
resources for the benefit and enjoyment of the general public” (Coastal Conservation Association
2014).
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Oil Companies
Union Oil, or the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) was the sole owner and operator 
of Platform A in 1969 (the lease on the offshore tract was shared with half a dozen other oil 
companies); it was headquartered in El Segundo, California. It was founded in 1890, incorporated in 
1919, and was fully absorbed by Chevron Corporation in 2005, becoming a mere subsidiary of the 
multinational (Wikipedia 2013). In addition to their culpability for the SBOS, they were also 
responsible for oil pipe leaks beneath Avila Beach, California from the 1950s to 1996, and the leaking 
of 18 million US gallons of dilutent under the Guadalupe-NipomoDunes and nearby oceanfront, from 
the mid-1950s to 1994—which Unocal tried to deny any involvement with, but records proved their 
knowledge and complicity (Wikipedia 2013). In 1969, Unocal was headed by Fred Hartley.
BP, formerly British Petroleum, is the owner of the lease that included the Macondo Prospect 
into which the Deepwater Horizon was drilling its exploratory well when it blew out. It is 
headquartered in London, England. It is the fifth largest company in the world (as of 2012) and the 
sixth largest oil and gas company (as of 2012) (Wikipedia 2013). It began life as the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, a subsidiary of Burmah Oil Company, and was tasked with exploiting Iran’s oil 
deposits; in 1935, it became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; and finally in 1954, British Petroleum 
(Wikipedia 2013). Between 1979 and 1987, it transitioned from state ownership to private (as part of 
PM Margaret Thatcher’s privatisation spree); after a merger with Amoco, it became BP Amoco, or 
just BP (Wikipedia 2013). BP’s egregious environmental record includes, but is not limited to: the 
1967 Torrey Canyon oil tanker spill, the 2005 Texas Refinery Explosion, and the 2006 Prudhoe Bay 
(Alaska) pipeline spill (Wikipedia 2013). In 2010, BP’s CEO was Tony Hayward, who upon 
assuming his new position decided the company should focus on safety, not alternative energies (as 
had been the emphasis of the previous CEO) (Wikipedia 2013).
Halliburton is one of the world’s largest oilfield services companies, headquartered in 
Houston, Texas and Dubai, United Arab Emirates (Wikipedia 2013). It provided cement and 
cementing personnel for the Deepwater Horizon (Cavnar 2010; Freudenberg and Gramling 2011). It
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operates in over 80 countries, employs over 100,000 people, and owns hundreds of subsidiaries, 
affiliates, and brands, several of which are not involved in petroleum mining (Wikipedia 2013). It was 
founded in 1919 by Erie Halliburton as the New Method Oil Well Cementing Company; by 1922, it 
had become the Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company; finally becoming Halliburton in 1961 
(Wikipedia 2013). It began foreign ventures in 1926 (Wikipedia 2013). Among its numerous 
controversies, two environmental ones include a very high Toxics Release Inventory score for a 
Harris County, Texas facility, and the creation of toxic cloud in Farmington, New Mexico that forced 
people to evacuate their homes (Wikipedia 2013).
Transocean, one of the world’s largest offshore drilling contractors, is headquartered in 
Venier, Switzerland (to minimize tax costs) (Wikipedia 2013). It was the owner and operator of the 
Deepwater Horizon exploratory drilling platform (C~ 2010; Freudenberg and Gramling 2011). It has 
offices in 20 countries, has a fleet of 135 offshore drilling units, and owns nearly 50% of the world’s 
deep water platforms (Wikipedia 2013). It began life in 1953 when Alabama-based Southern Natural 
Gas Company formed The Offshore Company to take advantage of the growing offshore presence in 
the GoM (Wikipedia 2013). It went public in 1967; became a full subsidiary in 1978; and changed to 
Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc. in 1982 (Wikipedia 2013). In 1996, it acquired Norwegian Transocean, 
which had begun life as a whaling company in the 1970s before transitioning into the oil business 
through a series of mergers to become Transocean Offshore, then eventually just Transocean by 2003 
(Wikipedia 2013). It has been involved in several fatal accidents, including the 2003 Galveston Bay 
explosion and the 2007 Bourbon Dolphin/Transocean Rather accident; in 2011, it was involved in an 
offshore leak off the coast of Brazil (Wikipedia 2013).
Other Political Actors
For both SBOS and DHOS, OPA are any actors working for or in service of the federal 
government who are not the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the US Senators of California 
(1969) or Louisiana (2010). They can include Administration officials, US Senators representing 
other states, and US Representatives of any state district.
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Presidents
Richard Milhous Nixon was elected the 37th President of the United States in 1968, serving 
one and half consecutive terms; he oversaw the transition of the US from the socially turbulent 1960s 
to the environmentally conscious early 1970s, and managed to end the US’s involvement in what was 
then its longest war, Vietnam. SBOS was pretty much the first thing Mr. Nixon had to deal with upon 
assuming the Office of the President, occurring a week after he was inaugurated. Despite coming late 
to conservationism—it had not been even an issue in the 1968 election campaign—Mr. Nixon would 
nevertheless, in the years after SBOS, form the EPA; discuss environmental policy in his subsequent 
State of the Union Addresses; and support the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, and the National Environmental Policy Act (requiring environmental impact 
statements for federal projects) (Wikipedia 2013). In 1972, he vetoed the Clean Water Act of 1972, 
but only because of its excessive costs; subsequently, he settled for withholding money for any part of 
the Act that he found unjustifiable (Wikipedia 2013).
Mr. Obama was elected the 44th President of the United States in 2008, and is currently 
serving the second of his two consecutive terms as of the first quarter of 2014. He is attempting to 
guide the US out of the Great Recession, that began in 2007, instigated by two wars-paid-on-credit, a 
collapsed housing bubble, and rampant derivatives trading (itself largely caused by the breakdown of 
the separation between banking and finance), and is overseeing the US’s gradual withdraw from its 
longest war to date, Afghanistan. In addition, Mr. Obama is continuing to wage the so-called “war on 
terror;” eleven days after DHOS began—a couple of weeks before anybody realized just how serious 
the spill was—Faisal Shahzad attempted to car-bomb Times Square, New York City in retaliation for 
repeated US drone attacks in his birth-country of Pakistan (Wikipedia 2013). Mr. Obama has stated 
that the “issue of climate change is one that we ignore at our own peril” (Obama 2006; note: he made 
this statement before being elected President) and has pledged to cut US GHG emissions by 80% by 
2050 via cap-and-trade (Wikipedia 2013). A mere month before DHOS erupted, however, he 
rescinded an executive order on, and unveiled plans for, new OCS oil development along the US’s
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other three coasts—an order that had been in effect since 1990 (as a direct result of Exxon Valdez; it 
had been lifted by President George W. Bush in mid-2008, but could not gain traction against the at- 
the-time still extant Congressional ban, which expired a few months later), and was the only thing 
preventing expansion of offshore development outside the Gulf since the 1981 Congressional ban 
expired in September 2008 (Wikipedia 2013). To his credit, however, Mr. Obama reinstated the 
moratorium along the other three coasts in December 2010.
Scientists
For both SBOS and DHOS, scientists are individuals who hold a doctorate and/or are 
employed by an academic or governmental institution. These accredited experts are generally of the 
environmental sciences type, though this study contains a smattering of general biologists and 
chemists; there is also a historian. SBOS broke out virtually on UCSB’s doorstep, resulting in many 
of its faculty speaking out against not only the spill, but also the lack of consultancy during the clean 
up (OSIC 1969-73). During DHOS, scientists were heard during Committee and Sub-committee 
hearings, but otherwise suffered from tardy, or absent, funding.
Sierra Club
The Sierra Club is one of the oldest grassroots environmental organizations in the United 
States. It was founded in 1882, in San Francisco, California, by John Muir (Sierra Club 2013). It has 
hundreds of thousands of chapters across the nation (Sierra Club 2013). Its mission is “to explore, 
enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the 
earth’s ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of 
the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives” (Sierra 
Club 2013). The four pillars of its 21st Century priority campaign are to: go beyond coal, go beyond 
oil, go beyond natural gas, and protect “our wild America” (Sierra Club 2013).
For this comparative analysis, I did not include any data from any of Sierra Club’s many 
chapters, not even California’s or Louisiana’s; I only included CDC framings that came from its 
national leaders.
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Secretaries of the Interior
The Interior Secretary of the US oversees the mining of mineral, metal, and energy resources 
on federal lands, as well as looking after federal forests and anything above or below the water 
surface extending 370 kilometres beyond the 5.5 kilometres that are under the jurisdiction of coastal 
states.
Walter Hickel was elected as the second (1966-1969) and eighth (1990-1994) Governor of 
Alaska, and was confirmed to the position of Secretary of the Interior in January 1969; five days later, 
SBOS happened. His confirmation hearings were among the most contested and acrimonious in 
recent history (OSIC 1969-73). Many considered him unfit for the job because of his decidedly pro­
development, anti-environmental attitudes, as demonstrated by his performance as Alaska’s governor 
and his former careers in construction and real estate (Wikipedia 2013). He turned out to be 
something of an environmentalist, however, imposing liabilities against offshore oil companies and 
demanding environmental safeguards against the expansion of oil development in his native Alaska 
(OSIC 1969-73; Wikipedia 2013). A centrist-leftist, he was eventually fired by Nixon over opposition 
to the President’s Vietnam War Policy and aggressive attitude against war protestors, which garnered 
much media attention. He died during week three of DHOS (Wikipedia 2013).
Ken Salazar was Sol from 2009-2013, after serving as US Senator for Colorado from 2005- 
2009. Environmentalists were leery of Mr. Salazar because of his significant involvement with the 
coal and mining industries, and his tendency to favour industry and agribusiness in debates revolving 
around ACC, fuel efficiency, and endangered species (Wikipedia 2013). In 2009, despite declaring 
melting ice the greatest threat to polar bears, he opposed using the Endangered Species Act to 
regulate GHG emissions, calling such a proposal an “inappropriate tool., .to deal with what is a global 
issue” (Wikipedia 2013). On the other hand, seven days after DHOS began, he approved the Cape 
Wind offshore wind farm (Wikipedia 2013).
State Actors
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For both SBOS and DHOS, these are represented by those whose authority and concern do 
not and cannot extend beyond the borders of California and Louisiana, respectively, and who are not 
Governors. These can include Attorney Generals and various state senators and representatives, as 
well as actors working for any of these states’ various departments, such as those overseeing the 
environment and natural resources.
Democratic US Senators
Alan Cranston was elected US Senator for California in 1968, serving for four consecutive 
six-year terms, having previously served as state controller from 1959 to 1967 (Wikipedia 2013). His 
interests included nuclear disarmament, civil rights, and environmental issues (Wikipedia 2013). He 
died on the 31st of December, 2000
Mary Landrieu was elected US Senator for Louisiana in 1996, and has so far served three 
consecutive six-year terms as of the first quarter of 2014. She is amongst the most conservative 
Democrats in the US Senate (Wikipedia 2013). She is a member of the Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources, and on the Subcommittee for Energy (Landrieu 2013). She supports increased 
drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, one of the few Democrats to do so (Wikipedia 2013). 
Republican US Senators
George Murphy was elected US Senator for California in 1965 for one six-year term. He was 
the first significant former actor to achieve state/federal public office (Wikipedia 2013). He died on 
the 3rd of May, 1992.
David Vitter was elected US Senator for Louisiana in 2004, and is currently serving his 
second consecutive six-year term as of the first quarter of 2014, after previously serving as US 
Representative for suburban Louisiana’s 1st congressional district (Wikipedia 2013). Although he 
supported efforts to make BP pay as much as humanly possible for DHOS, his environmental record 
appears to otherwise favour BAU economic expansion; many of his CDC frames have a decidedly 
pro-business slant to them.
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Appendix C -  Sample of the Super-extract Process
The following is a sample of the super-extracting process that was applicable only to 
DHOS raw data; the example comes from Governor Jindal. As mentioned in the main text of 
Chapter 4.1, CDC extracts featuring subject or verbatim repetitions were grouped together 
according to similarity; the italicized sentence preceding each extract provides a summation 
of the similar idea.
Who are the heroes o f the DHOS?
“Today -  along our coast, we have new heroes -  our coastal parish presidents, the fishermen 
who are laying our boom, the National Guardsmen who are help to contain the oil and the 
communities that are banding together to help each other out in their time of need. These are 
the heroes in this oil spill disaster response. “To see this team overcome many challenges, 
even when the odds were against them, the Saints give our people the confidence that we will 
be successful despite the odds. We too will dig down deep yet again and we will win this 
fight to protect our coast. Even when other people may count us out or may count us as 
underdogs -  we’re going to prevail. That’s the perseverance of the people of Louisiana, 
o From Jindal, Governor Jindal Joins Super Bowl Champion New Orleans Saints for 
Rally to Support Coastal Louisiana, 08/06/10 <
http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfin?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID=
2237&navID=12>
“You all know about our frustrations with the response to the spill last year and the economic 
effects that rippled through our coastal communities, but one of the most important things I 
want to talk to you about today are the heroes that stepped forward in response to this 
disaster. I want this one-year anniversary event to be about honoring the men and women 
who stepped forward to protect coastal Louisiana.
o From Jindal, Governor Jindal Joins Leaders to Honor Disaster Heroes and Invite 
Country to Visit Coastal LA on One Year Anniversary of BP Oil Spill, 20/04/11 < 
http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID= 
2787&navID=l>
“Of course, the biggest heroes in this disaster by far were the people of coastal Louisiana. The 
people whose resilience and determination brought us through another time of disaster. Our 
Louisiana people are truly the heart of what makes this state great.”
o From Jindal, Governor Jindal Joins Leaders to Honor Disaster Heroes and Invite 
Country to Visit Coastal LA on One Year Anniversary of BP Oil Spill, 20/04/11 < 
http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID= 
2787&navID=l>
The claims process is broken, needs fixing;
“DSS Secretary Kristy Nichols sent a letter this morning following up on the President’s 
announcement that he is bringing in a third party organization to ensure all claims from this 
disaster are paid. This announcement seems like a good step forward in a process that has 
been very frustrating to date. The state has requested access to BP’s claims database and 
procedures for weeks now and we have received only drips and drabs of information from 
BP. Their claims system absolutely needs to be reformed and whatever the final system is, the 
state must be assured full and complete access to the claims system in order to ensure our
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people’s claims are being handled fairly and quickly. We are also concerned that around 75 
percent of small business claims being turned into the SB A are being rejected and we are 
asking the SBA to improve their process so our people are getting the help they need while 
their businesses are suffering from this spill.
o From Jindal, Governor Jindal: We Are in a War Against This Oil, Need Real Results, 
16/06/10 <
http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID= 
2245&navID= 12>
“BP and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility must ensure that the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
claims administration process works efficiently and meets the needs of citizens, businesses 
and public entities affected by this disaster. First and foremost, the new system must be fully 
transparent to the state and our citizens. Claims protocols must be clear and understandable to 
our coastal communities so that they can effectively access the system. We must understand 
how the new claims system will be administered and who will evaluate the claims.
o From Jindal, Gov. Jindal Announces "Agenda For Revitalizing Coastal Louisiana", 
14/07/10 <
http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID=
2332&navID=l>
The hurting o f small businesses',
“We are here at Gulf Stream Marina today and this is a recreational fishing marina that now 
sits empty because of the BP oil spill that caused the loss of recreational and commercial 
fishing activity that would usually be bustling at this time of year. This marina employs three 
people -  and this is just one story of the many businesses here in Grand Isle that are 
struggling to deal with the very personal effects of this disaster on coastal Louisiana, 
o From Jindal, Governor Jindal: BP Claims System is Broken, 22/06/10 <
http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID= 
2255&navID= 12>
“On day 64 of this disaster, Gulf Stream Marina has a claim into BP for $113,000 in losses -  
but they haven’t received any payment for their business claim, only three checks for $5,000 
each for personal payments. Last week, BP told the marina they would call in three days, but 
the marina still hasn’t received a call. Meanwhile, these folks are fighting to keep their 
business open. The owner is struggling to stay in the black while once again the help that was 
promised is still not here.
o From Jindal, Governor Jindal: BP Claims System is Broken, 22/06/10 <
http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID= 
2255&navID= 12>
“Also here in Grand Isle is the Sand Dollar Marina, owned by Butch Gaspard. Butch has 
operated the Marina there for 13 years and he has been in business for 45 years. He employs 
15 people and told us he generated around $2 million in revenue last year. This time of year is 
when most of his profits come in, but because of the spill, he instead is incurring serious 
losses this year. Butch has a total of six claims outstanding with BP, representing his various 
related businesses. He just got another call yesterday telling him that the earlier paperwork he 
submitted would have to be filled out again because it was ‘lost.’ This morning, he was told 
they ‘may’ have found it. In 2005, after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it cost Butch around 
$1.4 million to rebuild. Now -  he faces the disaster of this BP oil spill.
o From Jindal, Governor Jindal: BP Claims System is Broken, 22/06/10 <
http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID=
2255&navED=12>
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Appendix D -  Sample of Sensitizing Concept Analysis
The following is a sample of the sensitizing concept analysis. The first section is from 
SBOS -  Crisis -  OPA and the second is from DHOS -  Disaster -  Government Reports. The 
SBOS CDC extracts consist of a series of individual extracts, while the DHOS ones are made 
up of two super-extracts. The analysis is indicated in italics', it was originally conducted 
using the Comments tool in Word’s track changes function, which were cut-and-pasted into 
the main document for this sample. The reason why some of the extract analyses do not, for 
example, use all seven elements of crisis’s sensitizing concept is because the extract did not 
contain any data pertaining to the missing elements.
SBO S-Crisis-O PA
“My initial action was personally to visit Secretary Hickel before his trip to Santa Barbara to 
express my concern and the feeling of a vast majority of my constituents about the poll 
crisis.”
o From US Congressman Teague, Re: what actions Teague took during SBOS from 
newsletter Jan-Feb 1969
■ Threat: oil poll from SBOS and/or constituents ’feelings about SBOS oil poll.
Big: the “vast majority ” of Teague’s constituents are none too happy.
Negative: Santa Barbarans are angry about SBOS oil poll.
“I also asked President Nixon, while I was visiting with him, to declare Ventura and Santa 
Barbara Counties a disaster area b/c of the severe direct and indirect econ injury resulting 
from the oil crisis. In addition, I requested the President to order the use of fed troops and 
equip wherever necessary to clean up the oil.”
o From US Congressman Teague, Re: what actions Teague took during SBOS -> from 
newsletter Jan-Feb 1969
■ Threat: the direct, indirect econ problems resulting from SBOS.
Big: Teague asked President to a) declare SB, Ventura D areas and b) send
out troops to clean up oil.
Negative: SBOS could have direct, indirect econ consequences.
Uncertain: don’t know what the indirect econ effects wills be.
“Santa Barbara Channel Oil Poll Crisis [title of his statement] The terrible despoliation along 
Santa Barbara’s majestic channel and coastline has not come to an end, though many people 
mistakenly think so. One hundred days after the blowout of an oil well, erected on a platform 
5 '/i miles out to sea, crude oil, at an estimated rate of 8000 gallons per day, has continue to 
blacken and blight the waters of the channel from fissures deep in the ocean bottom. Many 
fear further massive eruptions.”
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o Hon. Thomas H Kuchel, former US Senator (Cali), statement to Subcommittee on 
Minerals, Materials, and Fuels of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 19- 
20/05/69
■ Threat: oil continue to leak out after 100 days; people think that SBOS is 
over, this mistake; fear of more SBOSs.
Bis: spill still hap after 100 days, continue to oil SBC waters.
Negative: SB’s coastline still being oiled by SBOS after 100 days; there's 
fear of more spills.
Uncertain: implied in that since spill has continued for 100 days, don’t know 
when will end...
DHOS -  Disaster -  Government Reports
“The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was one of the worst man-made environmental disasters 
our country has ever experienced. The oil spill has dramatically affected the lives, jobs, and 
futures of millions of Gulf Coast residents. The Gulf of Mexico is a natural resource of vital 
importance which provides immeasurable benefits and services to citizens throughout the 
United States. The Gulf is also critical to nationwide commerce.” (2)
o From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10 
“By the time the well was capped, it is estimated that the Deepwater Horizon had released 
more than 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf,7 resulting in significant impacts on the 
Gulfs communities, ecosystem, and economic activity. It is one of the worst man-made 
environmental disasters in American history. The spill caused the closure of 88,522 square 
miles of federal waters to fishing, and affected hundreds of miles of shoreline, bayous, and 
bays.” (5)
o From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10 
“The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was one of the worst man-made environmental disasters in 
American history and resulted in severe economic dislocations across the Gulf Coast. It 
shares features with prior major oil spills like the Exxon Valdez, but is singular in its scope, 
scale, and effect upon the human and environmental health of the region. It poses similar 
economic challenges as a natural disaster, yet is distinct in both the absence of extensive 
infrastructure damage, and the breadth of its geographic impact.” (77)
o From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10 
“The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was one of the worst manmade environmental disasters 
ever experienced by the United States. Tens of thousands of people mobilized in the Gulf of 
Mexico and along the Gulf Coast to combat the spill, plug the well, and mitigate the spill’s 
immediate effects. Early on in the response, President Obama recognized that short-term 
efforts would not be sufficient to address the spill’s enduring effects. In an address to the 
nation on June 15, 2010, the President appointed Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus to 
examine the question of what comes after the well has been sealed and the oil is no longer 
flowing.”
o From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10
■ Social disrupt/phenomenon: DHOS one of the worst hum-caused 
environmental Ds in Us history; DHOS “singular in its scope, scale, and 
effect upon human/environmental health ” the 4.9 million barrels spilled 
causing significant impact on Gulf communes, econ activity, impacting lives,
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jobs, futures of millions of Gulf residents; GoM = vital nexus for natural 
resources used throughout US; close 88,522 square miles offed fish waters; 
requires mobilization o f 100s of thousands to fight, plug, mitigate.
Phvs destruct/damase: all that oil caused “significant impacts on the Gulf’s 
communes, ecosystem, and econ activities; affected 100s of miles of coastal 
wetland; there was actually an “absence of extensive infra damages ” (italics 
added).
Negative: see Social disrupt/phenomenon.
Event/svace-time: refuted b/c mentions that DHOS will have “enduring 
effects. ”
The government’s response to this latest disaster is guided primarily by the Clean Water Act 
of 1977 (CWA), the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), and related regulations. The CWA has 
a primary goal of restoration and maintenance of the Nation’s waters and provides several 
causes of action enforceable by the United States in order to promote these goals.” (6) 
o From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10 
“A key statute guiding the government’s response to this latest disaster is the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 (OPA) and its related regulations. Passed in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
oil spill, OPA expanded the scope of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan, more commonly called the National Contingency Plan (NCP), by 
mandating new contingency planning and response preparedness responsibilities for the 
federal government and industry, as well as by providing additional guidance on coordinating 
and directing response and cleanup activities.” (32)
o From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10
* Social disrupt/phenomenon: FG response to DHOS guided by CWA 1977 
and OPS 1990, which gives FG power to mandate new measures upon Big 
Oil.
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Appendix E -  Sample of the Frame Analysis Process
The following are examples of the FA procedure; the first comes from SBOS -  
Catastrophe -  GOO! and the second from DHOS — Crisis — President Obama. Like with 
Appendix 4, the SBOS CDC extracts consist of a series of individual extracts, while the 
DHOS ones are made up of two super-extracts. The CDC sensitizing analysis is indicated in 
italics, and the FA in Arial font; both were originally conducted using the Comments tool in 
Word’s track changes function, which were cut-and-pasted into the main document for this 
sample.
SBOS -  Catastrophe -  GOO!
“GOO is a rallying pt for those who are frustrated and want to do something. Our objectives 
are clear: No more oil leases and we want the ops there now to be suspended eternally. There 
is no evidence whatsoever that a similar catastrophe won’t be repeated. There are no 
safeguards to protect this community from damage or ultimate destruction.”
o Alvin Weingand, GOO chairman, about what GOO is and does “GOO Busy 
Collecting Names ON Abolish Drilling Petitions” SBNP 10/02/69
■ Requires new institutions: GOO! is a focal pt for those angry at 
inaction/counteraction by regular channels and want something to be done 
about oil poll/oil development in SBC.
■ Distinction determines response: SBOS = cat b/c only way to prevent 
another is to remove oil development from SBC all together.
• Context provided: GOO! formed so that those who want to remove oil 
development from SBC forever—but are dissatisfied w/ the ‘usual 
channels’—can work towards doing just that; evidence has yet to 
come to light that something similar to SBOS won't hap again. 
Meaning prod: there's no evidence whatsoever that another SBOS 
won't happen; therefore oil development in SBC should be stopped 
forevermore.
Values tapped/revealed: all or nothing, do nothing unless there's 
100% certainty that nothing bad will hap; citizen/NGO action can 
bring about change.
Who/what responsible: ordinary citizens taking part in grassroots org, 
like GOO!
CAT-FRAME = citizen power is the fulcrum by which removing oil 
development from SBC will be achieved.
“Your [the Senate subcommittee on air and water] presence here demos your cognizance that 
the oil spill catastrophe on the coast of Southern California is of national import and 
magnitude. Beyond issues of war and peace, polluting and destroying our environment is 
perhaps highest on the national agenda.”
o Hon. Alvin C Weingand, chairman of GOO, statement to Senate Subcommittee on 
Air and Water Pollution, SB California, 24/02/69
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■ Distinction determines response: Senate Subcommittee's presence 
underscores the gravity of SBOS; beside from war and peace, environment 
destruction top national agenda.
Total: claims that SBOS is of “national import and magnitude. ”
• Context provided: Senate Subcommittee on Air, W ater Poll has come 
to SB to hear testimony about SBOS.
Meaning prod: the presence and attention of senators from other 
parts of the country underscores that SBOS is of "national import and 
magnitude,” so much so that it stands alongside the issues of war 
and peace.
Values tapped/revealed: environment just as import a s  war and 
peace.
Who/what responsible: national Senate subcommittee has come 
clear-cross country to hear testimony in SB.
CAT-FRAME = SBOS is such a big deal that a  Senate subcommittee 
has been convened to look into it.
“You have heard and will hear representatives of the people of the city and county of Santa 
Barbara. They capably describe how this area has been grievously injured economically and 
in many other ways beyond price. Our ox has been sorely and infamously gored! Indeed, the 
whole nation has been gored. I am now going to show you a photograph by Dick Smith of the 
Santa Barbara News-Press. It is a sad symbol of this catastrophe depicted in media nationally 
and around the world. It tells of a national tragedy, of the deep concern of people everywhere. 
The 50,000 people of ‘Get Oil Out! ’—with thousands, perhaps million more, feel strongly 
that ours is not a local cause but a national moment.”
o Hon. Alvin C Weingand, chairman of GOO, statement to Senate Subcommittee on
Air and Water Pollution, SB California, 24/02/69
■ Distinction determines response: the symbolic power of SBOS has galvanized 
50,000, perhaps 1000s, millions more.
Total: SBOS has attracted national, world attention; perhaps millions of 
people feel that SBOS = national moment, not local cause.
• Context provided: SBOS has gotten the attention of US, world. 
Meaning prod: b/c of all the attention that SBOS has captured,
50,000 people have signed a petition to ban oil development in SBC 
forevermore; SBOS is not simply a "local cause, but a national 
moment."
Values tapped/revealed: solidarity; environment, aesthetics are 
import.
Who/what responsible: indeterminate.
CAT-FRAME = there's a feeling that SBOS is moving beyond being a 
local problem and into the realm of national, even worldwide import.
DHOS -  Crisis -  President Obama
All levels of FG have been doing everything they can, FG has been in point position since 
beg;
We just finished a meeting with Admiral Thad Allen, our National Incident Commander for 
this spill, as well as Coast Guard personnel who are leading the response to this crisis. And 
they gave me an update on our efforts to stop the BP oil spill and mitigate the damage.
o From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President from Venice, Lou, 02/05/10 
That is why since the initial explosion on the drilling rig occurred, the Federal Government 
has launched and coordinated a unified and relentless response to this crisis.
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o From Obama to Speaker of House of Reps, Presidential Memorandum -  Oil 
Supplemental Package, 12/05/10 
The day that the rig collapsed and fell to the bottom of the ocean, I had my team in the Oval 
Office that first day. Those who think that we were either slow on our response or lacked 
urgency don’t know the facts. This has been our highest priority since this crisis occurred.
o From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President on the Gulf Oil Spill, 27/05/10 
I’m briefed every day and have probably had more meetings on this issue than just about any 
issue since we did our Afghan review. And we understood from day one the potential 
enormity of this crisis and acted accordingly. So when it comes to the moment this crisis 
occurred, moving forward, this entire White House and this entire federal government has 
been singularly focused on how do we stop the leak, and how do we prevent and mitigate the 
damage to our coastlines.
o From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President on the Gulf Oil Spill, 27/05/10 
There has never been a point during this crisis in which this administration, up and down up 
the line, in all these agencies, hasn’t, number one, understood this was my top priority -- 
getting this stopped and then mitigating the damage; and number two, understanding that if 
BP wasn’t doing what our best options were, we were fully empowered and instruct them, to 
tell them to do something different.
o From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President on the Gulf Oil Spill, 27/05/10 
Understandably, the feelings of frustration and anger, the sense that any response is 
inadequate — we expect that frustration and anger to continue until we actually solve this 
problem. But in the meantime, we’ve got to make sure that everybody is working in concert, 
that everybody is moving in the same direction. And I want everybody to know that 
everybody here — at every level -- is working night and day to end this crisis. We’re 
considering every single idea out there, especially from folks who know these communities 
best.
o From Obama, Remarks by President After Briefing On BP Oil Spill, 28/05/10
■ Threat: the continuing spill, the damage being caused by it; perceptions, 
anger, resentment that FG response too slow, not urgent, not enough; the 
enormity of DHOS; BP not acting in FG's best interests.
Urgency; perception floating around that FG response not urgent enough, 
which FG/President refutes.
Bis: FG launched a coordinated, relentless response to DHOS as of Day I; 
stopping DHOS consider highest priority of WH, fed; entire WH, fed 
"singularly focused" on stopping spill, prevent & mitigate coastal damage; 
everybody working 24/7 to stop DHOS.
Negative: spill continues, damaging coasts; perception floating around that 
FG not doing enough, fast enough.
• Context provided: there’s  perception that fed not doing enough to 
respond to DHOS/response too slow, resulting in resentment, anger 
-> President refutes poor response by fed—rather fed response = 
coordinated, relentless since Day 1.
Values tapped/revealed: false info won’t be tolerated/will be refuted; 
crisis requires all-out fed response; if BP doesn’t act on best options 
for nation, fed will compel them otherwise.
Who/what responsible: fed b/c they are tasked w/ responding to any 
crisis that can/does harm Am interests; BP b/c it’s  their spill, their 
crisis.
Meaning prod: President refutes the perception that fed response to 
DHOS is slow and inadequate; fed is, and has been, doing 
everything it can and beyond, since Day 1, to deal wI spill.
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CR-FRAME = Descriptions of slow and inadequate response on the 
part of fed are patently untrue.
Sparing no efforts, sparing no resources;
I also want to stress that we are working closely with the Gulf states and local communities to 
help every American affected by this crisis. Let me be clear: BP is responsible for this leak; 
BP will be paying the bill. But as President of the United States, I'm going to spare no effort 
to respond to this crisis for as long as it continues.
o From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President from Venice, Lou, 02/05/10 
But every American affected by this spill should know this: Your government will do 
whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to stop this crisis.
o From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President from Venice, Lou, 02/05/10 
I’ve made clear to Admiral Allen and I did so again today that he should get whatever he 
needs to deal with this crisis. Whatever he needs, he will get.
o From Obama, Remarks by President After Briefing On BP Oil Spill, 28/05/10 
■ Threat: affects ofDHOS on Gulf residents.
Bis: everybody affected by DHOS will be helped; FG will make sure BP pays 
every last bill; FG committed to doing whatever it takes for however long it 
takes to stop DHOS; no resource will be left unutilized.
• Context provided: President promises that all who’ve been affected 
by DHOS will be helped, that BP will pay every last bill, and that fed 
will do whatever requires, no matter for how long, until spill stopped. 
Values tapped/revealed: sticking w/ victims thru thick and thin; 
pursuing perpetrators until justice finally done.
Who/what responsible: BP b/c they caused the spill and therefore 
should pay for it; fed b/c it has taken it upon itself to make sure 
victims are helped, that spill stopped.
Meaning prod: fed will do whatever it takes, use whatever resources 
required, to help people of Gulf, make BP pay.
CR-FRAME = see Meaning prod.
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Appendix F -  The List of Generalized CDC Frames Put Forth Bv SBOS and DHOS FSs
The following are all the generalized CDC frames that the sensitizing concept 
analysis, frame analysis, and refinement process found. They are divided by spill (i.e., all of 
SBOS’s first, followed by DHOS’s), then by crisis, disaster, or catastrophe (i.e., all of one, 
then the next), and finally by FS.
SBOS
GOO! Generalized Crisis Frames
Complaining that an incumbent politician did not respond effectively to SBOS ■) SBOS-1
Other Political Actors 1969 Generalized Crisis Frames
Teague relaying SBn’s anger to Hickel -> SBOS-1
SBOS jeopardizing SB’s future economic well-being, especially in terms of the unknown 
indirect economic effects; only by President declaring SB a disaster area can things be 
stopped from getting worse - )  SBOS-2
After 100 days, SBOS still happening, coastline getting oiled, and SBns fear another eruption 
is imminent -> SBOS-3
President Nixon Generalized Crisis Frames
Demonstrating that he is taking SBOS seriously by personally appointing an investigatory 
panel SBOS-1
Scientists 1969 Generalized Crisis Frames
The oil industry and the federal government are perverting science for their own ends, where 
facts are really just careful selections SBOS-1
The unhealthy relationship between DoI/USGS and the oil industry, and how it does not serve
the interests of America; need a system that breaks the federal-oil industry collusion and
protects the environment from exploitation -> SBOS-2, 3
SBOS was caused by a BAU system that no longer works SBOS-3
SBOS is considered a brushfire crisis, as opposed to a long-term, methodical problem ^
SBOS-4
Sierra Club 1969 Generalized Crisis Frames
Drilling in SBC should remain subject to a moratorium until the results of public,
participatory decision-making come in SBOS-1
The ill-considered use of technology caused SBOS SBOS-2
Too much is at stake—a liveable environment—to accept Sol’s assurances that everything 
within his powers is being done SBOS-2
Sol Hickel Generalized Crisis Frames
Assures that the federal government is doing everything in its power to respond to SBOS 
SBOS-1
Audubon 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
Technology causing problems that cannot be fixed -> SBOS-1
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SBns’ protest louder than any other recent ones because SBOS was human-caused SBOS- 
2
Government Reports 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
The spill was not a disaster because nobody died and property damage was light.. .although 
spill was reminder to use natural resources wisely, and the oiled and dead birds served as a 
symbol for humanity’s capacity to despoil the environment SBOS-1
Governor Reagan Generalized Disaster Frames
State of California’s declaration of disaster for SB’s beaches does not absolve UO of its 
responsibilities SBOS-1
Even though SBOS took place on OCS on federal leases operating under federal regulations, 
SoC will suspend its state oil operations until a review has been completed SBOS-2 
SoC tried to get oil companies and the federal government to acknowledge the possibility of 
spills by setting up an insurance account; this was ignored - )  SBOS-3
GOO! Generalized Disaster Frames
SBOS has caused much destruction already; SBOS has caused death and suffering to 
countless living creatures; oil pollution still happening SBOS-1, 6, 9 
Inevitable future spill will be worse; inability to even install a platform proves that another 
SBOS imminent -> SBOS-1, 16
Future generations will laud those (such as Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution) who 
put needs of many above the profiteering few by putting an end to oil development in SBC; 
only way to guarantee another spill does not happen is to follow the will of 50,000 petitioners 
calling for oil development ban in SBC; only way to guarantee end of threat of pollution is to 
ban and remove oil development from "esthetically vulnerable" SBC SBOS-1, 7, 8 
Even though GOO! only seeking to remove oil development from SBC, their efforts have 
piqued nation, who do not want to see another SBOS; GOO! has gained support from people 
across the country and world SBOS-2,14
Experts admit there are "no absolute guarantee^]" that will protect coast and sea against
another SBOS; no guarantees that another SBOS will not happen; SBOS-3, 9
SBOS should be stirring emotion, contrary to one opinion SBOS-5
SBOS death and damage proves "senseless[ness of humanity's]...exploitation and destruction
of his own living environment;" SBOS could be "turning point in national policy
[against]...ruthless exploitation" SBOS-6,14
SB's CoC accepting oil industry money to pay for false ads saying SB's beaches are clean and 
oil-free; despite advertisements paid for by UO, oil slick continues to "lurk" in SBC 7, 10 
SB only clean when oil is out SBOS-7
SBOS has brought problem of pollution and environmental destruction to forefront SBOS- 
8
Even though Sol admits oil development in SBC a mistake, he is nevertheless trying to 
continue it by talking tougher regulations and clarifying cleanup responsibilities; Sol has 
resumed oil development in SBC; Hickel guilty of resuming oil development in SBC; 
resumption of oil development in SBC unsurprising because of "weight of tradition" ■) 
SBOS-8, 9, 13, 18
SBOS leak still happening; SBOS leak still stoppered; contrary to Look, SBOS an ongoing
disaster SBOS-9,10,15
SBOS declared a "natural disaster" SBOS-10
SBOS has been bad for birds—they are gone SBOS-11
Oil pollution threatens not only economy, but survival, and if US fails to protect last- 
beachhead California's beaches, then not only a defeat for nation, but world; SBOS more than
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NIMBY, it symbolizes nation's continued acceleration towards "economic exploitation at any 
cost"; people throughout nation do not want to see another SBOS; SBOS not only a "regional 
disaster," but a "grave national disorder" SBOS-12, 18, 2, 14 
SBOS proves that how US administers its natural resources is flawed and infected by an 
"unholy, unhealthy, undemocratic alliance between Dol and petroleum industry" SBOS-13 
SBOS being compounded by President treating SBns wanting oil out like garment workers 
complaining about tariffs - )  SBOS-17
Union Oil Generalized Disaster Frames
It not being a disaster b/c nobody was killed, the damage could be cleaned/repaired, and 
future spills could be prevented DHOS-1, 2
Other Political Actors 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
For pro-legislation for oil and water pollution, SBOS is proof-positive why more federal 
powers are required to ensure clean water, no oil pollution, and “careful site selection and 
effective [clean up] authorization;” provisions, such as depletion allowances, should be 
discontinued so as to make oil companies pay their fair share of income tax; took SBOS to 
alert Congress to need for conservation legislation; thanks to SBOS, Senate has finally passed 
legislation (after three years of effort) that give President power to impose financial liability 
on oil companies for their oil pollution, and authority to clean up spills SBOS-2, 3, 7, 8 
Federal government paying 1 billion to buy back SBC leases to prevent another SBOS is 
worth more than having a "dead sea" off SoCal; only way to end the spill is for the federal 
government to acknowledge that SBns' right to oil pollution free life is greater than oil 
companies' right to profit-by-leasing, and therefore all oil development should be banned 
from SBC -> SBOS-5, 9
SBOS has reaped a few certainties, but many uncertainties, and because of the latter, a 
moratorium should be enacted until “all reasonable precautions” are in place SBOS-1 
To SBns, SBOS is a threat SBOS-2 
UO is legally responsible for SBOS SBOS-3
SBOS is costing taxpayers millions and that is why it should never happen again -> SBOS-4 
Teague wants President to declare SBC a disaster area because of risk of economic damage 
-» SBOS-6
SBOS happened despite rules and regulations SBOS-7 
SBOS has been leaking for a year and UO can't stop it SBOS-9
President Nixon Generalized Disaster Frames
The spill is serious enough to warrant a disaster declaration, bringing with it the federal 
government’s full attention and resources ^  SBOS-1
Scientists 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
The lack of chain of command is ruining science’s ability to learn from SBOS; SBOS could 
have been mitigated if there had been direct, coordinated technological action, not just plans 
and systems of notification SBOS-1, 7
UCSB’s expertise is not being utilized by the federal government or by UO SBOS-2 
Sol is allowing the resumption of drilling in SBC even though he does not understand 
tectonic data SBOS-3
SBOS has gone from NIMBY to a national and world-wide phenomenon ^  SBOS-4 
Tide of conservationism driving the oil industry into a comer; many Americans inspired to 
pay attention/notice environmental destruction and come to aid SBOS-4, 9 
Officials have (allegedly) covered up the fact that oil had reached San Miguel Island, thus 
expanding the area and environmental scope of SBOS SBOS-5
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Ecological disasters, such as SBOS, prove that humans are ignorant of complex ecosystems, 
and that countering this will be difficult -> SBOS-6
Dispersants should not be used because they do not cleanse the environment of oil, or even do 
what they advertise—suspend until eaten ^  SBOS-8
Sierra Club 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
Ordinary citizens were not consulted nor allowed to ask questions or appeal decisions re: 
ocean planning; SBns daily witnessing price of exploitive technology on environmental 
quality without “adequate public review;” public most likely to suffer if another SBOS 
happens so they have a right to know *) SBOS-1, 8, 14
Allowing citizens and associations to advise and act as watchdogs in future will give SBOS 
silver lining; the moratorium in SBC should remain until the results from Dol public hearings 
are in; public has the right to see the information Hickel based his resumption decision on -> 
SBOS-1, 9, 14
The federal government lied about SBOS ending on 16 February the slick is still being fed 
by the fracture, and federal officials still in SB; SBOS is in its 113th day; SBOS is a 
"continuing oil disaster" - )  SBOS-2, 7, 9
Dol is ultimately to blame for SBOS because they allowed the leasing and broke their
promise to keep SBC clean ^  SBOS-3
SBns were right about the risk of an oil disaster -> SBOS-4
SBOS not only a human disaster, but a wildlife one (baby seals allegedly killed by oil); SBOS 
still contaminating shoreline and harming wildlife -> SBOS-5, 7 
Hickel's decision to resume oil production in SBC will cause another disaster; Sol has 
permitted drilling in SBC again; Hickel should rescind his back-to-drill permit; decision to 
resume drilling a worse idea than granting drilling in first place ^  SBOS-6, 8, 9, 13 
Despite continued oiling of shores and wildlife harmed, SBOS is being brushed aside, 
deemed over, and no preventative measures taken ^  SBOS-7
SBns seeing daily proof of the consequences of letting exploitive technology run rampant 
without local community oversight; SBOS has gone from being local to becoming the next 
phase in the nation’s and the world’s pollution crisis caused by “ill-considered” technology; 
SBOs proves what happens when humans let themselves be “tyrannized” by waste and 
pollution causing technology SBOS-8, 10, 11
Hickel would not have permitted drilling in SBC in the first place; decision to drill in SBC 
was terrible to begin with SBOS-8, 13
Hickel should “review [the] fundamental issues” about the continuing SBOS; his assurances 
that everything is being done is not good enough ^  SBOS-9, 10
SBOS has gone from a local occurrence to becoming a piece of nation's and world's pollution 
crisis SBOS-10
SBOS can only be resolved with legislation, ones that include a “comprehensive ecological 
strategy” for protecting balanced use of US’s coasts ■) SBOS-12
Sol Hickel Generalized Disaster Frames
Future oil disasters will be prevented by the federal government and the oil industry working 
together to draft the best regulations possible; SBOS is so bad because current offshore 
regulations are inferior or non-existence, and by rectifying this, disasters like SBOS will not 
happen again -> SBOS-1, 3, 4
Hickel will not allow drilling to resume in SBC until he is convinced that another SBOS will 
not happen SBOS-2
The 10 day long SBOS was "more than any sensible American should [have] be[en] expected 
to take *■> SBOS-4
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State Actors 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
People tend to downplay the damage that oil disasters cause marine life; birds are dead or 
dying because of human oil activity; in fact, weeks-long SBOS wreaking “untold millions of 
dollars of damages to beaches and ocean wildlife SBOS-1, 5, 13
Lack of facts about SBOS is hindering decision-making about preventing future ones; lack of 
information is making it difficult to determine if better technology and/or rules would have 
prevented/ minimized the spill ■) SBOS-2, 3
California’s rules, regulations, offshore system is better, proved by lack of accidents; state 
waters have not suffered a spill SBOS-3, 4
Despite lack of spills in state waters, SLC reviewing its own house, in addition to federal’s, 
anyway to make sure ■) DHOS-4
SBOS is having an adverse effect on Lagomarsino’s reputation; contrary to rumour, he has 
been active in SBOS response - )  SBOS-6, 7
What Lagomarsino has done (helped convince Reagan to declare disaster; co-authored 
Assembly resolutions for help correct SBOS) ^  SBOS-7 
Lagomarsino has also been touched by spill ^  SBOS-8
Ongoing SBOS exacerbated by state’s rush to drill again even though SBns have not cleaned 
up spill yet - )  SBOS-9
Unruh predicts SBOS has angered people so much they will back tax reform against oil 
industry SBOS-10
State government doing all it can to learn everything about SBOS to prevent another; 
legislation required to ensure that spills are better contained and mitigated; SBOS requires 
state to "take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;" only bipartisan support can 
prevent future SBOSs SBOS-11,12,13,14
Oil industry should confront the possibility of spills happening and have final recovery plans 
-> SBOS-12 
- UO is responsible for SBOS SBOS-13
Weeks long SBOS wreaking “untold millions of dollars of damages” ^  SBOS -13 
State must “take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;” in response to worst oil 
pollution disaster in continental US history, and to protect Californians, Attorney General 
speaking out in favour of Cranston’s bill -> SBOS-13,15
Action/inactions of others have made SBns innocent victims of a man-made disaster -> 
SBOS-16
SRC’s no-vote against a bill says to SBns that they cannot count on their government to help 
them when SBOS hits again SBOS-17
Democratic Senator Cranston Generalized Disaster Frames
Present technology cannot guarantee against another SBOS SBOS-1 
Federal regulations amplify, rather than reduce, the chances of spills; SBOS proves that OCS 
Act is out-of-date and out-of-touch with modem technology and oil operations; federal 
authorities did not conduct inspections of Platform A, nor insisted on more higher casing 
requirements (despite $600 million from lease sales); characterizing the oil industry as the 
villains is unfair because it is the federal government that makes all the final decisions about 
leasing and regulations; federal “values and priorities” are “out of whack” with those of locals 
-> SBOS-1, 2, 3,5,12
If appropriate, Congress should phase-out oil production from SBC; only way to prevent 
another SBOS is for federal governments (in partnership with state) to remove all oil 
development from SBC SBOS-1, 6
Oil industry does not care about local communities who are/would be most affected by oil 
production; the initial leasing decisions were deliberately made without “adequate public
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hearings” because decision makers did not want to “stir the natives up;” Subcommittee’s non­
consideration of Cranston bill says that BAU is more important than SBn’s environmental 
and spill-ending concerns SBOS-2, 12,13
USGS is not releasing drilling programme information for public oversight; the validity of the 
WH report on SBOS (causes, why, recommendations) is questionable because testimony is 
being withheld from the public SBOS-3, 8
SBOs has made Americans very sensitive to oil spills—another could shutdown the nation’s 
oil production along all its coasts SBOS-4 
Oil industry is not the villain - )  SBOS-5
Federal government and state must work together to prevent another SBOS in SBC; there 
should be no drilling in SBC until all parties come together to agree on “proper procedures” 
to end SBOS and prevent others SBOS-6, 7
Validity of WH report on causes of SBOS and recommendations questionable because all the 
testimony came from UO and USGS—the responsible parties SBOS-8 
Because of the despoliation, people across US and world are asking why SBOS happened, 
and what Congress can do to prevent another; spill is raising questions about the federal 
government’s ability to prevent future spills and whether oil production in SBC is “truly...in 
the national interest” -> SBOS-9,10
SBOS has brought to a fore nation’s policy about natural resource use, and proves that policy 
can affect the environment ->SBOS-l 1
SBOS has been going on for 6 months, smearing beaches and angering property owners 
SBOS-13
Republican Senator Murphy Generalized Disaster Frames
Human-caused SBOS demonstrates limited ability to deal with disasters SBOS-1 
More knowledge and procedures can either prevent future spills or at least improve response; 
prevention or control and clean up of spills requires greater R&D investment ^  SBOS-1, 5 
If UO had drilled per state mles, not federal government’s, then SBOS would not have 
happened; federal government has not updated, or even reviewed, its regulations in 15 years 
SBOS-2
Humans should and need to be protected from environment, but SBOS shows that vice versa 
true, too SBOS-3
SBOS proves SBn’s misgivings right SBOS-4
There should be no drilling in SBC until there is certainty that another SBOS will not happen 
SBOS-4
GOO! Generalized Catastrophe Frames
Oil development should be banned and removed from SBC because there’s no evidence that 
another SBOS will not happen, and the only way this can happen is through citizen-power 
DHOS-1
Federal senators in SB underscores how important SBOS to nation, equal to war and peace ■) 
DHOS-2
SBOS is becoming as much a national and international issue as a local one DHOS-3 
The President treating the ecological catastrophe no different than a tariff dispute ^  DHOS-4
Other Political Actors 1969 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
How nothing will be done in the spill’s wake because the oil industry’s money speaks louder 
than ordinary people’s letters of protest or their votes SBOS-1 
The economic hardship of banning oil development between SB and Ventura pales in 
comparison to what SBOS portents SBOS-2
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Comparing oil smearing SB’s beaches to the 1906 SF earthquake and fire -4 SBOS-3
Scientists 1969 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
Non-federal and non-oil industry actors getting involved in spill response -4 SBOS-1
Sierra Club 1969 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
The lack of public consultation about resource use led to SBOS “4 SBOS-1
The public should be a partner in decision making about environmental resource use, and not
be at the federal government’s sole discretion - )  SBOS-1
Oil industry and the federal government do not have the capabilities to deal with oil spills, 
despite the frequency of blowouts and that such could have happened anytime and could 
happen again; private business is required to take up the slack -4 SBOS-2 
SBOS still in progress, oiling beaches SBOS-3
New technology and legislation cannot guarantee that another SBOS will not happen, SBC’s 
geology trumps technology -4 SBOS-4
Only solution is to support a bill to remove oil development from SBC completely; only 
banning all oil development in SBC can guarantee against another SBOS SBOS-3, 4
State Actors 1969 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
Only by removing oil development from SBC and turning into a federal reserve can another 
SBOS be prevented - )  SBOS-1
SBOS would have been really bad if the oil had reached LA or San Diego SBOS-2 
SBOS has shaken faith in technological prowess so much that if the cause of the spill is 
technological, then all offshore must end -4 SBOS-3
Both the state and federal government, for the sake of Californians, must act quickly and 
decisively to protect the marine environment from SBOSs -4 SBOS-4 
If SBOS had been bigger, more catastrophic, then oil development in SBC would have been 
banned -4 SBOS-5
Republican Senator Murphy Generalized Catastrophe Frames
New laws and provisions needed to prevent oil spills because they are becoming common -4 
SBOS-1
DHOS
REAs Generalized Crisis Frames
Calling DHOS a ‘spill’ fails to capture it—it is Exxon Valdez several time over, and will 
require years of response -> DHOS-1
Without sound management, the federal response to DHOS will end up like that for Katrina 
-» DHOS-2
Sound response holds the promise of creating RCACs, just as Exxon Valdez did in Alaska -4 
DHOS-2
BP liability money should be invested into existing, but under-resourced coastal restoration 
initiatives DHOS-3
The entire OCS system is “woefully under-regulated” and therefore cannot prevent or 
respond to spills -4 DHOS-4
The federal government should take advantage of DHOS, using it to break America’s fossil 
fuel addiction DHOS-5
Federal government’s response is perceived of as incompetent DHOS-5
DHOS’s impact on recreational fishing is still unknown, but businesses associated with it are
being hard-hit -4 DHOS-6
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Other Political Actors 2010 Generalized Crisis Frames
DHOS partly caused by MMS’s systemic dysfunction debilitating its ability to regulate OCS, 
aided by political partisanship and several Administrations -> DHOS-1 
Despite what oil industry says, blowouts are common in GoM; valuing profit over safety and 
the environment helped cause DHOS - )  DHOS-2
President’s only priority should be stopping the oil flow, and thinking about anything else 
would lead to hasty decisions that will cost jobs DHOS-3
Federal government using every resource in its arsenal to respond to DHOS; it will hold BP 
responsible DHOS-4
President Obama Generalized Crisis Frames
Refuting that the federal response to DHOS has been slow and inadequate and assuring that it 
is “singularly focused” on the spill, doing all that can be done since Day 1; fed is and will do 
whatever it takes, use whatever resource for as long as it takes to stop crisis and help people 
of Gulf; federal is in it for the long-term, staying to help Gulfers for as long as DHOS 
continues to effect DHOS-1, 2, 4
The devastating effect DHOS is having on the natural and human environment; the spill is so
vast and terrible that the region must be made whole again -> DHOS-3, 7
DHOS reveals to America how fragile the Gulf ecosystem is and how dependent local
communities and the nation are on its bounty - )  DHOS-3
Arguments over resource allocation and red tape are par the course DHOS-4
DHOS an "unprecedented crisis;" nature of DHOS is unprecedented -> DHOS-4, 8
Preident will make BP pay; President will relentlessly pursue responsible parties for full
compensation, and hold federal fully accountable for its part DHOS-2, 9
DHOS revealing how inadequate, broken, and unenforced OCS system is, hurting an already
injured region, and therefore calls for systemic overhaul of OCS; how oil industry and federal
conducted offshore will be overhauled to root out flaws; federal now realizes that it should
have made rules and regulations that took DW into account, and should have R&Ded
containment and cleanup technology DHOS-5,10,11
DHOS hurting an already injured region DHOS-5
How DHOS is threatening small businesses up and down the Gulf Coast -> DHOS-6 
Effects of DHOS will not be known for months - )  DHOS-7
Praising the thousands of ordinary people who have come out to help 24/7 - )  DHOS-8 
Gulf Coast will be made better than before DHOS-10
DHOS is “seriousQ and urgent[t]” and complex and ever-changing, making response 
challenging -> DHOS-12, 14
DHOS only adding to nation’s economic and job problems DHOS-13
Scientists 2010 Generalized Crisis Frames
Science’s knowledge and expertise is being underutilized DHOS-1
By refusing or dragging its feet on funding requests, the federal government (UC)
demonstrated its disinterest in DHOS-related science DHOS-2
DHOS is complex and invites no easy answers and defies SOPs, and that is why federal
response is poor -> DHOS-3
DHOS response is being derailed by lack of resources, lack of knowledge about ecosystem 
functionings, and the oil industry withholding vital information; no systems-wide approach to 
dealing with coastal-ocean ecology -> DHOS-4, 5,1
DHOS is making Louisiana’s coastal problems worse, thus emphasizing how vulnerable they 
are -> DHOS-6
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Progressive response to DHOS and future spills can only be achieved by using all talent and 
resources •)  DHOS-7
Sierra Club 2010 Generalized Crisis Frames
DHOS proves that the oil industry is strangling the economy, health, and environment of the 
nation by addicting it to oil; the oil industry is too fixated on more oil to learn from its 
failures, thus putting America at greater risk of more spills DHOS-1, 2 
America is addicted to oil, and is at a turning point, needing assurances that another DHOS 
does not happen and kicking oil over next 20 years DHOS-1
Sol Salazar Generalized Crisis Frames
DHOS’s oil is causing unanticipated impacts to the nation, requiring the best scientific and 
engineering minds -> DHOS-1
MMS’s ethical lapses may have contributed to DHOS - )  DHOS-2
Making hasty decisions about DHOS response could make things worse ^  DHOS-3
DHOS should be a turning point, something descendents can look to and say that is when
America changed how it used energy, the creation of CE economy using America ■) DHOS-
4
Audubon 2010’s Generalized Disaster Frames
DHOS has damaged coastal, non-human environment—especially to migrating birds and 
their habitat DHOS-1, 2
For coastal restoration to take place, society must deem it important; only immediate federal 
money can mitigate and restore the gulf Coast; America has a responsibility to protect and 
restore GoM; Gulf has long suffered from disaster, but because of DHOS, America has 
finally gotten the message that the region needs “long-term restoration;” a “legacy of 
optimism” is required to restore the Gulf, which itself requires fundamental change about 
how GoM is used to ensure future generations their bounty -> DHOS-1, 2, 4, 5, 8 
DHOS has inspired ordinary people to take responsibility and come out to help with response 
effort -> DHOS-3
Although the oil has stopped flowing, the damage to, and the fragility of, GoM cannot be 
forgot DHOS-4
Gulf has long suffered from disaster DHOS-5
Congress and Administration must enact Commission’s recommendations to improve and fix 
OCS system to make GoM healthy and productive for both humans and environment 
DHOS-6
Despite DHOS, despite Commission's findings, Congress has resumed BAU and is not 
helping Gulf -> DHOS-7
Government Reports 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames
DHOS is the worst human-caused environmental disaster in US history because of how much 
oil was spilled, how many square miles of federal fishing waters was closed, how many 
hundreds of thousands of people were required to fight it, and how much economic damage 
was incurred; caused significant human, economic, and environmental suffering, damage, and 
death to a region already battered by hypoxia and hurricanes; after DH exploded, killing 11, 
injuring more, America wouldn't know the full extent of the disaster for several weeks, by 
which time livelihoods, "precious habitats," and unique ways of life were under serious 
threat; would wreak "unknown impacts" on the unique and delicate co-existence of offshore 
energy, fishing and wildlife, and coastal tourism DHOS-1,14,18,19
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Federal response to DHOS followed precedents/guidelines of two past pieces of legislation; 
federal began its DHOS immediately by implementing standard procedure: drug-testing -> 
DHOS-2, 20
DHOS proves that health of Gulfs economy and people is "inextricably linked" to Gulf 
ecosystem's health DHOS-3
DHOS has caused Gulfs economy to go into a tailspin because of consumer non-confidence, 
resulting in no tourism, nobody buying Gulf fish DHOS-3
DHOS is a complex disaster causing widespread mental health issues, leading to medical, 
social, and economic problems, and this requires complex solutions, from BP paying claims 
to PSAs stressing the importance of staying connected to ensuring seafood safety to 
monitoring care-giver states of mind; many Gulfers are stricken with health ailments, but oil 
spills have long been considered environmental problems, not health, so... DHOS-4, 25 
Administration can improve DHOS response by encouraging the integration of services, 
federal-state government interface to better utilize local knowledge of local contexts 
DHOS-5
Federal's recovery role is by facilitating economic recovery via assessments, analysis, 
technical assistance, bolstering seafood marketing, and fisheries assistance, which has already 
begun with dispatch to 21 economic recovery teams DHOS-6 
Due to the scale of DHOS, non-profits have been vital to response/recovery, and will 
continue to as short-term segues into long-term DHOS-7
DHOS has broken Americans' faith in oil industry's and federal's ability to effectively respond 
to disaster and to protect their natural resource inheritance, Gulf-wide and nation-wide -)  
DHOS-8
Oil industry's general lack of sufficient safety culture and sound environmental practices 
contributed to DHOS; DHOS happened because oil industry actively failed to support, or 
blocked, legislation that would have expanded regulations, tightened safety, and they did not 
keep up with latest developments in offshore drilling technology, and were at the centre of a 
"complex web of decisions, actions, and circumstances" that were decades in the making; 
DHOS was caused by oil industry (from lack of major spills), drive for profit (thus skirting 
safety, not preparing for the worst, not developing effective containment/clean up technology 
(still same as in Exxon's day)), and not coordinating emergency plans with state/local ^  
DHOS-9, 10,13
Oil industry must fundamentally change how they operate vis-a-vis safety and environmental 
practices (+ cleanup, preparation, management behaviour) to regain public trust and be 
allowed access to OCS; America must re-examine how it produces and uses energy, and 
fundamentally reform the OCS system—beyond what has already been done—to ensure safety 
and prevention - )  DHOS-9,11
DHOS happened because members of Congress and several Administrations actively failed to 
support, or blocked, legislation that would have expanded regulations, tightened safety, did 
not keep up-to-date with latest developments in offshore drilling technology, and were at the 
centre of a “complex web of decisions, actions, and circumstances” that were decades in the 
making; DHOS was caused by federal complacency (from lack of major spills -> DHOS-10, 
13
DHOS has tarnished America's (self-considered?) reputation as OCS energy safety and 
effectiveness leader, and the Commission's investigation will be the first step in fixing this via 
explanation of cause and recommendations of improvement and prevention DHOS-12 
Gulf coast already battered by hypoxia and hurricanes before DHOS; Gulf coast "battered and 
degraded from years of mismanagement" - )  DHOS-14, 18
Bright side of DHOS: hypoxia-stricken areas may now be on short-list for restoration, and 
coastal restoration funding, in general, has speeded up -> DHOS-15
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Commission's report includes not only local, those-hurt input, but personal experience input 
DHOS-16
DHOS explosion initiated a human, economic, and environmental disaster; DHOS disaster 
began when the first person was killed DHOS-17, 21
Media coverage resulted in perception that DHOS was a wildlife disaster, prompting 12,000 
people to volunteer in a single week to help with wildlife recovery -)  DHOS-22 
Federal caught between satisfying public demand to end spill now and fear that doing so 
could make things worse DHOS-23
Independent science whilst DHOS still ongoing was only funded by National Science 
Foundation, and then only very limitedly; there was little R&D for oil spills and health 
because spills have long been considered an environmental problem, not a health one •) 
DHOS-24, 25
Governor Jindal Generalized Disaster Frames
Louisianans have endured frustrations and economic upheavals; SBA’s poor job accentuating 
and prolonging pain; pessimism about the chances of Gulf ever returning to normal; and 
causing widespread mental health problems DHOS-1, 2, 5, 11
BP not being transparent about its claims process by granting access; being unresponsive and 
stingy after 64 days to fishers and small business; failing to cooperate/do all they can to help 
DHOS victims by giving answers/plans or resources; and refusing to pay for mental health 
care DHOS-2, 3,7, 11
Federal government’s 6-month moratorium is causing a second disaster (lost wages, rigs 
moving elsewhere); its bureaucracies and partisanship getting in the way of local solutions; 
SBA is doing a poor job -> DHOS-4, 14, 2
Fishers and small businesses have especially been hit hard by DHOS, thereby damaging 
communities, and this will continue even after the well is capped DHOS-3, 5, 6 
Natural environment is and will continue to be damaged ever after the well is capped 
DHOS-5
DHOS will not be over until the environment is completely cleaned up and every effected 
industry is operating at 100% DHOS-8
DHOS is exacerbating and renewing damages wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita F- 
9,13
DHOS jeopardizing years of hard work to stop and reverse decades of coastal deterioration
negatively impacting various fishing industries DHOS-10
Claims process should be "fair, consistent, and communicated [well] to the public"
DHOS-12
Federal government should share OCS profits with Louisiana and fund coastal restoration 
projects it has already authorized; should honour federal court judge's ruling against 
moratorium for the sake of Louisiana's economy and employment DHOS-13, 4
REAs Generalized Disaster Frames
Federal government acted to prevent another DHOS b/c 11 men died; DHOS proves that 
America’s fossil fuel addiction is costing lives, and therefore nation should switch to 
renewables DHOS-1, 23
DHOS rendered oil industry’s no-spill record worthless, and has called into question federal 
practices; oil industry overconfident and hubristic, operating under certainty that a major spill 
could never happen, and thus cutting comers to cut costs; BP is not alone—the entire oil 
industry is to blame for DHOS by having a culture that does not respect safety or the 
environment DHOS-2, 5,15
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Changes needed to make offshore safe again must include entire region because of 
interconnection with oil; DHOS proves the folly of no local input, thus RCACs should be 
created to guide resource use, balance OC hegemony; local communities must be brought 
aboard to provide local input into full ecosystem damages assessments DHOS-2, 9, 7 
GRN’s independent monitoring reveals that BP’s and federal response very poor, especially 
compared to scale of spill...and this does not take into account BP’s lying about its actions; 
DHOS threatening to undo 15 years of GRN work to restore lost/damaged coastline by 
despoiling beaches and wetlands, and killing marine life and birds; DHOS has recommitted 
GRN to fighting for coastal restoration DHOS-3, 4, 16
DHOS threatening to undo 15 years of GRN work to restore lost/damaged coastline by 
despoiling beaches and wetlands, and killing marine life and birds; DHOS has caused 
considerable damage to Gulfs ecosystem, and the long-term impacts may be significant ■) 
DHOS-4,12
DHOS has called into question federal practices; meanwhile, MMS failed to do its job; 
federal and state governments are responsible for failed oversight -> DHOS-2, 5, 25 
BP’s and federal response very poor, especially compared to scale of spill.. .and this does not 
take into account BP’s lying about its actions; BP is a bad corporate actor because it blocks 
independent monitoring (because it would reveal their lies); BP is pouring a million gallons 
of dispersant into GoM even though the stuff does not help; BP is trying to hide important 
information about long-term impacts by forcing responders to sign non-disclosure 
agreements; BP’s response to DHOS making both short- and long-term impacts worse; BP is 
responsible for DHOS DHOS-3, 6, 13, 22, 24, 25
Louisiana’s coast already in trouble before DHOS due to wetland erosion and Katrina 
damage - )  DHOS-8
The world’s eyes are on Louisiana’s damaged coasts because of DHOS, and local voices 
should take advantage of this DHOS-14
Nine months after DHOS began, the President no longer thinks it worth mentioning, except 
to rescind the helpful moratorium; a year after DHOS and its power to arouse has fizzled—no 
repair-work done, spill response still lousy; one year after DHOS and the lessons of DHOS 
are not being enacted DHOS-IO, 11,17
DHOS proves that America’s fossil fuel addiction is costing lives, and therefore nation should 
switch to renewables; DHOS should be an opportunity to get disaster response right and to 
switch to renewables - )  DHOS-23, 26
BP is lying about its cleanup/mitigative actions; BP's statements [probably] do not match with 
reality ■) DHOS-3, 6
DHOS response “abysmal,” proving that response capabilities must be set up before drilling 
can resume ^  DHOS-7
Full ecosystem assessments must be done to guide restoration ^  DHOS-7
CCA has never encountered such a terrible human-caused disaster—its members may end up
giving up on the Gulf DHOS-18
DHOS so bad that only federal and responsible parties have the resources to respond, and 
they should provide them DHOS-19
DHOS may be big, but that will not prevent it from being beaten DHOS-20 
Commercial fishing is not the only fishing industry being damaged by DHOS—recreational 
fishing being hit, hard, perhaps worse DHOS-21
BP/Halliburton/Transocean Generalized Disaster Frames
Transocean is thoroughly investigating what caused the spill by working with BP and the 
government to get “satisfactory answers,” but not “premature. ..conclusions” ■) DHOS-1, 3 
BP committing to pay all legitimate claims in “simple [and] fair” way DHOS-2
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Expressing sorrow and regret that DHOS happened at all - )  DHOS-4
Other Political Actors 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames
Committee on Natural Resources reviewing OCS because evidence says MMS colluded with 
oil industry, falsifying reports and committing other infractions, and that MMS pervaded with 
a culture of "rationalized groupthink" DHOS-1
DHOS's scope and scale means that the consequences of oil and dispersant will effect/impact 
the interconnected systems of nature and humanity for years to come - )  DHOS-2 
DHOS is the culmination of BP's history of accidents stemming from choosing profit over 
safety, and BP now compounding this by not being forthcoming about spill DHOS-3 
America must not tolerate BP's profits over safety behaviour, but make sure BP pays for 
any/all damages and decide whether they should be allowed back in GoM; nation must take 
the opportunity to rethink its energy policy ("this made rush to drill") in a depoliticized way, 
bring responsible forward, prevent another, and make the oil industry upgrade its cleanup 
technology DHOS-3,10
Federal response to DHOS inadequate and unacceptable because it relied too much on BP 
(responsible for spill), made rash decisions not based on facts (moratorium, disbanding MMS, 
stopping leasing), and failed to uncover technical cause of DH blowout, fire, sinking, and oil 
escape, jeopardizing organisms and livelihoods; making a hypocrite of itself by not 
demonstrating the transparency it demands of others (not providing CNR with documents) -> 
DHOS-4,12
Federal should stop assigning blame and creating more bureaucracies, "indefinitely delaying
the production of our Nation's energy reserves," and own-up DHOS-4
DHOS has reversed decision to open up Atlantic coast to oil development, and this should be
made permanent because if GoM cannot even handle a huge spill, what chance elsewhere?
DHOS-5
DHOS proves that while drilling technology has advanced considerably in the past decades, 
safety regulations and clean up technology is the same as it was in 1969; OI must upgrade its 
clean up technology DHOS-6, 10
Oil industry and federal working together and using massive amounts of resources to end 
DHOS quickly and satisfactorily DHOS-7
DHOS is devastating GoM's fishing industry and fishers need immediate financial 
compensation for their losses to ensure that the industry still exists once the spill is over -)  
DHOS-8
Federal government made rash decisions not based on facts; DHOS response should be based 
on facts, evidence, and truth to achieve educated reforms, not emotion, knee-jerk blaming, 
and political opportunism, if to help people, economy, and environment of Gulf thrive again; 
oil industry and some members of the CNR consider DHOS an "outlier" event that is an 
exception to the long history of no-spills in GoM DHOS-4, 9,19 
DHOS has killed people, destroyed resources, and unleashed long-term consequences for 
Gulfs economy; people all along Gulf Coast who depend on it for their lives have been 
socially and economically upended by DHOS; DHOS has wrought terrible ecological impacts 
to Gulf-> DHOS-10, 12,13
Thoroughly investigating all aspects of DHOS will prevent another DHOS-11 
Knee-jerk moratorium and calls to end oil production are making DHOS worse in the form of 
jobs lost, oil and gas production amounts decreased, and rigs departing for foreign waters 
DHOS-12
Only massive, coordinated cooperation can hope to mitigate ecological hit to Gulf, and a 
good model would be ACC work DHOS-13
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DHOS could be "game changer" in how offshore energy is managed because of all the 
revelations ^  DHOS-14
Federal policy and regulators did not push oil industry to implement safeguards; federal 
enabled oil industry’s complacency, overconfidence, and carelessness DHOS-14,16 
DHOS the result of the oil industry's culture of mismanagement (aided and abetted by federal 
government)—something it refuses to acknowledge, proved by its push to expand drilling— 
epitomized by “knowingly” not implementing safeguards (which federal policy and 
regulators did not push for); DHOS and 11 deaths caused largely by oil industry’s 
complacency, overconfidence, and carelessness (all enabled by federal); oil industry 
executives not being honest and transparent with American people DHOS-14, 16, 17 
DHOS has spawned a host of unanswered questions, such as should federal accept BP's offer 
to pay all costs, could mandating pre-drilled relief wells have mitigated DHOS, and how can 
full spectrum of scientific skill be better utilized DHOS-15
America is judging oil executives on a) how fast they can stop the spill, b) how well and 
quick they can mitigate the damages done to the state and local communities, and c) their 
honesty and transparency to the American people ^  DHOS-17 
Science has been, is, and will continue to be important to DHOS response DHOS-18
President Obama Generalized Disaster Frames
Recovering from DHOS far from over even though oil flow has stopped; Administration will 
not abandon Gulf, will do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to respond/end DHOS and 
ensure complete recovery, just as it has been doing since Day 1; recovery is necessary, 
requiring long-term commitment -> DHOS-1, 2, 11
DHOS has thrown Gulfer’s lives into turmoil, threatening not only their livelihoods, but their 
very ways of life; DHOS unprecedented because it has shaken a region’s economy, damaged 
its environment, and jeopardized 1000s of livelihoods; DHOS is causing significant economic 
losses throughout Gulf, especially to fishers and small businesses because of ecological 
damage, threatening a collapse of the industry and a way of life; DHOS is a human, 
economic, and environmental disaster; lives lost, businesses damaged, communities forced 
into greater hardship ^  DHOS-1, 9, 10,13, 15
DHOS is a wake-up call to nation that energy security must include alternative energies and
new transport technologies DHOS-3
Marine and coasts require constant vigilance DHOS-3
Of DHOS’s many lessons, one is that oil production should only be allowed if there are 
assurances that another DHOS cannot/will not happened, oil industry not allowed back into 
GoM until this provided; DW drilling in GoM should only continue if oil industry can supply 
assurances of no more DHOSs DHOS-4,15
Purpose of President’s Commission is to find the cause of DHOS that killed 11, and 
recommend preventions DHOS-5
President considers BP financially and legally responsible for DHOS and therefore is 
obligated to repair damages to families, communities, and environment in addition to 
following federal’s directives DHOS-6
President demands to know why laws were not enforced, what laws worked/did not during 
response, and what can break regulator-oil industry compact ■) DHOS-7 
DHOS response is the largest single effort in US history to protect and clean up the 
environment; is largest response in US history -> DHOS-8, 9
DHOS latest disaster to hit Gulf in recent years, and people will be battling oil for months, 
perhaps years DHOS-11
Thousands of ordinary people have come out to help DHOS-12
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Oil industry has grown so powerful, basing itself on big risks for big profits, that it regulates 
itself DHOS-14
BP spending tens of millions to repair its image DHOS-16
Ninety days into DHOS, and although everybody wants clean water, can’t take short-term 
action that will cause long-term problems DHOS-17
Scientists 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames
DHOS’s impacts are not restricted to the human environment, but will nevertheless end up
doing so because of the interconnectivity of nature-humanity DHOS-1
The lack of interface between academia and federal agencies is a) hampering DHOS response
and b) not reducing the risk of spills anywhere in the world DHOS-2
DHOS response poor because of a lack of knowledge, both baseline and current - )  DHOS-3
DHOS is impacting livelihoods, and disproportionately those of the disadvantaged ■) DHOS-
4
DHOS exposes the incompatibility of restoring the coast and increasing offshore production 
DHOS-5
Mississippi River should be used to push oil from Louisiana’s coastline, but years of BAU 
mismanagement has prevented this - )  DHOS-6
Everybody is to blame for DHOS because a) everybody uses energy produced in GoM and b) 
everybody ignored the ecological situation ^  DHOS-7
DHOS may have been caused by how the entire offshore system managed because that 
system is based on efficiency, not safety DHOS-8
Sierra Club 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames
To spare other America’s other coasts for spills, oceans afire, and oil-threatened habitat, 
President should issue moratorium; leaders must prove they get the oil-is-unwise message by 
reinstating national moratorium; DHOS proves that offshore is inherently unsafe, thus 
justifying a blanket moratorium on new offshore; only way to prevent another DHOS is to 
keep Eastern GoM and Atlantic Coast out of 5-year drilling plan DHOS-1, 10, 13, 27 
DHOS proves that oil is dirty, deadly, and outdated; spill is a wake-up call for America to 
“wean [itself] from dirty oil;” DHOS proves that offshore is inherently dangerous; DHOS 
proves that oil is “dirty, dangerous, and deadly” ^  DHOS- 2, 5, 13, 15 
Because DHOS proves oil is 3Ds, nation must reject oil industry, break addiction, and realize 
a CE economy; adding stronger safeguards will not get to root of the problem, which is 
America's unacceptable oil addiction, and President should deliver a plan to get nation off oil 
within 20 years; DHOS is a wake-up call for Americans to "wean [it]sel[f] from dirty oil," 
rethink nation's energy policy, and start achieving a CE future; DHOS has outraged 
Americans, who demand that leaders end nation's oil dependence; leaders must deliver a plan 
to wean America off oil; only way to prevent another DHOS is to reform "outdated energy 
policy" and end oil addiction; missing family members exemplifies why oil must come to an 
end; DHOS represents the "rock bottom" of America's oil addiction, going CE would be 
clean, safe, and good for the economy; as long as offshore exists, there is a DHOS risk, and 
that is why nation should convert to CE; new regulations will not eliminate the risk of spills, 
only ending oil addiction will DHOS-2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 22, 26 
BP cheated; BP’s spill has killed people and jeopardized the livelihoods of 1000s; DHOS is 
BP’s fault because they did not purchase equipment that could have prevented the spill, and 
because they mishandled the response; BP is failing to staunch the oil flow ^  DHOS-3, 4, 8, 
21
MMS let BP cheat; MMS proved to be in oil industry's pocket, and thus cannot do its job 
DHOS-3, 13
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Fixes via adding stronger safeguards will not solve problem; new regulations will not 
eliminate the risk of spills DHOS-3, 26
Fishing and tourism have been especially impacted by DHOS; DHOS is hurting the working 
families in the fishing and tourism industries the most, both in the short-term via job losses 
and in the long-term via the economic consequences of the spill on their livelihoods—they 
should be fully compensated for all financial, legal, and health costs ^  DHOS-4, 11 
BP should be prosecuted for their malfeasance and made to pay compensation for their wilful 
negligence/all damages; DHOS is BP's fault and they should pay for the entire cleanup, 
compensate every victim, and pay for every destroyed national treasure; leaders must keep 
holding BP responsible for DHOS DHOS-4, 8,10
BP's spill has killed people and jeopardized the livelihoods of countless 1000s of people; 
DHOs continues to inflict suffering on Gulf communities; DHOS disaster continues in the 
form of job losses; DHOS impacted people regardless of culture or race ■) DHOS-4,14, 23, 
25
There are 1000s of rigs off America’s coasts, and the oil industry receives millions in 
subsidies per year, and they get to call the shots; oil industry, as a whole, ultimately to blame 
for DHOS because for years, in exchange for billions in profits, they fostered a culture of no 
accountability, poor preparation for DHOS-size spills, and lacking worker and environmental 
safety; oil industry has been "skirting safety regulations and lobbying against clean energy for 
years;" DHOS continues to inflict suffering on Gulf communities, yet oil industry is 
determined to resume drilling, inviting another DHOS; root of the problem is the “lopsided 
relationship” between oil industry and “hardworking Americans;” -> DHOS-5, 7, 8, 14, 17 
Already got CE technology, just need political will; CE solutions already exists, all that is 
required is for President to know that people are ready to stand up to oil industry -> DHOS-5, 
20
Oil industry’s influence continues to be powerful, blocking Gulf Coast recovery, prevention 
of future spills, and imitating CE economy; bills to hold BP accountable, action to reform 
OCS and prevent future spills blocked because of oil industry influence over a handful of 
senators; oil industry working hard to prevent America’s entry into CE economy DHOS-6, 
12,18
DHOS’s silver lining is that some energy-smart legislation has passed, an Arctic moratorium 
has been enacted, and oversight reviews have been initiated; leaders finally getting the 
message that continued reliance on oil is unwise ^  DHOS-9, 10
DHOS supposed to be a wake-up call, but despite toxic pollution, livelihoods ruined, health
jeopardized, bills to hold BP accountable being blocked and little action to reform OCS;
DHOS is a wake-up call, but leaders are not heeding it -> DHOS-12, 26
Better safety regulations could have prevented DHOS DHOS-17
Struggling Oiled Pelican symbolized America's attempt to achieve CE DHOS-19
After DHOS, BAU cannot be accepted DHOS-19
Federal government is not doing enough to force BP to prepare for and respond to DHOS ^  
DHOS-21
Even with the oil-flow stopped, the disaster continues via fish kills, and the oil on the shores 
and ocean bottom DHOS-23
Because of the scope/scale of DHOS and the damage it caused, oil industry must be held fully 
financially accountable with a portion of their profits going towards paying for cleanup, 
protection, and restoration DHOS-24
Sol Salazar Generalized Disaster Frames
DHOS proves how important it is to a) continue with the reforms of past 1.5 years and b) 
expand on them and ignore oil industry objections DHOS-1
277
Shell denied the go-ahead to drill in Arctic DHOS-2
Because of DHOS, Dol is increasing inspections, investigating the root causes of the spill, 
more thoroughly examining exploration plans, and reforming MMS to make offshore safe; 
Dol doing everything within its power to respond and protect/restore what's been damaged, 
even changing its plans; Dol has been aggressive in its response, even at Day 11 mark; Dol is 
helping people harmed by DHOS and learning lessons to prevent another DHOS-2, 4, 6, 7 
BP caused DHOS; BP did not prepare for disaster of DHOS magnitude because of gap 
between drilling technology and cleanup technology DHOS-3,12 
Sol has been doing his duty for American people by holding BP accountable for all damages 
and costs; due to the nature of DHOS, and to prevent another, Sol has brought in NAE for 
independent, science-based investigation of the spill's causes; President has charged Sol to 
alleviate Americans' lost confidence in offshore safety by evaluating safety and to make 
improvements DHOS-3, 5, 8 
DHOS is damaging the nation - )  DHOS-4
Americans not confident that offshore is safe or that DHOS will not happen again DHOS- 
8
Preliminary findings from DHOS investigations are good enough to base "initial decisions" 
on -» DHOS-9
DHOS requires a) a massive response and b) a "cautious approach" to boost safety and 
oversight ^  DHOS-10
DHOS happened despite oil industry's good track record and conducting of inspections 
because the evidence suggests the prevalence of "industry-wide risks;" oil industry did not 
prepare for disasters of DHOS's magnitude; DHOS caused by systemic management failure 
DHOS-11,12,5
DHOS happened because of the gap between drilling technology and knowledge and cleanup 
T&K DHOS-12
State Actors 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames
DHOS has killed and injured many and they must not be forgotten as Louisiana mobilizes 
every resource to respond DHOS-1
Attorney General will seek legal recourse; he will seek as much financial restitution as 
possible for Louisianans for the damages they have suffered - )  DHOS-1, 3 
DHOS is threatening coastal Louisiana’s very way of life; it is wreaking terrible damage to 
state’s fishing industry because of bad PR DHOS-2, 4
DHOS is a hum-caused disaster, and BP making it worse by refusing to test fish until “greater 
losses” seen DHOS-4
BP DHOS is acknowledged as the worst environmental disaster in history DHOS-5
All the “emphasis, resources, and energy” are going towards “administrative and legal 
proceedings arising from DHOS DHOS-6
The “unnecessary use of the toxin Corexit dispersant” is a second disaster for Gulf, and it is 
not being acknowledged; use of Corexit being ignored; independent science has determined 
that Corexit is toxifying waters and not evaporating or being digested DHOS-5, 6, 7
Democratic Senator Landrieu Generalized Disaster Frames
DHOS reaction must be calm and measured to get the “right lesson” to make the “wisest 
decisions;” although spill is terrible, and improvements to the system are required, must 
maintain perspective—most oil is harvested without spills, natural seeps introduce far more 
oil than even DHOS, America needs oil, should not export potential spills to ill-equipped 
countries DHOS-1, 9
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DHOS proves why it is important that Gulf States receive their fair share of Gulf OCS 
revenues ■) DHOS-2
DHOS is a human-caused disaster DHOS-2, 16
DHOS proves why it is important that federal bureaucracy be dismantled—inadequate and 
slow, prevents state efforts to protect and restore their states (barriers); claims process should 
be free of needless technicalities and complicatedness DHOS-2, 3 
Federal imposed DW moratorium is a second disaster for Gulf, making 1000s of businesses 
suffer (making that of wildlife insignificant); Louisiana’s energy production threatened by 
federal moratorium ■) DHOS-5,13
Fishers are suffering economic and emotional turmoil because of DHOS, and deserve fair, 
full, and simple compensation for all damages; DHOS has severely impacted Louisiana's 
fishing and tourism industries, so no moratorium DHOS-3,13 
If federal government does not respond appropriately to DHOS, the consequences will be 
bad, but if continue to ignore deteriorating coastline, then communities, economy, and ways 
of life are done for -> DHOS-4
Louisianans proud of energy contribution, but suffer the cost - )  DHOS-4 
Faultlessly, 1000s of businesses are suffering economic damage, and Congress must not make 
them pay for that out of pocket or go bankrupt waiting for BP compensation DHOS-6 
DHOS causing a tax nightmare, but that is no excuse for blocking financial aid ^  DHOS-15 
BP is responsible for all economic and psych damages caused by DHOS, and should be using 
local know-how and motivation; BP's compensation DHOS-7, 6
DHOS is an unprecedented spill threatening/causing significant harm to the environment and 
economy of America's working coast, hitting nation, too; DHOS a disaster because it has 
killed and is threatening the economy and environmental sustainability DHOS-8, 8a, 10 
DHOS another disaster threatening communities, businesses, and families, but with help 
something can be done; disasters have struck Louisiana before and its people have persevered 
DHOS-11, 12
Before DHOS, Landrieu tried to get everybody together to discuss protecting, restoring, and 
conserving coastal Louisiana DHOS-14
Need a balance between improving safety and oil industry’s importance to Louisiana's 
economy and America's energy security DHOS-13
Republican Senator Vitter Generalized Disaster Frames 
DHOS has hurt small biz DHOS-1
SBA should not be making things worse by demanding payments when consequences of spill 
make that impossible, but instead should be allowing deferred payments and not denying so 
many loan applications; Dept of Commerce Secretary should declare a fisheries disaster 
because of the importance of Gulf fishing to national economy; BP should/must provide 
written assurance that they will pay for all costs caused by DHOS, and federal should give 
majority of this money to Gulf states so they can invest in coastal restoration; the interface 
between decision makers and spill-effected people should continue; Gulf banks should be 
helping Gulf/Louisiana people by relaxing their rules (restructure loans, waive late-fees, 
hasten loan decisions) so repayment not required now, but when BP money starts arriving 
DHOS-1, 2, 4, 6, 8
DHOS has severely impacted Gulfs fishing industry DHOS-2
It has been almost a year since DHOS began, yet no money has been invested to restore GoM 
DHOS-2a
DHOS threatening Louisiana's coastal wetlands; DHOS is/has "environmentally devastated" 
Gulf; DHOS effecting/oiling wildlife -» DHOS-3, 5, 7
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Plan to mitigate DHOS damage to wetlands being held up by federal environmental review, 
which breaks President's promise to be "fully responsive" and to "do whatever it takes to 
protect [the] marshes;" the "job-killing moratorium" imposed by the President and "his 
environmental extremist allies...try[ing] to advance their anti-drilling agenda" making disaster 
worse; Secretary of Navy Mabus is in a position to influence Gulf restoration and recovery, 
but he is not taking meetings ■) DHOS-3, 5, 9
“Job-killing moratorium” is impacting Louisiana's economy by driving jobs overseas; DHOS
is economically devastating people of Gulf/Louisiana DHOS-5, 8
Moratorium and making US more dependent on foreign oil -> DHOS-5
Throughout DHOS, decision makers and spill-effected people have been interfacing ^
DHOS-6
Need to "educate environmental groups and other stakeholders to make sure that facts 
dominate, not theories or political and fundraising agendas - )  DHOS-6 
Need a robust PR campaign to inform people that GoM seafood is safe DHOS-6
Oiled wildlife not being adequately helped during DHOS DHOS-7
REAs Generalized Catastrophe Frames
Independent (response) monitoring is essential because DHOS is likely be worst in US 
history DHOS-1
DHOS proves that current system of offshore energy management is broken because there 
have been many accidents, and permitting is permissive ^  DHOS-2
Other Political Actors 2010 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
MMS’s flaws makes it necessary to completely review how OCS managed - )  DHOS-1
BP not appreciating just how much oil is pouring into GoM even though they are important to
determining how much boom and dispersant should be used DHOS-2
DHOS damaging/jeopardizing the $700 billion per year GoM fishing industry and its 185,000
jobs; people need compensation and restoration of faith DHOS-3
Asking of Transocean whether they will fund scientific analysis that could benefit Gulfs
environment -)  DHOS-4
Another DHOS is sure to happen if the Commission’s recommendations are not followed 
DHOS-5
Scientists 2010 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
How DHOS is the second catastrophe to hit Louisiana (after Katrina), and that this has the 
added twist of being caused by BP’s desire for profit over technological prudence DHOS- 
1
Sierra Club 2010 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
BP should not be subject to a 1 iability-1 imit because the spill damages are not limited -)  
DHOS-1
President should spare no resource responding to DHOS DHOS-2
DHOS has killed people and destroyed the environment, and the economy -> therefore,
President should place a moratorium on new offshore drilling DHOS-3
DHOS is so big that cleaning it up is impossible, and this is not helped by the fact that the
response is inadequate to the scale of the spill DHOS-4
DHOS is debilitating the entire Gulf Coast by destroying jobs and causing psychological 
trauma and environmental destruction *■> DHOS-5
State Actors 2010 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
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DHOS has wreaked death and suffering upon Louisianans who depend on GoM’s natural 
resources, which were already in trouble ^  DHOS-1 
People think fish are not safe to eat DHOS-2
BP not honoring commitment to Gulf by testing and publicizing fish as safe to eat DHOS- 
2
Republican Senator Vitter Generalized Catastrophe Frames
DHOS has severely damaged Louisiana’s fishing industry, requiring resources from every 
level to repair DHOS-1
Louisiana’s and America’s economic future in peril because some Senators are using DHOS 
to “let a handful of bureaucrats at the EPA” impose cap and tax ■) DHOS-2
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Appendix G: Action-Oriented Generalized CPC Frames from SBOS and DHOS
The following lists all the action-oriented generalized frames from SBOS and DHOS, 
taken from the Appendix F.
SBOS -  Crisis -  Action-oriented Generalized Frames
- GOO!
o Null 
Other Political Actors
o SBOS jeopardizing SB’s future economic well-being, especially in terms of the 
unknown indirect economic effects; only by President declaring SB a disaster area 
can things be stopped from getting worse -> SBOS-2 
President Nixon
o Demonstrating that he is taking SBOS seriously by personally appointing an 
investigatory panel SBOS-1 
Scientists
o The unhealthy relationship between DoI/USGS and the oil industry, and how it does 
not serve the interests of America; need a system that breaks the federal-oil industry 
collusion and protects the environment from exploitation -> SBOS-2, 3 
Sierra Club
o Drilling in SBC should remain subject to a moratorium until the results of public, 
participatory decision-making come in -> SBOS-1 
Sol Hickel
o Assures that the federal government is doing everything in its power to respond to 
SBOS -» SBOS-1
DHOS -  Crisis -  Action-oriented Generalized Frames
- REAs
o Calling DHOS a ‘spill’ fails to capture it—it is Exxon Valdez several times over, and 
will require years of response DHOS-1 
o Sound response holds the promise of creating RCACs, just as Exxon Valdez did in 
Alaska -» DHOS-2
o BP liability money should be invested into existing, but under-resourced coastal 
restoration initiatives DHOS-3 
o The federal government should take advantage of DHOS, using it to break America’s 
fossil fuel addiction DHOS-5 
Other Political Actors
o President’s only priority should be stopping the oil flow, and thinking about anything 
else would lead to hasty decisions that will cost jobs DHOS-3 
o Federal government using every resource in its arsenal to respond to DHOS; it will 
hold BP responsible -> DHOS-4 
President Obama
o Refuting that the federal response to DHOS has been slow and inadequate and 
assuring that it is “singularly focused” on the spill, doing all that can be done since 
Day 1; fed is and will do whatever it takes, use whatever resource for as long as it 
takes to stop crisis and help people of Gulf; federal is in it for the long-term, staying 
to help Gulfers for as long as DHOS continues to effect DHOS-1, 2, 4 
o The devastating effect DHOS is having on the natural and human environment; the 
spill is so vast and terrible that the region must be made whole again DHOS-3, 7
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o Prez will make BP pay; Prez will relentlessly pursue responsible parties for full 
compensation, and hold federal fully accountable for its part -> DHOS-2, 9 
o DHOS revealing how inadequate, broken, and unenforced OCS system is, hurting an 
already injured region, and therefore calls for systemic overhaul of OCS; how oil 
industry and federal conducted offshore will be overhauled to root out flaws; -> 
DHOS-5,10
o Gulf Coast will be made better than before DHOS-10
Scientists
o DHOS response is being derailed by lack of resources, lack of knowledge about 
ecosystem functionings, and the oil industry withholding vital information; no 
systems-wide approach to dealing with coastal-ocean ecology -> DHOS-4, 5, 1 
o Progressive response to DHOS and future spills can only be achieved by using all 
talent and resources DHOS-7 
Sierra Club
o America is addicted to oil, and is at a turning point, needing assurances that another 
DHOS does not happen and kicking oil over next 20 years -> DHOS-1 
Sol Salazar
o DHOS should be a turning point, something descendents can look to and say that is 
when America changed how it used energy, the creation of CE economy using 
America DHOS-4
SBOS -  Disaster -  Action-oriented Generalized Frames 
Audubon 
o Null.
Government Reports 
o Null.
Governor Reagan
o Even though SBOS took place on OCS on federal leases operating under federal 
regulations, SoC will suspend its state oil operations until a review has been 
completed SBOS-2
- GOO!
o Future generations will laud those (such as Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution) who put needs of many above the profiteering few by putting an end to oil 
development in SBC; only way to guarantee another spill does not happen is to 
follow the will of 50,000 petitioners calling for oil development ban in SBC; only 
way to guarantee end of threat of pollution is to ban and remove oil development 
from "esthetically vulnerable" SBC SBOS-1, 7, 8 
o Even though GOO! only seeking to remove oil development from SBC, their efforts
have piqued the nation—they do not want to see another SBOS; GOO! is supported 
by people across the country and world SBOS-2, 14 
o Even though Sol admits oil development in SBC a mistake, he is nevertheless trying
to continue it by talking tougher regulations and clarifying cleanup responsibilities; 
Sol has resumed oil development in SBC; Hickel guilty of resuming oil development 
in SBC; resumption of oil development in SBC unsurprising because of "weight of 
tradition" SBOS-8, 9, 13,18 
Union Oil 
o Null.
Other Political Actors
o For pro-legislation for oil and water pollution, SBOS is proof-positive why more
federal powers are required to ensure clean water, no oil pollution, and “careful site 
selection and effective [clean up] authorization;” provisions, such as depletion
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allowances, should be discontinued so as to make oil companies pay their fair share 
of income tax; took SBOS to alert Congress to need for conservation legislation; 
thanks to SBOS, Senate has finally passed legislation (after three years of effort) that 
give President power to impose financial liability on oil companies for their oil 
pollution, and authority to clean up spills -> SBOS-2, 3, 7, 8 
o Federal government paying 1 billion to buy back SBC leases to prevent another 
SBOS is worth more than having a "dead sea" off SoCal; only way to end the spill is 
for the federal government to acknowledge that SBns' right to oil pollution free life is 
greater than oil companies' right to profit-by-leasing, and therefore all oil 
development should be banned from SBC -> SBOS-5, 9 
o SBOS has reaped a few certainties, but many uncertainties, and because of the latter, 
a moratorium should be enacted until “all reasonable precautions” are in place 
SBOS-1
o Teague wants President to declare SBC a disaster area because of risk of economic 
damage SBOS-6 
President Nixon
o The spill is serious enough to warrant a disaster declaration, bringing with it the 
federal government’s full attention and resources -> SBOS-1 
Scientists
o Sol is allowing the resumption of drilling in SBC even though he does not understand 
tectonic data SBOS-3 
o Tide of conservationism driving the oil industry into a comer; many Americans 
inspired to pay attention/notice environmental destruction and come to aid -> SBOS- 
4,9
Sierra Club
o Allowing citizens and associations to advise and act as watchdogs in future will give 
SBOS silver lining; the moratorium in SBC should remain until the results from Dol 
public hearings are in; public has the right to see the information Hickel based his 
resumption decision on SBOS-1, 9, 14 
o Hickel's decision to resume oil production in SBC will cause another disaster; Sol has 
permitted drilling in SBC again; Hickel should rescind his back-to-drill permit; 
decision to resume drilling a worse idea than granting drilling in first place 
DHOS-6, 8, 9, 13
o Hickel should “review [the] fundamental issues” about the continuing SBOS;
SBOS-9
o SBOS can only be resolved with legislation, ones that include a “comprehensive 
ecological strategy” for protecting balanced use of US’s coasts SBOS-12 
Sol Hickel
o Future oil disasters will be prevented by the federal government and the oil industry 
working together to draft the best regulations possible; SBOS is so bad because 
current offshore regulations are inferior or non-existence, and by rectifying this, 
disasters like SBOS will not happen again -> SBOS-1, 3,4 
State Actors
o Despite lack of spills in state waters, SLC reviewing its own house, in addition to 
federal’s, anyway to make sure -> DHOS-4 
o State government doing all it can to leam everything about SBOS to prevent another; 
legislation required to ensure that spills are better contained and mitigated; SBOS 
requires state to "take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;" only bipartisan 
support can prevent future SBOSs -> SBOS-11, 12,13, 14 
o Oil industry should confront the possibility of spills happening and have final 
recovery plans SBOS-12
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o State must “take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;” in response to worst 
oil pollution disaster in continental US history, and to protect Californians, Attorney 
General speaking out in favour of Cranston’s bill SBOS-13,15
Democratic Senator Cranston
o If appropriate, Congress should phase-out oil production from SBC; only way to 
prevent another SBOS is for federal governments (in partnership with state) to 
remove all oil development from SBC SBOS-1,6 
o Federal government and state must work together to prevent another SBOS in SBC; 
there should be no drilling in SBC until all parties come together to agree on “proper 
procedures” to end SBOS and prevent others -> SBOS-6, 7 
o Because of the despoliation, people across US and world are asking why SBOS 
happened, and what Congress can do to prevent another; spill is raising questions 
about FG’s ability to prevent future spills and whether oil production in SBC is 
“truly...in the national interest” -> SBOS-9, 10 
Republican Senator Murphy
o More knowledge and procedures can either prevent future spills or at least improve 
response; prevention or control and clean up of spills requires greater R&D 
investment -> SBOS-1, 5
DHOS -  Disaster -  Action-oriented Generalized Frames 
Audubon
o For coastal restoration to take place, society must deem it important; only immediate 
federal money can mitigate and restore the gulf Coast; America has a responsibility 
to protect and restore GoM; Gulf has long suffered from disaster, but because of 
DHOS, America has finally gotten the message that the region needs “long-term 
restoration;” a “legacy of optimism” is required to restore the Gulf, which itself 
requires fundamental change about how GoM is used to ensure future generations 
their bounty -> DHOS-1, 2, 4, 5, 8 
o DHOS inspiring ordinary people to take responsibility by coming out to help with 
response effort -> DHOS-3 
o Congress and Administration must enact Commission’s recommendations to improve 
and fix OCS system to make GoM healthy and productive for both humans and 
environment DHOS-6 
Government Reports
o DHOS is a complex disaster causing widespread mental health issues, leading to 
medical, social, and economic problems, and this requires complex solutions, from 
BP paying claims to PSAs stressing the importance of staying connected to ensuring 
seafood safety to monitoring care-giver states of mind; many Gulfers are stricken 
with health ailments, but oil spills have long been considered environmental 
problems, not health, so... -> DHOS-4, 25 
o Administration can improve DHOS response by encouraging the integration of 
services, federal-state government interface to better utilize local knowledge of local 
contexts -> DHOS-5
o Federal's recovery role is by facilitating economic recovery via assessments, analysis, 
technical assistance, bolstering seafood marketing, and fisheries assistance, which has 
already begun with dispatch to 21 economic recovery teams -> DHOS-6 
o Due to the scale of DHOS, non-profits have been vital to response/recovery, and will 
continue to as short-term segues into long-term -> DHOS-7 
o Oil industry must fundamentally change how they operate vis-a-vis safety and 
environmental practices (+ cleanup, preparation, management behaviour) to regain 
public trust and be allowed access to OCS; America must re-examine how it
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produces and uses energy, and fundamentally reform the OCS system—beyond what 
has already been done—to ensure safety and prevention -> DHOS-9,11 
Governor Jindal
o Federal government’s 6-month moratorium is causing a second disaster (lost wages, 
rigs moving elsewhere); DHOS-4 
o DHOS will not be over until the environment is completely cleaned up and every 
effected industry is operating at 100% DHOS-8 
o Claims process should be “fair, consistent, and communicated [well] to the public”
-» DHOS-12
o Federal government should share OCS profits with Louisiana and fund coastal 
restoration projects it has already authorized; should honour federal court judge's 
ruling against moratorium for the sake of Louisiana's economy and employment 
DHOS-13, 4
REAs
o Changes needed to make offshore safe again must include entire region because of 
interconnection with oil; DHOS proves the folly of no local input, thus RCACs 
should be created to guide resource use, balance OC hegemony; local communities 
must be brought aboard to provide local input into full ecosystem damages 
assessments; DHOS-2, 9, 7,44 
o DHOS proves that America’s fossil fuel addiction is costing lives, and therefore 
nation should switch to renewables; DHOS should be an opportunity to get disaster 
response right and to switch to renewables -> DHOS-23, 26 
o DHOS response “abysmal,” proving that response capabilities must be set up before 
drilling can resume -> DHOS-7 
o Full ecosystem assessments must be done to guide restoration DHOS-7 
o DHOS so bad that only federal and responsible parties have the resources to respond, 
and they should provide them DHOS-19 
BP/Halliburton/T ransocean
o BP committing to pay all legitimate claims in “simple [and] fair” way -> DHOS-2 
Other Political Actors
o America must not tolerate BP’s profits over safety behaviour, but make sure BP pays 
for any/all damages and decide whether they should be allowed back in GoM; nation 
must take the opportunity to rethink its energy policy ("this made rush to drill") in a 
depoliticized way, bring responsible forward, prevent another, and make the oil 
industry upgrade its cleanup technology DHOS-3, 10 
o FG should stop assigning blame and creating more bureaucracies, "indefinitely 
delaying the production of our Nation's energy reserves," and own-up DHOS-4
o DHOS has reversed decision to open up Atlantic coast to oil development, and this 
should be made permanent because if GoM cannot even handle a huge spill, what 
chance elsewhere? -> DHOS-5 
o OI and FG working together and using massive amounts of resources to end DHOS 
quickly and satisfactorily -> DHOS-7 
o DHOS is devastating GoM's fishing industry and fishers need immediate financial 
compensation for their losses to ensure that the industry still exists once the spill is 
over -» DHOS-8
o FG made rash decisions not based on facts; DHOS response should be based on facts, 
evidence, and truth to achieve educated reforms, not emotion, knee-jerk blaming, and 
political opportunism, if people, economy, and environment of GC are to be helped, 
made to thrive again; OI and some members of CNR consider DHOS an “outlier” 
event, an exception to the long history of no spills in GoM -> DHOS4, 9, 19 
o Thoroughly investigating all aspects of DHOS will prevent another DHOS-11
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o Only massive, coordinated cooperation can hope to mitigate ecological hit to Gulf, 
and a good model would be ACC work DHOS-13
President Obama
o Recovering from DHOS far from over even though oil flow has stopped;
Administration will not abandon Gulf, will do whatever it takes for as long as it takes 
to respond/end DHOS and ensure complete recovery, just as it has been doing since 
Day 1; recovery is necessary, requiring long-term commitment DHOS-1, 2, 11 
o DHOS is a wake-up call to nation that energy security must include alternative 
energies and new transport technologies -> DHOS-3 
o Marine and coasts require constant vigilance -> DHOS-3
o Of DHOS’s many lessons, one is that oil production should only be allowed if there
are assurances that another DHOS cannot/will not happened, oil industry not allowed 
back into GoM until this provided; DW drilling in GoM should only continue if oil 
industry can supply assurances of no more DHOSs DHOS-4, 15
o President considers BP financially and legally responsible for DHOS and therefore is 
obligated to repair damages to families, communities, and environment in addition to 
following federal’s directives DHOS-6 
Scientists 
o Null
Sierra Club
o To spare other America’s other coasts from spills, oceans afire, and oil-threatened 
habitat, President should issue moratorium; leaders must prove they get the oil-is- 
unwise message by reinstating national moratorium; DHOS proves that offshore is 
inherently unsafe, thus justifying a blanket moratorium on new offshore; only way to 
prevent another DHOS is to keep Eastern GoM and Atlantic Coast out of 5-year 
drilling plan DHOS-1, 10,13, 27 
o DHOS proves that oil is dirty, deadly, and outdated; spill is a wake-up call for
America to “wean [itself] from dirty oil;” DHOS proves that offshore is inherently 
dangerous; DHOS proves that oil is “dirty, dangerous, and deadly” -> DHOS- 2, 5, 
13, 15
o Because DHOS proves oil is 3Ds, nation must reject oil industry, break addiction, 
and realize a CE economy; adding stronger safeguards will not get to root of the 
problem, which is America's unacceptable oil addiction, and President should deliver 
a plan to get nation off oil within 20 years; DHOS is a wake-up call for Americans to 
"wean [it]sel[f] from dirty oil," rethink nation's energy policy, and start achieving a 
CE future; DHOS has outraged Americans, who demand that leaders end nation's oil 
dependence; leaders must deliver a plan to wean America off oil; only way to prevent 
another DHOS is to reform "outdated energy policy" and end oil addiction; missing 
family members exemplifies why oil must come to an end; DHOS represents the 
"rock bottom" of America's oil addiction, going CE would be clean, safe, and good 
for the economy; as long as offshore exists, there is a DHOS risk, and that is why 
nation should convert to CE; new regulations will not eliminate the risk of spills, only 
ending oil addiction will DHOS-2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 22, 26 
o BP cheated; BP’s spill has killed people and jeopardized the livelihoods of 1000s, 
and they should be prosecuted; DHOS is BP’s fault because they did not purchase 
equipment that could have prevented the spill, and because they mishandled the 
response; BP is failing to staunch the oil flow DHOS-3,4, 8, 21 
o Fishing and tourism have been especially impacted by DHOS; DHOS is hurting the 
working families in the fishing and tourism industries the most, both in the short-term 
via job losses and in the long-term via the economic consequences of the spill on
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their livelihoods—they should be fully compensated for all financial, legal, and 
health costs DHOS-4,11 
o BP should be made to pay compensation for their willful negligence; DHOS is BP's 
fault and they should pay for the entire cleanup, compensate every victim, and pay 
for every destroyed national treasure; leaders must keep holding BP responsible for 
DHOS -» DHOS-4, 8, 10 
o Already got CE technology, just need political will; CE solutions already exists, all 
that is required is for President to know that people are ready to stand up to oil 
industry DHOS-5, 20 
o Oil industry’s influence continues to be powerful, blocking Gulf Coast recovery, 
prevention of future spills, and initiating CE economy; bills to hold BP accountable, 
action to reform OCS and prevent future spills blocked because of oil industry 
influence over a handful of senators; oil industry working hard to prevent America’s 
entry into CE economy DHOS-6,12, 18 
o Leaders finally getting the message that continued reliance on oil is unwise -> DHOS 
10
o Because of the scope/scale of DHOS and the damage it caused, oil industry must be 
held fully financially accountable with a portion of their profits going towards paying 
for cleanup, protection, and restoration DHOS-24 
Sol Salazar
o DHOS proves how important it is to a) continue with the reforms of past 1.5 years 
and b) expand on them and ignore oil industry objections DHOS-1 
o Because of DHOS, Dol is increasing inspections, investigating the root causes of the 
spill, more thoroughly examining exploration plans, and reforming MMS to make 
offshore safe; Dol doing everything within its power to respond and protect/restore 
what's been damaged, even changing its plans; Dol has been aggressive in its 
response, even at Day 11 mark; Dol is helping people harmed by DHOS and learning 
lessons to prevent another DHOS-2, 4, 6, 7 
o DHOS requires a) a massive response and b) a "cautious approach" to boost safety 
and oversight DHOS-10
State Actors
o Attorney General will seek legal recourse; he will seek as much financial restitution 
as possible for Louisianans for the damages they have suffered DHOS-1, 3 
Democratic Senator Landrieu
o DHOS reaction must be calm and measured to get the “right lesson” to make the 
“wisest decisions;” although spill is terrible, and improvements to the system are 
required, must maintain perspective—most oil is harvested without spills, natural 
seeps introduce far more oil than even DHOS, America needs oil, should not export 
potential spills to ill-equipped countries -> DHOS-1, 9 
o DHOS proves why it is important that Gulf States receive their fair share of Gulf 
OCS revenues DHOS-2 
o DHOS proves why it is important that federal bureaucracy be dismantled— 
inadequate and slow, prevents state efforts to protect and restore their states 
(barriers); claims process should be free of needless technicalities and 
complicatedness DHOS-2, 3 
o Fishers are suffering economic and emotional turmoil because of DHOS, and deserve 
fair, full, and simple compensation for all damages; DHOS has severely impacted 
Louisiana's fishing and tourism industries, so no moratorium -> DHOS-3, 13 
o BP is responsible for all economic and psych damages caused by DHOS, and should 
be using local know-how and motivation; BP's compensation DHOS-7, 6
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o Need a balance between improving safety and oil industry’s importance to 
Louisiana's economy and America's energy security -> DHOS-13 
Republican Senator Vitter
o SBA should be allowing deferred payments and not denying so many loan
applications; Dept of Commerce Secretary should declare a fisheries disaster because 
of the importance of Gulf fishing to national economy; BP should/must provide 
written assurance that they will pay for all costs caused by DHOS, and federal should 
give majority of this money to Gulf states so they can invest in coastal restoration; 
the interface between decision makers and spill-effected people should continue; Gulf 
banks should be helping Gull/Louisiana people by relaxing their rules (restructure 
loans, waive late-fees, hasten loan decisions) so repayment not required now, but 
when BP money starts arriving -> DHOS-1, 2, 4, 6, 8 
o Need to "educate environmental groups and other stakeholders to make sure that facts
dominate, not theories or political and fundraising agendas -> DHOS-6 
o Need a robust PR campaign to inform people that GoM seafood is safe -> DHOS-6
SBOS -  Catastrophe -  Action-oriented Generalized Frames
- GOO!
o Oil development should be banned and removed from SBC because there’s no 
evidence that another SBOS will not happen, and the only way this can happen is 
through citizen-power DHOS-1 
Other Political Actors 
o Null.
Scientists
o Non-federal and non-OI actors getting involved in spill response SBOS-1 
Sierra Club
o The public should be a partner in decision making about environmental resource use, 
and not be at the federal government’s sole discretion SBOS-1 
o Only solution is to support a bill to remove oil development from SBC completely; 
only banning all oil development in SBC can guarantee against another SBOS 
SBOS-3, 4 
State Actors
o Only by removing oil development from SBC and turning into a federal reserve can 
another SBOS be prevented SBOS-1 
o Both the state and federal government, for the sake of Californians, must act quickly 
and decisively to protect the marine environment from SBOSs SBOS-4 
Republican Senator Murphy
o New laws and provisions needed to prevent oil spills because they are becoming 
common SBOS-1
DHOS -  Catastrophe -  Action-oriented Generalized Frames
- REAs
o Independent (response) monitoring is essential because DHOS is likely be worst in 
US history -> DHOS-1 
Other Political Actors
o MMS’s flaws makes it necessary to completely review how OCS managed ->
DHOS-1
o DHOS damaging/jeopardizing the $700 billion per year GoM fishing industry and its 
185,000 jobs; people need compensation and restoration of faith -> DHOS-3 
Scientists 
o Null.
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Sierra Club
o DHOS has killed people and destroyed the environment, and the economy
therefore, President should place a moratorium on new offshore drilling DHOS-3 
State Actors 
o Null 
Republican Senator Vitter
o DHOS has severely damaged Louisiana’s fishing industry, requiring resources from 
every level to repair DHOS-1
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Appendix H: Indeterm inate and No Correlation Generalized Action-Oriented CPC
Frames
The following Tables present each spill’s and each CDC’s indeterminate and non­
correlative results.
Table 1: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented
Crisis Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes
Prez 2 Demonstrating that he is 
taking SBOS seriously by 
personally appointing an 
investigatory panel -> SBOS- 
1
I The investigatory panel’s recommendation for better, 
stronger regulations had been made by Sol Hickel 
before the report was published, and the panel 
convened, and were presumably on the way to being 
accomplished by the time the panel released its 
results. At best, the panel clarified what regulations 
need be strengthened and what kind o f new 
regulations should be drafted.
Sol 7 Assures that the federal 
government is doing 
everything in its power to 
respond to SBOS -> SBOS-1
I Not known if  FG did all it could.
OPA 1 SBOS jeopardizing SB’s 
future economic well-being, 
esp. in terms of the unknown 
indirect economic effects; 
only by President declaring 
SB a disaster area can things 
be stopped from getting worse 
-» SBOS-2
N Mr. Nixon did not declare SB a disaster area.
Sci 4 The unhealthy relationship 
between DoI/USGS and die 
oil industry, and how it does 
not serve the interests of 
America; need a system that 
breaks the federal-oil industry 
collusion and protects the 
environment from exploitation 
-> SBOS-2, 3
N The “unhealthy relationship” between DoI/USGS 
and OI continued after SBOS; in fact, it appeared to 
have strengthened, becoming absolutely intimate 
with the creation of MMS in 1981.
Table 2: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented
Crisis Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes
Prez 14 Refutes that the FG response I Although it appeared that FG used every resource it
to DHOS has been slow and had to stop the spill, whether it has followed this up
inadequate and assures that for the cleanup, restoration, and protection phases
it is “singularly focused” on cannot be definitely settled; FG scorecard is based
the spill, doing all that can on who one asks. FG, of course, thinks it has been
be done since Day 1; FG is doing well, but SC, local environmental
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and will do whatever it 
takes, use whatever resource 
for as long as it takes to stop 
the crisis and help the people 
of GC; FG is in it for the 
long-term, staying to help 
Gulfers for as long as DHOS 
continues to effect ->
DHOS-1 ,2 ,4
organizations, and residents are more muted. 
Determining FG effective action is complicated by 
the fact that on a gross, macro-level, DHOS did not 
appear to cause all that much damage—at least not 
the kind predicted during the spill’s height. 
However, evidence is mounting that at the specific 
and micro-level, the impact on the Gulf has been 
profound (mutations; the discovery o f vast mats of 
submerged oil).
Prez 15 The devastating effect 
DHOS is having on the 
natural and human 
environment; the spill is so 
vast and terrible that the 
region must be made whole 
again -» DHOS-3, 7
I Although billions of dollars have so far been 
invested into GC response and recovery, with 
billions more on the way, it is unknown if  any real 
progress has been made towards making the region 
whole again; there is the question of how the 
concept is even defined.
Prez 18 Gulf Coast will be made 
better than before -> DHOS- 
10
I The cleanup phase is now just ending for Florida, 
Alabama, and Mississippi (Texas, apparently did 
not need such an operation); restoration and 
protection will largely be up to the Gulf States, 
FG’s biggest contribution being the outcome of 
CWA violations trial currently ongoing. Unknown 
if  is/will make GC better than before.
Sci 20 DHOS response is being 
derailed by lack of 
resources, lack o f knowledge 
about ecosystem 
functionings, and the oil 
industry withholding vital 
information; no systems- 
wide approach to dealing 
with coastal-ocean ecology 
-» DHOS-4, 5,1
I Although it is unlikely that OI has/will change its 
mind about sharing what it sees as proprietary 
information, there have been a number of donations 
to various science-based organisations and 
institutions, which will presumably be used to gain 
knowledge about ecosystem functionings and 
perhaps develop a systems-wide approach to 
dealing with coastal-ocean ecology; the most recent 
was a $55 million donation to NFWF made by 
Halliburton in the wake o f being found guilty of 
destroying evidence about its faulty cementing (the 
donation was not a stipulation o f the charge). As for 
resources, cannot say.
Sci 21 Progressive response to 
DHOS and future spills can 
only be achieved by using 
all talent and resources -> 
DHOS-7
I FG appears to be operating according to BAU: 
hoping that there will not be another spill, despite 
the risk being omnipresent due to continued oil 
production. No big spills since = cannot prove if 
did.
RE As 11 The federal government 
should take advantage of 
DHOS, using it to break 
America’s fossil fuel 
addiction -> DHOS-5
N After a brief teething period, BOEMRE is granting 
leases in GoM’s OCS at a brisk pace; oil production 
continues to grow throughout the lower 48 and 
Alaska, largely through the controversial technique 
of tracking.
SC 11 America is addicted to oil, 
and is at a turning point, 
needing assurances that 
another DHOS does not 
happen and kicking oil over 
next 20 years -> DHOS-1
N Despite positive rhetoric by BOEMRE, etc., there 
has been and can be no assurance that another 
DHOs will not happen. No plan, or even 
commitment, has been offered to wean America off 
oil, within in any timeframe; in fact, domestic 
production, both offshore and onshore, appear to 
have increased.
Sol 22 DHOS should be a turning 
point, something 
descendents can look to and
N Technically, such a determination cannot be made, 
a mere three years after DHOS, but many long-term 
outcomes arising/influenced by SBOS emerged
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say that is when America 
changed how it used energy, 
the creation of CE economy 
using America DHOS-4
within three years, so in one way, this verdict can 
be made. The creation of CE economy does not 
appear to have advanced post-DHOS (although it 
does not appear to have retracted, either); and while 
the spill does not appear to have changed how 
America uses its energy, it seems that it has altered 
how it acquires its energy—namely increased 
domestic production, especially onshore in the form 
of flacking.___________________________________
Table 3: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented 
Disaster Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes
SC 35 Hickel should “review [the] 
fundamental issues” about 
the continuing SBOS 
SBOS-9
It largely rests on how one defines this and who is 
doing the defining: SC wanted oil development out of 
SBC, and therefore anything less than this constituted 
not “reviewing the] fundamental issues” and not 
doing everything that could be done. Mr. Hickel, on 
the other hand, blamed the spill on a dearth of 
regulations, which was then rectified and therefore 
assuring him that the “fundamental issues” had been 
reviewed and he had indeed done all within his 
power.
GOO! 24 Future generations will laud 
those (such as Subcommittee 
on Air and Water Pollution) 
who put needs o f many 
above the profiteering few 
by putting an end to oil 
development in SBC; only 
way to guarantee another 
spill does not happen is to 
follow the will of 50,000 
petitioners calling for oil 
development ban in SBC; 
only way to guarantee end of 
threat of pollution is to ban 
and remove oil development 
from "esthetically 
vulnerable" SBC SBOS- 
1 ,7 ,8 ____________________
N Although new state offshore production, in SBC and 
elsewhere along CA coast, has been prohibited since 
1969, new federal offshore production, in SBC and 
elsewhere along CA coast, did not; what is more, oil 
production from existing platforms or leases has 
continued. However, the rate at which oil production 
has increased is almost zero; today, there are only 
about 25 platforms along the entirety o f CA coast, 
almost half of which were installed pre-1969.
OPA 24 Federal government paying 
1 billion to buy back SBC 
leases to prevent another 
SBOS is worth more than 
having a "dead sea" off 
SoCal; only way to end the 
spill is for the federal 
government to acknowledge 
that SBns' right to oil 
pollution free life is greater 
than oil companies' right to 
profit-by-leasing, and 
therefore all oil development
N FG did not buy back the leases or acknowledge that 
SB’s right to oil pollution free lives takes precedence 
over OI’s right to seek profit. On the other hand, oil 
production—at least, new production on new 
leases—was banned in SBC from 1981-2008 (though 
SBOS did not appear to loom large in that decision).
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should be banned from SBC 
SBOS-5, 9
OPA 1 Teague wants President to 
declare SBC a disaster area 
because of risk of economic 
damage SBOS-6
N Mr. Nixon did not declare SBC a disaster area.
Prez 1 The spill is serious enough 
to warrant a disaster 
declaration, bringing with it 
the federal government’s full 
attention and resources -> 
SBOS-1
N Despite his observation, Mr. Nixon ended up not 
declaring SB a disaster area.
SC 32 Allowing citizens and 
associations to advise and 
act as watchdogs in future 
will give SBOS silver lining; 
the moratorium in SBC 
should remain until the 
results from Dol public 
hearings are in; public has 
the right to see the 
information Hickel based his 
resumption decision on -> 
SBOS-1, 9,14
N Citizen/association input in natural resource use, 
especially and including offshore oil, would not 
materialize until the early 1990s, when Alaska’s 
RCACs were legislated into being in the wake of 
Exxon Valdez. The moratorium on federal offshore 
production was not be renewed by Mr. Hickel; it 
would not be until 1981 that another federal 
moratorium would be enacted, and that only 
pertained to new leases/production. It is unknown if 
the public ever got to see the information Mr. Hickel 
used to base his back-to-drill decision on.
SC 33 Hickel's decision to resume 
oil production in SBC will 
cause another disaster; Sol 
has permitted drilling in 
SBC again; Hickel should 
rescind his back-to-drill 
permit; decision to resume 
drilling a worse idea than 
granting drilling in first 
place DHOS-6, 8,9, 13
N Not only did Mr. Hickel not rescind his back-to-drill 
decision, but there has not been another spill of 
SBOS’s magnitude in SBC despite the continued 
presence of offshore oil.
SC 34 Despite continued oiling of 
shores, and wildlife harmed, 
SBOS is being brushed 
aside, deemed over, with no 
preventative measures being 
taken 4  SBOS-7
N Although officially, SBOS was declared over, the 
spill continued to cause policy (a four-year, state 
moratorium; aided NEPA) and social reverberations 
(increased environmental awareness).
SC 36 SBOS can only be resolved 
with legislation, ones that 
include a “comprehensive 
ecological strategy” for 
protecting balanced use of 
US’s coasts SBOS-12
N SBOS, itself, was finally resolved through petering 
out and fading from immediate memory (except for 
locals, especially GOO!; and except as a cultural 
memory of something that happened and fed into 
something larger). What is more, CA banning new 
leasing in state waters, the defacto-then-official 
federal moratorium, the passage o f NEPA, and the 
growing environmental movement all represent an 
attempt at something like CES, but they failed to 
achieve critical mass and protect balanced use of  
US’s coasts: some areas are better protected than 
others, but for the most part, American coasts are not 
doing well.
SA 41 Oil industry should confront 
the possibility of spills 
happening and have final
N OI did not, and continues, to not confront the 
possibility o f spills happening and develop final 
recovery plans, despite claims and assurances to the
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recovery plans SBOS-12 contrary; their lack of success in spill mitigation, 
their use of antiquated techniques and strategies 
(dispersants, skimmers, burning) appear to prove this.
Dem 40 Federal government and 
state must work together to 
prevent another SBOS in 
SBC; there should be no 
drilling in SBC until all 
parties come together to 
agree on “proper 
procedures” to end SBOS 
and prevent others -> 
SBOS-6, 7
N FG and state did not actually come together to 
prevent another SBOS, nor did they agree on “proper 
procedures.” What happened was that CA banned 
new oil leases in state waters (which continues into 
the present day), and then FG eventually included 
SBC OCS in its blanket moratorium on new leases 
for all o f US’s coasts except for GoM and parts of 
Alaska.
Dem 24 If appropriate, Congress 
should phase-out oil 
production from SBC; only 
way to prevent another 
SBOS is for FG (in 
partnership with CA) to 
remove all oil development 
from SBC -> SBOS-1, 6
N Congress did not deem it appropriate to remove or 
even phase-out oil production from the SBC; on the 
other hand, said production has slowed almost to a 
stand-still because o f the ongoing moratorium on 
new drilling in state waters, and the FG one for OCS 
waters.
Rep 42 More knowledge and 
procedures can either 
prevent future spills or at 
least improve response; 
prevention or control and 
clean up of spills requires 
greater R&D investment -> 
SBOS-1, 5
N As proved by subsequent spills, whether from tankers 
or offshore, prevention and response procedures and 
technologies have not advanced much beyond what 
was available/used during SBOS.
Table 4: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented
Disaster Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes
Aud 43 For coastal restoration to I DHOS brought to the forefront the Gulf Coast’s—
take place, society must and in particular, Louisiana’s—coastal degradation
deem it important; only like nothing else before it: various actors have said
immediate federal money that coastal restoration and protection is the primary
can mitigate and restore the thing that needs to be done, whether from and
gulf Coast; America has a environmental, economic, or human POV; and the
responsibility to protect and RESTORE Act dictates that 80% of BP’s eventual
restore GoM; Gulf has long CWA fines should go directly to the five Gulf states
suffered from disaster, but to fund coastal restoration. On the other hand, it is
because of DHOS, America not known how ingenuous some of the actors were
has finally gotten the being; it is unknown just how much money the states
message that the region will end up receiving (it depends on whether BP if
needs “long-term found negligent ($5 billion) or grossly negligent ($20
restoration;” a “legacy of billion)); and because the states have full
optimism” is required to discretionary power over how to use the money, it is
restore the Gulf, which unknown if  every cent will actually go into coastal
itself requires fundamental restoration. SC, for one, is worried that because all
change about how GoM is five states are Republican-controlled, what the
used to ensure future money will actually be used for is up in the air.
generations their bounty ->
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DHOS-1, 2 ,4 ,5 ,8
Aud 45 Congress and 
Administration must enact 
Commission’s 
recommendations to 
improve and fix OCS 
system to make GoM 
healthy and productive for 
both humans and 
environment -> DHOS-6
I It is unknown if OCS system has been improved in 
the wake of DHOS, beyond breaking MMS into the 
three BOEMs—which was done before the 
Commission made its recommendations. Judging by 
the uptick in offshore oil leasing, especially the 
deepwater variety, it appears OI continues to occupy 
a favourable position in OCS management.
GR 48 Administration can improve 
DHOS response by 
encouraging the integration 
of services, federal-state 
government interface to 
better utilize local 
knowledge of local contexts 
DHOS-5
I It is unknown if Administration has acted on this 
Commission recommendation to integrate services 
and facilitate better FG-state interface to better utilize 
local knowledge. Perhaps the RESTORE Act is 
predicated on this, since the eventual CWA fines will 
go directly to the Gulf states so they can best and 
most efficiently put the money to use towards coastal 
restoration.
GR 49 Federal's recovery role is by 
facilitating economic 
recovery via assessments, 
analysis, technical 
assistance, bolstering 
seafood marketing, and 
fisheries assistance, which 
has already begun with the 
dispatch of 21 economic 
recovery teams -> DHOS-6
I It is not known if FG’s economic recovery 
facilitating tactics outlived the actual spill.
GR 17 Oil industry must 
fundamentally change how 
they operate vis-a-vis safety 
and environmental practices 
(+ cleanup, preparation, 
management behaviour) to 
regain public trust and be 
allowed access to OCS; 
America must re-examine 
how it produces and uses 
energy, and fundamentally 
reform the OCS system—  
beyond what has already 
been done—to ensure safety 
and prevention -> DHOS-9, 
11
N In spite of OI claims that safety and environmental 
practices have been proved, past experience predicts 
that little to nothing has changed, except for them 
having to endure increased inspections that they can 
no longer influence (if BOEMRE is to be believed); 
and OI was allowed to resume operations in OCS 
regardless o f public trust levels. Judging from the 
increase in onshore fracking and offshore deepwater 
leasing, it does not appear that America has re­
examined how it produces energy (and unlikely not 
how it uses it, too), nor fundamentally reformed OCS 
system—unless breaking MMS into the three 
BOEMs counts as fundamental OCS reform (to FG, 
and even OI, it might).
Gov 52 Federal government’s 6- 
month moratorium is 
causing a second disaster 
(lost wages, rigs moving 
elsewhere); its 
bureaucracies and 
partisanship getting in the 
way of local solutions; SBA 
is doing a poor job 
DHOS-4
N FG’s six-month moratorium does not appear to have 
caused any long-term economic damage; and 
whatever impact it did make appears to be getting 
mitigated by the swift pace of new GoM OCS 
leasing. The RESTORE Act appears to mitigate 
problems with bureaucracies and partisanship— at 
least at the federal level—by ensuring that eventual 
CWA fines go directly to the states so they can figure 
out how to use them. And whether SBA really did do 
a bad job, a good job, or was swamped by a sudden 
disaster and tried to do the best it could is unknown; 
since SBA is a federal bureaucracy, and since Mr.
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Jindal is vehemently anti-federal, it could be 
ideological rhetoric speaking, not an actual 
assessment o f SBA performance.
Gov 53 DHOS will not be over until 
the environment is 
completely cleaned up and 
every effected industry is 
operating at 100% -> 
DHOS-8
I Although it is a safe bet to say that the environment 
is not completely clean up, it is unknown if every 
effected industry is operating at 100%. Oil appears to 
be back on its feet, but what of fishing and tourism?
Gov 54 Claims process should be 
“fair, consistent, and 
communicated [well] to the 
public” -» DHOS-12
I It is unknown if the claims process was this; those 
who complained it was not may or may not have 
been speaking from a biased POV, or one with a 
definition of what it should mean being substantially 
higher than reality.
Gov 55 Federal government should 
share OCS profits with 
Louisiana and fund coastal 
restoration projects it has 
already authorized; should 
honour federal court judge's 
ruling against moratorium 
for the sake of Louisiana's 
economy and employment 
-> DHOS-13,4
I It is unknown if FG will share OCS profits with 
Louisiana or will/is fund/ing coastal restoration 
projects it has already authorized; FG did not, 
however, honour a federal court judge’s ruling 
against a moratorium, instead re-working the brief 
and putting it before a different judge.
REAs 9 Changes needed to make 
offshore safe again must 
include entire region 
because of interconnection 
with oil; DHOS proves the 
folly o f no local input, thus 
RCACs should be created to 
guide resource use, balance 
OC hegemony; local 
communities must be 
brought aboard to provide 
local input into full 
ecosystem damages 
assessments; the world’s 
eyes are on Louisiana’s 
damaged coasts because of 
DHOS, and local voices 
should take advantage of 
this -» DHOS-2,9 ,7 ,4 4
I-N It does not appear that the entire region/local input 
has been incorporated into making offshore 
production safe again or help guide resource use. 
Grassroots efforts to form a GoM RCAC have only 
recently begun in earnest (May 2013), and so far, OI 
will work with them (judging by their refusal to send 
representatives to the preliminary meeting). It is 
unknown if full ecosystem damages assessments are 
being made to guide present/future restorative action.
RE As 11/22 DHOS proves that 
America’s fossil fuel 
addiction is costing lives, 
and therefore nation should 
switch to renewables;
DHOS should be an 
opportunity to get disaster 
response right and to switch 
to renewables -> DHOS-23, 
26
N With the increase in tracking, oil shale, and 
deepwater, leasing/production, it is safe to say that 
America is not and will not be switching to 
renewables any time soon. It is unknown if DHOS 
has been taken as on opportunity to get disaster 
response ‘right.’
REAs 57 DHOS response “abysmal,” 
proving that response 
capabilities must be set up
N It is unlikely that in the year of slowdown between 
the end of the six-month moratorium on new 
deepwater drilling and the uptick in deepwater
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before drilling can resume 
-> DHOS-7
offshore leasing that response capabilities were set 
up, especially ones that mitigate REA’s “abysmal” 
rating.
REAs 58 Full ecosystem assessments 
must be done to guide 
restoration -> DHOS-7
I It is unknown if full ecosystem damage assessments 
are being made to guide present/future restorative 
action.
OPA 52 FG should stop assigning 
blame and creating more 
bureaucracies, "indefinitely 
delaying the production of 
our Nation's energy 
reserves," and own-up 
DHOS-4
N Although FG has continued to assign blame, and 
although it created three bureaucracies out o f the 
former MMS, it has not formally ‘owned-up’ except 
for Mr. Obama mentioning, off-hand, that FG bore 
some responsibility for DHOS, and it does not appear 
to have significantly “delayfed] the production of 
[the] Nation’s energy reserves”—unless regulations 
and regulatory bodies of any stripe or kind 
contributes to a delay.
OPA 61 DHOS has reversed 
decision to open up Atlantic 
coast to oil development, 
and this should be made 
permanent because if GoM 
cannot even handle a huge 
spill, what chance 
elsewhere? DHOS-5
I Although DHOS led to Atlantic coast being made 
safe from short-term oil development, it is unknown 
if  it will lead to a permanent ban.
OPA 63 DHOS is devastating GoM's 
fishing industry and fishers 
need immediate financial 
compensation for their 
losses to ensure that the 
industry still exists once the 
spill is over -> DHOS-8
I It is unknown if  the immediate financial 
compensation—if indeed any was provided—ensured 
that the fishing industry remained afloat for the post­
spill period.
OPA 64 FG made rash decisions not 
based on facts; DHOS 
response should be based on 
facts, evidence, and truth to 
achieve educated reforms, 
not emotion, knee-jerk 
blaming, and political 
opportunism, if people, 
economy, and environment 
of GC are to be helped, 
made to thrive again; OI 
and some members of CNR 
consider DHOS an “outlier” 
event, an exception to the 
long history of no spills in 
GoM -> DHOS-4, 9, 19
I It is unknown if this OPA’s complaint is valid or the 
product of rabid partisanism.
OPA 65 Thoroughly investigating all 
aspects o f DHOS will 
prevent another DHOS- 
11
I It is unknown if DHOS investigation will prevent 
future spills. Judging by history, this is unlikely.
OPA 66 Only massive, coordinated 
cooperation can hope to 
mitigate ecological hit to 
Gulf, and a good model 
would be ACC work -> 
DHOS-13
I It is unknown if massive, coordinated cooperation 
can or will mitigate the ecological damage done to 
the Gulf; it is equally unknown if the ACC model can 
or will be used—though due to the political climate 
of US, and especially the deep south, it is unlikely.
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Prez 68 Recovering from DHOS far 
from over even though oil 
flow has stopped; 
Administration will not 
abandon Gulf, will do 
whatever it takes for as long 
as it takes to respond/end 
DHOS and ensure complete 
recovery, just as it has been 
doing since Day 1; recovery 
is necessary, requiring long­
term commitment -> 
DH O S-1,2,11
I It is difficult to ascertain the level of 
FG/Administration commitment to long-term Gulf 
recovery, especially because it depends on who is 
asked (who harbour differing opinions about FG 
action) and what long-term response is supposed to 
look like. According to the RESTORE Act, FG’s role 
is to get CWA fines from BP and hand it to the states.
Prez 22 DHOS is a wake-up call to 
nation that energy security 
must include alternative 
energies and new transport 
technologies DHOS-3
N There is no indication that nation has significantly 
pursued alternative energies and new transport 
technologies in the wake of DHOS.
Prez 69 Marine and coasts require 
constant vigilance -> 
DHOS-3
I It is unknown if  marine and coastal environments are 
receiving constant vigilance, largely because there is 
no definition or model showing what this would 
entail.
SC 71 DHOS proves that oil is 
dirty, deadly, and outdated; 
spill is a wake-up call for 
America to “wean [itself] 
from dirty oil;” DHOS 
proves that offshore is 
inherently dangerous; 
DHOS proves that oil is 
“dirty, dangerous, and 
deadly” -> DHOS- 2, 5, 13, 
15
N With the increase in oil production, both offshore and 
onshore, it does not appear as if America will be 
“wean[ing itself] from dirty oil” any time soon.
SC 11/22 Because DHOS proves oil 
is 3Ds, nation must reject 
oil industry, break 
addiction, and realize a CE 
economy; adding stronger 
safeguards will not get to 
root of the problem, which 
is America's unacceptable 
oil addiction, and President 
should deliver a plan to get 
nation off oil within 20 
years; DHOS is a wake-up 
call for Americans to "wean 
[it]sel[f] from dirty oil," 
rethink nation's energy 
policy, and start achieving a 
CE future; DHOS has 
outraged Americans, who 
demand that leaders end 
nation's oil dependence; 
leaders must deliver a plan 
to wean America off oil; 
only way to prevent another
N With the increase in oil production, both offshore and 
onshore, it does not appear that America will be 
ending is oil dependency any time soon, much less 
convert to a CE economy. Contradicting SC’s 
assertion, FG has decided that adding stronger 
safeguards will be able to solve the problem—  
eliminating the risk of spills.
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DHOS is to reform 
"outdated energy policy" 
and end oil addiction; 
missing family members 
exemplifies why oil must 
come to an end; DHOS 
represents the "rock 
bottom" of America's oil 
addiction, going CE would 
be clean, safe, and good for 
the economy; as long as 
offshore exists, there is a 
DHOS risk, and that is why 
nation should convert to 
CE; new regulations will 
not eliminate the risk of 
spills, only ending oil 
addiction will DHOS-2, 
3 ,5 ,6 , 10,14,15, 16, 22, 
26
SC 72 Fishing and tourism have 
been especially impacted by 
DHOS; DHOS is hurting 
the working families in the 
fishing and tourism 
industries the most, both in 
the short-term via job losses 
and in the long-term via the 
economic consequences of 
the spill on their 
livelihoods—they should be 
fully compensated for all 
financial, legal, and health 
costs DHOS-4,11
I It is unknown if BP is/has fully compensated fishers, 
especially for their legal and health costs; the $20 
billion escrow account presumably helped with 
financial compensation. Some evidence suggests that 
after the initial lump-sum, fishers have received 
nothing, and can receive nothing due to agreements.
sc 96 Already got CE technology, 
just need political will; CE 
solutions already exists, all 
that is required is for 
President to know that 
people are ready to stand up 
to oil industry -> DHOS-5, 
20
N It does not appear Mr. Obama knows that enough 
people are willing to stand up to OI and initiate a CE 
economy.
sc 74 DHOS’s silver lining is that 
some energy-smart 
legislation has passed, an 
Arctic moratorium has been 
enacted, and oversight 
reviews have been initiated; 
leaders finally getting the 
message that continued 
reliance on oil is unwise -> 
DHOS-#, 10
N Leaders apparently did not get the message for they 
are either not saying anything at all or they are 
backing more aggressive domestic oil production 
strategies, such as ffacking.
sc 77 Because of the scope/scale 
of DHOS and the damage it 
caused, oil industry must be 
held fully financially
I Although BP has been and will be held financially 
accountable for DHOS, it does not appear that OI, as 
a whole, is or will share the same fate. It is unlikely 
that any significant portion o f their profits— or any
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accountable with a portion 
of their profits going 
towards paying for cleanup, 
protection, and restoration 
-> DHOS-24
portion—are going towards cleanup, restoration, and 
protection; there is definitely no state or federal 
legislation stipulating that they must, anyway.
Sol 78 DHOS proves how 
important it is to a) continue 
with the reforms of past 1.5 
years and b) expand on 
them and ignore oil industry 
objections -> DHOS-1
I Although DHOS resulted in much reform within Dol, 
it is not known if they were expanded upon; it 
especially unknown if they have really been ignoring 
OI objections. Shell was denied its go-ahead to drill 
in the Arctic, but that was within the first year; with 
the uptick in leasing, it appears that OI is still getting 
its way.
SA 72 Attorney General will seek 
legal recourse; he will seek 
as much financial restitution 
as possible for Louisianans 
for the damages they have 
suffered -> DHOS-1, 3
I It is unknown if LA’s Attorney General played a 
significant role in having Louisianans receive 
financial restitution for the damages they have 
suffered.
Dem 55 DHOS proves why it is 
important that Gulf States 
receive their fair share of 
Gulf OCS revenues -> 
DHOS-2
I It is unknown if trader the new BOEMRE regime the 
Gulf States will receive their fair share of Gulf OCS 
revenues...whatever ‘fair share’ is supposed to mean.
Dem 52 DHOS proves why it is 
important that federal 
bureaucracy be 
dismantled—inadequate 
and slow, prevents state 
efforts to protect and restore 
their states (barriers); 
claims process should be 
free of needless 
technicalities and 
complicatedness DHOS- 
2,3
I-N Federal bureaucracy has not been dismantled; quite 
the opposite: the single MMS is now three BOEMs 
(though this does not seem to have significantly 
slowed the leasing permitting). It is unknown if  the 
claims process became free o f needless technicalities 
and complicatedness.
Dem 72 Fishers are suffering 
economic and emotional 
turmoil because of DHOS, 
and deserve fair, full, and 
simple compensation for all 
damages; DHOS has 
severely impacted 
Louisiana's fishing and 
tourism industries, so no 
moratorium DHOS-3, 13
I It is unknown if fishers received fair, full, and simple 
compensation for damages; some o f the evidence 
suggests this may not have been the case. Although a 
moratorium on new deepwater drilling was enacted, 
it only last six months.
Rep 88 Need a robust PR campaign 
to inform people that GoM 
seafood is safe DHOS-6
I Although FDA, NOAA, and several marine scientists 
have certified Gulf seafood safe, it is unknown to 
what extent an actual PR campaign to inform people 
of this has reached.
Table 5: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented
Catastrophe Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes
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Sci 89 Non-federal and non-OI 
actors getting involved in 
spill response SBOS-1
I Science provides no details on who these non- 
federal, non-OI actors are; on the other hand, based 
on other CDC frames, in addition to perusing the 
raw data, these would include private business (i.e., 
Red Adair).
GOO! 24 Oil development should be 
banned and removed from 
SBC because there’s no 
evidence that another SBOS 
will not happen, and the only 
way this can happen is 
through citizen-power -> 
DHOS-1
N Oil development has continued in SBC, despite the 
lack of evidence disfavouring another spill, and 
despite citizen-power. On the other hand, the rate of 
growth of oil development in SBC has been 
extremely slow—virtually at a stand-still—since 
1969; part of this could be attributed to citizen- 
power.
SC 32 The public should be a 
partner in decision making 
about environmental 
resource use, and not be at 
the federal government’s 
sole discretion -> SBOS-1
N Although SBOS, itself, did not result in or 
contribute to providing the public a partnership in 
decision making about environmental resource use, 
CA citizens would eventually receive their say, as a 
result of the CA Coastal Act of 1976, leading to the 
creation of the CA Coastal Commission, wherein 
the public is allowed to participate in meetings and 
provide input.
SC 24 Only solution is to support a 
bill to remove oil 
development from SBC 
completely; only banning all 
oil development in SBC can 
guarantee against another 
SBOS SBOS-3,4
N All bills to ban oil development completely from 
SBC failed. However, CA did enact a four year ban 
on new leasing in state waters, which was then 
continued in one form or another up to the present 
day; from 1982 through 2008, a federal moratorium 
was placed on new offshore leasing all along West 
Coast (and even without the moratorium, new 
leasing has not yet been able to happen).
SA 24 Only by removing oil 
development from SBC and 
turning into a federal reserve 
can another SBOS be 
prevented SBOS-1
N Oil development has not been removed from SBC, 
and the closest thing to reserve the Channel 
received as a result o f SBOS is the establishment of 
the Coal Point ecological preserve in 1970, located 
all but next door to UCSB. Eventually, in 1980, the 
Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary was 
established.
Table 6: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented
Catastrophe Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes
— ■■■■■■■■■■■I—
Rep 95 DHOS has severely 
damaged Louisiana’s fishing 
industry, requiring resources 
from every level to repair -> 
DHOS-1
I Although resources from the federal level (in the 
form o f eventual BP CWA fines) and industry level 
(BP cleaning oiled environment) have been used, it 
is not known what states and municipalities have 
been contributing. NGOs have been providing 
assessments and criticisms; some citizens are trying 
to form a GoM RCAC.
REAs 91 Independent (response) 
monitoring is essential 
because DHOS is likely be 
worst in US history -> 
DHOS-1
N Although various environmental NGOs attempted 
to monitor the response, their efforts were often 
stymied by blocked access o f one kind or another.
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Appendix I -  Action-Oriented CPC Summary Conversion Chart
The chart below shows what the number-codes used from Chapter 5.2.1 through to 
the end of Chapter 5.2.3 to represent ACS, ADS, and ACaS stand for. The action summaries 
were composed in such a way that they provide an answer to one of these two questions: 
what action does the FS say is happening or what action does the FS want to happen? Some 
codes are missing. The reason for this is that as I refined my definition of/criteria for action, 
several could no longer be included because they a) actually took place in the past, b) 
represented conjecture (not statement or advocacy), and/or c) were negative in nature (i.e., 
they were actually complaints about such-and-such an action not being taken, or would 
probably not be taken). There is a total of seventy-five action-oriented CDC summaries.
1 Declare SB a disaster area 48 Encourage integration and interface
2 Appoint a panel 49 FG’s recovery role
4 Break FG, OI collusion 50 Include non-profits
5 Enact moratorium 52 Stop FG interference
7 FG acting 53 Completely clean, 100%
8 Requires years of response 54 Fair, consistent claims process
9 Create RCACs 55 Share OCS profits
10 Invest BP money into restoration 57 Need response capacity
11 Break oil addiction 58 Need full ecosystem assessments
12 President should only stop the oil flow 59 FG, OI should provide response resources
13 Using every resource; hold BP responsible 60 BP will pay
14 FG responding, focusing on long-term 61 Make Atlantic ban permanent
15 Make region whole again 62 OI, FG working together
16 Hold BP responsible 63 Fishers need compensation
17 Reform OCS system 64 Response should be fact-based
I t Make GC better 65 Investigation will lead to prevention
20 What is derailing response 66 Need cooperation
21 Better spill response 68 Need long-term response
22 Convert to CE Coasts need vigilance
23 Suspend state OD operations Need assurance of no more spills
24 Remove offshore from SBC imm EndOD
25 Rising environmental/oil awareness Need compensation
27 Resume oil development hT&K/ OI influence continues
28 Need environmental legislation 74 Leaders getting the message
30 Academic expertise not being used :’-7 m OI must pay
32 Need public participation Need to continue reform
33 Stop SBC drilling 80 Dol’s actions
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34 No preventative measures being taken 82 Need safety and oversight
35 Review spill facts 83 Need calm reaction
36 Need legislation to stop SBOS 85 Need to balance safety, economy, security
37 Review state offshore system 87 Need to educate environmentalists
40 Prevent more spills 88 Need PR
41 OI must confront spill risk 89 Other actors involved
42 Need more R&D 90 Protect the marine environment
43 Restore coasts 91 Need independent monitoring
44 Ordinary people are helping 95 Fishing needs repair
45 Repair OCS system 96 Need political will
47 BP should pay
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